



IMPP Guidelines

Role of the Field

Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

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IMPP GUIDELINES: Role of the Field Integrated Strategy and Planning

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A. PURPOSE

1. These guidelines outline the minimum standards for integrated strategy, planning, and coordination to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's peace consolidation efforts at the country level. They further explain and operationalize the United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006¹ and integrate additional principles as prescribed in the

¹ United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, 13 June 2006. Approved through Decision 2006/26 of 14 June 2006.

Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008). These guidelines should also be read in conjunction with the Secretary-General's Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (24/2005) and the Secretary-General's Notes of Guidance on Integrated Missions. Finally, these guidelines are part of the IMPP guidance package, which also includes (1) UN Strategic Assessment and (2) the Role of the Headquarters in Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences.²

B. SCOPE

2. These guidelines apply to UN field presences with both a peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT)³. This includes, but is not limited to, Missions that are "structurally integrated" through the appointment of a DSRSG/RC/HC and the UN country presences subject to the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) of 26 June 2008.⁴ Integration refers both to internal integration of components within the field mission (e.g. civilian and military) as well as the strategic partnership between the UN field mission and the UNCT.

C. RATIONALE

3. The aim of the guidelines is to assist multi-dimensional UN field presences in the establishment of integrated field coordination structures and an integrated strategic framework (ISF) reflecting common priorities for peace consolidation. Such guidelines are required given the increasingly complex and interdependent nature of work of the United Nations system in conflict and post-conflict environments. In this context, the guidelines promote a strategic partnership between Missions and UNCTs in support of common peace consolidation objectives.

4. The guidelines are not overly prescriptive but rather spell out the minimum requirements and provide further operational advice on the implementation of the IMPP at the field level. It is recognized that each country situation requires a unique and tailored response and, therefore, it is expected that the UN's Senior Leadership in country will guide field teams in the application of the IMPP tools described herein. As the implementation of the IMPP guidelines is also required in some UN presences that are not structurally integrated with a DSRSG/RC/HC, it is important to underline that undertaking the IMPP will not alter existing structural relationships between Missions and UNCTs. While these guidelines remain relevant throughout the life-cycle of a UN presence, the processes described herein are particularly important for UN field presences undertaking a transition in institutional arrangements (e.g. start-up or drawdown of a peacekeeping operation or special political mission).

² These guidelines are available on the UN Peace Operations intranet (<http://intranet.dpkp.un.org>) and to the entire UN system and its partners through the IMPP Community of Practice. To join the IMPP community of practice, please visit <http://cop.dfs.un.org> or contact Maria Regina Semana (semana@un.org).

³ In these Guidelines, the UN field mission (either a peacekeeping mission or a Special Political Mission) and the UN Country Team are jointly referred to as the "UN field presence."

⁴ Burundi (BINUB), CAR (BONUCA/MINURCAT), Chad (MINURCAT), Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), DRC (MONUC), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), Liberia (UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Somalia (UNPOS), Sudan (UNMIS/UNAMID), Iraq (UNAMI), Israel/Opt (UNSCO), Lebanon (UNSCOL), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Nepal (UNMIN), Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Kosovo (UNMIK), Haiti (MINUSTAH)

D. GUIDELINES

5. These guidelines provide advice, examples, and templates useful in the implementation of IMPP at the field level. They are organized into two sections as follows:

- integrated field coordination
- integrated strategic frameworks (ISF)

Integrated Field Coordination

6. Each UN field presence should have a standing coordination body or bodies that bring together the Mission and the UNCT to provide strategic direction and planning oversight to the joint peace consolidation efforts of the UN field presence. These coordination bodies assist with the requirement in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) for the development and implementation of an effective strategic partnership between the UN mission and UNCT to "ensure that all components of the UN mission/office and the Country Team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner."⁵ The field-based integrated field coordination structures also serve as partners to headquarters-based IMPP structures, in particular the Integrated (Mission) Task Forces (IMTF/ITFs) (see also paragraph 23, below).⁶

7. The configuration and composition of integrated field coordination mechanisms will vary from country to country based on the scale of the UN's operations and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required in keeping with the principle of "form follows function."⁷ The integrated field coordination architecture should be as light as possible while fulfilling the following core functions at the strategic, coordination, and planning levels.

8. **Strategic Direction**

- Develop the joint vision and peace consolidation priorities of the UN system based on a common conflict analysis and the comparative advantage of the UN system
- Delineate roles and responsibilities among the UN actors ensuring complementarities between Mission and UNCT and minimizing overlap
- Review progress on an integrated strategic framework (see paragraphs 24-54) and provide direction to UN components/agencies on implementation challenges
- Facilitate interaction with non-UN actors where there is interdependence related to common peace consolidation priorities

9. **Coordination**

- Coordinate the development and implementation of joint strategic planning processes including ISFs
- Guide and review the work of thematic working groups

⁵ These guidelines update the 2006 IMPP Guidelines, which called for an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) at the working level comprised of "peacekeeping operation and UNCT planners and other relevant actors."⁵ While the 2006 Guidelines delegated integrated planning responsibilities to the working level, these guidelines stress the direct role of senior managers, notably SRSG/ERSGs, DSRSGs (including DSRSG/RC/HCs), and RC/HCs. Thus, the terminology "Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT)" has been retired in favor of more generic terms (e.g. Strategic Policy Group and/or Integrated Strategy and Planning Team). Tailored terminology and approaches, which may be particularly useful for non-structurally integrated mission environments, are also encouraged.

⁶ See IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters for more details on the role and functions of the IMTF/ITFs.

⁷ Eide, Kaspersen, Kent and von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions*, 2005 p. 19.

- Conduct strategic reviews at key milestones, jointly with Integrated (Mission) Task Force (IMTF/ITF) and other HQ-based bodies as required, to take stock of major changes and/or new requirements (e.g. transition and drawdown)
- Promote the development of synergies and minimize overlap by promoting the development of UN system-wide thematic strategies (e.g. protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform)

10. **Planning**

- Provide secretariat services to integrated field coordination structures (e.g. Strategic Policy Group, Integrated Strategy and Planning Team, or similar, see below), including preparation of agendas, background papers, and actual drafting of integrated strategies, plans, and monitoring frameworks
- Compile inputs and draft shared strategies and plans and related monitoring reports
- Provide coordination support to thematic working groups and facilitate linkages between UN-internal mechanisms and coordination frameworks that involve national stakeholders, civil society and/or donors
- Serve as a strategy and planning point of contact for headquarters and facilitate linkages between field-based integrated coordination structures and the HQ-based IMTF/ITF

Leveraging Existing Coordination Structures

11. Before new structures are constituted, a mapping of existing structures should be undertaken to identify structures that could be leveraged or adjusted, either permanently or periodically, to fulfill the functions outlined above. For instance, a Strategic Policy Group (see figures 1 and 2) could be formed by expanding the Mission Leadership Team (MLT)⁸ periodically and according to an agreed schedule to include the RC/HC (for non-structurally integrated missions) and members of the UNCT. Likewise, meetings of the UNCT could be periodically expanded to include Mission representatives to create an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT), and humanitarian clusters could be expanded to comprise integrated thematic working groups.⁹


Models

12. These guidelines provide two possible models building on current field practice (see Annex 1: Examples of Integrated Field Coordination in Liberia and DRC). These configurations and titles are not required, but rather, provide an example methodology for fulfilling the minimum requirements described herein. The first, as depicted in Figure 1 below, could be applied for smaller UN field presences with integrated peace building offices. It has a Principals-level Strategic Policy Group which is supported by the shared analytical and planning capacity and thematic working groups.

Figure 1 : Example Integrated Peacebuilding Office and UNCT


⁸ According to the *Peacekeeping Mission Start Up Guide*, the Mission Leadership Team generally includes: SRSG/HOM, DSRSGs, Head of the Police Component, Head of the Military Component, Director/Chief of Mission Support, and the Chief of Staff. The MLT's key tasks include: providing political guidance and high-level operational direction to mission components and approving high-level policy approaches for issues with mission-wide effect.

⁹ Leveraging humanitarian clusters should be handled on a case-by-case basis. Any decision to leverage humanitarian clusters into an integrated field coordination structure should be taken after consultations with the humanitarian partners through the Humanitarian Coordinator.



13. The second, below, may be appropriate for UN field presences with large multidimensional peacekeeping operations (including military and police components). It has three layers: a Strategic Policy Group at the Principals level, an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT)¹⁰ at the senior officer level, and thematic working groups. The Strategic Policy Group provides the strategic direction; the ISPT translates that strategic direction into concrete deliverables and coordinates implementation. Thematic working groups (standing or ad hoc) are also recommended and should be formed based on the key peace consolidation objectives of the UN presence. (In many cases, these thematic working groups may already exist). Template Terms of References for both a Strategic Policy Group and an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team are provided in Annexes 2 and 3, respectively.

Figure 2: Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operation and UNCT



Leadership and Composition

14. SPGs and ISPTs should include representative members of the UN field presence including peacekeeping/political, rule of law/justice, support, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors. Military and/or police components should typically be represented, where present. UN DSS may also be included, particularly in volatile environments. SPGs should be chaired by SRSGs or ERSGs, taking into consideration the importance of strong partnership with the DSRSG(s), in particular the DSRSG/RC/HC and/or RC/HC for non-structurally integrated missions. The Mission Chief of Staff and the Head of the RC/HC’s Office are recommended co-chairs for ISPTs in large UN presences (e.g. those with

¹⁰ It may be advisable to use the term “Joint Strategy Team” for UN presences that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.

peacekeeping operations). Senior planners from the Mission and UNCT may chair ISPTs in smaller UN presences.

15. Missions and UNCTs vary, so the composition of integrated field coordination structures will be context-specific. Composition should ensure adequate coverage of the priorities identified in an integrated strategic framework and should also take into consideration the capacity of mission components and agencies to participate. There are pros and cons to constituting larger or smaller groups. For example, a broader representation of Mission and UNCT actors has the advantage of promoting wide ownership, transparency, and inclusion. Such broad representation in ISPTs (e.g. with all mission components and all UNCT members) may be appropriate, while SPGs may need to be smaller to allow for confidential deliberations.

16. The RC/HC should consult the UNCT to establish the UN agency representation in integrated field coordination bodies and is responsible for keeping the entire UNCT informed of developments. In addition, the SRSG/ERSG and RC/HC should also consult the World Bank Country Director regarding the inclusion of World Bank representatives.

Thematic Working Groups

17. SPGs and ISPTs may also develop and/or monitor implementation of their joint strategies through thematic working groups (see Figures 1 and 2, above). In establishing thematic groups, care should be taken to leverage existing groups (e.g. humanitarian clusters), as appropriate. UN field presences are encouraged to involve non-UN actors (e.g. humanitarian NGOs) in thematic working groups on a case by case basis. For instance, an existing intra-Mission working group on Rule of Law could be expanded to include UNCT and Humanitarian Country Team representatives. Likewise, partners could decide that UNDAF outcome group or humanitarian cluster be expanded with Mission representatives.

18. The SPG and/or ISPT should provide strategic direction to these groups and regularly review progress against their commitments, as reflected in the integrated strategic framework, to promote mutual accountability. Moreover, each thematic working group is responsible for consulting relevant government officials as per their usual planning or programme development process. Functional (resource mobilization, management, communications, monitoring and evaluation, programming, contingency planning) or cross-cutting (gender, human rights, HIV/AIDS, natural resources) thematic groups may also be convened on an ad hoc or standing basis. An example Terms of Reference (ToR) for an integrated outcome group in Liberia is attached in Annex 4.

Planning Capacities

19. Integrated field coordination structures require the direct support of a “shared analytical and planning capacity.” This takes the form of dedicated strategic planning resources in both Missions and UNCTs. Strategic planners are provided to Resident Coordinators through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), which maintains a roster and funds strategic planners in the Offices of Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HCs) in conflict-affected countries. On the Mission side, planning capacity is funded through the Mission’s Results Based Budget. Analytical capacity within Missions is typically provided through Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) as well as political and civil affairs offices.

20. The actual structure of a planning capacity may vary according to the field requirements, but there should, at a minimum, be at least one permanent planner

representing the peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and one for the UNCT.¹¹ Multidimensional peacekeeping environments usually have an expanded team of three to five planners on the Mission budget with at least one planner on the UNCT side. Figure 3 below provides example staffing allocations for Mission and UNCT planning capacities in Sierra Leone, Sudan (UNMIS), DRC, and Somalia.

Figure 3: Examples of Planning Staff in Sierra Leone, Sudan (UNMIS), DRC, Somalia

	Sierra Leone	Sudan	DRC	Somalia
Mission	Joint UNIPSIL/UNCT Strategic Planning Unit	1 P5, 1 P4, 2 UNVs (UNMIS)	1 P5, 2 P3s	1 P4, 1 P3
UNCT	1P4 (Strategic Planning), 1P4 (Peacebuilding Coord), 1P3 (Coordination), 3 NPO	1 P5, 1 P4	1 P4 (Integrated Office DSRSG/RC/HC)	1 P5, 1 P4

21. The “shared analytical and planning capacity” should be comprised of strategic planners drawn from the planning teams of the Mission and UNCT, respectively.¹² Missions and UNCTs with more than one planner should identify focal points for integration-related strategy and planning to be part of the shared analytical and planning capacity. Although some UN field presences may decide to create a structurally-integrated planning unit, this is not a requirement. This has been done, for example, in Sierra Leone between the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL) and the Sierra Leone UNCT.

22. The Mission and UNCT strategic planners must have a shared understanding of their purpose, core tasks, the composition of the team, and the organization of work. This joint understanding should be captured in a Terms of Reference. Although each ToR will be adjusted to specific country realities, a template is attached in Annex 5 as a useful reference point. All members of the shared analytical and planning capacity should have some or all of these tasks reflected in their annual performance appraisals. Finally, it is also advisable to have planners located in the same building to ease communication and help build personal relationships.

Link between Field Coordination Structures and the Headquarters IMTF/ITF

23. In keeping with the Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration and further guidance from the Integration Steering Group (ISG)¹³, headquarters-based Integrated (Mission) Task Forces (IMTF/ITFs) are required for all UN presences with a Mission and a UNCT. Their purpose is to ensure coherent and consistent policy support and guidance.¹⁴ These task

¹¹ Smaller integrated peacebuilding offices may have one planner in the integrated office of the ERSR/RC/HC covering both the Mission and UNCT.

¹² In most peacekeeping Missions, the analytical and planning capacities are designed as separate work units. However, as strategic planning processes require both analytical and planning capacities, the contribution from the Mission to the “shared analytical and planning capacity” will typically extend beyond the planning unit and reflect contributions from a diversity of mission components (e.g. JMAC, political affairs, civil affairs). Key inputs from these other mission components (e.g. conflict analysis for an ISF) should be reflected in the ToR of the joint analytical and planning capacity.

¹³ The Integration Steering Group is a Principals -level body charged with ensuring implementation and progress on integration-related issues. It is chaired by DPKO and consists of DPA, DFS, OCHA, OHCHR, DOCO, PBSO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, and EOSG.

¹⁴ Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration, para iii. See also IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters.

forces should be co-chaired by the field or benefit from alternate chairing arrangements between the field and headquarters. Thus, UN field presences should designate standing representatives from their integrated field coordination structures (e.g. ISPT chair(s) and/or selected ISPT members, mission and UNCT planners) to participate in Task Force meetings by telephone or VTC. Field participation in IMTF/ITFs may also be tailored based on the specific agenda of the meeting. The field participants in the IMTF/ITF should be actively engaged in the development of IMTF/ITF agendas and ensure adequate follow-up to action points. Field-based strategic planners should also ensure an exchange of action points or meeting notes between the ISPT and/or SPG and the HQ-based IMTF/ITF.

Integrated Strategic Framework

Policy Framework and Background

24. The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration of June 2008 requires UN field presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT) to have an integrated strategic framework (ISF) that reflects:

- “a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives” and,
- “a set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace”

25. The **purpose** of an ISF is to:

- Bring together the Mission and the UNCT's combined mandates and resources around an overarching framework of agreed peace consolidation priorities
- Prioritize and sequence agreed elements
- Facilitate an appropriate shift in priorities and/or resources
- Allow for regular stocktaking by senior managers

26. The ISF is meant to be a **short document** (e.g. 10-15 pages) **at the strategic level**. Unlike planning tools of the Mission (e.g. Results Based Budget, RBB) or the UNCT (CHAP/CAP¹⁵, UNDAF,¹⁶ Transition Plan), an ISF does not reach the level of programmatic interventions or outputs. In addition, the ISF is, first and foremost, an internal UN document. If UN field presences would like to produce a version of the ISF as a public information tool or for consultation purposes, it should be adapted from the original internal document. In this

Example ISF Development Roadmap

Preparation/Diagnostics

- Develop/update conflict analysis
- Map existing strategies and plans

Strategic Policy Group Retreat

- Establish shared vision
- Identify strategic objectives

ISPT and Strategic Planners develop content

- Thematic Groups develop strategies/results
- Consult non-UN partners and Government
- Identify resource gaps
- Develop monitoring framework

Consultation/Finalization

- Involves SPG, IMTF/ITF, SRSG, RC/HC (on behalf of UNCT), USG Lead Department

¹⁵ Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP)/ Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)

¹⁶ United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)

context, it might be necessary to exclude sensitive annexes and/or conflict analysis in the public versions.

27. These guidelines present suggested methodologies for diagnostics/preparation, content development, and consultation/approval of an ISF. The ISF is meant to be a light and flexible exercise, so these guidelines may be broadly applied depending on the capacities and circumstances in country. They may also be applied for the development of an “early ISF” at mission start-up (see text box below, right). It should be noted that with the coming into effect of the ISF requirement, DPKO and DFS decided to eliminate the requirement to elaborate a “Mandate Implementation Plan” (MIP) in order to streamline the planning requirements and reduce duplication.

Preparation/Diagnostics

28. The Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration (24/2008) established the requirement for an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), but gives scope and flexibility for different types of vehicles or tools to fulfill this requirement.

29. The decision to begin an ISF exercise should be taken at the field level in consultation with the IMTF/ITF based on developments in country (e.g. mission start-up, peace agreement, elections/new government). It is also strongly recommended that an ISF exercise be undertaken with a view to harmonizing and adding coherence to UN system planning cycles. For this reason, an ISF should come **before** the annual development of a Mission’s RBB, an CCA/UNDAF review, or a CHAP/CAP review.¹⁷ (See also Annex 6: ISF Diagnostic Phase:

“Early ISF” at mission start up

These guidelines may also be used to support the development of an “early ISF” or “early strategy and action plan” at Mission start up as called for in the recent *Report of the Secretary-General on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict*. An “early ISF” may require an abbreviated development process and would address a smaller number of immediate priorities, with clear roles and responsibilities. Thus, achieving an early ISF will require even more involvement of the senior leadership team, more direct support from headquarters (including surge capacity), and be shorter in its duration (e.g. 6-9 months). The aim of an early ISF is to speed delivery of an early peace dividend. The content of an early ISF may also prove useful for the development of resource mobilization plans for the programmatic elements of a peace consolidation plan that are not funded by the assessed budget of a peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and may be presented to the various multilateral sources of pre-positioned pooled funds (e.g. UN Peacebuilding Fund, World Bank Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund, EU Stabilisation Fund, UNDP/BCPR Trust Fund).

Key Questions in Preparing to Develop an ISF).

30. A UN field presence (Mission and UNCT), in close consultation with the IMTF/ITF, may propose that an existing strategy/framework corresponds to an ISF. If this is the case, the framework should be reviewed against these guidelines, and a short evaluation should be sent to the headquarters-based IMTF/ITF for discussion. (See also Annex 7: Evaluating Existing Frameworks Against ISF Minimum Standards).

31. Where no existing strategy or framework corresponds to an ISF, this diagnostics phase lays the analytical basis for the ISF development process and maps country strategies among the UN actors in country. If capacity gaps for the preparation, kick-off, or development of an ISF are identified, the UN field presence may request an ISF support

¹⁷ According to the 21 October 2009 decision of the Integration Steering Group, all 18 countries required by the Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration to produce an ISF should have obtained approval for an existing framework against the minimum standards described herein or undertaken an ISF exercise by the end of 2010. All ISFs should be in place by mid-2011.

mission be mobilized through the IMTF/ITF. An example Terms of Reference for the ISF support mission to Côte d'Ivoire is included in Annex 8 as an example of the types of assistance and deliverables that an ISF support mission may provide.

Linkages between the ISF and other Planning Tools

33. The purpose of an ISF process is to achieve an overarching strategy for the UN's role in peace consolidation in a given country. Therefore, the focus should not be on ascertaining whether the ISF can or should replace other planning processes¹⁸, but rather the need for a case by case analysis and design for each country as described in the "preparation/diagnosis" section above. Whereas existing UN planning processes (e.g. UNDAF for development, CHAP/CAP for humanitarian action, RBB for the Mission) are specific to development, humanitarian, or peace and security, the ISF is unique in that its primary purpose is to reflect the collaborative objectives of the UN system for peace consolidation at the strategic level. In order to foster synergies and avoid duplications, whenever possible, a coherent process should be used for the different UN planning tools and instruments.

34. If the ISF follows other planning processes and instruments it should draw upon existing analysis, while allowing senior managers to step back and have a strategic discussion about current peace consolidation priorities. The ISF process is likely to reveal gaps and suggestions regarding how current plans could be revised in order to contribute more effectively to peace consolidation. Different processes will have different scopes and different hierarchy of results. This is not necessarily problematic, so long as there is an overall coherence among them.

35. When examining the linkages between the ISF and existing UN system planning tools, some UN field presences may consider whether an existing in-country tool, such as an UNDAF or an integrated peacebuilding strategy, could be adapted to fulfill the minimum standards for ISFs described herein (see also preparation/diagnostics section above). However, in certain situations adapting a current tool may not be sufficient. For instance, complex UN architectures with multiple mandated presences would benefit from developing an ISF (as described in these guidelines) that effectively brings together the UN presence around a set of agreed priorities. Likewise, multi-dimensional operations (e.g. that include police and/or military components) would require an ISF so as to adequately reflect the scale of mission resources and/or allow for a short-term planning horizon suited to these typically volatile environments.

36. An ISF is meant to focus the attention of senior managers around a shared set of high-level strategic priorities. It therefore, should not reach the level of programmatic interventions. That said, an ISF will need to be translated into concrete resources and actions, by updating (or developing from scratch where they do not exist) the relevant programmatic elements and/or projects in the RBB, UNDAF, and CAP frameworks to ensure that the ISF's objectives are adequately resourced. Thus, an ISF should form the basis for the revision of peace consolidation aims within existing UN system planning tools (e.g. UNDAF, CHAP/CAP, RBB).

¹⁸ With the coming into effect of the ISF requirement, DPKO and DFS decided to eliminate the requirement to elaborate a "Mandate Implementation Plan" (MIP) in order to streamline the planning requirements and reduce duplication. Missions are required, however, to produce a Mission Concept that provides political and operational direction, timelines and lead/supporting roles to Mission components for priority activities to achieve the mission's mandate. (See also IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters and DPKO-DFS guidance on the development of Mission Concepts).

37. **Conflict Analysis:** According to the overall IMPP methodology, an ISF would ideally be elaborated after a Strategic Assessment¹⁹ has taken place, in particular the conflict analysis and strategic options for the UN. However, if no Strategic Assessment has taken place, conflict analysis will need to be consolidated from existing strategies or reports (e.g. Common Country Assessment, humanitarian CAP/CHAP, Reports of the Secretary-General, work products of the Mission's JMAC, political affairs division, civil affairs, human rights, child protection, and gender units). Work that identifies immediate conflict drivers is particularly pertinent, as an ISF addresses short to medium-term priorities.

38. In some circumstances, conflict analysis will need to be developed. In such cases, the recommended methodology is contained in Annex 9, which provides the authoritative guidance as per the guidelines for Strategic Assessment. These guidelines, which are part of the IMPP guidance package, describe how to conduct and apply conflict analysis and comparative advantage methodology (problem tree and SWOT analysis, respectively) to identify strategic options for UN engagement (see figure 4, below).

Figure 4: Methodology for Conflict Analysis and Development of Strategic Options




Developing the ISF Content

40. **Roadmap:** Field teams should develop a road map for the development of the ISF that delineates key steps/outputs, sets deadlines, identifies roles and responsibilities, and reflects how all stakeholders will be included in the ISF development process, including the non-UN members of the Humanitarian Country Team.

41. **Retreat of senior managers:** A retreat of the Strategic Policy Group (or similar) may be held to (a) identify three to four strategic priorities for peace consolidation that are achievable in the envisaged time frame (e.g. 1-2 years) and (b) establish clear leads and/or co-leads for each of the strategic priorities. (A note on preparing an ISF retreat is contained in Annex 11).

42. **Design and Scope of an ISF:** Figure 5 demonstrates that cross-cutting issues carried out by the peace and security, humanitarian, and development actors are at the heart of the ISF. At the same time, as indicated by the dotted line, some elements of an ISF may primarily be carried out by one of these mandated bodies.

Figure 5: Example ISF Scope (1)




43. The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. Figure 5, for example, represents the possible scope of an ISF in a peace consolidation or peacebuilding context. In that regard, a review of current ISFs²¹ reveals the following thematic priorities: security sector reform, DDR, rule of law, restoration of state authority, protection of civilians, return and reintegration and durable solutions, recovery (including at the early stage), and basic social services. These issues involve potentially political and necessarily sequenced inputs from number of UN actors and, thus, could benefit from inclusion in an ISF to promote a coherent approach and a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities.

44. The scope of an ISF may vary greatly in highly volatile environments (e.g. Sudan, Afghanistan, eastern DRC). For example, Figure 6 demonstrates how the scope of an ISF may shift and narrow considerably in such cases. Such a shift is appropriate as the UN would be obliged to prioritize the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian

²¹ Reflects the thematic priorities in ISFs under development in Chad, DRC, and Côte d'Ivoire.

assistance in these environments. In countries with pockets of conflict, it may also be necessary to tailor the scope of an ISF to account for regional differences.

Figure 6: Example ISF Scope (2)




45. In this regard, principled humanitarian action remains an important element of the UN system’s response. However, even though humanitarian response often supports peace consolidation, its primary aim is to respond to needs. Accordingly, many humanitarian activities (as reflected in a CHAP) are likely to remain outside the scope of an ISF. Key exceptions may be activities related to protection of civilians, return and reintegration, and early recovery.

46. It is also important to recall that certain subjects, including human rights, must be mainstreamed into the work of all UN bodies. For example, according to the decision of the Secretary-General No. 2005/24 on Human Rights in Integrated Missions, *‘all UN entities have a responsibility to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected through and within their operations in the field’*. In addition, the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 requests *‘all entities of the United Nations system should institute mechanisms for gender mainstreaming in their planning and programming for example, through participation of gender specialists in these processes.’* Within the IMPP process at the field level, the form and structure of integration – and how this is captured in the ISF -- should enable the human rights and gender components to further mainstream human rights and gender across UN peace consolidation priorities.

47. **Dialogue with Headquarters:** Field teams should maintain a dialogue with headquarters through the IMTF/ITF throughout the ISF development process to ensure consensus around the key peace consolidation priorities (strategic objectives) before elaborating the full strategy. For example, a schedule of VTCs between the IMTF/ITF and its field counterpart could be elaborated as part of the ISF development road map.

48. **Methodology and Key elements of an ISF.** The presentation of an ISF should typically follow the results framework methodology (see Figure 7 below). Recalling that an ISF is at the strategic level and does not reach the programmatic level, an ISF result is equivalent to “expected accomplishment” (RBB) or “UNDAF outcome”. An example end state, strategic objective (with narrative) and result are provided in Annex 12 as adapted from existing strategies in Somalia and eastern DRC.

Figure 7: Results Framework Methodology



49. **Thematic working groups and the elaboration of results:** Once basic decisions are taken about the three to four strategic peace consolidation priorities (the strategic objectives) that will be addressed by the ISF, it is useful to further develop the ISF content through thematic working groups. In most cases, this will involve senior working level staff from Mission components and the members of the UNCT. In this context, it is important to involve those with a direct understanding of programming and budgetary allocations (e.g. cluster leads, outcome group leads, Mission heads of components) to ensure that commitments in the ISF can be adequately resourced (through RBB, CPAPs, etc). These thematic working groups should report to the ISPT or SPG and benefit from the coordination and facilitation support of the strategic planners of the Mission and RC Office. Thematic working groups should be engaged in the development of ISF content including the political and operational strategy, risk analysis, sequencing of priority results, linkages to other elements of the ISF, and the partnerships strategy (with World Bank, bilaterals, etc).

Consulting non-UN actors:
 Unlike an UNDAF or PRS, an ISF does not require the direct endorsement of national authorities. That said, each contributor to an ISF is responsible for consulting the appropriate national authorities, non-UN actors (e.g. NGOs, bilateral donors, other multilateral actors) throughout the ISF development process and should be able to articulate how the ISF's priorities contribute to national peace consolidation strategies (e.g. PRSPs, Transitional Results Frameworks, National Recovery Strategies, etc).

The nature of consultations with national actors will vary depending on the context. For instance, consultations on an ISF being developed in a peacebuilding context may be extensive and an ISF may be explicitly linked to existing national peacebuilding and development strategies. However, consultations with national authorities for ISFs in conflict situations will require more care, and may involve non-state actors and civil society.

50. To aid field teams in the preparation of an ISF, a generic ISF outline is provided below and reflects **the minimum standards for the ISF content**.

Figure 8: Minimum Standards for ISF content

Shared Vision and Analysis

- *Situation analysis*: Draws on the conflict analysis and current conflict triggers identified in the preparatory phase (or previous strategic assessment), may consider divergent trends within the country and reflect risks and assumptions
- Description of the *UN's combined mandate and partnerships* in country and expectations regarding its future strategy
- *Peace consolidation end state* that the UN seeks to achieve over the ISF timeframe (generally longer than the Mission mandate and shorter than a typical multi-year development programming cycle)
- *Reference to the ISF development and endorsement process*

Strategic Objectives, Results, Timelines, Responsibilities

- *Overall approach*: Scope of the ISF priorities, reasons for the prioritization, role of non-UN actors, link between the ISF and national strategies (as relevant), assumptions/risks/scenarios
- *Narrative Strategy for Each Strategic Objective*: Each thematic area has a unique narrative explaining what is to be achieved, why it is a priority, how it will be done, and who is/are the *responsible* leads/co-leads, and risks to achievement
- *Results*: Set of results pitched at the strategic level (e.g. using a similar methodology as an UNDAF "outcome" or RBB "expected accomplishment"). Special or joint implementation arrangements may also be presented
- *Timelines*: explanation of how the strategic objectives and related results will be phased to take into consideration the synergies in the plan (may split results into phases, use critical path methodology, etc)
- *Summary results framework*: A summary of the ISF results framework may also be presented graphically as part of the ISF document (see figure 7).

Coordination and Implementation arrangements

- Brief description of coordination arrangements (e.g. visual graphic) and any integrated approaches to be employed in implementation of the ISF

Monitoring

- Frequency of reporting
- Role of integrated field coordination structures (SPG, ISPT, etc) in reviewing/acting upon monitoring reports
- Actual reporting format (attached to the ISF)
- Roles and responsibilities in data collection

51. **Consultation and Finalization:** The SPG (or similar) should receive regular updates on the development of the ISF and review drafts as they are finished. The SPG's validation of the ISF means that the Mission and UNCT agree to pursue the results, timelines, and responsibilities as described and will be mutually accountable for achieving the results. This concept of mutual accountability takes into consideration that the contributors are also pursuing other mandated priorities outside the scope of the ISF. Following the endorsement of the SPG, the SRSG/ERSG and UNCT (represented by the RC/HC) should present the document for discussion at a Director-level meeting of the Headquarters-based IMTF/ITF. At this stage, IMTF/ITFs may call upon the expertise of the IMPP Working Group to assist with quality assurance in the ISF process and product. Following these discussions, the SRSG/ERSG, RC/HC, and IMTF/ITF should formally endorse an ISF. The USG of the lead Department should also sign-off on the ISF as a demonstration of support.

Monitoring and Evaluation

52. Each ISF must contain a monitoring and evaluation framework when it is presented for endorsement. This monitoring framework should leverage existing data collection and

monitoring capacity and experience within the Mission and UNCT (e.g. UNCT monitoring and evaluation working group, Mission JMAC, RBB performance monitoring reports).

53. Unlike purely quantitative monitoring tools, the ISF's tracking tool should provide scope for quantitative and qualitative analysis. The target audience of the monitoring tool is the senior leadership team and the Strategic Policy Group (or similar), who should review the monitoring reports regularly, identify strategies to further progress, define strategies to mitigate risks, allocate responsibilities for remedying lags in implementation, and adjust strategies as required in light of the evolving situation on the ground. As the monitoring tool is designed to be discussed by groups such as the SPG, it is an important tool for promoting teamwork and ensuring mutual accountability for results under the ISF.

54. As the ISF is a new requirement, there are currently no best practices for monitoring and tracking progress. However, the scorecard from the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UN SSSS) for eastern DRC offers a good methodology for reference and is unique in that it includes proposed management interventions for results deemed "yellow" or "red" (see UN SSSS Scorecard, Annex 13). In addition, it is advisable to engage the thematic working groups in the monitoring process to maximize thematic expertise and minimize overlap in reporting. Additional ISF monitoring frameworks will be posted on the IMPP community of practice²² as they become available and future updates of these guidelines will include additional examples.

E. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): the authoritative basis for planning new multidimensional missions and UNCTs applying the principles of integration, as well for the revision of existing mission and UNCT plans

Integrated Mission: generally refers to structurally integrated field missions, e.g. UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/Head of Mission. However, structural integration is no longer the key trigger for applying an "integrated approach" as required by the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) and as indicated in these guidelines. Rather, the collaborative principles of integration are to be applied in UN field presences with a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office working alongside a UN Country Team.

DSRSG/RC/HC: a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC serves as the bridge between the mission and UNCT in structurally integrated missions. The reporting lines, relative roles and responsibilities, and key tasks of DSRSG/RC/HCs are described in the Secretary-General's Directive of 11 December 2000 and the Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions of 9 February 2006.

²² To join the IMPP community of practice, please visit <http://cop.dfs.un.org> or contact Maria Regina Semana (semana@un.org).

F. REFERENCES

Normative or superior references

Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General, June 2006

Note of Guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators, and Humanitarian Coordinators (30 October 2000)

The Secretary-General's Notes of Guidance on Integrated Missions (9 February 2006)

Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (24/2005)

Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision on Integration (24 June 2008, 24/2008)

Related Policies

UN Security Council Resolution 1327 (2000) on the implementation of the report on the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the "Brahimi Report")

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the "Capstone Doctrine")²³

The Report of the Secretary-General on the concept of strategic deployment stocks and its implementation²⁴

Guidelines: UN Strategic Assessment

Guidelines: IMPP Role of the Headquarters: Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

G. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

The IMPP Working Group will track compliance with these guidelines and provide regular status reviews to the Integration Steering Group. This will include quality assurance on the development and implementation of integrated field coordination structures and integrated strategic frameworks. The Integration Steering Group (ISG) will also monitor compliance with these Guidelines and report to the Secretary-General's Policy Committee.

H. CONTACT

Kristina Koch-Avan, Integrated Missions Planning Officer, DPKO, Office of Operations, email: koch-avan@un.org


²³ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008)
<http://intranet.dpkp.un.org/dpko/pages/PoliciesAndPractices.aspx>

²⁴ See A/56/870 particularly para. 35

I. HISTORY

These guidelines were undertaken by an inter-departmental and inter-agency IMPP Working Group convened by DPKO including DPA, DFS, OCHA, DOCO, PBSO, OHCHR, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNHCR. They were approved by the Integration Steering Group (ISG), a Principals-level body at headquarters with the same institutional representation as the IMPP Working Group, in December 2009 and subsequently endorsed by the Secretary-General.

APPROVAL SIGNATURE:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kim Mow Ban". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long vertical stroke extending downwards from the end of the name.

DATE OF APPROVAL:

12 February 2010

ANNEXES

Annex 1

Examples of Integrated Field Coordination: Liberia and DRC

A review of existing practice found two emerging good practices in integrated field coordination structures in Liberia and DRC, respectively. The Liberia Strategic Policy Group is the head of a layered integrated field coordination system that bridges the UNCT and UNMIL using an UNDAF that reflects the joint peace consolidation priorities of the peacekeeping operation and the UNCT as the basis for prioritization and tracking of results. DRC has an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) that has evolved from an operational group overseeing the implementation of the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) to one at the country level to development an Integrated Strategic Framework and coordinate its implementation (see details in annex).

Liberia: The Senior Policy Group (SPG) in Liberia is the principal forum for the discussion of key policy and strategic issues in the context of this structurally-integrated mission and has been operational since 2007. The SPG benefited from clarity of purpose that came from having integrated structures (from HQ in Monrovia to the Liberia's provincial counties), integrated strategies, a comprehensive coordination structure, and including cross cutting issues and operational management groups. (See Figure 1, below Liberia Integrated Field Coordination Structure). More specifically, the Liberia SPG managed the development and implementation of an UNDAF that was jointly-owned by the Mission and UNCT, tracked progress on implementation of these joint priorities, and helped create innovative operational tools that leveraged the Mission and UNCT resources (joint county offices, joint programmes, etc). It played a similar role in the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Mission benchmarks for Consolidation, Drawdown, and Withdrawal (CDW) that were prepared for the Security Council. The SPG's Forward Agenda is also included in Figure 2, below.

Figure 1: Liberia Integrated Field Coordination Structure




Figure 2: Liberia SPG Forward Agenda

Recurrent issues:

- Feedback from UNDAF Outcome Groups
- Regular updates on the CDW benchmark progress
- Secretary-General's Progress Reports on UNMIL, incl. recommendations on mandate renewal
- Discuss common UN response/position to key national developments
- Discuss management and leadership issues beside bigger agenda items (for example issues relating to operations, upcoming missions, joint offices, joint programmes etc)

Operational issues:

- Field/county based structure
- Outcomes from significant assessment processes, such as Joint Security Assessment

Thematic Issues:

- "Social Protection" has been chosen as the theme of the first UN Issues Papers. Draft report will be available for discussion in January 2009
- Hot Spot Report (RRR), available in January 2009
- Civil society engagement
- Gender Mainstreaming
- Natural resource management
- Rubber Plantation issues, including outcome from Joint UNMIL/GoL Task Force
- Economic governance/inclusive growth (this is likely to be the topic of UNDP's Human Development Report)
- Employment
- RoL issues
- Reconciliation (based on initial paper by PPS and Peacebuilding colleagues)
- UN accelerated response to rape cases

External presentations

- During the last year, a number of external partners or high-level visitors have made presentations at the SPG, including the Minister of Finance and the UNICEF Executive Director.

The experience in Liberia demonstrates, *inter alia*, that institutionalized coordination under the active direction and leadership of the senior management team can create a high level of joint understanding and ownership for a common vision, which can subsequently be implemented with concrete tools. The SPG, chaired by the SRSG and comprised of UNMIL Section Chiefs and UNCT Representatives, owes its success, in part, to its inclusive representation, senior management support, issue-focused agendas, regular and frequent meeting schedule, a broader context of a layered coordination structure with appropriate linkages (Including UNCT, County Support Teams and functional bodies such as the Inter-agency Programming Team, UNDAF Outcome Groups, Operations Management Team and others). It has also proven to support mutual accountability of delivery against key priorities in country.

Democratic Republic of Congo: In the DRC, the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) has evolved to meet the expanding coordination needs of one of the world's largest UN operations. The DRC IMPT originally was formed to oversee the implementation of the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) in eastern DRC and had structures in the headquarters (Kinshasa) and the affected region (Goma). More recently, the model has been updated to the national level and refocused at the strategic level with two tiers. The IMPT/policy has been established at the Principals Level in Kinshasa to determine the shared vision for peace consolidation of the UN system in DRC and ensure achievement of the related common objectives. The IMPT/programme sits in Kinshasa at the senior officer level and aims to translate this vision and common objectives into an integrated strategic framework and subsequently, to oversee its implementation. Thematic working groups and regional/provincial level IMPTs are also envisaged.

Annex 2

**Template Terms of Reference
Strategic Policy Group**

Note: The Terms of Reference (ToR) for each Strategic Policy Group (SPG) should be tailored to the distinct needs of the country and UN presence. The SPG should be ready to revise its TOR when the situation changes or when the UN presence enters a new phase (e.g. from conflict to peacebuilding). **The title of the group (SPG) may be altered according to the specific needs/interests of the field.**

Purpose

The Strategic Policy Group is the senior integrated coordination body for UN presences with a multidimensional peacekeeping operation and/or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT). It aims to provide strategic direction to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's peace consolidation efforts by promoting the development and implementation of a strategic partnership between the Mission and UNCT for peace consolidation. It is a forum to negotiate the delineation of roles and responsibilities for the UN actors contributing to peace consolidation and promotes a mutual accountability between members of the UN presence against their commitments

Background

This section is context-specific and should describe the legislative basis for the Mission and the UNCT's activities, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. It may also refer back to Strategic Assessments, Technical Assessment Missions, Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies, or any other type of joint assessment undertaken by the Mission and UNCT. This section may also include the rationale for a tailored configuration, purpose, and working methods of this particular ISPT. This is particularly important for Missions and UNCTs that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.

Principal functions

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the Strategic Policy Group. As noted above, these may change depending on the situation and phase. The core functions of an SPG are listed below:

- Develop the joint vision and peace consolidation priorities of the UN system based on a common conflict analysis and the comparative advantage of the UN system
- Delineate roles and responsibilities among the UN actors ensuring complementarities between Mission and UNCT and minimizing overlap
- Review progress on an integrated strategic framework (see paragraphs 24-54) and provide direction to UN components/agencies on implementation challenges
- Facilitate interaction with non-UN actors where there is interdependence related to common peace consolidation priorities

Composition

This section should define the composition of the SPG. The SPG should be comprised of representative members of the UN presence including peacekeeping/political, rule of law/justice, support, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors. Military and/or police components should always be represented, where present. In some cases, the SRSG and RC/HC may decide to identify a representative group of Mission and UN Agencies for inclusion in the SPG based on their respective contributions to the agreed peace consolidation framework (Integrated Strategic Framework or similar). If this is the case, the RC/HC should consult the UNCT to establish the UN agency representatives. All SPG members should commit to participate at the level of Heads of Agency or Head of Mission Component.

Organization of work

This section should describe the working modalities, including how frequently the group meets, modalities for formation of meeting agendas, procedure for the preparation and presentation of background documents for decision, and the production of action points and/or minutes. This section should also describe how the work of the SPG is linked to other integrated coordination structures in the field (e.g. Integrated Strategy and Planning Team, thematic working groups, provincial/regional ISPTs) and UN Headquarters (Integrated (Mission) Task Force). It may also describe how the SPG interacts with national coordination structures and/or coordination structures involving other non-UN actors (e.g. donors, World Bank).

Annex 3

**Template Terms of Reference
Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT)**

Note: The Terms of Reference (ToR) for each ISPT should be tailored to the distinct needs of the country and UN presence. The ISPT should be ready to revise its TOR when the situation changes or when the UN presence enters a new phase (e.g. from conflict to peacebuilding). **The title of the group (ISPT or other) may be altered according to the specific needs/interests of the field.**

Purpose

Suggested generic text: "The Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT) aims to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace. The ISPT responds to the requirement in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration¹ for UN country level arrangements that promote the development and implementation of a strategic partnership for peace consolidation. It also aims to ensure that all components of the UN mission and the members of the UN Country Team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner and in close cooperation with other national and international partners. The ISPT receives direction from and reports to the Strategic Policy Group and is the field-level counterpart to the [country] Integrated (Mission) Task Force chaired by [lead Department].

Background

This section is context-specific and should describe the legislative basis for the Mission and the UNCT's activities, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. It may also refer back to Strategic Assessments, Technical Assessment Missions, Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies, or any other type of joint assessment undertaken by the Mission and UNCT. This section may also include the rationale for a tailored configuration, purpose, and working methods of this particular ISPT. This is particularly important for Missions and UNCTs that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.

Principal functions

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the ISPT. As noted above, these may change depending on the situation and phase. ISPT should seek to define its own key deliverables. Below are some of the typical functions of an ISPT:

- Coordinate the development and implementation of joint strategic planning processes including ISFs
- Guide and review the work of thematic working groups
- Conduct strategic reviews at key milestones, jointly with Integrated (Mission) Task Force (IMTF/ITF) and other HQ-based bodies as required, to take stock of major changes and/or new requirements (e.g. transition and drawdown)
- Promote the development of synergies and minimize overlap by promoting the development of UN system-wide thematic strategies (e.g. protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform)

Composition

This section should define the composition of the ISPT. The ISPT should comprise representative members of the UN presence including peacekeeping/political, support, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors. Military and/or police components should always be represented, where present. In some cases, the SRSG and RC/HC may decide to identify a representative group of Mission and UN Agencies for inclusion in the ISPT based on their respective contributions to the

¹ Decision of the Secretary-General on Integration – 25 June 2008 meeting of the Policy Committee. Decision 2008/24

agreed peace consolidation framework (Integrated Strategic Framework or similar) and to limit staff time in meetings. If this is the case, the RC/HC should consult the UNCT to establish the UN agency representatives. ISPT members should participate in meetings at the senior officer level in order to maintain the strategic focus of the ISPT and be empowered to represent their entities.

Organization of work

This section should describe the working modalities of the ISPT. It should define how frequently the team meets. Information about the development of a work plan, the modalities for formation of meeting agendas, and the production of action points and/or minutes may also be included in this section. This section should also describe how the work of the ISPT is linked to other integrated coordination structures in the field (SPG, thematic working groups, provincial/regional ISPTs) and UN Headquarters (Integrated (Mission) Task Force). (A graphic such as Figure 1, below, may be used). It may also describe how the ISPT interacts with national coordination structures and/or coordination structures involving other non-UN actors (e.g. donors, World Bank).

Annex 4

Terms of Reference for UNDAF Outcome Groups

Background

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008-2012 (UNDAF) for Liberia provides a clear, overarching framework that details the support of the United Nations to the national priorities of Liberia. It identifies five 'UNDAF Outcomes' that respond to the four pillars of the Poverty Reduction Strategy as well as HIV/AIDS.

The United Nations has agreed to form a coordination mechanism called an UNDAF Outcome Group, which includes participants from all UNCT Agencies and UNMIL sections responsible to deliver within each respective UNDAF Outcome area. The DSRSG/Resident Coordinator (RC), who retains overall leadership and accountability to the Government of Liberia for delivery of the outcomes, is delegating responsibility to five UN Conveners to act on the RC's behalf in a number of specific ways (see below) to support the UNDAF Outcome Group.

Each UNDAF Outcome Groups is responsible to:

- Provide joint UN advocacy, policy support and advice through the PRS structure and to relevant PRS Pillar meetings;
- Exercise technical leadership and providing expert UN opinion on areas falling within the mandate of the group;
- Ensure / Maintain links to the *Functional and Cross Cutting Groups*;
- *Share information on existing and pipeline programmes as well as on relevant resource mobilization efforts; and*
- Facilitate the implementation of joint outputs under respective outcomes, *address bottlenecks/constraints, and identify key gaps and areas for joint interventions on advocacy, policy and programmatic levels.*

Joint Annual Work-Plan

Each UNDAF Outcome Group is responsible for the preparation and follow-up of a Joint Annual Work Plan, with assignment of lead agency for each output. *The Plan will include the Outcome Group's joint activities towards achieving the UNDAF Outcomes and Outputs. The Outcome Group will, under the leadership of the Convener, prepare mid-term and annual reports on its implementation to the SPG.*

Group Membership and Accountability

The agencies/UNMIL will formally designate a member to the relevant Outcome Group. If this appointee to the Outcome Group can not attend, he/she is expected to appoint a representative in his/her place. The Convener is responsible for maintaining a membership list and record frequency of attendance by the members or their representatives in the meetings. This information will be included in the quarterly reports to the SPG.

Members are expected to be empowered to represent their organisations on the matters under discussion at meetings. The members of the Outcome Groups will be responsible for briefing their organization on the orientation, recommendations, and decisions of the Outcome Groups.

The Outcome Groups can establish working groups to focus upon a particular topic or sub-sector as determined by the Outcome Group. The working group will report to the Outcome Group on its activities and results.

Calendar of meetings

The UNDAF Outcome Groups will meet at least every second month and as necessary to prepare for the relevant PRS Pillar meetings.

UN Conveners

The DSRSG/Resident Coordinator is delegating responsibility to UN Conveners to act on his/her behalf in a number of specific ways. In this regard, the Conveners do not act in the capacity of their organization (UN agency / UNMIL section) but on behalf of the entire United Nations in Liberia. The Conveners, who will be appointed for an initial term of one year, are expected to *guide the group and ensure that the group fulfils its mandate through adequate consultation and participation by all members.*

The UN Convener:

- Acts on behalf of the RC on matters related to his/her specific UNDAF Outcome and UN support to the Government's PRS Pillar meetings
- Serves as the UN Focal Point for the corresponding Government Pillar Group and represents UN at high-level interaction with national and other partners (including civil society and donors) in respective thematic area
- Brings UN (UNCT and UNMIL) together in the respective area and Chairs the UNDAF Outcome Group
- Facilitates the preparation and reporting of the workplan.
- Fosters Joint Programming, including operationalization, resource mobilization and monitoring
- Ensures and communicates joined-up UN policy advice in respective thematic area
- *Reports quarterly to the Strategic Planning Group meetings.*
- *Ensures that necessary secretarial support is provided to the Outcome Group, with support and guidance from RCO.*
- *Liaise with the Conveners of the other UNDAF Outcome Groups for support and sharing of ideas on how to facilitate the work of the Outcome Groups.*

Cross-cutting / Joint Programme Groups and Conveners

In addition, the UNDAF identified several cross cutting areas and the United Nations has established cross-cutting thematic groups in the following areas:

- Gender Equality
- Children and Youth - Empowerment and Employment
- Peacebuilding & Conflict Sensitivity
- Food Security & Nutrition
- Environment & Climate Change
- Macroeconomic Taskforce

The cross-cutting / joint programme groups are responsible for

- Providing joint UN policy support and advice to the Outcome Groups
- Exercising technical leadership and providing expert UN opinion on areas falling within the mandate of the group
- Acting as the UN coordinating mechanism for Joint Programmes (under the Joint Steering Committees) on Youth Empowerment and Employment, Food Security & Nutrition, Gender (including SGBV JP)
- Reporting to the UNCT and Joint Programme Steering Committee
- Advancing research and analytical thinking by producing issues papers

IMPP Guidelines for the Field

A convener will coordinate the support of the United Nations following the same TOR as for Convener's above with the additional responsibilities to ensure crosscutting issues are mainstreamed in the work of all outcome groups

Functional Groups

The following functional groups provide oversight, outreach advice and support in accordance with their respective ToRs.

- Inter-Agency Programming Team (IAPT)
- Operations Management Team (OMT)
- UN Communications Group (UNCG)
- Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Annex 5

Template Terms of Reference
Shared Analytical and Planning Capacity for UN Field Presences

Note: The Terms of Reference (ToR) for each shared analytical and planning capacity (“shared capacity”) should reflect the specific requirements and circumstances and can take different structural forms. Given the dynamic operational environment, this ToR should be updated annually. The title of the shared analytical and planning capacity may also be tailored by the UN field presence (e.g. “Joint Planning Unit”)

Purpose

The shared capacity is comprised of strategic planners from the Mission and the UNCT. Although the members of the shared capacity have their own distinct tasks related to the Mission (e.g. RBB) and the UNCT (UNDAF), respectively, the strategic planners also work on joint Mission/UNCT initiatives that aim to develop a strategic partnership between the Mission and UNCT around core peace consolidation objectives.

The shared analytical and planning capacity responds to the requirement in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration² for UN country level arrangements to have a “shared analytical and planning capacity” to ensure that the following is in place:

- A shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives
- Closely aligned or integrated planning
- A set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of task critical to consolidating peace
- Agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation

The shared capacity cannot fulfill these tasks alone. To be successful, the team requires the active direction and involvement of the Senior Leadership Team (from both the Mission and the UNCT) as well as an appropriate coordination structure such as an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT).

Core Tasks

Each shared capacity should develop its own list of priority tasks and present them to their managers and the ISPT for approval. A list of generic tasks follows:

- Provide secretariat services to integrated field coordination structures (e.g. Strategic Policy Group, Integrated Strategy and Planning Team, or similar, see below), including preparation of agendas, background papers, and actual drafting of integrated strategies, plans, and monitoring frameworks
- Compile inputs and draft shared strategies and plans and related monitoring reports
- Provide coordination support to thematic working groups and facilitate linkages between UN-internal mechanisms and coordination frameworks that involve national stakeholders, civil society and/or donors
- Serve as a strategy and planning point of contact for headquarters and facilitate linkages between field-based integrated coordination structures and the HQ-based IMTF/ITF

Composition

This section should define the composition of the shared capacity. It should include at least one dedicated strategic planner from the Mission and the UNCT. A team leader or chair of the group should be identified to facilitate the organization of work. In some cases, the shared capacity may

² Decision of the Secretary-General on Integration – 25 June 2008 meeting of the Policy Committee. Decision 2008/24

IMPP Guidelines for the Field

have a core team comprised of the professional strategic planners in O/SRSG and O/RC/HC, with additional analysts or planners from Mission Components (e.g. Joint Mission Analysis Cell, political affairs, military, police, rule of law) and the members of the UNCT brought in as resources for detailed strategy and planning exercises.

Organization of work

This section should describe the working modalities of the shared capacity. Some shared capacities may choose an integrated structure for the team with a joint chain of command and reporting arrangements. Others may choose lateral collaboration. In such cases, the modalities for communication and joint collaboration should be specified. For structurally integrated missions, it is advisable to have the shared capacity co-located in the same building to ease communication. All members of the shared capacity should have these tasks reflected in their annual performance appraisals.

Annex 6

ISF “Diagnostic Phase: Key Questions in Preparing to Develop an ISF

- Decide what **capacities** are needed to develop and implement an ISF. How much staff time, and from which staff members (bearing in mind the need to ensure senior management are fully involved in guiding the process), will be needed? From whom (e.g. senior leaders, strategic planners, mission/UNCT analysts)?
- Is conflict analysis required or does it exist already? If not, is there dedicated capacity to complete it?
- Is there a mapping of existing UN strategies and frameworks in country? If not, could one be undertaken (see separate guidance)?
- Do you already have an integrated field coordination structure? If not, are there other mission/UNCT co-ordination mechanisms you could use? Do you have the requisite planning expertise? Do you need to ask for help from HQ? Are there regular meetings of the HQ-based IMTF/ITF that can be used to liaise with HQ on the ISF development?
- Assess the **readiness** of all actors to participate. Not just the mission and UNCT and HQ (Secretariat, funds and programmes) but (on a case by case basis) national authorities (which ministries or local governments?), NGOs, major international and bilateral donors. Do those non-UN actors have the necessary capacity to participate in an ISF, and is it available in-country or elsewhere?
- Consider the **timing**: should the ISF be slightly delayed – or speeded up – to take account of other factors? For example, if elections are planned within the next few months, it might make sense to delay starting the ISF until the results are known. Or you might do an ISF now, but ensure that it defines short-term priority results for the next six months separately from the longer term results. Or perhaps another strategic planning exercise is already underway; can the work for that exercise be used to develop an ISF?
- How will the various planning tools of the UN system be linked/inform each other? Can you get agreement that an ISF will form the basis for the peace consolidation aspects of an UNDAF review? CHAP/CAP review? Next RBB?

Annex 7

Evaluating Existing Frameworks against the ISF Minimum Standards

Some existing peace consolidation or peace building strategies may fulfill the minimum standards for the development and content of an ISF as described in these guidelines. In such cases, the existing framework(s) (e.g. UNDAF, Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy) should be evaluated against these guidelines by following the steps outlined below. Note that if you have more than one framework could approximate an ISF (e.g. conflict analysis in one framework, benchmarks and indicators in another), you could analyze more than one framework, making distinctions as needed.

All evaluations should be carried out jointly by Mission and UNCT experts and presented in the form of a short 1-2 page report to the HQ-based IMTF/ITF for discussion. The IMTF/ITF and field actors, together, will need to evaluate whether the minimum standards have been met or a unique ISF exercise needs to be undertaken.

When completing this evaluation, it is useful to answer the following key questions:

Does the framework encapsulate a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives?

- Does it include a **conflict analysis** (i.e. a thorough, recent analysis of the root causes of conflict or "conflict triggers", jointly produced by the mission and the UNCT)?
- Does it describe the current **peace consolidation strategy** of the mission and UNCT, and associated assumptions, risks, contingencies? Does it describe the peaceful end state at which it is aiming, expressed as a measurable, achievable, sustainable change in country situation and people's lives?
- Does it include **strategic objectives**? Or does a recent Strategic Assessment exist? If so, how many strategic objectives are listed? (3 to 6 is ideal.) Are they based on a solid analysis and joint strategic direction (e.g. through a retreat of senior managers)?
- Was the selection of strategic objectives based on a **prioritization** process that included comparative advantage analysis? Do the objectives link back to the conflict analysis and reflect the combined UN mandate of peace and security, humanitarian, human rights and development? Does the framework explain how each objective will be pursued, and how risks will be mitigated? Does it explain how each objective relates to the others? Does it describe what other partners are doing in this area?
- Was the Senior Leadership Team in country (including the SRSG/ERSG and RC/HC) closely involved throughout the development of the framework? Did they direct the process and confirm the results?
- Was the framework endorsed by the SRSG/ERSG and RC/HC and by the relevant IMTF at HQ and cleared by the lead USG?
- Is the framework linked to national frameworks, as necessary?
- Is it **dynamic** (e.g. able to change to reflect evolving circumstances)?

Does the framework define results, timelines and responsibilities?

- Does the framework define **cross-sector priority results** for each strategic objective? Indicators of achievement? Clear roles and responsibilities? Were all these developed via inclusive thematic discussions between the mission and UNCT?
- Was a prioritization process undertaken in order to identify the desired priority results? Do the results derive from the UN's comparative advantage? Do they reflect where non-UN actors (World Bank, member states etc) will lead?
- Are timelines, priorities and sequencing attached to the results? If appropriate, are some results prioritized (e.g. early results in first six months leading up to elections) over others?
- How long a period does the framework cover? (It generally will be longer than the mission mandate but shorter than a typical multi-year development programming cycle. The risks and assumptions should determine the time horizon.)

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- Has the Senior Leadership Team endorsed the roles and responsibilities set out in the framework? Have they agreed who should lead in each area, and who should support? Have they agreed whether new resources are required for coordination or delivery?
- Have the mission and UNCT agreed that they will pursue these results, timelines and responsibilities?
- Is there a **monitoring and evaluation** tool? Does it: establish regular reporting, and thus enable regular stocktaking and intervention by senior management? make use of existing monitoring capacity in the mission and UNCT? allow for both quantitative and qualitative assessment?

Can the framework function as a useful strategic management tool?

- Does the framework enable senior management to track progress against priorities? Does it enable senior management to react coherently if the unexpected happens (eg external shocks or programme funding reductions), and still maintain a strategic focus? Do the priorities established in the framework allow for sensible reallocation of resources in the event of such shocks?

Annex 8

Côte d'Ivoire Integrated Mission Task Force

**Terms of Reference
Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) Support Mission for Côte d'Ivoire
9 June 2009**

Background

The Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision on Integration (24/2008) reaffirmed integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated. The Decision also included a list of situations, including Côte d'Ivoire, where key principles of integration should be applied.

The Decision on Integration also stressed the importance of an effective strategic partnership between the UN mission and UNCT. In this regard, it established that UN country presences should have a shared analytical and planning capacity as well as an integrated strategic framework (ISF). As established by this Decision and further developed by the ASG-level Integration Steering Group³ at its 12 March 2009 meeting, an ISF should include:

- 1) a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives, and
- 2) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace

At its March 12 2009 meeting, the Integration Steering Group (ISG) also endorsed a number of principles and assumptions for the development of an ISF.⁴ These include:

- Developed through a building block approach (see points 1,2 above)
- Both process and a product, not a "cut and paste" from existing frameworks
- Process ensures joint ownership by Mission and UNCT
- Development led by Senior Managers
- Provides clarity on roles and responsibilities
- Does not alter structural arrangements between the Mission and UNCT
- Linked to national frameworks, as appropriate
- Applies to existing UN presences as well as future start ups, rolled-out in phases for existing UN presences

At the same meeting, the ISG also asked the IMPP Working Group to develop guidance on the ISF and to "accompany" the ISF development process in 1-2 locations in order to root the eventual ISF guidelines in actual practices. Côte d'Ivoire is one of these two ISF case studies.

Purpose

It is understood that the development of an ISF for Côte d'Ivoire is already in the advanced stage. In this context, the Côte d'Ivoire IMTF, in coordination with the IMPP Working Group, is fielding an ISF support mission with the dual objectives of:

- Providing technical support for the finalization of an ISF for Côte d'Ivoire
- Learning from the field-based process and documenting practices in real-time to inform the development of the ISF guidance package

³ The ASG-level Integration Steering Group was established by the Decision on Integration to "help ensure implementation and progress on integration-related issues. The group is convened by DPKO and includes DPA, DFS, PBSO, OCHA, OHCHR, DOCO, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and EOSG.

⁴ See also the full ISF Discussion Paper approved by the ISG, which is available on the IMPP Community of Practice

In this regard, the key deliverables associated with the objectives above are:

- Design and deliver a workshop to UNOCI and the UNCT including:
 - background information on global policy development for an ISF
 - a validation process for the work undertaken to date
- Complete an After Action Review of the ISF Development Process to date with a view to identifying best practices for a generic ISF development process map, which is currently under development for the global ISF guidelines
- Document practices in Côte d'Ivoire that have been established to support the common objectives identified in the ISF (e.g. joint field offices)
- Provide technical assistance to the strategic planners from UNOCI and the UNCT to finalize the ISF draft that is proposed to cover the period June 2009 to June 2010. This may include facilitating thematic discussions, technical assistance with indicators, design of tracking tools, and finalization of the ISF narrative.

Composition

The Côte d'Ivoire IMTF will establish an ISF Support Mission with the assistance of the IMPP Working Group. The group will (keeping in mind logistical constraints) include representatives of DPKO (Office of Operations), OCHA, UNDP, PBSO, and DOCO.

Dates and Duration

The ISF Support Mission will travel to Côte d'Ivoire from 21 June to 26 June. The specific dates and agenda will be agreed with UNOCI and the UNCT through the Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC.

Logistical Support

The ISF Support Mission will rely on the logistical and administrative support of UNOCI and the UNCT including for scheduling of meetings, transport and accommodation. All costs related to travel, DSA, and accommodation for task team members will be borne individually by each department and agency participating in the mission.

Annex 9

Strategic Assessment Methodology

The following is a **suggested** methodology and process for drafting the Strategic Assessment report. The Strategic Assessment TORs may modify this outline or the ITF may decide on a more appropriate format. Annex C provides a non-exhaustive list of conflict analysis approaches that could be applied in addition to the assessment outlined below.


Drawing upon previous assessment and analysis where appropriate, the Strategic Assessment should propose an integrated UN response to the situation prevailing in the country. To this end, the Strategic Assessment should (1) present a shared UN analysis of the conflict situation including its key factors and dynamics, (2) identify the main priority objectives to address those key factors (3) identify the strategic options for the UN in order to respond to the situation on the ground (and potentially revisit the UN’s configuration).

The Strategic Assessment should therefore be based on the following components:

- (a) Articulation of the aim of the Strategic Assessment in the context of the country;
- (b) *A conflict analysis* centered around the aim of the Strategic Assessment, including key conflict factors, their dynamics and risks including, as appropriate, the development of scenarios;
- (c) *The analysis of priority objectives* for peace consolidation;
- (d) *The articulation of UN strategic options* to address the situation in the country (including, where appropriate, proposals for reconfiguration).

Ideally, two to three strategic options should be presented at the end of the Strategic Assessment. Of these, one strategic option for a UN approach to peace consolidation in the country may be recommended, based on possible scenarios and timelines for future developments (if there is agreement on the recommendation). It should be kept in mind that the status quo could be one of the strategic options presented.

The following diagram gives an overview of the analysis process, with the tools allowing to move from one part of the process to the other:



Each of the components and tools is described in detail below:

(a) *Aim of the Strategic Assessment in the country situation*

The Strategic Assessment is not a comprehensive country analysis, but an exercise to articulate a limited range of UN strategic options to contribute to the consolidation of peace in an integrated manner. Therefore, a limited aim, tailored to the country situation should frame the ensuing analysis, to ensure that the Strategic Assessment exercise remains focused and articulates options for an integrated UN response in the short to medium term. This aim should be clearly articulated in the Strategic Assessment TORs. It is essential that all members of the ITF accept and commit to the aim throughout the exercise.

(b) *Conflict analysis*


The development of a shared analysis of causes, dynamics and consequences of a given conflict provides an important basis for determining the appropriate form of UN support. The key factors (both underlying causes and near-term effects) driving the conflict situation in the country should first be surveyed and their dynamics analysed. The only criteria to identify factors to be included should be their relevance to the overall country-specific aim of the Strategic Assessment (e.g. a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS may be a problem for the country but often does not enter the scope of a Strategic Assessment). The analysis should aim at identifying the factors most salient for addressing the conflict through a multi-dimensional UN strategy. *The following is an example list of factors: unequal access to resources, poor governance, inter-ethnic strife, separatist ambitions, rising food insecurity, lack of national strategies, incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants, displacement, inconclusive elections, gender inequalities in accessing resources, high levels of sexual and gender-based violence including when perpetrated as a warfare tactic.* The analysis of these factors should include the rights of individuals and obligations of authorities based on the applicable international human rights standard.

A “Problem Tree” approach may be useful in mapping the links between key conflict factors (see diagram below).

Analytical tool : Problem tree

The problem tree methodology allows the visualization of the links between conflict factors. It can help translate the analysis into strategic priority objectives for the country.

Diagram 1: Problem tree




(c) *Priority objectives for the country*

20. The conflict analysis should provide the team with a comprehensive overview of key conflict factors that need to be addressed in any attempt to promote peace consolidation. From the conflict analysis, the Strategic Assessment should then identify the key factors that need to be addressed as priorities in the near term and state these as priority objectives for an integrated effort by the UN system. The priority objectives should reflect fully relevant international legal obligations of the State, including human rights obligations. These key conflict factors are then transformed into priority objectives, These priority objectives are linked to one another according to the initial conflict analysis. Taken together as a whole, the priority objectives should present a map that would highlight the most important elements to be addressed in order to consolidate peace in the country. It should be kept in mind that the priority objectives should not be limited to the scope/mandate of one UN entity.

The following table shows an example of how conflict factors can be translated into priority objectives:

Conflict factor	Priority objective
Unequal participation in political representation or access to power key factor fueling conflict	Support inclusive form of government as key component of a negotiated settlement
Militarization of politics perpetuates violent conflict and impedes peaceful resolution of disputes	Establish comprehensive process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups following a cease-fire
High level of impunity for sexual violence used as a tactic of warfare or as a means of destabilizing communities	Develop security sector and justice sector strategies to prevent sexual violence
Political and social inequality in access to economic and social rights fuels grievances and conflict	Establish inclusive system of government; provide population with equal access to services and entitlements
Massive population displacement preventing economic recovery and creating new causes of conflict	Protection, resettlement and reintegration of displaced populations in secure areas of return
Weak civil society leading to lack of progress in local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts	Support strengthening of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts

Diagram 2: Priority objectives



(d) Development of UN strategic options

The Strategic Assessment should develop a range of one to three possible strategic options for UN engagement to address the identified priority objectives for peace consolidation. In doing so, rather than focusing on activities of individual UN actors, the Strategic Assessment should review clusters of priority actions within priority objectives. It should also take into account the likelihood of scenarios and focus on the needs of the country as well as the UN’s comparative advantage and capacity.

Analytical tool: SWOT analysis

The translation of the priority objectives for the country into a coherent UN strategy can be aided by using a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis. This methodology analyzes the internal and external capacities to address priority objectives. For each priority objective, the Strategic Assessment could list the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for the UN. The aim of the analysis is to determine the UN’s comparative advantage. The stakeholder mapping exercise as part of the desk review (described in paragraph 23) should be taken into account when conducting the SWOT analysis.

For each priority objective, a SWOT analysis will allow the team to assess whether the UN should be involved, what type of role (lead versus support) it should take, and which key actors it should engage with to ensure that the priority objective is fully addressed. In some cases, it may result in supporting another, better-positioned actor, rather than taking the lead for a given priority objective.

If helpful, the team could include tables for priority objectives. The following is a basic example. In actual cases, there should be more details.

Priority objective : Build local security capability	
<p><u>Strengths of the UN</u> Some operational capacity in UNCT and field mission Expertise and experience of departments, agencies or funds Standards, values and instruments, including on human rights</p>	<p><u>Opportunities for UN and non-UN actors</u> Regional organization with readily available expertise, experience and funding Capacities and mandates of government authorities and bilateral actors (e.g. ongoing capacity-building programme jointly organized by donors, regional organization and</p>

	government).
<u>Weaknesses of the UN</u> Lack of funding for programmes Duration of necessary implementation Lack of fit with mandates of departments, agencies or funds Lack of available human resources, institutions, budgets Likelihood of success low	<u>Threats to the priority objective</u> Rebel group outside of peace agreement Shift in power relations Other priorities of donors and beneficiaries

Based on this table, the UN should probably assume a support role in this priority objective area (i.e. building local security capability) and work closely with lead actors such as the regional organization, donors and national government.

The different strategic options can be based on different scenarios or timelines or on differences in the interpretation of the analysis of opportunities and threats for the UN (based on the SWOT analysis). Each strategic option should frame the broad strategic orientation of UN engagement, with the understanding that subsequent planning processes will provide further details on how the strategic option will be operationalised, including respective roles for different parts of the UN system. It should always be kept in mind that the status quo is also a strategic option that could be presented (and in some cases recommended).

Each strategic option should include the following elements:

a) Overall approach and expected impact of the UN in helping achieve the priority objectives: This is the main part of the strategic option. It provides the “function” part of the “form follows function” principle. The overall approach should be developed on the basis of a realistic appraisal of existing UN capacities and expertise, as well as those which can be deployed in short order. It should also take into account the role of other actors (national, regional and international) undertaking related peace consolidation efforts. Finally, the approach should include consideration of key assumptions and risks related to the strategic option and adequately reflect existing obligations of the State, including human rights obligations.

b) Implications for alignment and coordination of the various elements of the UN response: The effectiveness of UN engagement will depend on effective coordination of individual UN entities based on a clear understanding of key priorities. The strategic option should articulate alignment/coordination implications of the UN response, keeping in mind that planning processes and instruments developed by humanitarian, development and other entities of the UN system cover other priorities specific to their individual mandates.

c) Proposals for the form and structure of UN engagement: The strategic options should provide preliminary indications regarding the required form of UN engagement, which refers to how the UN, as a system, could organize its country presence and capacities to implement its overall peace consolidation approach in an integrated and coherent manner. As noted in paragraph 8 (f), this should be driven by the analysis and the the resulting overall approach of the UN. Examples of organizational configurations include, but are not limited to, a “normal” UN Country Team (UNCT) configuration, a special political mission, a structurally integrated peacekeeping operation, the deployment of a human rights presence, the reduction or withdrawal of the UN presence.

Annex 10

Note on Mapping Country Level Frameworks

This note aims to give guidance and examples on how to undertake a mapping of frameworks as part of a strategic planning process.

When initiating a process of in country joint UN planning; a mapping of existing analysis, planning frameworks and strategies can be a very useful starting point to: (1) assist stakeholders to determine the level of strategic discussion required and to foster coordination; and (2) provide a useful first step towards achieving a coherent overview of the planning architecture in country.

A mapping is therefore useful in the preparatory and analytical stages of the strategic planning process.



Purpose

A mapping of existing planning frameworks serves different purposes:

1. **It identifies the different analytical and strategic frameworks that are in place** at both national level and within the international community including the UN family¹;
2. It provides **an overview** on how the various frameworks complement and build upon each other (or not);
3. It assists in **identifying any inconsistencies, overlaps or gaps** amongst the existing planning processes and the results articulated therein;
4. It allows planners to use the planning process as an **opportunity to build or enhance complementarity between different processes** and address gaps that might exist.

It is also important to take into account the distinction between (1) overall national/multi-stakeholders plans (such as a plan emerging from peace negotiations, or developed by the government for the implementation of the peace agreement; (2) overall national transition plans); (3) thematic planning processes (such as a reintegration action plan and/or policy); (4) plans which represent the response of the UN (and/or other parts of the international community) to national priorities and (5) UN internal planning processes¹. This is relevant when preparing an ISF so that the UN planning can build upon larger plans and take into account the focus and priorities followed by other actors. It is also important in identifying which other plans can be replaced by the ISF and which cannot (based on their mandatory nature and/or purpose they serve).

What to map?

¹ The mapping should build on any tools or mapping exercises already undertaken in country. For example, in some countries UNDP assists the government in operating a Development Assistance Database (DAD) that captures information of a wide range of government, UN, national and international actors' activities in country that can be disaggregated by various parameters.

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Scope of mapping: It is important to consider the inclusion of both national frameworks and those done in cooperation with international partners, as well as UN internal plans. Plans that refer to the UN response in country must be included and should take into account the full range of peacekeeping, humanitarian and development plans of the UN system. That way, an assessment of UN strategy will include a review of the wider framework within which the UN operates and can inform discussions on UN positioning. Examples: PRSP, peace agreements, UNDAF, Mission mandate and planning frameworks (MIP, RBB etc), CHAPs (Humanitarian plans), cross-cutting sectoral strategies, and frameworks that have geographical focus.

Different planning processes will have different scopes and a different hierarchy of results. This is not necessarily problematic, so long as there is an overall coherence among them. Moreover, it is important to consider that certain foundational processes or documents (such as peace agreements, SC mandates) ought to be included in the mapping, even if not translated in planning processes as such, as they are a key part of the basis to determine priorities.

Time frame: It should be acknowledged at the outset that plans as they stand have different timeframes and therefore articulate results that are to be achieved along different time horizons. It is therefore important to decide how to deal with such discrepancies.

Results level: it must be determined at the outset at what level results (outcome/output/activity) should be reflected. The results level of each framework is likely to differ and therefore analysis must be done to determine how various frameworks correspond to each other.

Form: Mapping can take different forms and can be categorized in various ways. The most common types of mapping are categorized either on (A) the hierarchy of existing frameworks (B) along thematic areas of work, or (C) based on triggers of conflict. A mapping can start at any point of the results hierarchy of frameworks depending on what the mapping attempts to clarify.

Examples:

Based on hierarchy of results (in narrative)

Annex IV: Current UN Priorities for Guinea-Bissau

A number of exercises have been undertaken by the UN system and the Guinea-Bissau authorities to identify the country's peace consolidation priorities as well as the appropriate UN response. The analysis of current "UN priorities" for the country is based on the following documents:

- Secretary-General reports to the Security Council (latest: 2 December 2008), and the Letter dated 18 December 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/777)
- UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF, 2008-2012)
- Strategic framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau (2008)
- Report of the UN Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau (2008)
- Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP, 2009)

Current priorities by strategic document

The latest Secretary-General's report emphasizes the positive developments on the electoral front, with the successful holding of legislative elections in November 2008. It stresses the importance of strengthening UN support in SSR, especially following the October 2008 Inter-Agency mission, and of improving the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, seen as "highly detrimental to the consolidation of the rule of law, peace and stability in the region". Finally, it recognizes that "overall social and economic indicators for the country still remain disturbingly low".

The Letter dated 18 December 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/777) clearly spells out the mandate of UNOGBIS in Guinea-Bissau:

- (a) assisting the Peacebuilding Commission in its multidimensional engagement with Guinea-Bissau;
- (b) strengthening the capacities of national institutions, including law enforcement and criminal justice systems, in order to maintain constitutional order;
- (c) supporting an all-inclusive national reconciliation and political dialogue process as an institutionalized peace consolidation framework;
- (d) supporting and facilitating the implementation of security sector reform.

Based on hierarchy of results (in matrix)

- Included in both STERP and 100 day plan
- **Included in STERP but not in 100 day plan**
- Included in 100 day plan but not in STERP
- Included in needs assessment or CAP/CHAP but not in STERP or 100 day plan
- In GPA BUT NOT IN STERP AND/OR 100 DAY PLAN
- In GPA AND ALSO IN STERP AND/OR 100 DAY PLAN

Clusters	Global Political Agreement (GPA)	STERP Sectors	100 Day Plan Sectors	CAP/CHAP Sectors ¹	Needs Assessment Sectors
Overarching issues (STERP: Cross Cutting Issues);	- ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL CULTURE TRAINING PROGRAMME	- Support to GPA - Regional integration - Environment - Research, science and technology - Diaspora and brain drain - Youth development - Engagement of the international community (debt) - Investment			- Environment - Gender - HIV/AIDS - Youth

Based on thematic areas of work (schematic overview)

Members of judiciary and correction personnel deployed and given means to discharge duties	Justice system reformed and reorganized in line with new constitution	Improve access to assistance, justice, compensation, rehabilitation and redress of victims of human rights violations	Civil service is reformed and transformed into professional structure, supported by coherent legal framework	Advice to strengthen democratic institutions at all levels	Strengthen support to existing institutions and build new ones
<p>Strategic plan to support police, military, judicial and correction services developed</p> <p>Assistance to establish Council Superior</p> <p>Human rights promoted and protected with emphasis on fight against impunity/ National HR Commission/ Training security sector</p>	<p>-National HR Commission</p> <p>-Cour constitutionnelle and conseil d'etat</p> <p>-Network of parliamentary HR defenders</p> <p>-Training to 800 magistrates to discharge duties and uphold Rome statute</p> <p>-Free legal aid system in pilot areas</p> <p>-Establish Conseil Superior</p> <p>-Training to update/ review legislation</p> <p>-Establish mixed criminal chambers/ investigate suspected perpetrators of war crimes</p> <p>-Establish gender justice prog</p> <p>-inputs for new legislation of media and protection for journalists</p> <p>-Pilot mechanism for collecting data of violence against children</p>	<p>-Establish juvenile justice system</p> <p>-Rehabilitation of prisons</p> <p>-establish child protection unit in ministry</p> <p>-training of child and labour rights to senior justice staff</p> <p>strengthen capacities of judicial institutions and develop criminal justice policy focused on sexual violence</p> <p>Guarantee effective application of 2006 law on SV</p> <p>Improved access to justice for SV victims</p> <p>Ensure reparation for SV victims</p> <p>Create a protective environment for protection from SV</p> <p>Develop national protocol for multi sectoral assistance</p>	<p>Deployment of civil authorities</p> <p>Deploy civil authorities</p> <p>Support implication of state authorities and civil society in management and peaceful resolution of local conflicts</p> <p>Capacity of state institutions and CBCS to deliver basic services increased and area-based recovery programmes piloted in selected communities</p>	<p>Fiduciary systems at provincial and local levels are established and capacities to deliver social services are strengthened, supported by a coherent legal framework</p> <p>-TA on laws and regulatory texts on decentralization</p> <p>-Training to provincial administrators on management of public resources, planning mechanism, mainstream human rights in local development plans</p> <p>-TA to reform birth registration system</p> <p>-Training to women's organizations to influence social expenditures at local level</p> <p>-Community radio states established</p> <p>-Advice on improving financial management in provincial and local governments</p> <p>-Training to local officials on improved service delivery</p> <p>-Training to officials in public record offices</p> <p>-TA on implementation of national gender strategy on local level</p>	<p>Promote national reconciliation and internal political dialogue, including strengthening civil society and multi-party democracy and support to Goma and Nairobi processes</p> <p>Local security improved and local reconciliation promoted</p> <p>Local peacebuilding coordination and joint efforts start</p>

How to map

The process of mapping will depend on the specific context and the number of analytical and planning processes and documents which need to be considered. However, in general, such a process would entail:

1. Listing of existing frameworks:
 - Can be done through a desk review and gathering of documents

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- Estimated time frame: 3-4 days
2. Determine strategic linkages:
 - Establish results level (outcome/output/activity) of each framework and determine how the results correspond to each other.
 - Requires an analytical review of the different processes and documents
 - It may be useful to base this on a discussion amongst key partners to ensure ownership
 - Could feed into the senior level discussion on identification of gaps, overlaps, contradictions, etc.
 - Can be done through a matrix or any other format
 - Estimated time frame: 1-2 weeks
 3. Gap analysis:
 - Identify areas where the frameworks overlap or show gaps
 - Can be used to prepare the ground for the planning and use the actual planning process to reconcile differences, build upon commonalities and as much as possible address gaps.
 4. Consideration of thematic issues:
 - If extensive planning or analytical processes and documents related to a specific thematic issue(s) exist in country, a mapping of thematic issues is recommended.

ⁱ Examples of these different categories are: "*Programme de sortie de crise*" In Côte d'Ivoire; CAF in DRC; UNDAFs.

Annex 11

Planning an ISF Kick-off Retreat

Aim: The ISF development process may benefit from a kick-off retreat led by the senior leadership team and including the members of the Strategic Policy Group (or similar). This retreat **aims to establish the shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives for peace consolidation** and should take into consideration political direction from UN headquarters and the results of the field-based preparatory work from the diagnostics phase (conflict analysis, mapping, comparative advantage analysis). In order to focus the discussion, the retreat **should take place after adequate preparation** (as detailed in the diagnostics phase) is completed.

Participation: This retreat should involve the most senior representatives of the UN system in the country. The number of participants should be large enough to include representation from peacekeeping/political (including the military and police), support, human rights, humanitarian, and development actors, but small enough to allow for confidential and open debate (e.g. 20-30 people). It is also a good practice for the lead department to send a senior official to provide strategic guidance and ensure broad understanding and consensus, from the outset, on the goals of the exercise at the headquarters and field levels. Past retreats have also included strategic planners from the region who have gone through similar processes, which promoted sharing of lessons learned and emerging good practices.

Facilitation: The retreat benefits greatly from the engagement of an external, professional facilitator and resource persons. Names of external facilitators with experience in ISF kick-off workshops or similar types of exercises (e.g. UNDAF workshop, CAP workshop) are available from DPKO, DPA, DOCO and OCHA. As the external facilitator will be funded from in-country resources, Mission, RC/HC, and Agencies may be asked to contribute. Likewise, trained facilitators and IMPP policy experts are also available for short term missions from headquarters to support the preparation and delivery of a kick-off retreat.⁵ Headquarters IMPP policy experts also have sample retreat agendas and can offer additional advice on initial lessons learned from the ISF case studies in Cote d'Ivoire and DRC.

Key Questions: Strong preparatory work in the diagnostic phase should allow the senior managers participating in the retreat to focus on the follow key questions:

- Based on the conflict analysis and mapping of current UN activities, how effectively is the UN presence addressing the root causes of conflict and/or the current conflict risks and triggers?
- Where there are limitations in the UN's effectiveness, where does the UN have the potential to become more effective, through coordinated and/or joint action of the Mission and UNCT?
- Based on the previous discussion, what are the 3-4 top priorities for the UN system in the country during the planning period (1-2 years)? Top priorities should meet these criteria:
 - necessary for peace consolidation
 - Leverage the combined comparative advantage of the Mission and UNCT (e.g. based on the capacity mapping and SWOT analysis results), with partners where appropriate
 - Are achievable in the short-medium term (e.g. 6-24 months)
- Who will take the lead on the coordination and delivery of results for each of the thematic priorities?
- How could we work better together to achieve these results?

Retreat Outcomes: The retreat participants should identify 3-4 strategic priorities that are achievable in the envisaged time frame (e.g. 1-2 years) and based on a realistic appraisal of the UN's comparative advantage and capacity. The retreat should also set for the strategic vision for

⁵ Contact the Chair of the IMPP Working Group in New York (Kristina Koch-Avan, koch-avan@un.org) or your relevant HQ counterpart for more information on contracting external facilitators or engaging resources from headquarters.

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achievement of these priorities and provide analysis on how to mitigate risk in the operational and political climate in country. Finally, senior managers should have identified leads and/or co-leads for each of the strategic priorities, and the leads should have agreed to carry forward the development and implementation process in these areas. In this context, it may be a good practice, as was done for the integrated Mission/UNCT UNDAF in Liberia, to identify co-leads from the Mission and UNCT, respectively, for each priority (except in the unusual circumstance that a priority rests wholly within the mandate and competence of either the Mission or the UNCT). There should also be a mutual understanding of what accountability for these roles entails, and whether additional resources for either coordination or delivery are required. Finally, who leads/co-leads the peace consolidation priorities identified by the retreat is a function of the specific country context. The results of the retreat should allow the senior working level staff in the ISPT (or similar), to translate the strategic priorities identified by the senior managers into results, timelines, and responsibilities.

Annex 12

Definitions and Examples: ISF End state, Strategic Objective, and Results

The examples have been adapted from existing UN strategies, including the UN Security and Stability Support Strategy (UN SSSS) for Eastern DRC and the Proposed Workplan for Priority Interventions (Somalia February 2009).

1. End State

Definition: Defines broadly (e.g. security, humanitarian, and development aspects) the state of affairs in the country at the conclusion of the ISF implementation period. The focus is on having the minimum elements required for peace consolidation or stabilization in place within time horizons of the peacekeeping/political mission, with a central emphasis on political and security imperatives necessary to lay the groundwork for peace consolidation or peacebuilding.

Example: Former war-affected areas stabilized and largely free of violent conflict, illegal armed groups disarmed, and the local population is benefiting from the gradual redeployment of state security, public administration, justice, and basic social services

2. Strategic Objective

Definition: This is a strategic-level outcome that captures a number of inter-related dynamics of conflict, and therefore, peace stabilization/consolidation. Some typical examples could encompass the inter-related aspects of, *inter alia*, political/governance (or state authority), protection of civilians, security (including security sector reform), return and reintegration, rule of law, and the delivery of peace dividends/early recovery.

Minimum standard: Each thematic pillar of the ISF should be stated as a strategic objective. Each strategic objective should have a unique narrative including (a) a statement of “strategy”, i.e. HOW will this be pursued and how risks will be mitigated, (b) how this relates to the other strategic objectives (i.e. reflecting sequencing or interdependence), (c) a brief description of what other international partners are doing in this area, and (d) how cross cutting themes will be addressed.

Example: State authority extended to war-affected areas⁶

This strategic objective aims to rapidly extend state authority to areas formerly dominated by the FDLR and Congolese armed groups through support for the training and deployment of police, justice, penitentiary and local administration officials. Early results from on-going attempts to support the restoration of state authority in former conflict areas (e.g. deployment of the Police in North Kivu) reveal a number of challenges that must be addressed to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of these interventions, and avoid new sources of conflict. These include the need to politically manage and negotiate the deployment of ‘new’ state authorities in areas which have over time developed their own political power dynamics and interests; the need to avoid perceptions of unequal treatment between different communities in the choice of localities chosen for restoration of state authorities; and the inability of GoDRC provincial structures to institutionally, administrative and logistically absorb and support the expansion of their personnel and presence on the ground.

⁶ Adapted from the UN SSSS

3. Results

Result: ISF results should be pitched at the strategic level (e.g. expected accomplishment in an RBB or outcome in an UNDAF)⁷, not at the level of programmatic outputs. ISF results, would therefore encompass a number of related outputs that could be further delineated in an operational workplan.

Minimum Standard: Set of results pitched at the strategic level (e.g. using a similar methodology as an UNDAF “outcome” or RBB “expected accomplishment”). In some cases, special or joint implementation arrangements may also be presented, in particular when new arrangements are to be undertaken.

Example Result: Establishment of a Somali police service⁸

Previous assessments have recommended the establishment of a police force with 10,000 officers. To date, there are only 2,777 registered police personnel that have undertaken professional training. To train the other police officers, the UN will scale-up its support to police training, mentoring, and infrastructure so as to assure the formation of the force at the earliest possibility without compromising the methods and period of training, vetting of recruits, and to ensure professionalism and the protection of human rights. This will also involve increased monitoring of the police to prevent and punish human rights violations. The strategy for this result is to build up existing training programmes to meet increased demand in the wake of the peace agreement and to ensure Mission support in preparation of government enabling legislation for the formation of the national police force and the definition of police powers. The specific interventions prioritized under this result follow:

- Training of trainers and Police Command Courses (UNDP/UNPOS)
- Training of 4,000 new recruits (UNDP/OHCHR/UNICEF)
- Provision of vehicles, equipment, and uniforms (UNDP)
- Rehabilitation and construction of 50 police stations (UNDP)

⁷ “expected accomplishment” is defined as per ST/SGB/2000/8 as follows: “a desired outcome involving benefits to end-users, expressed as a quantitative or qualitative standard, value or rate. Accomplishments are the direct consequence or effect of the generation of outputs and lead to the fulfilment of a certain objective. The definition of “outcome” based on the UNDAF guidelines may also be used.

⁸ Adapted from the Proposed Workplan of Priority Interventions, Somalia, February 2009

**DRAFT September 2008 Update
Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for Eastern DRC**

Goma Process and Nairobi Communiqué:

- The Goma process is seriously challenged since the resumption of military confrontations on 28 August. A unilateral CNDP commitment to pull back to its original positions (pre-28 August) was followed by a Minister of Defense Communiqué also committing to a Cease-Fire for the FARDC. Yet, throughout the month of September, CNDP and FARDC continued to confront each other along several axis and proximity points in North Kivu and along the fringes of South Kivu Province.
- Despite this phase of escalation, the GoDRC remains committed to the Amani program, but CNDP now openly started rejecting Amani and insists on direct talks with the GoDRC.
- MONUC, backed by the International Facilitation, imposed a Separation and Disengagement Plan for all signatories of the Actes d'Engagement. The SRSG will approach the Security Council to ask for formal approval of this new approach, which is dubbed Amani Plus.
- Following the *Comite d'Pilote* for the Amani Programme, fast-tracking DDR, opening the strategic axes, deploying the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) and extending state authority in South Kivu, in the Grand Nord and in Maniema has been prioritized in coordination with the PNDDR.
- The fighting in North and South Kivu is a temporary setback for the Nairobi Communiqué and especially Operation Kimia, after the Integrated and Trained Battalions of the FARDC are drawn into the combat zone in North Kivu and are moved away from the Triangles. No new FARDC battalions have joined the training centers.
- There is not much progress on the 70 *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR/RUD) combatants in the regroupement center in Kasiki although MONUC reaches an agreement in principle with the GoDRC representatives for the Kisangani Road Map on an incentive package for FDLR who repatriate/relocate under the Program.
- Relations between Rwanda and DR Congo did not improve during the month and mutual accusations are exchanged in media articles; President Kagame and President Kabila accuse one and other through media channels as well.

Security:

- The security situation is far from stable as long as there is no cease fire in North Kivu and Separation and Disengagement are not implemented. A flaring up of attacks by the FRPI in Ituri against the FARDC forces MONUC to use its attack helicopters and puts more strains on the FARDC, after Ituri zone Operations Commander Kinkela left to North Kivu to reinforce the 8TH Military Region.
- The LRA are changing their modus operandi in DR Congo and stage a series of raids against soft targets in Dungu, west of the Garamba Park. The FARDC experiences serious delays in the deployment of FARDC to the Dungu. 2 Battalions of GR arrive in Kisangani but their transportation to Dungu is hampered by financial constraints.
- Demonstrations and violent mob attacks against MONUC peacekeepers become routine and spread from Rutshuru to Goma and other parts of the Kivu Provinces. Country-wide, politicians campaign against MONUC and voice their disappointment with the slow pace of the Amani Process.

State Authority, return and recovery:

- Activities for the rehabilitation of roads and infrastructure have had to be partially suspended in North Kivu due to the security situation along those areas. Meanwhile, focus is turning to South Kivu where road rehabilitation is expected to commence in the coming weeks. Efforts to link DDR activities in the province with the extension of state authority and community reintegration activities are being made.
- The police and border police components continue to make progress in the planning and preparedness for the deployment of the PNC, including the possibility of deployment in the non-militarized zones that will need to be created as part of the disengagement plan.
- The forth component is being revised to extend conflict resolution and recovery activities along the axes. This re-conceptualization is intended to quick-start fourth component activities in a more synchronized, rather than sequential manner, with activities implemented in the other components and therefore accelerate peace dividends for the population living in those areas.

Sub-component	Impact Indicators	September Developments	Status	Management Intervention
FARDC capability improves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of FARDC battalions in TTF Facility ➤ Number of effective FARDC battalions in the Kivus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The courses planned at MONUC's two training facilities expected to take place in September had to be postponed until October due to the non arrival of FARDC battalions to the training site. ➤ The FARDC Command and control structure was tested by CNDP operations in North Kivu during the month of September with some set backs. However, on-going operations are 	Yellow: Some progress has been made but intervention is	SRSG and FC to persuade MoD and Chef de l'Etat Major to commit battalions to MONUC training and to site garrisons along the strategic axes SRSG to seek

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		<p>having the positive effect of permitting an identification of capable FARDC commanders and experience is being gained.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The lack of bi-lateral agreements to provide vehicles and radios for post-brassage and post Military Training Program (MTP) battalions remains a key limitation on capability improvement of the FARDC in the Kivus. 	required	support from the international community for bi-lateral equipment support to FARDC (Vehicles and communication equipment)
Armed groups are encouraged to negotiate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of FARDC battalions actively engaged in operations against armed groups in the Kivus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ LRA: One FARDC battalion is currently in Dungu and patrolling further afield which has sparked an increase in LRA violations. The remaining two GoDRC battalions are currently held in Kisangani for lack of transport means. ➤ ADF / NALU: Operations against the ADF/NALU were delayed due to the transfer of FARDC commander and the battalion that had been allocated to the North being redirected to other areas in North Kivu. ➤ FDLR: There were almost no operations carried out against the FDLR as three out of the eight FARDC battalions have been reassigned to operations against CNDP. The three additional battalions due to join the operations in September have not yet arrived. 	Yellow: Some progress has been made	
Armed militia enter brassage or DDR/DDRRR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of ex-combatants entering DDR or DRRR ➤ Number of ex-combatants awaiting brassage ➤ Number of children released from armed groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Since the implementation of the Nairobi Communiqué, 862 FDLR including dependents, have been repatriated to Rwanda by MONUC. ➤ 1109 militia are assembled at Kitona, 2896 at Kamina and 1766 at Lukusa brassage centres awaiting training. Training is said not to be able to start until the number of candidates in the centers reaches 3000. ➤ 932 FARDC are at Mura undergoing training by RSA for the Rapid Reaction Force with postponed date of completion fixed on the 03 October 2008. ➤ The launching of PNDDR is expected to commence on the 3 October 2008. Intense discussions have been taking place to link the need of accelerating DDR activities with decisions being made in Amani Steering Committee. Focus is placed on prioritizing South Kivu and Maniema. A mapping of on-going reinsertion and recovery activities for non-eligible combatants is underway. 	Yellow: Some progress has been made	SRSR and DSRSG to meet with the Chairman of the Amani Programme and with the Head of the UE/PNDDR to coordinate and align efforts on the resumption of DDR activities.
At-risk populations are protected, cease-fires monitored and checkpoints dismantled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of ceasefire violations ➤ Number of checkpoints dismantled 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Continued, extensive Cease-fire violations were registered throughout September as the FARDC and CNDP both seek tactical advantage and ignore the ceasefire. FDLR and PARECO have also, but to a lesser extent, exploited the instability. ➤ Firm MONUC action has protected the main population centers and MONUC MOBs have provided a haven for IDPs. Nevertheless CNDP and FARDC actions have resulted in an 	Yellow: Some progress has been made but intervention is required	

		increase in IDPs populations in the Petit Nord.		
<p>Spoilers are identified and sanctioned</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Number of spoilers whose assets have been frozen ➢ Number of <i>genocidaires</i> arrested ➢ Number of FDLR leaders locally and abroad with travel restrictions ➢ Number of spoilers facing judicial and/or financial proceedings locally 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ On 17 September LRA commenced a series of attacks on villages north of Dungu. Abducting approximately 90 children, killing around 20 people as well as looted and burned the villages. The attacks has led to displacement of the population of an estimate of 75 000 persons ➢ The deterioration of the situation along the axis Bunia Bogu, due to a sudden resurrection of a strong FRPI (using new weapons such as 82 mm mortars) suggests renewed outside support for militia in Ituri, a process that could compromise the gains made. ➢ The ICC's confirmation of the charges against Ngudjolo and Katanga are a positive development. ➢ Continued recruitment of children by CNDP and Paraco is confirmed. ➢ A first surprise inspection of aircraft was conducted by a joint MONUC-GoDRC team at Kavumu airport. 	<p style="text-align: center;">●</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Red: Limited progress made despite efforts</p>	<p>SRSG to meet with SESG for LRA Affected areas. Rapid implementation of the FARDC deployment under 'Operation Rudia', for containment and protection of civilians. FC to encourage and participate in trilateral Chief of Staff meetings (DRC, Ugandan and Sudan).</p>
<p>Political leaders are encouraged to follow-through on commitments</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Fighting continued between disputing forces notably FARDC and CNDP ➢ SRSG Doss met with key political figures (President Kabila, President of National Assembly, Minister of the Interior and Security) in the DRC to seek ways to end the fighting ➢ MONUC presented a disengagement plan to the GoDRC President Kabila and all armed groups on the request of the International facilitation based on the Actes d'Engagements. ➢ MONUC and the International Facilitation participate in the fourth Meeting of the Amani steering Committee in Bukavu (South Kivu) where the disengagement plan was presented and all armed groups agreed to comply. CNDP is still to discuss the plan with MONUC 	<p style="text-align: center;">●</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Red: Interventions have been made on all levels but little progress has occurred</p>	<p>SRSG to intensify discussions with special envoys over confidence-building measures and establish deadlines for positive actions by both sides</p>
<p>Diplomatic relations improve</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Lack of implementation of the Ngurdoto Agreement including no exchange of full diplomatic relations, at ambassadorial level, between Uganda and DRC ➢ Positive development: Chef de Cabinet of Interior Minister Kalumie in Uganda to discuss Rukwanzu and the border issue (1-3 Oct) ➢ No diplomatic relations between DRC and Rwanda. Deteriorating confidence and harsher relations after Paul Kagame's interview in the Belgian <i>Le Soir</i>. Followed by several negative media reports both in DRC and Rwanda ➢ Accusation by DRC Foreign Minister of Rwandan support to CNDP (letter). Complains by Rwanda on DRC support to FDLR (41st JMG-TF meeting) 	<p style="text-align: center;">●</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Red: Limited progress made despite efforts</p>	<p>SRSG and the good offices in Kampala and Kigali, to encourage bilateral meetings between DRC and Uganda and Rwanda respectively, both on political (Head of States, Foreign Ministry) and military (Chief of Staff and regional Commanders) level</p>


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<p>Roads and state infrastructure</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of priority axes rehabilitated ➤ Number of state infrastructure rehabilitated/constructed along the axes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Update on Sake-Masisi. 60% of works on the first phase of rehabilitation of the road have been completed. Work along Sake-Masisi had to be suspended due to clashes between FARDC and CNDP along the axis and adjacent areas. ➤ Update on Rutshuru-Ishasa. UNOPS is expected to start establishing work-sites end of September. A phased approach is being contemplated, beginning with the Nyamilima-Ishasa stretch which is judged relatively more secure than the southern sections of the road. ➤ Update on Bunia-Boga. A preliminary assessment of road rehabilitation requirements was carried out jointly by UNOPS, MONUC CAS and Force HQ Fwd Chief Engineer. The MONUC Nepalese contingent is expected to rehabilitate the road surface while UNOPS will rehabilitate drainage and road infrastructure. ➤ Update on Bukavu-Hombo. Works for road and infrastructure rehabilitation are expected to commence first week of October. ➤ Verification of sites for infrastructure rehabilitation. Discussions with local authorities are at an advanced stage in Ituri district, North and South Kivu with respect to the identification of land for construction of state infrastructure. Final authorizations and transmission of necessary documents (land titles and cadastre numbers) expected over the course of the next week, which will allow UNOPS to start work. 	<p>Green: Progress has been made. Efforts are being accelerated in South Kivu and Ituri</p>	
<p>National police are deployed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of national police deployed ➤ Number of police stations rehabilitated and operational ➤ Number of police housing units constructed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ 40 Foreign Police Units (FPU) Officers were deployed in Goma on the 27 September 2008. ➤ The selection of 'Non-originaires' (PNC officers not originally from the place where they are intended to be deployed) PNC Officers started on the 29th of September by UNPOL/PNC mixed Committee and is expected to be completed on 04th October. ➤ The selection of local PNC officers is ongoing in Bunia, Bukavu and Goma by the joint UNPOL/PNC teams. ➤ Discussions continue regarding the deployment of the Joint Monitoring Teams (JMT) intended to monitor the performance of newly deployed PNC along priority axes. A JMTs manual will be finalized soon. 	<p>Green: Progress has been made</p>	
<p>Sexual Violence (SV): Protection and Response</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of victims of sexual violence received multi-sectoral assistance ➤ Percentage increase in number of criminal cases related to SV 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A mapping exercise of ongoing and planned activities by international actors on sexual violence in DRC. A preliminary analysis is being finalized that will allow for identification of gaps and prioritization of programmes. ➤ A centralized database is being developed. This will allow for improved qualitative and quantitative reporting on incidents of sexual 	<p>Yellow: Some progress has been made</p>	<p>SRSRG and DSRSG to promote problem of Sexual Violence as a political issue and ensure incorporation of the issue of at all levels of the GoDRC</p>

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	<p>brought judicial proceedings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of perpetrators tried and sentenced for SV crimes ➤ Percentage decrease of SV incident cases 	<p>violence. Indicators to allow for a comprehensive situation analysis specifically on protection and prevention of SV are being finalized.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A strategic concept note and plan of action on combating impunity is in the process of being adopted and is being presented to the Ministry of Justice other high judicial authorities and actors involved in justice reform. . Two further sub- components of the overall SV strategy on prevention and protection and security sector reform are currently under development. . ➤ Coordination mechanisms for Sexual Violence are being streamlined, through the creation of a new SV Task Force; a proposed position paper on improving national coordination mechanisms is for SV will be shared with all UN actors and NGOs actors implicated in SV, , with a primary focus on provincial level coordination in the East. ➤ Incorporating Sexual Violence in other thematic coordination mechanisms and agendas, such as the protection cluster and Security and Justice Reform. 		<p>agenda</p>
<p>Judiciary and prison personnel are deployed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of prisons rehabilitated and operational ➤ Percentage increase in number of criminal cases processed ➤ Percentage decrease in number of pre-trial detainees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Nothing significant to report 	<p>Yellow: Work has continued</p>	
<p>State representatives are deployed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of legally recognized state representatives deployed ➤ Number of state offices rehabilitated ➤ Number of local security councils operational 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ An analytical report and database of the administrative posts occupied by armed groups (parallel administration) have been completed and shared with provincial Ministries of Interior in the Kivus and is still under progress in Ituri. Basic data has been transmitted to the Amani Program. ➤ The selection of administrative entities to rehabilitate and support along the 6 strategic axes has been streamlined with existing legal framework and is being discussed and validated with provincial, then national authorities. ➤ A final detailed action plan and schedule of activities are under preparation. ➤ A comparative analysis of the AMANI component "restoration and extension of State authority" and UNSSSS objectives and activities has been done. ➤ Support from the Congolese authorities is being requested on the following issues: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Validation of UNSSSS action plan on restoration and extension of State 	<p>Yellow: Work has continued</p>	

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> authority. 2. Clarification of the legal status of “Chefs de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif” (CPEA). 3. Validation of the type and number of administrative services and civil servants to be deployed. 4. Validation of buildings prototypes per administrative unit (“Territoire” and “Groupement”). 5. Issuance of title deeds and proof of ownership. 6. Coordination identification, appointments and deployment mechanisms for civil servants. 7. Definition of the minimum kit for equipments to be delivered to administrative services. 8. Validation of capacity building activities for deployed civil servants. 9. Reliable and effective salary payment system for deployed civil servants. 		
Border police are deployed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Number of Border Police deployed ➤ Number of criminal incidents reported along eastern borders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Pre-deployment reconnaissance of all future Border Police Stations has been completed. Based on this exercise, the structure of the border police in North and South Kivu will be the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ North Kivu: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provincial headquarters – Goma 2. Beni (5 posts) 3. Rutshuru (3 posts) 4. Goma (4 posts) ▪ South Kivu: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Provincial headquarters – Bukavu 6. Kalehe (5 posts) 7. Bukavu (6 posts) 8. Uvira (6 posts) 9. Baraka (6 posts) 10. Specialized Training Center – Bukavu (works completed) ➤ The pre-fabricated containers that will serve as border police offices in these 32 locations are already prepositioned in Bukavu and will be transported to their final locations within the coming month. ➤ The training of the PNC officers to be deployed is expected to take place in the coming weeks. 	<p>Yellow: Work has continued</p>	
Return and recovery		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ A technical commission between Rwanda-HCR-DRC was supposed to meet in Goma on the 24-26 September as scheduled by the tripartite meeting held in July in Kigali. However, due to the situation prevailing in the Kivus, the Rwandan authorities did not respond to the invitation and the expected meeting had to be cancelled. ➤ Fighting in North Kivu has made several locations, including Karuba and Ngungu, non-durable for the return of IDPs again after initial 	 <p>Red: Limited progress made despite efforts. The security environment is</p>	

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		<p>assessments had taken place in order to launch activities on the priority axes in previous months.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ In Ituri and South Kivu certain areas on the priority axes do meet established benchmarks for durable return ➤ Returnee families continue to receive NFI kits in Ituri, North Kivu, Katanga and South Kivu from UNICEF as part of PEAR programme. ➤ UNICEF, UNDP and FAO are preparing a joint project to the Dutch Government to support social and economic recovery along the UNSSSS priority axes in South Kivu. ➤ Most return areas targeted as part of plan still lack basic services in health, education and water and sanitation. ➤ The fourth component is currently being reformulated to include increased transitional and recovery activities along the axes. A proposal is being developed in this regard in view of commencing activities before the end of the year. 	<p>not conducive</p>	
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