

EXTRACT OF MONUSCO REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The introduction of the FIB and the Mission's reconfiguration to the East have impacted on mandate implementation, in particularly POC. On the one hand, the FIB's efforts to neutralize the M23 have eliminated a threat and provided a boost on the morale. On the other hand, the insertion of the FIB has provoked a number of contingents within the Framework Brigades to undertake a passive and largely ineffective approach to tasks. However, this aggravates already difficult command and control challenges, leads to loss of confidence among the population, and demotivates those within the FIB who feel they have an unfair share of the burden.
2. Despite the Mission leadership's efforts to promote a sense of "one mission", "one mandate" and "one force", the coordination of operations between the Framework Brigades and the FIB are not as complimentary as they should be. This is in part due to different interpretation of the mandate, and partly a result of the brigade commander's desire not to consider operations holistically. The Mission should therefore be supported to have one set of tasks to establish a proactive and robust posture.
3. The number of cities and villages that are spread out on large geographical areas, with poor infrastructure, make it challenging for the Mission to be present everywhere. The POC by presence is a not workable concept. The option is to disrupt the negative armed groups with a more flexible and mobile MONUSCO force and police component working in support of the FARDC and the PNC.
4. The force requires mobility. Prior to any attempt to reduce aviation assets, the Mission must conduct a comprehensive review of aviation assets by analysing its requirements in full consultation and coordination with uniform and substantive components. In the absence of good road infrastructure in the host country, aviation assets, both fixed and rotary wing, play a crucial role in ensuring timely movements of the personnel, equipment, sustainment supplies and providing the robust support to the uniformed personnel.
5. The Mission needs to continue to build on its work with the GoDRC, FARDC and PNC, so that they take ownership. From the standpoint of the Mission's exit strategy, the Mission needs continue to build the capacity and support the FARDC and PNC in respect of their core responsibility to provide security to their citizens.
6. The Mission's information gathering and analysis capabilities are not sufficient to meet the complexity of threats. The Mission need more investment in human and signals intelligence capabilities, particularly within the uniformed components. There is a need to work with the Mission to improve its information gathering and analysis capability, in order to enhance intelligence-driven operations to protect the population.
7. Military and police are not well integrated and are operating in isolation and in parallel instead of in complementarity. JMAC and JOC need to change focus and redefine their role to support joint tasking and integration. Both JMAC and JOC are understaffed and the Mission is trying to reinforce them. The Mission should seek better planning, coordination and integration.
8. The Mission Concept, and the Military and Police CONOPS, and directives are outdated and must be reviewed and supported by a consolidated Mission Support plan. There is a need to reassess the operational environment and the operational requirements of each unit.
9. The force has a very dispersed deployment layout, which includes a number of company and platoon operating bases. Vulnerable outposts have been created, a large number of troops are

involved in guarding bases, reserves have been committed, the burden on administration is significantly increased, and the medical support is stretched beyond reasonable limits. The force is now reducing the number of bases.

10. The Mission has lost momentum on the PNC reform, as a majority of MONUSCO police have been redeployed to the eastern regions. The “antenna office” concept has not been effective to achieve the same tasks. Strong MONUSCO police leadership presence is required in Kinshasa to strengthen coordination and maintain close contacts with PNC leadership and UNCT entities. The Police Component needs to be reconfigured and strengthened to effectively address current challenges and priorities related to PNC capacity building and electoral security. Additional reserve FPU’s may be necessary in key populated centres, including the west and Kinshasa.
11. FPU’s are under-utilized and not producing expected outputs and there is limited operational control over them. The FPU coordination cells need to be fully established at sector-level, where FPU’s are deployed, to provide administrative and operational support.
12. Many systemic gaps identified in other missions also exist in MONUSCO. For example: inadequate air mobility to support mandate implementation, lack of pre-deployment training, non-integration of the Mission training, discrepancy between SURs and tasks, provision of welfare, delay in payment of MSA and reimbursement of claims, expiration of ammunition and tear gas, absence of adequate language assistants, absence of detention arrangement, and limited COE compliance and capability.
13. Mission Support is in reactive mode, especially in supporting the Mission’s activities in East. The Mission needs to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for support, and provide direction to all components.
14. Currently, the Mission is providing rations and fuel to FARDC troops while conducting joint operations with MONUSCO. The budgeted numbers are far lower than the actual support that is being provided, thus causing budget overruns. In addition, the financial implications for the training and equipping of FARDC’s rapidly deployable units are enormous. The Mission needs practical budgeting assumptions and may need to find donors who are willing to sponsor some of these activities through a trust fund mechanism.
15. Targeted acts and demonstrations against MONUSCO personnel have increased recently, in particular in North Kivu. With anticipated upcoming elections and possible tension within the local population combined with the armed group’s random attacks on villages, the security climate in MONUSCO’s area of responsibility is unpredictable and easily could worsen. The Mission needs to continue to engage with host nation, T/PCCs to enhance its security capabilities.
16. Media outreach to gain the hearts and minds of the Congolese population seems to be falling short. The public often blames the Mission for civilian losses at the hands of armed groups. This hampers the Mission’s efforts to gather information from civilians, and sometimes requires that the Mission confronts civilians who are behaving aggressively towards the Mission staff and installations.

I. MANDATE, STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS AND GUIDANCE

a. Mandate and Tasks

1. It was decided under Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) that MONUSCO shall have, within the authorized troop ceiling, an “*Intervention Brigade*,” with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities. The Security Council also requested MONUSCO to strengthen the presence of its military, police and civilian components in eastern DRC and to reduce, to the fullest extent possible for the implementation of its mandate, its presence in areas not affected by conflict in particular Kinshasa and in western DRC.
2. Security Council resolution 2147 (2014) extended MONUSCO’s mandate along the lines of resolution 2098 (2013) and further requested for a clear exit strategy and that future reconfigurations of MONUSCO should be determined on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground in line with the three priorities of *Protection of Civilians (POC)*, *Stabilization* and *Support to the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF)*, as set out in the Mission Concept.
3. It was evident that the Mission would benefit from one set of tasks to establish a proactive and robust posture. To this effect it would be beneficial for DPKO to involve the key T/PCCs in formulating the revised mandate, Mission Concept and the Military and Police Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to optimize their commitment and will in effective implementation of operational responsibilities and tasks. Given the close coordination and cooperation between the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)* and the MONUSCO force, it may also be appropriate to engage with the GoDRC as a new mandate and revised tasks for the Mission is being articulated. This would most likely reduce some of the criticism of MONUSCO.
4. The Minister of Defence expressed the view that MONUSCO must confront all armed groups and stressed that his Government had no intention of protecting the *Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)*. He emphasized that operations aimed at this group would have to be different from the engagement with the M23. He further expressed the view that a large number of MONUSCO contingents continue to operate with a Chapter VI mind-set and hoped that the Mission would become more proactive.
5. The key tasks for MONUSCO Military Component is to: provide protection to civilians (in the area of operations), the United Nations personnel and facilities; neutralize armed groups; monitor the implementation of the arms embargo; and to provide support for the government owned Security/Defence Sector Reform (SSR/DSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation, -Repatriation,- Reintegration and -Resettlement- (DDR(RR)) programme which includes the reform of the FARDC, as well as the establishment of its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).
6. MONUSCO police are mainly tasked to provide advice and support to the GoDRC for the reform of the police, including by contributing to the provision of training to the PNC, contribute to POC activities through early warning and patrolling, and protect United Nations personnel and facilities.
7. The Chief of the PNC stated that he has received good support and training from MONUSCO police and have jointly developed a reform plan which now needs to be implemented. He mentioned that PNC requires more assistance in the area of training, human resource management, electoral security, logistic and infrastructure development for police facilities.

He underlined the importance of having a nationwide PNC capacity building assistance, rather than focusing on east only, and develops a roadmap for transition.

8. The uniformed components are largely taking forward the priority tasks assigned by the Council; however, there are challenges to their ability and willingness to implement POC mandate. There are also shortcomings in the Mission's nationwide approach to SSR.

b. Impact of Reconfiguration to the East

9. With MONUSCO's robust actions, especially with the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), the security situation in eastern DRC has improved since March 2013, as the capacity of some armed groups has been reduced, but it is still fragile. The overall state security presence remains weak outside of main population centres in the conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC. Despite being weakened, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continues to be capable of targeted, asymmetric attacks. The FDLR voluntary disarmament is stalled as they appear unwilling to engage in DDRRR. The lack of progress in implementing reforms outlined in the PSCF and the national consultations is unlikely to change and the pace of reform in the security sector is expected to remain limited.
10. Approximately 98% of MONUSCO force has been deployed in eastern DRC. However the Mission continues to have a much dispersed deployment including a number of company and platoon operating bases. The overall impact of this is that a number of potentially vulnerable outposts have been created, a large number of troops are involved in guarding bases, reserves have been committed, the burden on administration is significantly increased and the medical support is stretched beyond reasonable limits. Current Mission planning aims at reducing the number of locations by 30% by the spring 2015 to a total of 61. Such planning should be strongly supported.
11. MONUSCO support to GoDRC forces is still necessary to implement security and peace in the DRC mainly in the East, where illegal armed groups are still active. Joint operations with FARDC require joint planning and an extensive use of liaison officers. The Mission is required to support FARDC and PNC with intelligence and assets. The Mission needs to continue to build on its work with the GoDRC, FARDC and PNC, so that they take ownership. From the standpoint of the Mission's exit strategy, the Mission needs continue to build the capacity and support the FARDC and PNC in respect of their core responsibility to provide security to their citizens.
12. Within the Mission, there are different views on which of the armed groups that should be defeated first. The Head of Mission considers FDLR to be the biggest threat to stability whereas the force sees the ADF and the *Lord's Resistance Army* (LRA) as being the main threats. Moreover, the GoDRC will have its own priorities. While military priorities must have some balance between operational and political considerations, failing to confront the ADF has already shown to have serious liabilities for the Mission's standing amongst civilians, and has led to a misunderstanding of the Mission priorities amongst the force.
13. MONUSCO has been mandated to enforce an arms embargo. This requirement has been mandated by the Security Council based on the belief that arms are being trafficked in large quantities. It is assumed that this belief is based on intelligence. There have been very few seizures of weapons or ammunition by the Mission since the embargo was imposed. Although MONUSCO has been resourced with five Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to enhance information collection, the Mission continues to operate on rivers and lakes. It does not have the forces or resources to control the long and porous borders or the vast number of small airports throughout the country; nor does the FARDC.

14. The Police Component is participating in the stabilization process through the daily monitoring and mentoring of PNC territorial officers deployed in areas freed from armed groups, joint monitoring together with civilian observers in the Kivus as well as in the Ituri District. To enhance its participation, MONUSCO police must intensify its collocation strategy in targeted key locations in order to facilitate PNC effective takeover of security responsibilities from FARDC.
15. The deployment of MONUSCO police and other state security entities to create Islands of Stability (IoS) is a visible signal to the local population that law and order is returning and state authority is being restored. There is, however, a lack of buy-in to the concept among some elements of the uniformed components. The Mission should conduct a feasibility analysis of IoS on the basis of the established areas before any further expansion.
16. With the exception of one unit remaining in Kinshasa, the other five FPUs have been re-deployed to eastern DRC to reinforce security in main populated locations (Goma, Bukavu, Bunia), sustain security in high volatile areas with activities of armed groups (Beni) and provide operational support to the PNC intervention units in crowd control and public order maintenance situations. Within the inter-mission cooperation, MONUSCO has loaned two of the FPUs, to its already insufficient eight FPUs to UNMISS; their return is required in order to support in key populated areas.
17. The relocation of the FPUs has contributed to the overall enhancement of the security situation in eastern DRC, particularly in Goma. However, their activities and patrols are not well coordinated with their counterparts, mainly the PNC and MONUSCO military. The planning of daily or weekly patrols is not based on any information or operational analysis, but simply left to the discretion of FPU commanders who often do not prioritize tasks and receive limited guidance and directives from their superiors.
18. It is important to note that the Mission has lost momentum in supporting a holistic PNC reform, as a majority of MONUSCO police have been redeployed to eastern regions. The Mission reconfiguration process has limited the ability of MONUSCO police to carry out capacity building activities, particularly training in areas other than those recently freed from armed groups in the east. Training and other capacity building needs still exist in areas not affected by armed conflict, mainly in the west.
19. Since the shift in Mission priorities from west to east, Mission Support has installed mechanisms to decentralize the support provision to Brigade, Battalion and Company Operating Bases (CoBs) level for optimal support provision. The necessary support is being provided in hub-and-spoke concept. Mission Support offices have been established at all Sector/Brigade levels from where all the COBs are being supported. Rations and fuel are directly being delivered to the team sites by the contractors. However, there is a need to further enhance the provision of support to remote locations. Mission Support, where possible, should assist the T/PCCs with supplies/spares, on a cost-reimbursable basis, even though it is their own responsibility, for efficient mandate implementation and to ensure safety, security and well-being of uniformed personnel.
20. The contingent owned equipment (COE) movements resulting due to the shift of the Mission priorities from west to east are taking an inordinate amount of time and effort. This could have been minimised by entering into standby movement contracts with national/international vendors, instead of the existing piece-meal approach. This is further aggravated by the lack of a comprehensive relocation and re-employment plans for uniformed personnel. In addition, they are unable to forecast the requirements and timelines in which they need to be

operational in new locations. This should be done in advance in order to enable Mission Support to make arrangements for the movements, accommodation and related issues.

c. Protection of Civilians

21. The introduction of the FIB, and the Mission's reconfiguration to the east, have impacted the implementation of the POC strategy in unexpected ways. On the one hand, the FIB's efforts to neutralize the M23 have eliminated a threat to civilians. On the other hand, the insertion of the FIB has provoked a number of contingents within the Framework Brigades to essentially disown the POC agenda, and undertake a passive and largely ineffective approach to the task. This lack of willingness to take a forward-leaning approach to the POC, as required by the mandate has become a major obstacle to POC implementation. There are initial signs that this may be replicated by other contingents. This situation, further aggravates already difficult command and control (C2) challenges, leads to loss of confidence among the population, and demotivates those within the FIB who feel they have an unfair share of the burden.
22. In his 2 May 2014 note to the force, entitled Force Guidance on the Protection of Civilians, the Force Commander (FC) noted that he is "...absolutely clear that the best way to protect civilians is to take action against the threat ('threat' should be understood as all of the armed groups)." In short, the FC's formula for POC in MONUSCO is:

Protection of Civilians = Taking Action Against Armed Groups
23. Not all contingents share his view. The lack of action by many, if not most, contingents in the Framework Brigades, is a clear indication of their unwillingness to endorse his views on POC. While this may be more of a function of the messages they are receiving from their capitals, there are also strong indications that the garrison mentality is firmly established in the minds of many military contingents of the Framework Brigades. They show a reluctance to take forward the sorts of measures that the FC requests of them, including conducting ambushes, establishing listening posts, and undertaking nighttime patrols. There is little doubt that peacekeeping in the DRC requires techniques and tactics that are different from those of the past to be effective.
24. The reservations of some contingents to take forward the FC's intent for POC has been made explicit in some cases, for example by North Kivu Brigade, which has clearly established an approach of "protection by presence." While the Review Team did not hear any clear articulation of the concept, or how it differs from other approaches to POC, one of the Military Advisors from a Permanent Mission reiterated in a meeting between OPSP and MONUSCO TCCs prior to the Mission visit that this was his country's approach to POC.
25. During a visit to South Kivu Brigade, a contingent commander expressed the firm view that he was deployed for traditional peacekeeping with his unit under a Chapter VI mandate. Consequently, his company would also have difficulties in implementing the FC's directions.
26. There are some preliminary signs that the garrison mentality may be contagious, including amongst contingents of the FIB. The Beni Head of Office informed the Review Team that the FIB contingents that are co-located with the Framework Brigades have become more passive/static. He attributed this to the fact that the FIB sees from the Framework Brigades' example that they can get by with a less proactive approach to their work. In Tshabi, there were clear signs of discontent among the FIB in this regard. The Brigade Commander argued that the FIB should be paid more than the Framework Brigades since the former assumes all the risk by undertaking offensive operations. He also felt that the rates for reimbursement of equipment should be revisited and requested better living conditions to be provided by MONUSCO.

27. On a separate note, the new reimbursement framework¹ provides for the possibility of premium payments for risk. The “risk premium” recognizes extraordinary performance by units under circumstances of exceptional danger. Noting that MONUSCO involves an element of risk and that uniformed personnel by virtue of their training and equipment are able to respond to hostile actions, this premium may be recommended for some units by the Mission leadership. This would be done in order to qualify for the exceptional payment, once the reimbursement system is in place.
28. The effect of this schism between the two types of brigades is such that the FC has few contingents in which he has full confidence. Not only do the Framework Brigades fail to implement his instructions regarding POC, but in many instances they appear to be avoiding even the bare minimum required.
29. Inaccurate reports of number of patrols and other maneuvers, which are necessary at least to show presence and demonstrate the Mission’s commitment to protecting civilians, are signals of a dysfunction within the force. Despite the FC’s efforts to instill the ‘One Mandate’ and ‘One Force’ ethos in his troops, it is clear that many believe there are two mandates and two forces.

d. Force and Police structure

30. The current operational environment suggests a requirement for reconsidering the tasks provided to the two types of brigades employed in the Mission; the Framework Brigades and the FIB. The Review Team was informed of ongoing discussions aimed at changing one of the battalions of each of the Framework Brigades to a Light Mobile Battalion better suited for rapid response in support of POC threats in remote jungle areas. The Review Team supports the notion expressed by the force that the Mission should assume the role of the hunter, rather than the prey. However, the effect of such a change may be conditional on the process chosen of revising the mandate and ensuring to instill one mandate and one mission principle.
31. Going forward, it would also be important to assess the structure of the FIB to ensure that it is configured appropriately for emerging priority tasks, including threats that are more asymmetric in nature. Whereas the FIB appears to have an expedition mindset it is currently not fully supported and equipped to accomplish this task. Air mobility and enhanced COE self-sustainment such as quality tents must be secured.
32. Whereas the brigades in the eastern part of the DRC are well resourced, the small number of military personnel deployed in western DRC represents far less than a conventional brigade. The number of troops and equipment should not be referred to as a “brigade”. While the security centre of gravity of the Mission continues to be in the east of the country, there is a need for maintaining a senior military officer at the minimum rank of Brigadier General in Kinshasa to maintain contact with Government officials.
33. Enabling units are crucial mission assets for the force to accomplish its tasks. Some of the Engineering companies which are currently structured for road repair and airport infrastructure should be configured as combat engineer companies in order to enhance ground mobility for the force and large scale horizontal engineer tasks should be outsourced. Whereas the Mission’s Riverine Unit may continue to have an important role to play, including in supporting the arms embargo, plans to redeploy some of its assets to Lake Tanganyika may require bigger and better patrol boats.
34. The Review Team found that a number of military observers (MILOBs) continue to be inappropriately employed with several serving in the Integrated Support Section (ISS).

¹GA resolutions 67/261 and 68/281.

Military participation within the ISS is valuable and removal of the Military Officers would create difficulties. However, some of the individuals employed in ISS are not fully qualified for their functions due to gaps in education, training, experience and language skills. At the same time others don't feel credited for their experience and are not pleased to fill posts at a level that is too low.

35. The current context in the DRC with upcoming elections, or possible delays in organizing the elections, could trigger unrest in a number of hotspots. MONUSCO police is required to support the PNC in ensuring the security of this electoral process by providing technical advice and assisting the development of operational orders, training and mentoring PNC personnel throughout the national territory. This also includes the provision of escort for electoral material as well as for monitoring and reporting on security threats before, during and after the elections. The possible emergence of civil disturbances in these locations could have serious implications for the safety and security of civilians and the Mission. Therefore, FPU's are required for providing support in these locations, where and when need arises.
36. In addition, the Mission has planned to relocate the Bangladesh female FPU to Kisangani. Though, the unit needs to be utilized more effectively, the Review Team believes that this unit should remain in Kinshasa as it can be more productive and has ongoing engagement in several mandated activities.
37. During the upcoming elections, MONUSCO police needs to be reconfigured to provide operational support and capacity building for the PNC holistically. Therefore, MONUSCO police should ensure strong leadership presence in Kinshasa to strengthen coordination and maintain close contacts with PNC leadership and UNCT entities.
38. The Police Component is currently understaffed and will require a surge during the next two years to focus on several priorities including: nationwide capacity building for PNC; assisting in forthcoming electoral security; and contributing to POC. Additional reserve FPU's are necessary in Kinshasa and Goma, and could be deployed in hot spots to address threats when and where required. FPU's would also provide protection for the United Nations personnel and premises. Meanwhile, deployment of any additional Congolese FPU's (if any) to a peacekeeping mission should be carefully assessed and such deployment may be postponed until after the elections in the DRC. A detailed assessment on further requirements for the MONUSCO policing would be provided by DPKO/DFS Strategic Review.

e. Strategic Directives, Guidance and CONOPS/ROE

39. In its resolution, the Security Council² has requested the revision and subsequent updating of the Mission Concept of Operations (CONOPS), rules of engagement (ROE) and all other relevant United Nations planning documents. These documents provide strategic guidance and operational plans to the Mission's components to undertake the mandate within the scope of the reconfiguration.
40. The Mission is operating on the basis of a draft Mission Concept dated December 2013, a DPKO Military CONOPS of May 2013, and a Police draft CONOPS which require updating. Furthermore these strategic directives must be fully supported by an updated Mission Support plan that is realistic and achievable.
41. DPKO has not issued Mission specific directives to Head of Military and Police Components to guide and support their functions. The Directive on detentions, searches, use of force for FPU's (2005) need to be revised and updated to reflect the real situation on the ground and to address MONUSCO mandate, particularly the role of the Police Component in POC. The

²S/RES/2098 (2013).

draft guidelines on FPU should be completed and be disseminated to unit level and shared with PCCs.

42. MONUSCO also operates with a Force Headquarters Manual dated July 2013. Many staff members are not aware of the Manual which outlines the organization and tasks of each of the Branches, Cells and some of the specific functions in the Force Headquarters. Consequently it is not adhered to. MONUSCO Force Headquarters should consider updating the Manual and it would be more helpful to new staff if it also described “how” tasks are to be performed as this is an issue.

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b. Operational plans

43. The military and police operations and activities are not jointly planned and rarely even shared. The Civilian planning team is relatively new and works in complete isolation from uniformed components. Mission uniformed components should coordinate their activities to ensure the full implementation of mandated objectives.
44. Subsequent to the move to the East, all the procedures and protocols put in place for the provision of support to uniformed personnel are ad hoc and reactive. This could be due to a lack of a comprehensive, strategic level plan at the Mission level. Moreover, and as a result of the volatile security situation in some parts of the East, the deployment of the FIB elements could not be well-planned or forecasted; hence the ad hoc support provision. The Mission needs to develop an overall plan incorporating all elements of the Mission, including their deployment and employment plan. Based on this strategic document, all components, including Mission Support should develop their own individual plans.
45. Due to a lack of this essential planning and ineffective and non-inclusive integrated efforts in the budget formulation, it appears that the Result Based Budgeting (RBB) framework is not well developed and articulated in the budget submission. This further appears to be resulting in mistrust among various components. The Military Component feels that the draft outcomes of the Military Capability Study (MCS) were included in the budget submission without due consultations and any strategic level discussions in the Mission.

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d. Training

46. Pre-deployment training remains a T/PCC responsibility. By its resolutions 67/261 and 68/281, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the Senior Advisory Group on troop reimbursements and put in place a new framework for reimbursing troop- and police-contributing countries. With this, contributing countries are now reimbursed for the costs they incur in pre-deployment training based on the United Nations standards. The inclusion of training in the rate of reimbursement should reflect a significant commitment from contributing countries to enhancing pre-deployment training.
47. Presently, there is limited mechanism in place to define training requirements and evaluate the training received by contingents or to communicate interactively with T/PCCs regarding mission-specific training requirements. While limited Mission-specific training packages do

exist, more effort is required in this regard. T/PCCs largely train using generic or nation-specific drills, which are not always suitable for the Mission environment.

The Review Team was informed that some of the contingents presently operating in the Mission have not been fully trained prior to their deployment to accomplish all Mission essential tasks. This included conducting joint operations with the FARDC.

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f. Contingent Owned Equipment

- 48. Rotations at the United Nations expense of specific categories of T/PCC major equipment deployed to field missions was recommended by the 2014 Contingent-owned Equipment Working Group (2014 COE WG) and approved by the General Assembly³. Certain categories of major equipment under prolonged deployment to peacekeeping missions which are non-operable or for which continued maintenance is not economical in the mission area can be considered for rotation at the United Nations expense on the basis of operational requirements within the Mission. COE of the majority of MONUSCO units meet the eligibility for rotation and should be considered in priority order to enhance the operational capability of the units deployed in critical locations.
- 49. Several military and police units have severe shortfalls in major equipment such as APCs, Ambulances, 4X4 vehicles, trucks and other enabling equipment (Benin, India, South Africa, Uruguay, Morocco, and Bangladesh). These shortfalls are limiting the operational capabilities of these units and are often ineffective in performing the mandated tasks. It's also a safety concern for those units as they may not be able to defend themselves, should a situation arise. Though the mandatory, periodic integrated COE inspections and verifications are carried out, there are no effective mechanisms in place to follow up and remedying the shortfalls and unserviceable equipment.

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- 51. Presently, there is limited mechanism in place to define training requirements and evaluate the training received by contingents or to communicate interactively with T/PCCs regarding mission-specific training requirements. While limited Mission-specific training packages do exist, more effort is required in this regard. T/PCCs largely train using generic or nation-specific drills, which are not always suitable for the Mission environment.
- 52. The Review Team was informed that some of the contingents presently operating in the Mission have not been fully trained prior to their deployment to accomplish all Mission essential tasks. This included conducting joint operations with the FARDC.
- 53. Regarding MONUSCO police units, only a temporary pre-deployment training curriculum for FPU's presently exists. In addition, some of the deployed officers arrive without prior field

³A/RES/68/282, dated on 30 Jun 14.

pre-deployment training and therefore have to undergo mentoring leading to delays in mandate implementation. The promulgation of an updated standard curriculum is required⁴.

- 54. The Mission training cell is not integrated. Therefore, each component organizes its own induction training. This requires having a dedicated training cell in each component to plan and conduct training. As a priority, Mission shall establish an Integrated Mission Training Cell (IMTC). However, the force has a well-established training programme for Staff Officers, MILOBS and contingents. This programme should be considered for best practices with the view to support other peacekeeping missions.

e. Administration and Support

- 55. Currently, the Mission is providing rations and fuel to FARDC troops while conducting joint operations with MONUSCO. At times, the Mission is also transporting these sustenance items to front lines to ensure correct end users. The Review Team have been informed that the budgeted assistance to FARDC is far lower than the actual support that is being provided, thus causing a budget overruns. Given the dynamic operational tempo with which these joint operations are being conducted, it is envisaged that this support provision to FARDC could easily increase several fold and could even expand into other areas such as provision of air transport as well.

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Safety and security

- 56. Targeted acts and demonstrations against MONUSCO personnel have increased recently, in particular in North Kivu. With anticipated upcoming elections and possible tension within the local population combined with the armed group's random attacks on villages, the security climate in MONUSCO's area of responsibility is unpredictable and easily could worsen. The Mission needs to continue to engage with the host nation, T/PCCs to enhance its security capabilities. This also requires enhanced situational awareness, including through intelligence capabilities and aerial surveillance, and providing requisite equipment, training and medical capabilities.
- 57. Despite the prevailing security situation, the Review Team observed inadequate perimeter fencing and camp defenses in many of the locations visited; in an emergency, this could have a devastating impact on troop and staff safety and security. The Team was informed that there are shortages of Hesco Bastion and sand bags, though this should certainly not stop units from digging foxholes and putting up temporary fortifications in and around the Mission's camps.

⁴ Temporary Training Standard for Formed Police Units (20 December 2011).