# **Introduction to UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Specialized Training Materials for Staff Officers**

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## **Rationale and Introduction**

- 1. The primacy of the United Nations in peacekeeping keeps increasing with the continuous growing number and complex crises that pose threats to international peace and security. The United Nations has accordingly introduced a multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping which has also come with new challenges especially on performance standards of military staff officers at the Force and Sector Headquarters. Various United Nations staff End of Assignment Reports have also ascribed part of the problem to inadequate pre-deployment training of many Staff Officers to UN missions. Considering the crucial interfacing roles of staff officers between strategic and operational and to tactical levels, they need to be proficient in performing their duties to ensure effective mandate implementation.
- 2. The development of this Specialised Training Material (STM) is therefore part of a three-fold joint initiative by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) to improve peacekeeping performance in the field. Specifically, this project was led by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) and supported by DFS, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS).
- 3. It is noteworthy that, this STM has been developed based on the presumption that, qualified military staff officers would have at least completed their national basic staff courses as part of their career progression. This serves as the start point for this STM. The STM is thus, a generic training material that builds on this start point by orienting military staff officers on the UNDPKO/DFS approach to peacekeeping operations.
- 4. In effect, this STM is not intended to substitute national training doctrines of Troop Contributing Countries but to provide guidance to the trainers of Military Staff Officers' Courses in order to harmonize the different doctrinal perspectives and also to establish a baseline standard for pre-deployment training for military staff officers at Force and Sector headquarters in UNDPKO/DFS led peacekeeping missions.
- 5. In conducting training with this STM, it is essential to begin with the Core Predeployment Training Materials (CPTMs) which are intended to provide all peacekeeping personnel (military, police and civilian) with a shared understanding of the basic principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping to ensure coherence in United Nations mandate implementation. With regards to Mission Specific Training, trainers should be guided by the Pre-deployment Information Packages (PiPs) in aligning their courses to reflect the peculiarities of the mission. The PiPs are accessible on ITS Community of Practice (CoP) website at https://pktcop.unlb.org

# **Target Audience**

6. This STM targets at all military personnel selected by Member States to be deployed as Military Staff Officers in UN peacekeeping operations. Military Staff Officers are required to have at least completed their national basic military staff course..

#### Aim

7. The aim of this Specialised Training Material for military staff officers is to support the pre-deployment training efforts of Troop Contributing Countries by providing UNDPKO training standards to ensure a common military approach to work at Force and Sector levels in UN peacekeeping missions.

# **Training Objective**

- 8. The training objectives of the STM for Military Staff Officers are to generally prepare the participants for duties in a peacekeeping operation so that they can:
  - contribute efficiently to implementing military aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates in accordance with DPKO/DFS principles and guidelines;
  - perform their military functions in an effective, professional and integrated manner; and
  - demonstrate the core values and competencies of the United Nations.
- 9. The therefore training seeks to turn a **capable** military officer into a skillful peacekeeper.

#### **Course contents**

10. The package for the military staff officers Pre-deployment Training entails the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials and Specialized Training Material for military staff officers

CPTM Unit 1 – A Strategic Level Overview of UN Peacekeeping

CPTM Unit 2 – The Establishment and Functioning of UN Peacekeeping Operations

CPTM Unit 3 – Effective Mandate Implementation

CPTM Unit 4 – Standards, Values and Safety of UN Peacekeeping Personnel

STM Module 1: The Organisation and Basic Staff Procedures in UN Mission HQ

STM Module 2: Legal Aspects of UN Peacekeeping Operations

STM Module 3: United Nations Logistics at Work

STM Module 4: Introduction to Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)

STM Module 5: Information Gathering

STM Module 6: Introduction to Military Component Planning Process

STM Module 7: Introduction to Crisis Management

STM Module 8: Staff Officers' Integrated Exercise

For further details please see the Course Specifications contained in Annex A

# **Duration and timing of the course:**

11. Staff Officers Pre-deployment Training is delivered by Regional or National Peacekeeping Training Institutes over a minimum period of two weeks.

# **Methods of Training and Evaluation:**

12. Methods of training will be decided by the training staff. It is, however, recommended that due attention is paid to principles of adult learning, guided by the fact that:

- adults are autonomous and self-directed
- adults have accumulated a foundation of life experiences and knowledge
- adults are goal-oriented
- adults are relevancy oriented
- adults are practical

The training sessions should therefore reflect these factors and be interactive; case studies based and make use of the trainees' experiences.

#### **Contact Person**

13. Major Farouck Bashar, basharf@un.org,

# **Future Updates**

14. Because the aim of the aim of the UN Peacekeeping Training Standards for Staff Officers is to support pre-deployment training of military officers going to serve in UN peacekeeping operations, ITS will ensure they are regularly updated to reflect changes in UN peacekeeping policies and guidance. Any updates to different units or sections will be posted and explained on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website (http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org). Instructors are encouraged to check that site regularly.

# **Acknowledgements**

15. The ITS first words of gratitude are for General Patrick Cammaert and Mr. Adam Day who jointly with the project manager after a thorough research and consultations within the DPKO offices and peacekeeping missions in the field, drafted the Guidelines on Roles and Training Standards for Staff Officers that formed the basis for the determination of the course scope.

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- 18.ITS would also thank the relevant offices in DPKO including the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and especially the subject mater experts and advisers Mr Philip Shetler-Jones (IMPP OASG for Operations) and Ms. Norul Rashid (Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide), for the constructive collaboration, which have helped to ensure that the training material reflects the view of the United Nations as a whole..
- 19.ITS also acknowledges the important contribution of the Director of the International Peace Support Training Centre of Kenya (IPSTC) who collaborated providing the center's facilities, instructors and participants for the Consultation Workshop and the pilot course of Staff Officers. It is also important to highlight the contribution of ITS and International facilitators (Col David Caceres, Ltc Sazid Imtiaz, Maj Farouck Bashar, Maj Eric Cottenoir, Maj Kevin Barker, Ltc Modest Kombo, Maj Catherine Nekesa) and IPSTC training staff who participated in the Kenya 2011 Pilot Course. The valuable outcomes of those activities were incorporated into the final text of the training materials.
- 20.ITS also acknowledges the untiring efforts of the following staff members who aside their normal work schedules, developed the Staff Officers Specialised Training Materials: Col David Caceres, Project Team Leader and developer of modules 1, 3 and 7, Maj Farouck Bashar, Project Team Member and developer of modules 2, 4 and 6; and Ltc Sazid Imtiaz, developer of module 8. Equal acknowledgement also goes to Cmdr Darryl Watters (Australian Navy), consultant for the project and developer of module 5.
- 21.ITS also wishes to thank the members of its Review Group (Col Farooque Coudhury and Lt Col Birender Bisht) who collaborated in giving smooth language and cohesion to the course materials.
- 22.ITS would finally thank the Permanent Mission of Austria, Canada, Croatia, Ghana, Peru, Sweden, United States of America Member States for making available their staff officers training materials.

| <sup>2</sup> g. 6 | Introduction to UN Pre-deployment Training Standards for Staff Officers |
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|                   | Core Pre-deployment Training Materials                                  |
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| Unit 1 A<br>Strategic Level<br>Overview of UN<br>Peacekeeping                   | <ul> <li>The aim of this Unit is to provide a strategic level overview of UN peacekeeping by familiarizing peacekeeping personnel with: <ul> <li>The main United Nations (UN) bodies involved in UN peacekeeping</li> <li>The different kinds of peacekeeping activities and peacekeeping missions</li> <li>The key principles and ideals of UN peacekeeping and how to put them into practice</li> <li>The qualities needed in UN peacekeeping personnel.</li> </ul> </li> <li>On completion of this unit participants will be able to:</li> </ul> |
|---|---|
| Part 1 Introduction to UN Peacekeeping Suggested Minimum Time 120 min           | List the main bodies involved in UN peacekeeping     List the five types of peace and security activities used by the Security Council     Explain the main differences between traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping operations  |
| Part 2 Fundamental Principles of UN Peacekeeping  Suggested Minimum Time 60 Min | <ol> <li>List the basic principles of UN peacekeeping</li> <li>Explain what is meant by the "credibility and legitimacy of UN peacekeeping mission" and how peacekeeping personnel can support this in practice</li> <li>Explain what national ownership means and why it is important to the success of UN peacekeeping</li> <li>List the necessary qualities in UN peacekeeping personnel</li> </ol>  |

| Unit 2 the Establishment and Functioning of UN Peacekeeping Operations                                 | The aim of this Unit is to familiarize peacekeeping personnel with the process for establishing a UN peacekeeping operation, strategic level direction of UN peacekeeping by the Security Council and Secretary-General and operational level structures of UN peacekeeping missions.  Specifically, this section informs peacekeeping personnel on:  • how the Security Council establishes mandates for UN peacekeeping operations and monitors their work;  • how the United Nations Secretariat transforms this strategic level guidance into operational frameworks for peacekeeping operations and the roles of different components in a mission;  • authority, command and control in UN peacekeeping operations;  • Mission management structures. |
|--|---|
| Part 1 The Establishment & Operationalisation of Security Council Mandates for Peacekeeping Operations | <ol> <li>On completion of this unit participants will be able to:</li> <li>Describe how the Security Council establishes a mandate for a UN peacekeeping operation and monitors its implementation</li> <li>Explain why all peacekeeping personnel must be familiar with the mandate of their peacekeeping operation</li> <li>Name at least three key documents which operationalize Security Council mandates.</li> </ol>  |

| Suggested<br>Minimum Time<br>120 min                       |   |
|--|---|
| Part 2 How United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Function | <ol> <li>Explain the relationship between the support and substantive components of a peacekeeping operation and mandate beneficiaries</li> <li>List at least four main positions of authority in a UN peacekeeping operation</li> <li>Explain the main role of the military, police and civilian components of UN peacekeeping operations</li> </ol> |
| Suggested<br>Minimum Time<br>60 min                        |   |

# Unit 3 Effective Mandate Implementation

The aim of this Unit is to provide peacekeeping personnel with general knowledge on how peacekeeping missions can implement their mandates effectively.

Part 1 outlines the UN position (contained in Security Council resolutions and UN policy) that conflict can only be addressed effectively when peacekeeping operations ensure respect for international humanitarian law, human rights and the rights of women and children in conflict. It then provides practical tools for peacekeeping personnel to apply that knowledge in their daily work. Part 2 then familiarizes peacekeeping personnel with the key partners they must engage to implement their mandate effectively and ensure that peacebuilding carries on even after the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.

# Part 1a International Law Applicable to Peacekeeping Operations Part 1b

Human Rights

Peacekeeping

Operations

Part 1c

Protection in UN

On completion of Unit 3 – Part 1a, participants will be able to:

- 1. List the essential rules of international humanitarian law (IHL)
- 2. Define who is protected by international human rights law

On completion of Unit 3 – Part 1b, participants will be able to:

- 3. Define human rights;
- 4. Recognize and identify human rights violations or abuses that occur in the conflict or post-conflict mission environment;
- 5. Discuss UN policies on human rights that are relevant to peacekeeping settings;
- 6. Describe the practical relevance of human rights to their work and ways to promote and protect human rights through their tasks
- 7. Explain the importance of coordinating human rights-related actions with the mission's human rights component.

The Promotion of Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping

Operations

Part 1d

Child Protection in UN

1. Explai

Peacekeeping Operations.

On completion of Unit 3 – Part 1c, participants will be able to:

- 1. Explain the different impacts of conflict on women/girls and men/boys
- 2. Explain that women are both victims of conflict and key partners for peacekeeping and peace-building activities of UN peacekeeping operations
- 3. Provide examples of how peacekeeping personnel can help protect women and support gender equality in their daily work

On completion of Unit 3 – Part 1d, participants will be able to:

| Suggested<br>Minimum Time<br>250 min | <ol> <li>Provide the definition of a "child" in international law</li> <li>Explain how international law protects children affected by armed conflict</li> <li>Describe the impact of violent conflict on children</li> <li>Explain what peacekeepers can do to promote child protection and children's rights in armed conflict.</li> </ol> |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Part 2 Working with Mission Partners | <ul> <li>On completion of Unit 3 – Part 2, participants will be able to:</li> <li>1. Explain the benefits of an integrated approach between a peacekeeping operation and UN Country Team</li> <li>2. Explain why national actors are key partners for UN peacekeeping operations</li> </ul>  |
| Suggested<br>Minimum Time<br>60 min  | List the three humanitarian principles     Explain the role of a UN peacekeeping operation in the delivery of humanitarian assistance  |

| Unit 4 Standards, Values and Safety of UN Peacekeeping Personnel | Unit 4 focuses on the responsibilities and obligations of individual peacekeepers in relation to their service in a UN peacekeeping operation. It aims to familiarize UN peacekeeping personnel with the UN rules, core values and standards on conduct and discipline, respect for diversity, HIV/AIDS and all aspects of safety and security.  On completion of this unit participants will be able to:   |
|--|---|
| Part 1 Conduct and Discipline                                    | <ol> <li>List the three key principles governing the conduct of peacekeeping personnel</li> <li>Describe what constitutes misconduct with reference to serious misconduct and misconduct</li> <li>Describe what constitutes sexual exploitation and abuse, with reference to the uniform standards that peacekeeping personnel are expected to uphold</li> <li>Outline the consequences of misconduct - particularly sexual exploitation</li> </ol> |
| Suggested<br>Minimum Time<br>205 min                             | <ul> <li>and abuse - for peacekeeping personnel, the host population and the mission</li> <li>5. Outline the Department of Peacekeeping Operation's three-pronged approach to addressing sexual exploitation and abuse</li> </ul>   |
| Part 2 HIV/AIDS in Peacekeeping Operations                       | Explain how HIV is transmitted     List the ABCs of prevention of HIV/AIDS     Describe how to use a condom properly     Explain whether it is possible to tell if a person is infected with the HIV virus from their appearance  |
| Suggested<br>Minimum Time<br>80 min                              |   |
| Part 3 Respect for Diversity in UN Peacekeeping                  | <ol> <li>Explain what is meant by "diversity" and "culture"</li> <li>Describe how cultural differences and different kinds of diversity might be evident in the mission environment and in the host country</li> <li>Describe what is involved in respecting diversity in relation to working effectively in a multicultural peacekeeping environment</li> <li>Describe strategies for effective communication</li> </ol>                           |

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| Suggested<br>Minimum Time<br>120 min |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Part 4 Safety and Security           | <ol> <li>Participants will be familiar with UN security Management System including the UN security phases system;</li> <li>Participants will be familiar the procedures for security clearance for travel to a UN mission will have been initiated by relevant personnel</li> <li>Eligible personnel (required for civilians and individually deployed military and police officers, and recommended for contingent and FPU commanders) will have completed the Basic and Advanced Security in the Field (B/ASITF) on-line course*</li> <li>List the four basic UN rules of road safety; and</li> <li>Explain that peacekeeping personnel require a UN driver's permit in order to drive a UN vehicle and how to obtain a UN driver's permit.</li> <li>Be familiar with appropriate personal and food hygiene measures and personal behaviors that can protect their health while in mission;</li> <li>Be familiar with, and have completed, all required and recommended vaccinations for their mission;</li> <li>Be familiar with, and have received, any required prophylaxis for their mission deployment.</li> </ol> |

# **Specialized Training Materials for Staff Officers**

# STM Module 1: The Organisation and Basic Staff Procedures in UN Mission HQ

| Aim: | The aim of the Organization and basic staff procedures in UN      |
|------|---|
|      | mission HQ module is to provide staff officers with the necessary |

|                                | knowledge to understand the United Nations peacekeeping mission military structures, roles and procedures existing at mission and sector levels. |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Time                           | Learning Outcome   |
| Suggested<br>Minimum Time:     | On completion of the module: Organization and basic staff procedures in UN mission HQ, participants will be able to:                             |
| 90 minutes plus 80 minutes for | Describe the UN Mission HQ structures.   |
| exercise learning              | Identify the duties and responsibilities of staff officers.  |
| activity                       | Describe the SOP and staff routine at mission HQ.  |
|                                | Identify the key staff functions in force/sector HQs   |
|                                | Conduct briefings in a Mission HQ environment.   |
|                                | Apply the report procedures and formats.   |

# **STM Module 2: Legal Aspects of UN Peacekeeping Operations**

| Aim:   | The aim of this module is to equip military staff officers with the basic legal foundation in United Nations peacekeeping in order to enhance their ability to appreciate and handle law and order matters in a United Nations peacekeeping operations environment to facilitate effective mandate implementation. |
|--|--|
| Time   | Learning Outcome   |
| Suggested Time:                                  | On completion of this section, participants will:  |
| 45 minutes plus 45 minutes for learning activity | <ul> <li>Comprehend the application of legal principles in UN<br/>Peacekeeping missions.</li> </ul>  |
| donvity  | <ul> <li>Be aware of the status immunities, privileges, and<br/>responsibilities of the UN peacekeeper</li> </ul>  |
|  | Be able to identify potential breach of law and order in order to take the appropriate steps to prevent it.  |
|  | Be familiar with their rights and responsibilities as peacekeepers.  |

# **STM Module 3: United Nations Logistics at Work**

| and the system and its operations in support of field missions. |  | The aim of the United Nations Logistic at work module is to provide staff officers with an overview of the United Nations logistics system and the system and its operations in support of field missions. |
|---|--|--|
|---|--|--|

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| Time  | Learning Outcome   |
|---|--|
| Suggested<br>Minimum Time:                        | On completion of the module: UN Logistic at work, participants should be able to:  |
| 100 minutes plus 45 minutes for learning activity | <ul> <li>Describe the concept of the Global Field Support Strategy,<br/>Integrated Support Services and the Joint Logistic Operations<br/>Centre.</li> </ul> |
|   | Define the Contingent Owned Equipment System (COE) and United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE).  |
|   | Explain the medical support in the field.  |

# **STM Module 4: Introduction to Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)**

| Aim:   | The aim of this module is to introduce military staff officers to the basics of the Integrated Mission Planning Process in order to facilitate their participation in its implementation in an integrated United Nations presence. |
|--|--|
| Time   | Learning Outcome   |
| Suggested  | On completion of this section, participants will:  |
| Minimum Time:<br>100 min plus 25<br>minutes for role | Be familiar with the entire progression of the Integrated Mission Planning Process   |
| learning activity                                    | Understand the role of the field in process  |
|  | Be aware of the role of the headquarters in the process  |

# **STM Module 5: Information Gathering**

| Aim:                            | The aim of this Unit is to inform military staff officers in missions on the concepts and practices of information gathering in a complex United Nations peace operation. |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Time                            | Learning Outcome  |
| Suggested                       | On completion of this Module, participants will be able to:   |
| Minimum Time:<br>45 min plus 45 | Understand the direction and planning of Information Gathering.   |
| minutes for                     | Identify the different methods of Information Gathering.  |
| learning activity               | Understand how gathered information is processed.   |

| • | Identify the various products of processed information. |
|---|---|
| • | Recognise and Protect sensitive information             |

# **STM Module 6: Introduction to Military Component Planning Process**

| Aim:   | The aim of this module is to provide Military Staff Officers with the necessary information to understand the requirements and procedures of Military Component Planning Process in a United Nations Peacekeeping operation. |
|--|--|
| Time   | Learning Outcome   |
| Suggested  | On completion of this Module, participants will:   |
| Minimum Time:<br>220 min plus 140<br>minutes for | Be familiar with the UN military component authority, command and control structure and relations.   |
| exercise activity                                | Be familiar with the basic tenets of Mission Command.  |
|  | Understand the how the Operational Area is generally organised for effective mandate implementation.   |
|  | Identify the steps of the Military Component Planning Process  |
|  | Understand how, as staff officers, they can contribute to the MCPP process.  |

# **STM Module 7: Introduction to Crisis Management**

| Aim:                                    | The aim of the Introduction to Crisis Management module is to provide staff officers with an overview of the crisis response in the UN HQ and DPKO led field missions as well as the DSS role during a crisis situation. |  |
|---|--|--|
| Time                                    | Learning Outcome   |  |
| Suggested                               | On completion of the module participants will be able to:  |  |
| Minimum Time:                           | Understand the principles of UN HQ crisis response in support of   |  |
| 55 min plus 75 DPKO led field missions. |  |  |
| minutes for                             | Define the DPKO-led field mission crisis response.   |  |
| learning activity                       | Comprehend the DSS role in a crisis situation.   |  |
|   |  |  |

# **STM Module 8: Staff Officers' Integrated Exercise**

| Ī | Aim: | The aim of the INSTEX is to enable the participating staff officers to |
|---|------|--|
|   |      | work in a mission environment and understand the staff functioning     |
|   |      | of the Sector and Force Headquarters.                                  |

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| Time                               | Objectives   |  |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| Suggested<br>Minimum Time:         | Objectives: Following objectives are intended to be achieved through this INSTEX:  |  |
| Three days of six training periods | Orient and understand the staff procedures followed in the different headquarters.   |  |
|                                    | Get to know about the staff responsibilities and synchronize staff functioning.  |  |
|                                    | Adaptability, advance planning and ability to work under changing situations.  |  |
|                                    | Prepare and conduct situation brief for the commanders.  |  |
|                                    | Understand, prepare and conduct mission analysis and decision briefs.  |  |
|                                    | Report generation.   |  |
|                                    | Coordination and cooperation among different branches within<br>the headquarters and outside with other partners in the mission<br>area. |  |

# **Module 1 Organization and Basic Staff Procedures in United Nations Mission Headquarters**

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# **Preparatory Notes to Instructor**

# **Background**

Multinational Operations and Allied forces operations have the advantage of sharing the same doctrinal base and procedural standards which made possible the interoperability among armed forces of different countries.

In order to achieve the peacekeeping mission operational aims, UN military staff officers must be able to communicate and jointly work cooperatively in a multinational and multicultural environment under multiple constrains. Their work is even more challenged by the volatile political situation always evolving in a fast changing peacekeeping mission scenario.

Staff Officers need a clear understanding of standard procedures, mission structures, roles and duties for the different components and branches present in the mission HQ.

Staff officers' understanding of their functions, roles, structures and procedures in place at mission HQ will help them in performing their duties efficiently in above depicted environment.

#### Aim

The aim of the Organization and basic staff procedures in UN mission HQ module is to provide staff officers with the necessary knowledge to understand the United Nations peacekeeping mission military structures, roles and procedures existing at mission and sector levels.

# **Learning Outcomes**

On completion of the module: Organization and basic staff procedures in UN mission HQ, participants will be able to:

- Describe the UN Mission HQ structures.
- 2. Identify the duties and responsibilities of staff officers.
- Describe the SOP and staff routine at mission HQ.
- 4. Identify the key staff functions in force/sector HQs
- 5. Conduct briefings in a Mission HQ environment.
- 6. Apply the report procedures and formats.

# **Training Sequence**

The material contained in this module could be delivered over two to three training units, depending on the number of learning activities upon which the instructor decides. The instructor can modify the duration to suit national training requirements and reflect the subject matter comprehension level of the participants.

#### **Duration**

| Minimum<br>Session Time | Lecture/Presentation | Questions/Assessment | Session Activities |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 180 minutes             | 90 min               | 10 min.              | 80 min             |
| Additional<br>Options   | Mission Specific     | Optional Film        | Optional Activity  |
|                         | TBD by PKTI          |                      |                    |

# Methodology

This module contains suggested learning activities to keep adult learners engaged. The facilitation team should use as many of the learning activities as time allows and keep them tailored to the target audience. Participants should be fully involved in the learning process through practical exercises, brainstorming sessions, discussion of case studies, working in small groups on specific tasks, etc.

The instructor should inform participants of the content, format and timing. Knowing what to expect, participants can improve their ability to focus on the subject and benefit better from the session.

Structure of the presentation

- The United Nations Mission Head Quarters structures
- Duties and responsibilities of staff officers
- The mission Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
- The mission staff routine
- Key staff functions in force/sector HQs
- **Briefings**
- Report procedures and formats

Instructors are encouraged to add examples and mission-specific information related to the specific deployment of participants, if known.

\*Please Note: It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written quiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers are provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages.

#### **Instructor Profile**

This module is best presented by an instructor who has experience in working as staff officer at a mission HQ, who could share his/her, experience with the group. If there is more than one instructor, at least one should have practical experience. The instructor should

also encourage questions from the participants and aim for an interactive discussion. All participants should be encouraged to contribute to the group discussions, case study discussions and in any other activities.

# **Instructor Preparations**

### **Required Readings**

- Mission Start-up Field Guide Guidelines August 2010
- Generic Mission SOP 2009
- Standard Operating Procedures for Peacekeeping Missions 1998.
- Standard Operating Procedure for the Submission of Situation and Special Incident reports by DPKO Field Missions 2006.
- Core Pre-deployment Training Materials 2, Part 2 How Missions Work.
- United Nations Correspondence Manual "A guide to the drafting, processing and dispatch of official United Nations communications".2000
- United Nations Editorial Manual Online © 2004-2010 (New York). <available at <a href="http://dd.dgacm.org/editorialmanual/">http://dd.dgacm.org/editorialmanual/</a>>
- Policy Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) 1 November 2010
- DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions (2011), in particular paragraphs 84 to 88 concerning UN Military personnel.

## **General Preparations**

#### Equipment:

- 1. Computer and PowerPoint slides
- 2. Projector and Screen
- 3. Flip Chart

#### Materials:

- 1. Two to four printed copies of Annexes 1a, 1c, 2a and 2b,
- 2. Copies of handouts and Mission Structures and Generic Force Headquarters.
- 3. Copies of Civilian leadership and management functions and the Duties and responsibilities of Staff Officers for the practical exercise.

#### **Mission Specific**

If this module is being presented to prepare participants for a particular UN peacekeeping mission, then gather mission specific information from the mission website (available at the

UN DPKO internet website, through 'current operations':

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp). Additional mission specific information is available at the UN DPKO Policy and Training internet website:

http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

# Symbols Legend



- Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words versus being read to participants)
- 2 Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)
- Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
- Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
- Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
- Film (A film that is recommended as a core part of the training or an option)
- Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
- Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit, section or part – as indicated in the text)
- Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

# **Session Notes**

# The organization and basic staff procedures in UN mission Head Quarters Slide 1

Note to Instructor: Give the participants a brief explanation why they should pay special attention to this module. Refer to: Background in the Preparatory Notes to the Instructor

| Aim   | Slide 2 |
|---|---------|
| To provide staff officers with the necessary knowledge to       | Ondo 2  |
| understand the United Nations peacekeeping mission military     |         |
| structures, roles and procedures existing at mission and sector |         |
| levels.   |         |

# As UN Staff Officer... Why should I know this?

# Learning Outcome

Slide 4

On completion of the module: Organization and basic staff procedures in UN mission HQ, participants will be able to:


- Describe the UN Mission HQ structures.
- Identify the duties and responsibilities of staff officers.
- Describe the SOP and staff routine at mission HQ.
- Identify the key staff functions in force/sector HQs
- Conduct briefings in a Mission HQ environment.
- Apply the report procedures and formats.

# Structure of the Presentation

Slide 5

- The United Nations Mission Head Quarters structures
- Duties and responsibilities of staff officers
- The mission Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
- The mission staff routine
- Key staff functions in force/sector HQs
- Briefings
- Report procedures and formats

# The United Nations Mission Head Quarters management structures and support systems



# The United Nations Mission Head Quarters management structures and support systems

Slide 7

- Critical decision-making systems
- Core management, planning and resourcing systems (CPTM, IMPP module)
- Management support structures and systems
- Relations with the UNCT (CPTM)

**Note to Instructor:** Explain that Integrated Mission generally refers to structurally integrated field missions, e.g. UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a multi-hated DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/Head of Mission. The collaborative principles of integration are to be applied in UN field presences with a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office working alongside a UN Country Team.

Note to Instructor: Make a reference to the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials Unit 2 – Part 2 How UN Peacekeeping Operations function to explain the management planning and support structures in place in a peacekeeping mission (pg 46 to 61)

Mission Headquarters management structures and support systems The information on the systems and associated tasks that need to be established for the MHQ to build the capabilities needed to achieve the mandate, has been outlined in the Unit 2 – Part 2 How UN Peacekeeping Operations function.

The structures and systems are grouped into four categories, as follows:

- Critical decision-making systems
- Core management, planning and resourcing systems: a critical managerial systems that set broad-based management approaches and priorities as well as managerial processes that allow the mission to plan its activities and obtain the resources to implement that plan
- Management support structures and systems: a range of managerial support systems that help integrate the mission and enable more efficient mandate implementation.
- Relations with the UNCT: Under the authority of SRSG/HOM, the DSRSG/RC/HC works to ensure that the mission strategic framework encompasses UNCT perspectives and also to establish working mechanisms between the mission and UNCT.

# Critical decision-making systems

# Critical decision-making systems Mission Leadership Team (MLT) Security Management Team (SMT) to be explained in the crisis management module. Crisis Management Team (CMT) to be explained in the crisis management module.

Critical decision-making systems In this module will concentrate our attention to explain the Critical decision-making systems

The mission's critical decision-making systems include the following and are described in further detail below:

- Mission Leadership Team (MLT)
- Security Management Team (SMT). The SMT consists of representatives from the peacekeeping mission as well as the UNCT, and it acts as a consultative body on United Nations security arrangements in country. The SMT functions and composition is explained in the crisis management module.

• Crisis Management Team (CMT) is the critical decision-making body and advisory committee to the SRSG/HOM during an emergency. CMT functions and composition is explained in the crisis management module.

# Mission Leadership Team (MLT)

# Slide 9 Mission Leadership Team (MLT) SRSG/HOM, DSRSGs. HOPC, HOMC. DMS/CMS and COS. Msn primary decision-making body Approving the Msn plan Reviewing budgets Political guidance & high-level Op direction Approving high-level policy

# Mission Leadership Team (MLT)

MLT generally includes the principal leaders of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, including: SRSG/HOM, DSRSGs, HOPC, HOMC, DMS/CMS and COS and heads of human rights components. The meetings of MLT are chaired by SRSG/HOM.

MLT, as a group, is the mission's primary decision-making body. Key tasks of the MLT include the following:

Making decisions on issues from the SMG

- Approving the mission plan and reviewing the mission budget before submission to **OHNU**
- Providing political guidance and high-level operational direction to Senior Management Group (SMG)
- Approving high-level policy approaches for issues with mission-wide effect
- Making decisions on issues referred from the SMG

| Standing structures to support in-mission integration        |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <ul> <li>Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)</li> </ul>     |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Joint Operations Centre (JOC)</li> </ul>            |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC)</li> </ul> |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Integrated Support Services (ISS)</li> </ul>        |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Integrated Mission Training Cell (IMTC)</li> </ul>  |  |  |

| Module 1: Organization and basic staff procedures in UN mission HQ Pg. 10   |
|---|
|   |
| <b>Note to Instructor:</b> remind participants that joint or integrated structures in the mission were taught in CPTM 2-2 page 58 and 59 (slide 17) and JMAC functions will be explained in details in the module Information Gathering. JLOC and ISS will be explained in the module UN Logistic at work.  |
| These joint structures, with the provision of sufficient resources and support by senior management, can act as force multipliers across the full range of capabilities and tasks of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. They need strong managerial support from the beginning as well as quality personnel seconded from line components. They can be important tools for bringing together and adding value to the work of the mission's line components. Joint structures support not just one manager; they produce synthesis products of value to the leadership team as a whole. As mission-wide resources, these structures generally report administratively to COS or DSRSG. |
|   |
|   |



# Learning Activity: Civilian leadership, management functions, duties and responsibilities of staff officers



Note to Instructor: Explain participants that in this training activity, Staff Officers will read, discus and identify the key Civilian Leadership and Management Functions. They also will identify the duties and responsibilities of staff officers (Instructions are attached)

# **Learning Activity Time Required:**


|             | 05 minutes | for activity introduction and instructions |
|-------------|------------|--|
|             | 15 minutes | for discussion in small groups             |
|             | 10 minutes | debrief in the plenary group               |
|             | 05 minutes | questions and answers                      |
| Total time: | 35 minutes |  |


# **Alternative learning activity:**

# **Learning Activity Time Required:**

| <b>es</b> deb | rief in the plenary group |
|---------------|---------------------------|
| t             | t <b>es</b> deb           |

Alternative for this learning activity is to provide the participants the day before with the participant versions materials and have they go through the CPTM's material, the internet and any available documentation. The solution of the activity can then be discussed in plenary while doing the course presentation. At that time, only 10 minutes are required for discussion.





# **The mission Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)**

# Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs)

# Slide 13 **Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs)** Set of instructions covering those features of operations and administration, which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.

- Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs). SOPs are a set of instructions covering those features of operations and administration, which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. It is appreciated that different mission, different conditions and different types of operation make each set of SOP unique in its own right. In this module we intent to explain the layout, organization and general content of SOPs in a PKO.
- Each PKO developed its own SOPs and promulgated it. Constituent units/elements of the PKO in turn based their own SOPs on those of the higher HQ.
- SOPs at all levels are kept under review at regular intervals and relevant amendments initiated as judged necessary by the FC/CMO.

Development of procedures to guide military personnel action on human rights issues is now a standard requirement applying to all missions. These procedures are meant to be developed in coordination with the human rights component from the onset of the mission, provide guidance on peacekeepers' operations when confronted with human rights violations and ensure that prompt information over human rights information takes place. G3 and G5 officers should be involved in developing such procedures

# **SOPs Layout and Organization**

| SOPs Layout and Organization   | Slide 14 |
|--|----------|
| <ul> <li>Initial Reference Sheets.</li> </ul>                        |          |
| <ul> <li>Volume/Part/Section 1 - Introduction.</li> </ul>            |          |
| <ul> <li>Volume/Part/Section 2 - Headquarters.</li> </ul>            |          |
| <ul> <li>Volume/Part/Section 3 - Operations.</li> </ul>              |          |
| <ul> <li>Volume/Part/Section 4 - Personal Administration.</li> </ul> |          |
| <ul> <li>Volume/Part/Section 5 - Logistics Administration</li> </ul> |          |
| · ·  |          |

- SOPs Layout and Organization. SOPs can be broadly organized along the following lines.
  - Initial Reference Sheets.
  - Volume/Part/Section 1 Introduction.
  - Volume/Part/Section 2 Headquarters.
  - Volume/Part/Section 3 Operations.
  - Volume/Part/Section 4 Personal Administration.
  - Volume/Part/Section 5 Logistics Administration.
- The size and complexity of a PKO will be reflected in the size and complexity of the SOPs. To allow for this, while the organization should always be as above, the option of Volumes/Parts or Sections can be exercised by the producing headquarters (e.g. large forces may require a separate Operations Volume with subsidiary parts and sections while a small observer mission might merely have an Operations part).

# **Security Classification SOPs**

# Security Classification SOPs Slide 15

The level of security classification given to SOPs is the prerogative of the individual commander and is subject to the requirements of SG bulletin on information, sensitivity, classification and handling.

Security Classification SOPs The level of security classification given to SOPs is the prerogative of the individual commander. According to ST/SGB/2007/6 on Information sensitivity, classification and handling, the three official UN security classifications are:

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, CONFIDENTIAL and UNCLASIFIED. The security classification will be indicated at the centre, top and bottom of:

- the outside front cover of SOPs:
- the outside back cover of SOPs, and
- each individual page of SOPs.

### The mission staff routine

#### **General Headquarters Routine**

|   | General Headquarters Routine | Slide 16 |
|---|------------------------------|----------|
| • | Working Hours                |          |
| • | Duty Hours                   |          |
| • | Standby                      |          |
| • | Overtime                     |          |
|   |                              |          |

- General Headquarters Routine UN PK mission's operations are on a 24-hour basis. Thus, in principle, to ensure the operational efficiency of the Force, all HQ military personnel are on duty 7 days a week 24 hours a day. However, to permit reasonable rest and recreation a weekend routine will normally be followed on one day a week whereby only operation centres will be manned.
- Leave. UN military staff officer on mission are entitled to the following leave on the understanding that it is to be taken as actual leave without any cash compensation in lieu of leave not used: 2.5 days/month (15 days/6 months; 30 days/12 months). Staff officers are not entitled for Compensatory Time Off (CTO)

#### **Working Hours**

Working Hours. Peace-keeping is a full-time operational activity and the concept of a 24-hour working day must be obtained. Working hours are promulgated in an Administrative Circular issued by the Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support or Chief Administrative Services, for military and civilian staff in those parts of the HQ which do not need to maintain a 24-hour capability. Personnel are not to be absent during working hours without prior permission from their supervisors. A member absent without permission is liable to disciplinary action and in addition to such punishment as the CO may award, may forfeit his/her UN pay for the period of unauthorized absence.

#### **Duty Hours**

Duty Hours To meet operational tasks in Branches and Units, duty personnel, such as HQ duty officers, signals operators, duty drivers and medical service staff, are required. In these areas a duty system exists to cover periods outside working hours. This could be backed up by an on-call system, which enables the branches/cells to be built up quickly in an emergency. Duty rosters are maintained for all special duties. Normally, personnel should not be on continuous duty beyond 24 hours.

### **Standby**

Standby Staff officers must be available after normal working hours either to assist duty personnel or to be available for emergency cases. Lists of personnel on standby are to be published by Branches. Standby duties will not be offset by compensatory time off (CTO). CTO can only be granted, if operational reasons require active duty of UN military experts of mission (MEoM) or UNPOL on a continuous basis, including Weekends and official holidays. Thus, if the Mission HQ staff officers, or any other UN MEoM, enjoy weekends and holidays off, they do not qualify for CTO which requires continuous active duty, where the service otherwise breaks only for sick leave or annual leave.

#### **Overtime**

Overtime does not apply as the HQ is 24/7.

# **Signing and Approval Authorities**

| Signing and Approval Authorities The principal responsibility for drafting outgoing communications, and for their substance and factual accuracy, lies with Branch Heads and Section Chiefs. Branches are responsible for clearing with the COS outgoing communications involving matters of policy that should be brought to the attention of the FC | Slide 17 |
|---|----------|
|---|----------|

- Signing and Approval Authorities The principal responsibility for drafting outgoing communications, and for their substance and factual accuracy, lies with Branch Heads and Section Chiefs. Branches are responsible for clearing with the COS outgoing communications involving matters of policy that should be brought to the attention of the FC. The following are examples that may apply:
  - Correspondence to UN HQ NY and other UN missions, will be signed by the FC or, for him by the COS or the CMS for administrative matters,
  - Operations Orders will be signed by the COS or COO for the FC,
  - CMS will sign Administrative Instructions, Administrative Directives and Information Circulars,
  - Amendments to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) will be signed/approved by COS. Logistics Directives are issued by the CLO after consultation with and approval by the COS and the CAO,
  - Engineer, Military Police, Signal and Medical Instructions will be promulgated by the Chief Engineer Cell, Force Provost Marshal, Chief Comms Cell and Chief Health Cell as applicable after approval by COS,

- Force Routine Orders (FRO) will be recommended by the CMPO and signed by the FC.
- Instructions pertaining to branch areas of expertise will be signed by Branch Heads.
- Correspondence on technical or routine subjects or on matters on which the FC's policy has been clearly established may be signed by Branch Heads, and
- Internal correspondence will be signed by the originator.

# **Key staff functions in force/sector HQs**

| Key staff func   | tions in force/sector HQs | Slide 18 |
|--|---------------------------|----------|
| <ul> <li>Personnel</li> <li>Military Information</li> <li>Operations</li> <li>Logistics</li> <li>Civil-Military Coordina</li> <li>Communications Bran</li> </ul> |                           |          |

# Personnel

#### Slide 19

#### **Personnel Functions:**

- Maintenance of strength
- Personnel management
- Development and maintenance of morale
- Maintenance of discipline, law and order
- Headquarters management
- Miscellaneous
- **Personnel** The main personnel functions are related to the following topics:
  - 1. Maintenance of unit strength
    - a. Personnel records
    - b. Replacements/rotation
      - (1) Individual
      - (2) Units
  - 2. Personnel management
    - a. Military personnel
    - b. Civilian personnel
    - c. Apprehended personnel and refugees
  - 3. <u>Development and maintenance of morale</u>

- a. Personnel services
  - (1) Postal
  - (2) Finance
  - (3) Religious
  - (4) Exchange
  - (5) Welfare
  - (6) Legal
  - (7) Rest & leave
- b. Decorations & awards
- c. Graves registration
- 4. Maintenance of discipline, law and order
- 5. Headquarters Management
- 6. Miscellaneous

#### Personnel

Slide 20

# The personnel estimate

CMPO prepares the personnel estimate to determine the impact on the personnel situation on operations.

#### Factors:

- Strength
- Morale
- Discipline

## The personnel estimate

CMPO prepares the personnel estimate to determine the impact on the personnel situation on operations and the impact of operations on personnel matters. All relevant personnel factors (e.g. strength, moral, etc) are considered to determine their influence on the overall course of action to be adopted. The estimate also includes recommendations to meet estimated requirements on the personnel sector.

#### **Personnel Estimate Format**

Slide 21

1. BASIS

- 2. FACTORS
  - a. Geography
  - b. Non-UN activity

- Personnel situation C.
- d. Miscellaneous
- **COURSES OF ACTION** 
  - a. Own courses of action
  - b. Analysis and discussion
  - c. Conclusions.
- 4. RECOMMENDATION

### (A TYPE FORMAT FOR PERSONNEL ESTIMATE)

#### CLASSIFICATION

| Copy No                |
|------------------------|
| Issuing Section and HQ |
| Place of Issue         |
| DTG                    |
| Ref No:                |

PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NO.....

Ref: Maps, relevant documents, etc.

1. **BASIS** 

(Mission, situation, Cdr's planning guidance, etc.)

#### 2. **FACTORS**

(Data/facts and deductions from these which may affect courses of action)

- a. Geography (terrain, weather, etc., affecting personnel situation)
- b. Non-UN activity (affecting personnel situation)
- c. Personnel situation (strengths, replacements, discipline, law and order, apprehended personnel, refugees, morale, and personnel services, internal management, civilian personnel etc.)
- d. Miscellaneous (diplomatic relations, religious and ethnological matters affecting the use, deployment and supply of units, etc)

#### 3. **COURSES OF ACTION**

- a. Own courses of action (normally given by COO)
- b. Analysis and discussion (advantages and disadvantages of each course of action from a personnel stand-point)
- c. Conclusions.

#### 4. RECOMMENDATION

(The personnel feasibility of the operation, and preferred course of action from a personnel stand-point).

CMPO

Annexes:

Distribution:

# **CLASSIFICATION**

# **UN Civic Military Coordination (UN CIMIC)**

# What is UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN CIMIC)?

United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UN CIMIC) refers to the coordination mechanisms and procedures used by the UN System, i.e. in UN peacekeeping missions and by UN humanitarian and development agencies. Slide 22

### What is UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN CIMIC)?

United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UN CIMIC) refers to the coordination mechanisms and procedures used by the UN military and civilian partners, among them the civilian components of UN field missions, UN Police, UN agencies, funds and programmes, host national government, non-governmental organizations, and grass-roots organizations. Such coordination encompasses activities undertaken and/or facilitated by military components of UN missions across the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping operations. In a UN peacekeeping context, this coordination is called "UN-CIMIC" which is a military staff function that contributes to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components of an integrated mission, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, in order to support UN mission objectives. UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) on the other hand refers to the humanitarian civil-military coordination function that provides the necessary interface between humanitarian and military actors to protect and promote the humanitarian principles and achieve the humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies and natural disaster situations

Note to the Instructor: Explain participants that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and some nations, mostly those in Europe and North America use other concepts with approximately the same intent as UN-CIMIC, e.g. NATO and some countries use Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and the United States of America and some countries use Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Civil Affairs (CA). The primary difference between UN-CIMIC and these other concepts is that in the UN context the military is part of an integrated mission structure under the overall civilian control of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).

# What is the essential aim of UN CIMIC?

Slide 23

The essential aim of UN-CIMIC is to maximize and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners, especially the host nation government, to allow the peace process to unfold, and contribute to achieving the mission objectives.

#### What is the essential aim of UN CIMIC?

The essential aim of UN-CIMIC is to maximize and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners, especially the host nation government, to allow the peace process to unfold, and contribute to achieving the mission objectives. Guided by existing standards such as the Oslo Guidelines, UN-CIMIC activities should provide indirect assistance with a focus to exploit advantages that may serve as a "multiplier" to civilian efforts to improve local capacity and confidence rather than direct assistance designed to "win hearts and minds". Small scale projects utilizing small numbers of soldiers can yield inherent comparative military advantages including general physical security, information collection and analysis, planning and coordination, training and outreach, logistics, and special capabilities such as deployment of female military personnel.

# What are the Core Tasks of UN-CIMIC?

Slide 24

- Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing
- Civil Assistance

#### What are the Core Tasks of UN-CIMIC?

<u>Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing</u>: To facilitate the implementation of this function, the following should guide the UN-CIMIC officers:

- May act as the first point of entry to the military component of the mission for police and civilian partners.
- Should ensure that their military components are aware of benefits and sensitivities when working with police and civilian partners, especially with the humanitarian actors (UN-CMCoord).
- Should contribute to development of procedures ensuring cooperation between the Military component and human rights colleagues over information-sharing and to guide action to prevent and respond to human rights violations.

 UN-CIMIC interaction with the police and civilian partners should be based on an agreed appropriate framework/process that would ensure the transparent flow of information.

<u>Civil Assistance</u>: These activities are to be undertaken as appropriate and within mission capabilities:

- Provide support to ensure a coordinated mission response to requests for assistance from humanitarian and development actors, and
- Facilitate the interaction between the Mission and the local civilian population and authorities
- Provide support to the work of the human rights and other civilian components including by providing escort to staff in the conduct of their activities.

#### **UN-CIMIC Estimate Format**

Slide 25

- 1. BASIS
- 2. FACTORS
  - a. Refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees
  - b. Allegations of human Rights violations and other breaches of the International Law:
  - c. Needs and Health Assessment (villages, IDP-camps, hospitals, orphanages etc.)
  - d. Significant Public Attitude in the Mission Area

#### Slide 26

# **UN-CIMIC Estimate Format (cont...)**

- e. Significant Local Government and Administration Information
- f. Major activities of leading humanitarian agencies (indicate grid, who and what programs, projects etc.)
- g. Identification of important topics which the mission Force should devote attention

#### COURSES OF ACTION

- a. Own courses of action
- b. Analysis and discussion

- Conclusions. C.
- d. Deductions or general constraints for the mission Force towards the local organisations
- Deductions or general constraints for the mission Force towards UN Agencies and mission components, including Human Rights, UNPOL (UN Police), , local NGOs, media and others concerned
- Final conclusions
- 4. **RECOMMENDATION**

#### (A TYPE FORMAT FOR UN - CIMIC ESTIMATE) **CLASSIFICATION**

Copy No..... Issuing Section and HQ Place of Issue DTG Ref No:....

UN - CIMIC ESTIMATE NO.....

Ref: Maps, relevant documents, etc.

- 1. BASIS (Mission, situation, Cdr's planning guidance, etc.)
- 2. FACTORS (Data/facts and deductions from these which may affect courses of action)
  - a. Refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees:
    - (1) Stationary assessment (IDP-camps, collection centres, villages):
      - (a) Date, time, location name and grid (co-ordinates)
      - (b) Estimation of the number of people (male/female adults, elderly, children)
      - (c) Identification of representative person (name and description of problems, incidents or other relevant information, etc.)
      - (d) Equipment, shelter, baggage, heating, water and food condition, weaponry and protection, etc.
      - (e) Procedure and presence of leading humanitarian agencies

- (f) Government administration procedure and presence (villages: indicate figures before conflict)
- (2) Moving assessment:
  - (a) Date, time, location name, grid origin and assumed point of destination and route
  - (b) Estimation of number (male/female adults, elderly, children)
  - (c) Identification of representative person (name and description of problems, incidents on the move, or other information)
  - (d) Equipment, shelter, baggage, transportation method, weaponry, protection, water condition, etc.
  - (e) Procedure and presence of leading humanitarian agencies
  - (f) Government administration procedure and presence
- b. Human Rights Violations and other breaches of International Law (Remember that the first port of call for UN Military to report on human rights violations is the mission's human rights component):
  - (1) Date, time, location name, grid
  - (2) Short description of the abuse or incident
  - (3) Assessment of procedure and presence of human rights officers in the sector, relevant UN Agencies, UNPOL, and others concerned
  - (4) Measures taken to consult/share allegations with the mission's human rights component for its verification and other follow up.
  - (5) Assessment of procedure and presence of local police or any other authorities (this and other follow up to be coordinated with the human rights component).
- c. Needs and Health Assessment (villages, IDP-camps, hospitals, orphanages etc.)
  - (1) Date, time, location name, grid and a short description of the needs and requirements
  - (2) Assessment of procedure and presence of leading humanitarian agencies
  - (3) Assessment of procedure and presence of health institutions and individuals practitioners
- d. Significant Public Attitude in the Mission Area
  - (1) Date, time, location name and grid of cooperative or non-cooperative public attitude (individuals, interest groups, arranged or spontaneous gatherings, local press, journalists, negative newspapers writing, negative radio and television transmission)
  - (2) Location name and grid of public trouble spots, sensitive areas and a short description of the problem
  - (3) General constraints which could have implications towards the mission Force
  - (4) Measures taken and impression of the outcome

- e. Significant Local Government and Administration Information
  - (1) Information on local authorities (ordinary administration, mayors, police, city councils, elderly councils, fraction parties, squire and others concerned)
  - (2) Information on local administration (power installations, heating station, thermal power station, water supply and waterworks, sewer cleaning. and other concerned)
  - (3) Status of local authorities (deaths, arrests, disappearances, detainees, prisoners, change of attitudes, etc.)
- f. Major activities of leading humanitarian agencies (indicate grid, who and what - programs, projects etc.) including requirements for the mission Force assistance
- g. Identification of important topics which the mission Force should devote attention

#### 3. **COURSES OF ACTION**

- a. Own courses of action (according to the assessed factors)
- Analysis and discussion (advantages and disadvantages of each course of b. action from a UN -CIMIC stand-point)
- Deductions or general constraints for the mission Force towards the local C. organisations
- Deductions or general constraints for the mission Force towards UN Agencies, d. UNPOL (UN Police), human rights and other mission components, media and others concerned
- Final conclusions e.

#### RECOMMENDATION 4.

(The UN CIMIC feasibility of the operation, and preferred course of action from a UN CIMIC stand-point).

**UN CIMIC** 

Annexes: Distribution:

#### CLASSIFICATION

#### Communications

|   | <u>Communications</u>   | Slide<br>27 |
|---|---|-------------|
| • | <b>G7 SO Comms</b> is responsible for supervising and coordinating mission forces signals |             |

- Comms Cell is responsible for establishing connectivity through mission civil CCO to all mission forces units on SATCOMM and – if possible - PTT with an Access Switch in mission HQ
- Units communications Each unit is responsible for their internal communications systems
- Interoperability These will provide the basis for possible interoperability on HF and VHF using frequencies, squelch systems and some codes on a common user basis
- G7 SO Comms is responsible for supervising and co-ordinating mission forces signals, field work, SAT-communication, mission forces signal orders and frequency management. All SO's are working with Communications Electronic Operational Instructions (CEOI), Communications Electronic Instructions (CEI) and code systems.
- Mission COMMS CELL The Mission Comms Cell is responsible for: Establishing connectivity through mission civil CCO to all mission forces units on SATCOMM and – if possible - PTT with an Access Switch in mission HQ. A HF backup net on military equipment will be established. Establishing all cabling to Staff members in HQ and connectivity to access switch together with UN Field service.
- Units Special Communications Each unit is responsible for their internal communications systems. One copy of the communications set-up and all signal orders shall be forwarded to G4/COMMS CELL.
- Interoperability. The overall management for communications within the mission forces will by orders and frag orders. These will provide the basis for possible interoperability on HF and VHF using frequencies, squelch systems and some codes on a common user basis. SATCOMMS may also be organised to establish interoperability

#### **COMMS Estimate Format**

Slide 28

COMMS ESTIMATE NO.....

Ref: Maps, relevant documents, etc.

- 1. BASIS
- 2. FACTORS
  - a. Geography
  - b. Non-UN activity
  - Comms situation (contingent's comms units, experience and expertise of units, vulnerabilities of comms systems, availability of log/administrative support, interoperability of comms systems, etc,)
  - d. Resources (information of equipment available)

#### **COMMS Estimate Format (Cont...)**

Slide 29

- 3. **COURSES OF ACTION** 
  - a. Own courses of action (normally given by COO)
  - b. Analysis and discussion (advantages and disadvantages of each course of action from a comms stand-point)
  - c. Conclusions.
- **RECOMMENDATION** 4.

#### (A TYPE FORMAT FOR COMMS ESTIMATE) **CLASSIFICATION**

Copy No..... Issuing Section and HQ Place of Issue DTG Ref No:....

#### COMMS ESTIMATE NO.....

Ref: Maps, relevant documents, etc.

1. BASIS

(Mission, situation, Cdr's planning guidance, etc.)

2. **FACTORS** 

(Data/facts and deductions from these which may affect courses of action)

- a. Geography (terrain, weather, etc., affecting comms situation)
- Non-UN activity (affecting comms situation)

- c. Comms situation (contingent's comms units, experience and expertise of units, vulnerabilities of comms systems, availability of log/administrative support, interoperability of comms systems, etc,)
- d, Resources (see attached table)

#### 3. COURSES OF ACTION

- a. Own courses of action (normally given by COO)
- b. Analysis and discussion (advantages and disadvantages of each course of action from a comms stand-point)
- c. Conclusions.

#### 4. RECOMMENDATION

(The comms feasibility of the operation, and preferred course of action from a personnel stand-point).

G-7 Comms

Annexes: Distribution:

#### **CLASSIFICATION**

Table of communications resources (equipment) available in mission area

| SR | ITEM | Contingent | Qty | Serviceability | Remarks |
|----|------|------------|-----|----------------|---------|
|    |      |            |     |                |         |
|    |      |            |     |                |         |



# Learning Activity: Organization and basic staff procedures in UN mission HQ Exercise: staff estimates

In this an exercise with a military scenario, participants are required to be exercised in the preparation and presentation of staff estimates to put into practice the related material presented in SO STM Module 1

Participants should be provided with the Carana Scenario background, current situation, special idea and maps at reasonable time ahead of the lesson to enable them prepare adequately for it.



#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

| 05 minutes | Activity introduction and instructions |
|------------|--|
| 20 minutes | Syndicate discussion                   |
| 05 minutes | Debrief in syndicates                  |
| 15 minutes | Debrief in the plenary group           |
| 45 minutes |  |

**Total Time:** 

Slide 31

|                | Learning Activity: Organization and basic staff procedures in UN mission HQ Exercise: staff estimates  Learning Activity Time Required: |  |  |  |
|----------------|---|--|--|--|
| 3              |   |  |  |  |
|                | 05 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions |  |  |
|                | 20 minutes  | Syndicate discussion                   |  |  |
|                | 05 minutes  | Debrief in syndicates                  |  |  |
|                | 15 minutes  | Debrief in the plenary group           |  |  |
| Total<br>Time: | 45 minutes  |  |  |  |

# **Briefings Techniques**

| ı |   |   |  |
|---|---|---|--|
|   | • | Briefings are either intended to provide general information or information to a specific audience. |  |
|   | • | Do not unnecessarily repeat information.  |  |
|   | • | Present facts   |  |
|   | • | Describe shortfalls, critical constraints or  |  |
|   | • | Recommendations for action should include What, When, Where, Who and Why                            |  |
|   | • | An agenda has to be established, and the areas of responsibility of each individual briefer         |  |
|   |   |   |  |

**Some Guidelines for Briefings** 

Some Guidelines for Briefings. Briefings pursue various purposes. They are either intended to provide general information or information to a specific audience, to facilitate the workflow or to prepare a decision. Do not unnecessarily repeat

information. Present facts - otherwise call it assumptions - describe shortfalls, critical constraints or limitations with regard to your own capabilities. Recommendations for action should include What, When, Where, Who and Why (if applicable also How). One briefer or a group of briefers may hold the briefing. In the latter case, an agenda has to be established, and the areas of responsibility of each individual briefer have to be coordinated to avoid repetition.

#### The briefer should keep the following aspects in mind:

- Analyze the audience
- Decide on the purpose of the briefing and the desired outcome
- Be brief and concise under due consideration of the given time limit
- Decide on the focus of your briefing (or your part of the briefing)
- Do not go too much into detail if not requested to do so
- Use visual aids (slides, map, and sketches)
- Choose short, descriptive, precise words and pronounce them clearly
- Avoid words you find difficult to pronounce
- Don't speak too fast (especially if you are a native speaker)
- Avoid lyrics and meaningless phrases
- Maintain eye contact with the audience

|  | Briefing | preparation | check list: |
|--|----------|-------------|-------------|
|--|----------|-------------|-------------|

| Briefing preparation check list | Slide 32 |
|---------------------------------|----------|
| • Medium                        |          |
| Location                        |          |
| <ul><li>Training aids</li></ul> |          |
| Tips for briefers               |          |

#### Medium

- Are the tools available (slide presentation, flipchart, posters, maps, etc.)?
- Are the slides short and concise?
- Have you used colours and fonts appropriately, omitting unnecessary sound effects, transitions and images?
- Is the background clear?
- Is the UN mission logo present?

#### Location

- Have you shared on the venue, the date, and the time?
- Are the seating arrangements appropriate?
- Is the venue appropriately equipped (ventilation, lighting, noise level, toilet facilities, refreshments, etc.)?

#### **Training aids**

Do you have all required tools (projector, screen, markers, flipcharts, audio recorders, agendas, personnel)?

#### Tips for briefers

- Avoid putting complete paragraphs on the slide. Use bullet points and explain the content verbally.
- Avoid reading the information on the slide to the audience. Most people can read at least twice as fast as you can talk. Letting them read for themselves can also be ineffective as the reader will read to finish before you change the slide rather than read for comprehension.
- Assume one slide per minute if using PowerPoint. If you don't intend discussing the point – don't point it on the slide

#### Military Information Briefing

#### Slide 33 **Military Information Briefing** Mission Situation of the parties to the conflict, capabilities and presumable intentions Situation of superior formation, adjacent units and other organizations Situation of friendly forces in all basic functional areas Friendly intentions Special command and control problems Requests / recommendations Summary

- Military Information Briefing: The aim of it is to inform superiors or subordinated commanders on the current situation. It includes:
  - Mission
  - Situation of the parties to the conflict, capabilities and presumable intentions
  - Situation of superior formation, adjacent units and other organizations
  - Situation of friendly forces in all basic functional areas
  - Friendly intentions
  - Special command and control problems
  - Requests / recommendations
  - Summary

#### Visitors Information Briefing

| Visitors information briefing   |          |
|---|----------|
| Visitors Information Briefing   | Slide 34 |
| Aim: To inform visitors or guests about the current situation or a specific topic |          |

- Introduction and purpose of the briefing
- Mission
- Situation of the parties to the conflict
- Situation of other organizations as applicable
- Situation of friendly forces in all basic functional areas as applicable
- Friendly intentions
- Summary
- Visitors Information Briefing: The aim of it is to inform visitors or guests about the current situation or a specific topic. It includes:
  - Introduction and purpose of the briefing
  - Mission
  - Situation of the parties to the conflict
  - Situation of other organizations as applicable
  - Situation of friendly forces in all basic functional areas as applicable
  - Friendly intentions
  - Summary

#### **Staff Conference Briefing**

#### **Staff Conference Briefing**

Slide 35

Aim: To inform staff personnel and coordinate the workflow and planning process.

- Introduction, purpose and agenda
- Mission
- Development of the parties to the conflict, capabilities and presumable intentions
- Situation of other organizations as applicable
- Development of friendly forces in all basic functional areas
- Decisions and guidelines
- · Further friendly intentions
- Summary
- **Staff Conference Briefing**: The aim of it is to inform staff personnel and to coordinate the workflow and planning process. Several staff conferences may be needed to develop courses of action or coordinate the planning process. It includes:
  - Introduction, purpose and agenda
  - Mission
  - Development of the parties to the conflict, capabilities and presumable intentions

- Situation of other organizations as applicable
- Development of friendly forces in all basic functional areas
- Decisions and guidelines
- Further friendly intentions
- Summary

# Handout Possible outline of an initial staff conference briefing

| WHAT   |
|--|
| Introduction, Purpose, Agenda and Mission  |
| Initial Information Preparations, Terrain and Weather Analysis, Threat Evaluation, Capabilities, Presumable Intentions   |
| General Situation, HQ or Higher Commander's Intent, Concept of Operation, Centres of Gravity, Desired End-State.   |
| Specified, Implied and Essential Tasks, Decisions, Guidelines Facts, Assumptions, Limitations Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical Constraints, and Recommendations |
| Logistic Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical Constraints, and Recommendations   |
| Personnel Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical Constraints, and Recommendations  |
| Other Affairs Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical Constraints, and Recommendations  |
| Further friendly intentions, summary (And or request commander's guidance)   |
|  |

|     | Staff Conference Briefing   | Slide 36 |
|-----|---|----------|
| cos | Introduction, Purpose, Agenda and Mission   |          |
| Ю   | Initial Information, Terrain and Weather Analysis,<br>Threat Analysis, Presumable Intentions                  |          |
| COO | General Situation, HQ or Higher Commander's Intent,<br>Concept of Operation, Centres of Gravity, Desired End- |          |

| State.   |   |
|--|---|
| Specified, Implied and Essential Tasks, Decisions,       |   |
| Guidelines Facts, Assumptions, Limitations               |   |
| Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical Constraints, and       |   |
| Recommendations  |   |
| Logistic Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical      |   |
| Constraints, and Recommendations                         |   |
| Personnel Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical     |   |
| Constraints, and Recommendations                         |   |
| Other Affairs Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical |   |
| Constraints, and Recommendations                         |   |
| Further friendly intentions summary (And or              |   |
|  |   |
|  | Specified, Implied and Essential Tasks, Decisions, Guidelines Facts, Assumptions, Limitations Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical Constraints, and Recommendations  Logistic Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical Constraints, and Recommendations  Personnel Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical Constraints, and Recommendations  Other Affairs Estimate Conclusions: Shortfalls, Critical |

#### **Decision Briefing**

| Decision Briefing  | Slide 37  |
|--|-----------|
| <ul> <li>Introduction and purpose</li> <li>Mission and mission analysis</li> <li>Situation, estimate of the parties to the conflict,</li> <li>Situation, estimate of superior formation, adjacent units</li> <li>Situation, estimate of other organizations as applicable</li> <li>Situation, estimate of friendly forces in all basic functional areas</li> <li>Environmental conditions and their appreciation</li> <li>Comparison of forces (Force Ratio)</li> <li>Assessment and comparison of possible Courses of Action (COA)</li> <li>Recommended decision</li> </ul> | Silide 37 |

- **Decision Briefing.** The aim of it is to inform about courses of action and to prepare a commander's decision. Includes:
  - Introduction and purpose
  - Mission and mission analysis
  - Situation, estimate of the parties to the conflict,
  - Situation, estimate of superior formation, adjacent units
  - Situation, estimate of other organizations as applicable
  - Situation, estimate of friendly forces in all basic functional areas
  - Environmental conditions and their appreciation
  - Comparison of forces (Force Ratio)
  - Assessment and comparison of possible Courses of Action (COA)
  - Recommended decision

**Note:** If the decision is made at the end of the briefing it is important that it be followed up with written direction, classified and filed appropriately.

#### **Report procedures and formats**

UN Writing style

#### **UN writing style**

Slide 38

The correspondence of the United Nations must be concise, clear and accurate in content, direct and dignified in style, correct in form and attractive in appearance. In English, British spelling is used as a general rule

UN writing style The UN Correspondence Manual provides guidance on the drafting of UN correspondence. It states that, to contribute effectively to the conduct of the business of the United Nations, the correspondence of the Organization must be concise, clear and accurate in content, direct and dignified in style, correct in form and attractive in appearance. In English, British spelling is used as a general rule. The following suggestions are intended to help the drafter of correspondence meet these criteria.

## Think before drafting

Slide 39

- "Why am I writing?
- To whom am I writing?
- What, if any, action do I expect as a result of what I have written?"
- **Think before drafting** Regardless of the urgency; take time to answer the questions
  - "Why am I writing?
  - To whom am I writing?
  - What, if any, action do I expect as a result of what I have written?" This will make it easier to draft more clearly and concisely.
- Why am I writing?
  - Is it to give someone information? If so, what information? For what purpose?
  - Do I need information? If so, what information? For what purpose?
  - Is some action needed? If so, what action? For what purpose?
- To whom am I writing?
  - Who will the reader(s) be?
  - What does (and doesn't) the reader know about the situation?
  - What does the reader need to know?

- What questions will the reader have in mind when reading my communication?
- How is the reader likely to react?
- What is my relationship to the reader?

| Write simply, clearly and concisely  | Slide 40 |
|--|----------|
| Once we know what we want to communicate, to whom and  |          |
| why, we can draft correspondence clearly, correctly and concisely using a simple style. It is unadorned, and therefore is easily understood. |          |

Write simply, clearly and concisely Once we know what we want to communicate, to whom and why, we can draft correspondence clearly, correctly and concisely, using a simple style that is neither simple-minded nor simplistic. It is unadorned, avoiding arcane constructions and seldom-used words, and therefore is easily understood. Nevertheless, a simple style can convey complex ideas with subtlety and grace and without ambiguity.

| Dos and Don'ts in writing |  |   |  |  |  |
|---------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|
|                           | Dos  | Don'ts  |  |  |  |
|                           | Be concrete  | Don't use any more words<br>than necessary                          |  |  |  |
|                           | State your facts or ideas directly   | Don't use a circumlocution  |  |  |  |
|                           | <ul> <li>Use verbs in the active</li> </ul>  | Don't use emphasis in correspondence.                               |  |  |  |
|                           | Use concrete words.  | Don't use needless     adjectives and adverbs                       |  |  |  |
|                           | <ul> <li>Use short words, short<br/>sentences, and short<br/>paragraphs</li> </ul> | Avoid anything which might offend the sensibilities of the readers. |  |  |  |

**Dos and Don'ts in writing** Here are some positive and negative rules to be followed whenever possible to achieve simplicity and clarity in writing:

#### Dos

- Be concrete and specific, rather than vague and indirect.
- State your facts or ideas directly (subject-verb-object).
- Use verbs in the active rather than the passive voice. (for example the boy threw the ball' rather than 'the ball was thrown by the boy')
- Use concrete rather than abstract words.
- Use short words, short sentences, and short paragraphs rather than long words, long sentences and long paragraphs.

#### Don'ts

- Don't use any more words than necessary to convey your meaning.
- Don't use a circumlocution if a single word or phrase will do. (i.e. .a roundabout or indirect way of saying something like 'the driveway was not unlike that of a military training device known as an obstacle course' when the simple statement 'the driveway resembled an obstacle course' would have conveyed the message.
- Don't use emphasis (bold, italics, underlining) in correspondence.
- Don't use needless adjectives and adverbs (don't overemphasize).
- Avoid anything which might offend the sensibilities of the readers.

#### Well-constructed papers; well-constructed paragraphs

Slide 42

- Well-constructed papers present reasoned propositions,
- Introductory paragraphs should normally begin with a statement of the proposition to be presented in the paper.
- The narrative should be developed in a series of intermediate
- Concluding paragraphs should be very brief, recapitulating the analysis, drawing conclusions and making recommendations

# Well-constructed papers; well-constructed paragraphs

- Well-constructed papers present soundly reasoned propositions, starting with introductory paragraphs, followed by intermediate paragraphs to develop the narrative point-by-point and ending with concluding paragraphs to present recommendations, make requests or invite other forms of response.
- Introductory paragraphs should normally begin with a statement of the proposition to be presented in the paper. These paragraphs should be brief, with no more than six lines of text; the major points to be covered in the paper should be identified.
- The narrative should be developed in a series of intermediate paragraphs analyzing the points in order of importance as set out in the introductory paragraph.
- Concluding paragraphs should be very brief, recapitulating the analysis, drawing conclusions and making recommendations, inviting comments or whatever form of response is desired.

# The operational correspondence

| The operational correspondence                                  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| Operations Orders will be laid out in the normal military five- |  |  |  |  |  |


#### paragraph format

- Situation
- Mission
- Execution
- Service support
- Command and signal

#### **OPERATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE**

- **The operational correspondence** Operations Orders will be laid out in the normal military five-paragraph format.
  - Situation
  - Mission
  - Execution
  - Service support
  - Command and signal

| The correspondence conventions                         | Slide 44 |
|--|----------|
| The following correspondence conventions will be used: |          |
| Signature Blocks                                       |          |
| Annexes  |          |
| Appendices   |          |
| Page Numbering   |          |
| Paragraph Numbering                                    |          |
| Enclosures   |          |
| Distribution List                                      |          |



- The correspondence conventions. The following correspondence conventions will be used:
- **Signature Blocks**. Signature blocks should be at the bottom right of the last sheet of correspondence. The signature block will have the initial and surname of the signatory typed in capitals underneath. Under the name will be the rank and under the rank the appointment.

| Examp | le: |
|-------|-----|
|       |     |

| N  | la | m | Δ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|----|----|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 11 | a  |   | ᆫ |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Lt Col

**Chief Operations Cell** 

For Force Commander

- **Annexes**. Supplementary documents that amplify a parent document are called annexes. They are used when the inclusion of all of the detail in the body of a document would make it cumbersome. The following guidelines will be followed:
  - Annexes should have their own subject heading and should be referred to in the text of the parent document,
  - Annexes should be lettered consecutively in capitals,
  - Annexes should be listed at the end of the parent document (see example in Annex C),
  - The relevant annex letter should be shown at the top right corner of the first sheet and connected to the title of the parent document,

Example: Annex A to:

Significant Incident Report

Dated 25/12/00

Pages of an annex should be numbered using the annex letter and page number,

The third page of Annex B would be numbered B-3 Example:

- **Appendices**. Supplementary documents that amplify an annex are called appendices. These should be used only when the information cannot be included in the parent annex, and usually apply to sketches and statistical tables. Appendices should be referred to in the text of the parent annex. They are numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals in the order in which they appear in the text, for example, Appendix 1. Association with the parent annex should be shown at the top right corner of the first sheet (for example Appendix 1 to Annex B). Appendices are listed at the close of the parent annex (but not the main parent document).
- Page Numbering. The pages of all documents, other than the first page, will be

numbered in the centre of the bottom of each page with consecutive Arabic numerals, above the security classification.

- Paragraph Numbering. Paragraphs are numbered in consecutive Arabic numerals, sub-paragraphs in lower case letters, sub-sub-paragraphs in bracketed Arabic numerals and so on down to Roman numerals.
- Enclosures. These are documents that are complete in themselves and are
  forwarded under a covering letter. Enclosures are listed numerically at the end of
  the parent document under the heading "Enclosures". If an enclosure has a copy
  number, the copy number and title are shown.
- Distribution List. If a document has only one addressee, the addressee is noted above the subject heading at the top left of the document (see examples at Annexes C and D). If there are multiple addressees, short distribution lists can be shown at the bottom left side of the last page of the document, opposite the signature block. If the document is of a high security classification and is consequently numbered, then the number must also be shown on the distribution list. For large numbers of addressees, standard distribution lists should be established and used (for example, Distribution: List B or List C, less CAO and SAO). The precedence in listing distribution addressees is:
  - (1) External Action Addressees,
    - (2) Internal Action Addressees,
    - (3) Information Addressees.

#### Classification levels

| Slide 45 |
|----------|
|          |
|          |
|          |
|          |
|          |

Classification levels The following security classifications are used with UN documents. Sensitive information may be classified as "confidential" or "strictly confidential".

- The designation "confidential" shall apply to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the work of the United Nations. The designation "strictly confidential" shall apply to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to or impede the conduct of the work of the United Nations.
- The designation "unclassified" shall apply to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected not to cause damage to the work of the United Nations.

#### **Security Markings**

# Security Markings Security markings must be typed in capitals at the centre top and bottom of each page and on the front and back cover if the document is bound

- Security Markings Security markings must be typed in capitals at the centre top and bottom of each page and on the front and back cover if the document is bound. If classified UN SECRET, the document must have copy and page numbering and code/reference numbers as follows:
  - Copy Number. This is placed at the top right corner of the first page. It specifies the copy number and the total number of copies on distribution as follows: "Copy No. 4 of 12 Copies".
  - Page Number. This is placed in the normal position at the bottom centre of each page above the security classification. It must specify the page number and number of pages in the complete document.
  - Code/Reference Number. As far as possible, classified documents will be given a code or reference number that can be used in subsequent correspondence to avoid reference to titles or subject matter.
  - Attachments. Annexes, maps, charts, etc, which are part of a classified document, will bear the same security classification as the parent document.

#### **Operational Reporting Requirement**

|   | Operational Reporting Requirement                    | Slide 47 |
|---|--|----------|
| • | Military Daily and Weekly Situation Report (SITREP). |          |
| • | Special Incident Report (SINCREP)                    |          |
| • | Military Monthly and Annual Reporting.               |          |

Reporting following the Use of Force.
Operational Readiness Reporting.

## Operational Reporting Requirement


- Military Daily and Weekly Situation Report (SITREP). They are a military specific report, provided on a daily and weekly basis, to the UN Military Adviser, particularly in field missions that involve significant or critical military operations or activities. For field missions that involve less significant or critical military operations or activities, it is sufficient to include a military specific report within the mission level daily or weekly SITREP that is submitted to the DPKO/DFS Situation Centre (SITCEN) in UN Headquarters. SITREPs should never include names of sources or victims of human rights violations.
- Special Incident Report (SINCREP) is also referred to as "Flash Report", is
  used to provide short and operationally focused information in case of a crisis or
  rapidly deteriorating situation. Flash Reports are required in all cases of
  casualties among UN personnel (including serious accidents), hostile action
  targeting UN personnel, and incidents significant enough to affect the mission's
  ability to implement its mandate.
- Military Monthly and Annual Reporting. Is a technical military report provided every month to the UN Military Adviser, and include statistical and evaluative data concerning Military Component and its operations in the field mission.
- Reporting following the Use of Force. On every occasion that armed or lethal
  force is used by a member of the military Component, regardless of the
  circumstances, the HOMC is responsible for conducting an inquiry into the
  incident and promptly transmitting this report to the UN Military Adviser in UN
  HQ.
- Operational Readiness Reporting. During a mandated period or every six months, the DMS/CMS is required to submit an Operational Readiness Inspection Report to UN HQ. The HOMC is directed by HOM to formally review the Military Component structure, in consideration of the current and likely future operational situation. This review is necessary to revise the material requirements for the Military Component and provide associated inputs to the operational readiness report.

## **Tactical Reporting Requirement**

| Tactical Reporting Requirement                       |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|
| <ul> <li>Battalion (or Force Troops Unit)</li> </ul> |  |  |  |

- Sector
- Force
- Military Component
- Tactical Reporting Requirement Information about military activities within UN PKOS is passed up to/though two chains: Force and Military Observers. The information collected at Force HQ is received from the correspondent Sectors up to Battalion level. The two reporting chains join at the JOC where a UN PKOS Military SITREP is produced. The UN PKOS Military SITREP represents the Military Component input to the daily UN PKOS SITREP to DPKO/DFS Situation Centre (SITCEN) and Office of Military Affairs in UN Headquarters in New York.
- General procedures for SITREP writing and submission

Daily SITREPs cover events, incidents or developments with a notable political or operational impact (not routine meetings or activities).




- Daily/Weekly Situation Reports at Tactical Level Reporting of DAILY/WEEKLY Situation Report begins at Battalion (or major unit) level using the format specified in the Force SOP.
  - Battalion (or force troops unit). The Battalion Operations Officer or an officer delegated by him produces the battalion SITREP and submits it to Sector HQ (or Force HQ for Force Troops units). The Battalion Commander is responsible for ensuring that the daily SITREPs that his unit submits are accurate and submitted on time.

- Sector. The Sector Operations officer or an officer delegated by him collates all the battalion SITREPs and submits a single Sector SITREP to Force HQ. Inconsistent or unclear information should be verified to the extent that time allows and if unconfirmed by the time of release its status should be made explicit. Procedures should be in place to ensure that allegations of human rights violations or early warning information on risks of violations be shared promptly with the human rights component in the sector for verification and follow up. Respect for the principle of confidentiality of sources or victims of human rights violations must always be maintained. The Sector Commander is responsible for ensuring that the daily and interim SITREPs that his sector submits are accurate and submitted on time.
- Force. The Force HQ Duty Officer is responsible for collating the Sector and Force Troops SITREPS received in the previous 24 hrs to produce the Force daily SITREP at the time specified in Force Mission SOP. Inconsistent or unclear information should be verified to the extent that time allows and if any uncertainty remains by the time of release its status should be made explicit in the SITREP.
- Military Component. The COS(O) and COO(F) designate the staff officer responsible for collating the UN PKOS Military SITREP. This officer will collate the MILOBS and Force SITREP to produce the daily Military SITREP. COS(F) is responsible for ensuring that the details of the daily SITREP are correct. Format for the UN PKOS daily Military SITREP is showed in a handout.

#### Daily/Weekly Situation Reports at Operational Level

- SITREPs are compiled by a designated office in the mission in time to meet the submission deadline for UNHQ, using the correspondent format.
- The designated office/officer must cross-check inputs from different components to ensure the report is internally consistent and accurate. If several components of the mission are reporting on the same incident, the information should be consolidated into a single write-up in the SITREP.
- SITREPs can be signed by any civilian, military or police official provided with the delegated authority to do so by the Head of Mission.
- Where a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) has been established in line with the DPKO
  Policy Directive on Joint Operations Centres/Joint Mission Analysis Centres
  (JOC/JMAC), the JOC will handle the preparation of Situation and Special Incident
  Reports in their entirety. The Chief/JOC or the mission's Chief of Staff may sign the
  Situation and Special Incident Reports to UNHQ, as determined by the Head of
  Mission.


SITREPs are transmitted to the DPKO Situation Centre and Office of Military Affairs, which monitors developments in the field on a 24-hour basis.



#### **Deadlines**

- Daily Situation Reports cover the 24-hour period up to midnight Local Time (LT) and must reach the DPKO Situation Centre and Office of Military Affairs no later than 06:00hrs New York time (NYT) every morning Mondays to Fridays. The Monday report should include relevant developments over the weekend. Individual arrangements will be made to adjust submission timelines for missions in the same time zone as New York.
- Weekly SITREPs cover the period from 00:01hrs Tuesday to 24:00hrs Monday and must reach the DPKO Situation Centre and Office of Military Affairs by 09:00hrs NYT on Tuesdays.

**How to draft Daily/Weekly Situation Reports** 



- A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information,
- Note to Instructor: When delivering a mission specific training, distribute DAILY/WEEKLY SITREPS formats of the mission where participants are to be deployed.
- How to Draft Daily/Weekly Situation Reports They should be as short as possible but still self-contained, based on the following criteria:
  - The description of any event, incident or development must answer the basic questions of "who, what, where, when, why".
  - If the available information is insufficient or remains to be verified, this should be indicated and followed up in future SITREPs or, in urgent cases, through Special Incident Reports.
  - The designation "NSTR" (Nothing Significant To Report) can be used when there has been no development of importance.
  - Geographical locations, except for the main cities, must be identified through the place name and distance from the closest major town or closest UN position.
     Missions with GIS capacity should include either a map and/or the geographic coordinates of a reported incident or operation.
  - Weekly SITREPs should not reiterate the operational details contained in the daily SITREPS but recap the most significant events with updates, assessments and additional commentary, as appropriate.

#### **Special Incident Reports**

#### **Special Incident Reports**

- Slide 52
- Meant to answer the basic questions of "who, what, where, when, why",
- Do not follow any prescribed format
- Keep the Secretary-General, the Security Council and troop/police-contributing countries informed during a crisis.
- Special Incident Reports meet the need for speedy and increased information flow during a crisis or rapidly deteriorating situation. Like daily SITREPS, they are meant to answer the basic questions of "who, what, where, when, why", and need not provide any assessment of trends or implications. Geographic information should be included as stated under SITREP.
- Special Incident Reports do not follow any prescribed format and are transmitted to the DPKO Situation Centre by clear or encrypted e-mail, depending on the sensitivity of the material.
- Special Incident Reports are vital to DPKO's ability to keep the Secretary-General, the Security Council and troop/police-contributing countries informed during a crisis. They are supplemented by more detailed briefing notes and background information provided to UNHQ through the regular channels.



A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information regarding a situation in which a Special incident report was needed



## **Handout Format for Daily/Weekly Situation Reports**

#### **MISSION NAME**

**Daily Situation Report Covering Period:** Date (00:01-24:00hrs)

**Weekly Situation Report Covering Period:** Tuesday (00:01hrs) to Monday (24:00hrs)

#### **HIGHLIGHTS**

 Three or four bullet points should summarize the most significant events during the reporting period. This is to ensure that readers will not overlook key events.

#### **POLITICAL**

[This section should cover events, incidents or developments with a notable political impact. It is applicable only in missions with a political mandate.]

#### **OPERATIONAL**

[This section should cover events, incidents or developments with a notable operational impact, irrespective of the mission component(s) affected, e.g. humanitarian, human rights, civil affairs, logistics, military, police, mine action and others, as applicable.]

#### SECURITY/SAFETY

[This section should cover any new threats to personnel, special security measures established or lifted during the reporting period, and an update on any personnel missing, seriously wounded or killed during the reporting period, where applicable.]

#### [OTHER SUB-HEADINGS IF REQUIRED]

[Additional sections can be added if considered absolutely necessary for purposes of clarity. However, the most simplified reporting format is preferable.]

#### COMMENTS

[This section is optional. Comments can also be added to specific events described in the main text.]

**NOTES:** One must remember that this report should cover key events that may have impact on the mission from an integrated perspective The weekly report should not just be compilation of the previous Daily SITREPs provided in the reporting period but should include an overview of key events and developments that occurred with the HOMC assessment and observations.

## Handout Format for Monthly Military Situation Report (SITREP)

Mission Name:

Period covered is from 1 to 31 Month year

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

One must remember the purpose of the executive summary is to summarize the content of the whole report in such a way that readers can rapidly grasp the key elements without having to read it all. It shall contain a brief statement of the incidents covered in the major document, background information, concise analysis and main conclusions and recommendations. This is often where the HOMC will pass key messages to the higher levels. As such it is considered as an id to decision making.

#### 1. **INFORMATION / INTELLIGENCE UPDATE**

- General information in Area of operations (AO)/Area of Interest (AOI)
- Analysis of the General Situation (Political and Security overview)
- Specific Area(s) of Interest
- **UN Military Forces**
- Other Military Forces (national security forces and informal or other armed groups)
- Local Population (Presence, Attitude)
- Non Military Matters (Civil Affairs; Human Rights; Humanitarian; Public Information...)
- Assessment of Overall Situation

#### 2. **OPERATIONS UPDATE**

- **HOMC Intent**
- Past operations (Analysis / Feedback / Comments)
- Current operations / Specific Incidents / Violations
- Current Military Component deployment Map
- Planned operations (including expected accomplishments)
- Other mission operations involving or affecting the Military Component (DDR / SSR / QIPs)
- Operations statistics update (if relevant)

#### 3. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE UPDATE

Personnel Return: Military Component strength to include Staff Officers, Contingents and Units, Military Observers and Military Liaison/Adviser Officers. More details may be included as an Annex to the Report and reporting template is provided as Personnel & Administrative Monthly Report below.

- Training (specific training courses conducted inside and outside the mission area)
- Contingents / Units specific personnel issues
- Medical issues (repatriation / hospitalization / specific medical or health issues)
- Casualties
- Disciplinary matters (statistics / cases of repatriation)
- Boards of inquiry (Bol)
- Security and safety of military personnel
- Military personnel welfare issues

#### 4. LOGISTICS UPDATE

- Vehicle serviceability status (If affecting military operations)
- Equipment / weapons (If affecting operations)
- Communications (If affecting operations)
- Engineering issues
- Accommodation status for military personnel
- Supply
- Other mission support issues

#### 5. <u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>

- General military issues
- HOMC meetings held/attended (of significance only)
- HOMC significant issues / forecast / intentions
- Any other issues

\_

<u>Note</u>: \* This format is indicative only and may be adapted by the HOMC to meet the specific needs of each field mission. This monthly report should not just be compilation of the previous Daily and Weekly SITREPs provided in the reporting period but should include an overview of key events and developments that occurred with the HOMC assessment and observations.

# **Handout Personnel & Administrative Monthly Report**

#### 1. PERSONNEL: Military Strength Report

|                    | Authorized<br>Strength | Present<br>Strength | Remarks (including any repatriation on technical grounds) |
|--------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---|
| Headquarters       |                        |                     |   |
| Contingent A       |                        |                     |   |
| Contingent B       |                        |                     |   |
| Special Unit X     |                        |                     |   |
| Special Unit Y     |                        |                     |   |
| Experts on Mission |                        |                     |   |
| (UNMOS/LOs/MilAd)  |                        |                     |   |
| TOTAL              |                        |                     |   |

#### **MEDICAL STATUS** 2.

|                    | Hospitalization | Repatriation on<br>Medical grounds | Fatalities |
|--------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|------------|
| Headquarters       |                 |                                    |            |
| Contingent A       |                 |                                    |            |
| Contingent B       |                 |                                    |            |
| Special Unit X     |                 |                                    |            |
| Special Unit Y     |                 |                                    |            |
| Experts on Mission |                 |                                    |            |
| (UNMOS/LOs/MilAd)  |                 |                                    |            |
| TOTAL              |                 |                                    |            |

#### **INCIDENTS / ACCIDENTS** 3.

|                    | Vehicle Accidents | Shooting Incidents/<br>Attacks | Others |
|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|--------|
| Headquarters       |                   |                                |        |
| Contingent A       |                   |                                |        |
| Contingent B       |                   |                                |        |
| Special Unit X     |                   |                                |        |
| Special Unit Y     |                   |                                |        |
| Experts on Mission |                   |                                |        |
| (UNMOS/LOs/MilAd)  |                   |                                |        |
| TOTAL              |                   |                                |        |

#### 4. **DISCIPLINARY CASES**

|              | Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Cases | Repatriation on<br>Disciplinary<br>grounds | Others |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|--|--------|
| Headquarters |                                     |  |        |
| Contingent A |                                     |  |        |

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| Contingent B                         |  |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| Special Unit X                       |  |  |
| Special Unit Y                       |  |  |
| Experts on Mission (UNMOS/LOs/MilAd) |  |  |
| TOTAL                                |  |  |

# 5. <u>CASUALTIES (NOTICAS)</u>

|   | Fatalities | Injuries | Remarks |
|---|------------|----------|---------|
| Headquarters                            |            |          |         |
| Contingent A                            |            |          |         |
| Contingent B                            |            |          |         |
| Special Unit X                          |            |          |         |
| Special Unit Y                          |            |          |         |
| Experts on Mission<br>(UNMOS/LOs/MilAd) |            |          |         |
| TOTAL                                   |            |          |         |

6. TRAINING

|                    | Specific Military | Specific Training | Individual Training / |
|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
|                    | Training          | Sessions          | Courses               |
| Headquarters       |                   |                   |                       |
| Contingent A       |                   |                   |                       |
| Contingent B       |                   |                   |                       |
| Special Unit X     |                   |                   |                       |
| Special Unit Y     |                   |                   |                       |
| Experts on Mission |                   |                   |                       |
| (UNMOS/LOs/MilAd)  |                   |                   |                       |
| TOTAL              |                   |                   |                       |

# 7. PERSONNEL EVALUATIONS (As necessary)



# (Sample MONUSCO Daily SITREP)

#### UNITED NATIONS

Mission of the Organization of the Nations United for the Stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo



#### NATIONS UNIES

La mission de l'Organisation des Nations a Unies pour la Stabilisation de la République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC)

#### SKB MILITARY DAILY SITREP PERIOD COVERED: 061800 MAR TO 071800 MAR 2010

#### Annex

Annex A - Daily Incident Report

#### **COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT**

- 1. Threat Forces. NSTR.
- 2. Joint Operations. NSTR.
- 3. Miscellaneous. Security situation in AoR remained under control. The MONUC troops in SKB AoR are alert and the situation is being closely monitored.

#### **G-2 ASSESSMENT**

- Militia Situation. NSTR.
- 2. **Law and Order**
- Looting by unknown bandits at xxxx Health Centre (xxxxxKm SW of COB xxxxx).
- b. Looting by 2 x thieves at Village xxxxx (9 Km NW of COB xxxxx).
- **Assessment.** Generally, the security situation in the AoR of xxxx remained under control, however, sporadic looting incidents are a source of concern thus demands pro-active measures by LEAs to ensue PoCs

#### **G-3 ASSESSMENT**

- 1. **Operations** 
  - a. **FAR Situation** NSTR.
  - b. **MONUC Situation** 
    - (1) Proactive action and frequent interaction with local administration / population along with establishment of MOB/TOBs and patrolling by xxxxx have greatly helped in restoring the peace and confidence of locals.
    - (2) A total of 21 x night and 49 x day patrols were conducted and 4 x escorts were to the UN organizations during the period under review.

- 2. Law and Order (FAR Discipline). NSTR
- 3. <u>Assessment</u>. ssss proactively continues to stabilize the security situation by area domination missions, show of force and establishment of MOBs and TOBs for ensuring peace and maintaining credibility of MONUC in the AoR.

#### **ANNEX A**

# SOUTH KIVU MAP OF THE AREA WITH MARKINGS OF THE DAILY INCIDENTS MAP

#### **HIGHLIGHTS**

| 1. | Batt-3 AoR - Special Meeting with CPS MONUC   | Para 5 a     |
|----|---|--------------|
| 2. | Batt-3 AoR - Long Range Patrolling  | Para 9 b     |
| 3. | Batt-3 AoR - Update on CPS MONUC Mission in xxxx  | Para 9 c     |
| 4. | Batt-2 AoR - Update on Tentative Plan for Training, Restructuring and Integration of FAR Bdes / Units in Batt-2 AoR | Para 3 a (1) |
| 5. | Batt-3 AoR - Update on Rape of a Girl by a Soldier ex 44 Sec FAR at Village xxx (2 Km from NW COB MINEMBWE)         | Para 3 c (1) |
| 6. | Batt-1 AoR - Looting by Unknown Bandits at xxxx Health Centre (16 Km SW of COB xxxxx)                               | Para 4 a     |
| 7. | Batt-4 AoR - Looting by 2 x Thieves in Village xxxx (9 Km of NW COB xxxxxx)   | Para 4 b     |

- 1. <u>Internal Armed Groups</u>
- a. <u>Mai Mai</u>. NSTR.
  - b. <u>CNDP</u>. NSTR.
  - c. **PARECO**. NSTR.
  - d. PNC. NSTR.
- e. **RAYIA MUTOMBOKI (RM)**. NSTR.
- f. **FRF**. NSTR.
- 2. Foreign Armed Groups
  - a. **FDLR.** NSTR.
- b. <u>ADF/NALU</u>. NSTR.
- c. **FNL**. NSTR.
- 3. **FAR**

#### a. FAR Activity (Unilateral)

- (1) <u>Batt-2 AoR Update on Tentative Plan for Training, Restructuring and Integration of FAR Bdes / Units in Batt-2 AoR</u>. Reference SKB DSR of 28 Feb 10. On 6 Mar 10, a patrol was sent from COB xxx to xxx (14 Km North of COB xxxx). The patrol leader met Maj xxx, Cmdr Recce Coy ex 2 Bde FAR who informed following: -
  - (a) 2 Bn FAR previously deployed at xxx (10 Km NW of COB xxxx) has been relocated at xxx (22 Km SW of COB xxx) to ensure presence of some FAR troops. 2 x Coys ex 2423 Bn FAR previously deploy at KATASONWA (20 Km NW of COB MINOVA) have been deployed at BUSHAKO. However strength of 2423 Bn FAR located at xxx has been badly diluted due to redeployment of 2 x Coys at xxxx.
  - (b) 2422 Bn FAR previously located at xxxx (10 Km SW of COB xxxxx) has been relocated at xxxx to undergo the training. To ensure presence of some FAR troops, 1 x coy (-) ex 242 Bde FAR previously deploy at xxxx (19 Km SW of COB xxxxx) has been redeployed at xxxx.
  - (c) Effectiveness of 2 Bde FAR around xxxx and surrounding areas have virtually reduced to bare minimum due to re location of troops to xxxx, xxxx training, xxx and xxxx.
  - (d) Serious sense of insecurity prevails amongst the masses due to wider gaps in FAR deployment occurring due to massive displacement of FAR troops, unchecked entry routes from KBNP and reported presence of FDLR around Taxi xxx (18 Km SE of COB xxxx) and RAMBA (23 Km NW of COB KALEHE).
- b. **Joint MONUC / FAR Activities**. NSTR.
- c. FAR / PNC HRVs / Discipline
- (1) Batt-3 AoR Update on Rape of a Girl by a Soldier ex 44 Sec FAR at Village XXXX (2 Km from NW XXXX XXXX). Reference SKB DSR of 27 Feb 10. On 7 Mar 10, the MEDEVAC of victim girl is in progress due to the deteriorating health situation of the victim girl as requested by MONUC xxxx from XXXX XXXX. The victim is also being accompanied by her mother during the evacuation. In the backdrop of the reports regarding protest by local women against rape of the victim girl, on 7 Mar 10, Cmdr XXXX XXXX held a meeting with ANR and PNC Chief XXXX XXXX. During the meeting, both the Cmdrs have denied about the happening of any such protest.
- d. FAR Salaries Update. NSTR.
- 4. Others / Unidentified Groups / Bandits
- a. <u>Batt-1 AoR Looting by Unknown Bandits at LUVUNGI Health Centre (16 Km SW of COB KAMANYOLA)</u>. On 7 Mar 10, a reliable source informed Batt-1 EWC COB KAMANYOLA, that on night 6 / 7 Mar 10, 5 x unknown bandits wearing FAR uniform entered in LUVUNGI Health Centre and looted all medicine and cash amount from Medical Staff. The staff could not recognize the culprits. Cmdr COB KAMANYOLA shared the information with local FAR authorities for necessary investigation at their end. <u>Grade B SKB Comments</u>. Batt-1 has been instructed to carry out extensive patrolling in the area to ensure PoC and thwart such incident in future.
- b. Batt-4 AoR Looting by 2 x Thieves in Village KAHIRA (9 Km of NW COB KALONGO).

  On 7 Mar 10, Mr VANIAN BUGUMA GroupChief of KANYOLA informed EWC COB KALONGO that on night 6/7 Mar 10, two thieves broke into the house of local civilian at KAHIRA and looted US \$ 100 and some house hold items. The local apprehended one thief while other managed to escape. Reportedly these thieves belong to BURAHAIE Group. The apprehended thief is under custody of PNC KANYOLA and investigation is being carried out.

- 5. **Civil Affairs**
- a. <u>Batt-3 AoR Special Meeting with CPS MONUC</u>. In the context of recent identification of child soldiers in FAR, on 7 Mar 10, a special meeting between OIC CPS MONUC UVIRA and Cmdr COB xx was held at MONSUCO xxx. During the meeting OIC CPS has informed that they have identified 5 x child soldiers between ages 15-16 in 43 Sec FAR and had been shifted to xx. The said soldiers were recruited by ex xx and will be shifted to XXX for handing over to their respective families. **Grade A**.
- 6. **DDRRR**. NSTR.
- 7. Restructuring / Reorganization of FAR. On 2 Mar 10, HQ Ops AMANI LEO FAR, was visited by SOs ex HQ SKB to follow the ongoing restructuring /re-org of FAR in SK. Col Likongo, COS ex HQ Op AMANI LEO shared following information:-
- a. Framework of restructuring / reorganization is still not finalized, however input / ground work is ongoing on the subject.
- b. Likely contours of restructuring are as under:-
  - (1) 5 x Regts comprising 2 x Bns each will be organized in SK AoR. These Regts will comprise 1200 x troops, administratively dependent on 10 MR. However, Ops control of these Regts will rest with FAR HQs at Kinshasa.
- (2) Rest of the Bns (not part of Regts) will remain under command HQ Ops AMANI xxxxx
- 8. **MONUC Ops / Deployments**. Following TOBs and MOBs established by Batts are in place and effectively dominating the area with the aim of ensuring protection of local population:
  - a. TOBs
  - (1) Batt-2 TOB at xx (30 Km NW of COB xx).
  - (2) Batt-3 TOB at xx (5 Km SW of COB xx).
  - (3) Batt-4 TOB at xx-2 (48 Km West of COB xx).
  - (4) EgyBatt TOB at xx (75 Km SW of COB xx)
  - b. MOBs
  - (1) Batt-1 AoR MOB at xx (12 Km NW of COB xx) established with effect from 7 Mar 10.
  - (2) Batt-2 AoR MOB at xx (12 Km SE of COB xx) established with effect from 7 Mar 10.
  - (3) Batt-3 AoR MOB at xx (14 Km SW of xx) established with effect from 28 Feb 10.
  - (4) Batt-4 AoR MOB at xx (18 Km SW of COB xx) established with effect from 7 Mar 10.
  - c. <u>Surveillance Operations</u>. Details of surveillance operations are given at Appendix-I to SKB DSR.
- d. Anti MONUC Activities. NSTR.
- 9. <u>Misc</u>

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- a. official building, constructed by UNOPS for Women Self Reliance Training Centre in order to impart, stitching, computer and handicraft training to women. **Grade B**.
- b. <u>Batt-3 AoR Long Range Patrolling to xx</u>. On 7 Mar 10, a long range patrol was conducted from Batt-3 COB xx to xx in order to ascertain the prevailing security situation in the area. The patrol leader held meeting with locals of the area especially with FAR Cmdr to get the update on ongoing concentration and future deployment of FAR in xxxx and reported presence of Mai Mai elements in xx (40 Km South of COB xx) and surrounding area. Details to follow **Grade A**.
- c. <u>Batt-3 AoR Update on CPS MONUC UVIRA Mission in MINEMBWE</u>. On 7 Mar 10, CPS MONUC Uvira team who was staying at COB MINEMBWE for last 3 x days had identified 1 x child soldier in 44 Sec FAR (ex FRF). The CPS Team along with child soldier has returned to UVIRA. Grade A.
- 10. <u>Humanitarian Issues</u>. NSTR.
- 10. Mentoring of FAR and Support to FAR/ PNC. NSTR.
- 12. Military Affairs. NSTR.
- 13. **Ammunition Expenditure**. NSTR.
- 14. Unit Level Training. NSTR.

#### Appendix-I

#### To SKB DSR

#### **HQ** xxx

#### **SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS**

#### 1. Batt-1 AoR

3 x Vehicular patrols and 1 x foot patrol were sent from COB XXX Operation South Xxx. a. for area domination and show of force in XXX city and surrounding areas during the period under review.

#### b. **Operation South Sachet**

COB xxxx. 3 x Vehicular patrols (including an Armored (1) Personnel Carrier patrol) and 1 x foot patrol from COB xxxx were sent for assessment of security situation, market domination and show of force in xxxx and surrounding areas.



(2) **COB S XXXX**. 3 x Vehicular patrols (including an Armoured Personnel Carrier patrol) and 1 x foot patrol from COB xxx were sent for assessment of security situation, market domination and show of force in xxx and surrounding areas.

#### **Patrolling Activities** c.

- (1) Vehicular Patrolling. 4 x Vehicular patrols comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x Soldiers each were sent out from COB x, COB XXX, COB xxx and COB xx to respective surrounding areas.
- (2) Foot Patrolling. 4 x Foot patrols comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x Soldiers each were sent out from COB xx, COB XXX, COB xxx and COB xxx to respective surrounding areas.



#### 2. **Batt-2 AoR**

**Operation South Silicon**. 3 x Vehicular patrols and 2 x foot patrols a. were sent out from COB xx for area domination and show of force in xx Centre (5 Km NW of COB xx) and xx surrounding areas during the period under review.



- b. Operation South Saddle. 3 x Vehicular patrols and 2 x foot patrols each from TOB xx and COB xx were sent out for area domination and show of force on xx-xx axis during the period under review.

c. <u>Operation South Sable</u>. 3 x Vehicular patrols and 2 x foot patrols each from COB xx and COB xx were sent out for area domination and show of force on xx-xx axis during the period under review.

#### d. Patrolling Activities

(1) <u>Vehicular Patrolling</u>. 3 x Vehicle patrols comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x Soldiers each were sent out in xx, xx, xx, xx and xx surrounding areas including 1 x APC Patrol each from COB xx and COB xx and 3 x routine market domination patrols from COB xx to xx (7)



- Km South of COB xx) and MITTI xx (6 Km North of COB ADIKIVU) and HOMBO. The security situation remained generally calm and no untoward incident was reported.
- (2) <u>Foot Patrolling</u>. 1 x foot patrol comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x Soldiers each were sent out from COB xx, xx, xxx, xxxx and xx and surrounding areas.

#### 3. Batt-3 AoR

- a. Operation South Spectacle. 2 x Vehicular patrols (1 x day and 1 x night) and 1 x foot (day) patrol were sent out from COB xx in xx City and surrounding area to ensure protection of civil populace. 19 x soldiers (including 1xofficer) participated in patrolling.
- b. <u>Operation South Scanner</u>. 2 x Vehicular patrols (1 x day and 1 x night) and 1 x foot patrol (day) were sent out from COB xx on axis BARAKA-FIZI for area domination and interaction with civilians.
   19 x soldiers (including 1xofficer) participated in patrolling.



c. Operation South Safelight. 2 x Vehicular patrols (1 x day and 1 x night) were sent out from COB xx on x-x axis for area domination / show of force. 19 x soldiers (including 1 x officer) participated in patrolling.



#### d. Patrolling Activities

(1) Vehicular Patrolling. 2 x Vehicular patrol comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x soldiers each were sent out from COB x, COB xx and COB xx to respective surrounding areas.



(2) Foot Patrolling. Patrol comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x soldiers each were sent out from COB xx, COB xx and COB xx to respective surrounding areas.



(3) APC Patrolling. APC patrols comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer, and 15 x soldiers each were sent out form COB xx, COB xx and COB xx to respective surrounding areas. No untoward incident was reported.



(4) Farm Patrolling. Farm patrols comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x soldiers each were sent out from COB xx to xx and surrounding areas.



- (5) Market Domination. Routine market domination patrols, comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x soldiers were sent out from, COB xx to xx and surrounding areas, on the designated market day for market domination and show of force. Situation in the market remained calm and peaceful.
- (6)On 7 Mar 10, TOB KILEMBWE carried out patrolling in Activities of TOB xx. KILEMBWE and surrounding areas in order to protect civil population. The patrol comprised of 1 x officer and 8 x soldiers.

#### 4. **Batt-4 AoR**

- Operation South Spotter. 2 x Vehicular patrols was sent out from Batt-4 COB xx to xx (18 a. Km NE of COB xx) and xxx (16 Km SW of COB xx) surrounding area during reporting period for area domination and interaction with civilians. 19 x soldiers (including 1 x Officer) participated in operation.
- Operation South Santolina. 2 x Vehicular patrols was sent out from Batt-4 COB xx to xx b. (14 Km SW of COB xx) and xx (10 Km NW of COB xx) surrounding area during reporting period for area domination and interaction with civilians 19 x soldiers (including 1 x Officer) participated in operation.

- c. Operation South Saturn. 2 x Vehicular patrols were sent out from Batt-4 COB xx to xx (10 Km SW of COB xx) and xx (15 Km South of COB xx) and surrounding area during reporting period for area domination / show of force. 19 x soldiers (including 1 x Officer) participated in operation.
- d. Operation South Saturn. 2 x Vehicular patrols was sent out from Batt-4 COB xx to xx (10 Km SW of COB xx) and xx (12 Km NW of COB xx) surrounding area during reporting period for area domination/show of force. 12 x soldiers (including 1 x Officer) participated in operation.

#### e. Patrolling Activities

(1) <u>Vehicular Patrolling</u>. 2 x Vehicular patrol comprising
1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and
10 x soldiers was sent out from COB xx and, xx to xx (15 Km
South of COB xx) and xx (15 Km West of COB xx)
surrounding area respectively. The security situation
remained generally calm and no untoward incident was reported.



(2) <u>Foot Patrolling</u>. 2 x Foot patrols 1 x Officer, each comprising 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x soldiers were sent out from COB xx and, xxx to xx (7 Km NW of COB xx) and xx (5 Km SW of COB xx), surrounding areas respectively. No untoward incident was reported.



(3) APC Patrolling. 1 x APC patrol comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 14 x soldiers was sent out from COB xx|O to xx (17 Km South of COB xx) and surrounding area. The security situation remained generally calm and no untoward incident was reported.



(4) <u>Market Domination</u>. 1 x Routine market domination patrols, each comprising 1 x Officer, 1 x Junior Commissioned Officer and 10 x soldiers each was sent out from COB xx to xx (25 Km NE of COB xx) on the designated market day for market domination and show of force. Situation in the market remained calm and peaceful.



(5) Activities of TOB xxx-2. On 7 Mar 10, TOB xx-2 carried out patrolling in xx-2 and surrounding area. The patrol comprised of 1 x officer and 10 x soldiers.

#### $\Box$ (Sample MONUC Team Site SITREP)

#### UNITED NATIONS

United Nations Observation Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo



#### **NATIONS UNIES**

Mission d'observation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo

#### **TEAM 507 ABC**

XXX Team Site - 507 From:

MILOB HQ, G3 (Ops/Plans) To

Date : 19/03/ 2010

DAILY SITREP COVERING THE PERIOD 190000 B - 192359 B MAR 2010 Subject:

**HIGHLIGHTS:** 

Team patrol to Chowe, 37 Km N.

**INTERNAL ARMED GROUPS:** NSTR

FOREIGN ARMED GROUPS: NSTR

MONUSCO OPS / DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT: **NSTR** 

**JOINT MONUSCO/FARDC ACTIVITIES: NSTR** 

FARDC/PNC HRVS: **NSTR** 

**OTHER UNIDENTIFIED GROUPS: NSTR** 

**ARMS EMBARGO: NSTR** 

**ANTI MONUSCO ACTIVITIES: NSTR** 

#### **CURRENT OPERATIONS AND PATROL ACTIVITY**

1. Road Condition: Good but, with heavy rainfall, some parts are difficult to negotiate.

| Team Site | Location | Task (Patrol)                                   | Remarks   |
|-----------|----------|---|---|
| -         | xxx      | Monitor security situation and show UN presence | 1. The MILOBs team conducted a scheduled patrol to XX, 37 Km N of XX Town. Details as under:-  OXX -28° 33 586′ E 02°54 107 S  OXX - Ihanga OXX - XX  OThe patrol found that the security situation in the village is peaceful and calm.  INFO GAINED FROM PLACE VISITED  GENERAL SITUATION  The Patrol members interacted with:- |

| <ul> <li>Village Chief - Mr. ABC</li> <li>Nurse of Health Centre - CCC</li> <li>13 Female and 4 male members of village.</li> <li>Collectively they gave following information:-</li> <li>The Population of the village is 1680. 40 % Male, 60 % Female and out of these 10 % are children.</li> <li>The village has a health centre operated by NGO CC. At this health facility, there are no drugs for basic diseases. Two nurses are there to attend the patients but get salary from the fees obtained from patients.</li> <li>The village has 2 water sources constructed by NGOs.</li> <li>Their main economic activity is agriculture with cassava, maize, rice, banana and beans as their main growing crops. Their harvest has since gone down now due to several diseases that has attacked their gardens.</li> <li>There is no school in the village and students go to school in the nearby villages.</li> <li>SECURITY SITUATION</li> <li>The situation in XXX is calm and peaceful. There have been no reports of any XX activities in this village. The population of XX are going on with their daily activities peacefully.</li> <li>ARMED GROUPS: XX are reported in the surrounding mountains specially in the village of XX (3 Km) and XXXX (4 Km).</li> <li>PNC/ANR/FARDC: 6 FARDC soldiers and no PNC.</li> <li>LAND DISPUTE/POWER CONFLICT: NSTR</li> <li>POLITICAL ISSUES: Main Political party in this village is XXXX and all people support this.</li> <li>IDP/RETURNEES SITUATION: NSTR</li> <li>DDRRR PROGRESS: NIL TL Comments: In general the security situation of XXXX as a whole remains calm and peaceful but still regarded as very unpredictable especially in the presence of FDLR around the area.</li> <li>The security situation in team's AOR, in next 24 hours, in the security situation in team's AOR, in next 24 hours, in the security situation in team's AOR, in next 24 hours, in the security situation in team's AOR, in next 24 hours, in the security situation in team's AOR, in next 24 hours,</li></ul> |
|--|
| is expected to remain relatively calm.  (Please do not disclose the names of victims and sources)  |

#### 2. Patrol Composition

- a. Maj xxx
- b. Capt xxx
- c. Maj xxx

#### 3. **Personnel State**

| UN ID   |      | Name | APPT  | Telephone  | Remarks |
|---------|------|------|-------|------------|---------|
| MO-0000 | MAJ  | AAA  | TL    | 0998111550 | PRESENT |
| MO-0000 | MAJ  | ВВВ  | G1/G3 | 099113570  | PRESENT |
| MO-0000 | CAPT | ccc  | G4    | 0991187203 | PRESENT |
| MO 0000 | MAJ  | DDD  | G2    | 0991150612 | PRESENT |

4. **Comms/ IT Equipment Status.** 

a. UPS : Operational b. HF E-MAIL : Operational c. HF VEH RADIO : Operational : Operational d. VHF

e. MPDS : Operational but very SLOW

f. GPS : Operational

5. **Logistics Status** 

> a. Supplies : OK

b. Vehicles : Operational

**Generators: Operational** C.

| Generator No.          | <b>Current Reading</b> | Refuelling in Ltrs. | Name of the MILOB | Date of refuelling |
|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| MIK 42773<br>20 KVA    | 10792                  | 20 ltrs             | CAPT AAA          | 19.03.2010         |
| NUC-A-05634<br>5.1 KVA | 281                    | 3 ltrs              | CAPT AAA          | 19.03.2010         |

#### 7. Medical: NTR

8. Future Plans (Next 24 hours): The team will conduct patrol to XXXXX TOWN on 20 Mar 2010.

| Enquiries:  | Maj AAA          | Team Leader, Team 507           |
|-------------|------------------|---------------------------------|
| Mobile :    | 0991121550       | Name of Village/ Place Visited: |
| MONUC Ext : | NIL              | XXX, 6 Km N                     |
| E Mail :    | MONUC–SKB–TS–XXX | Scheduled Patrol                |

**MAJOR** AAA **TEAM LEADER TEAM SITE 507 – XXX** Mob No 0998111550

#### **Learning Outcome Assessment**

It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written guiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers are provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages.

At the end of the entire unit and/or the conclusion of the STMs instructors may want to choose some of the following questions for review.

#### Questions

- 1. Questions on roles and functions of military and civilian key functions as per the practical exercise.
- 2. Members of the Mission Leadership Team

#### **Expected outcome**

- As per the Directing Staff answer sheet
- MLT generally includes the principal leaders of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, including: SRSG/HOM, DSRSGs, HOPC, HOMC, DMS/CMS and COS. The meetings of MLT are chaired by SRSG/HOM.

### **Module 2 - Legal Aspects of Peacekeeping**

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#### **Preparatory Notes to Instructors**

#### Introduction

This module is not intended to turn staff officers into legal experts in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) but to arm them with the essential legal fundamentals that will enhance their ability to perform their mandate and guide their work. This module also recognises the need to consult the mission's Legal Officers in all major legal matters or when in doubt.

#### Aim

The aim of this module is to equip military staff officers with the basic legal foundation in United Nations peacekeeping in order to enhance their ability to appreciate and handle legal matters in a United Nations peacekeeping operations environment to facilitate effective mandate implementation.

#### **Learning Outcomes**

On completion of this section, participants will:

- Comprehend the application of legal principles in UN Peacekeeping missions.
- Be aware of the status, privileges and immunities, and responsibilities of the UN peacekeeper
- Be able to identify potential breaches of international law in order to take the appropriate steps to prevent it.
- Be familiar with their rights and responsibilities as peacekeepers.

#### **Training Sequence**

This module has been divided into parts 1 and 2 to allow instructors to focus on the part that suit their training needs. Part 1 provides participants with basic understanding of the legal basis for UN Peacekeeping and the international laws applicable in UN peacekeeping. This is meant to widen the perspectives of staff officers in order to enhance their ability to contextualize and make better informed estimates of their operational environment. Part 2 deals with legal implications for the force's conduct of core peacekeeping activities and legal consequences for the peacekeeper's individual or personal matters in the Area of Operation (AO).

The module could better be delivered as two or more training units (Parts 1 and 2), The instructor can modify the duration to suit national training and mission specific requirements and the subject matter comprehension level of the participants/learners.

The module should be delivered with due attention to the CPTM modules on A Strategic Level Overview of United Nations Peacekeeping – Unit 1 Part 1 and 2, and Effective Mandate Implementation – Unit 3 Part 1d.

#### **Duration**

The duration indicated below constitutes the minimum recommended time periods. Additional activities and discussions can be added as time permits.

| Part1 Min Session Time  | Lecture/Presentation | Questions/Discussion<br>& Session<br>Assessment | Core Learning<br>Activities |
|-------------------------|----------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| 45mins                  | 20 min.              | 15 min.   | 10                          |
| Part 2 Min Session Time | Lecture/Presentation | Questions/Discussion<br>& Session<br>Assessment | Core Learning<br>Activities |
| 45mins                  | 20 min.              | 15 min.   | 10                          |
| Additional Options      | Mission Specific     | Optional Films                                  | <b>Optional Activities</b>  |

#### **Methodology**

This module should be delivered with adequate learning activities to keep adult learners engaged. The facilitation team should use as many of the learning activities as time allows and keep them tailored to the target audience. Participants should be fully involved in the learning process through practical exercises, brainstorming sessions, discussion of case studies, working in small groups on specific tasks, etc.

The instructor should acquaint participants with the reason why it is important for them to study the module and also provide its learning outcomes, content, and format not less than a day ahead of the lecture in order to get them prepared for a more interactive lesson.

#### Structure of the Presentation:

- UN Peacekeeping and the Rule of Law
- Legal Basis for UN Peacekeeping
- International Law applicable to UN peacekeeping Operations
- Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping
- Status, Privileges and Immunities, and Responsibilities of UN peacekeeper

Note to the Instructor: It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written quiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers be provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key

messages. Instructors are encouraged to add examples and mission-specific information related to the specific deployment of participants.

#### References

- United Nations Charter
- United Nations Staff Rules, as contained in the latest Secretary General's
- Bulletin (currently ST/SGB/2008/3)
- United Nations Staff Regulations, as contained in the latest SecretaryGeneral's
- Bulletin (currently ST/SGB/2008/4)
- SecretaryGeneral's Bulletin on "Status, basic rights and duties of officials other than Secretariat and experts on mission" (ST/SGB/2002/9) 18 June 2002
- 10 Rules/Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets
- Secretary-General's Bulletin on "Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law" ST/SGB/1999/13
- General Guidelines for Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations Department of Peace-keeping Operations. New York, 1995. UN/210/TC/GG95
- Status, basic rights and duties of United Nations staff members, ST/SGB/2002/13
- 1 November 2002
- CPTM Modules on Effective Mandate Implementation Unit3 Part 1d.
- Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), "The International Bill of Human Rights" UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (art. 1), adopted by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948
- Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946
- United Nations Information Circular, Secretariat 7 September 2010 ST/IC/2010/26
- Secretary-General's bulletin Revised edition of the Staff Regulations ST/SGB/2006/4
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines United Nations
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, 2008

- Secretary-General's bulletin Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission ST/SGB/2002/9 18 June 2002
- Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights; Frequently Asked Questions on International Humanitarian, Human Rights and Refugee Law in the context of armed conflict, 2004
- United Nations Rule of Law Website and Document Repository (<a href="http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml">http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml</a>)
- OCHA Guiding Principles on Internal Displaced Persons, June 2001
- MODEL SOFA (A/45/594) dated 9 Oct 1990

#### **Instructor Profile**

This module is best presented by a legal officer or experienced military trainer who has the requisite UN field missions experience to share with trainees. The instructor should also encourage questions from the participants and aim for an interactive discussion. All participants should be encouraged to contribute to the group discussions, case study discussions and in any other activity.

#### **Instructor Preparations**

#### **Required Readings**

- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (The Capstone Doctrine
- CPTM modules on Effective Mandate Implementation Unit3 Part 1d.
- Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Operations, IPA-UNDP workshop Report UN Millennium Plaza Hotel, NY Friday February 6, 2004
- MODEL SOFA (A/45/594) dated 9 Oct 1990

#### **General Preparations**

#### Equipment:

- 1. Computer
- 2. Projector and Screen
- 3. Flip Chart

#### Materials:

- 1. Copies of handouts...etc.
- 2. Power Point presentations

#### **Mission Specific**

If this module is being presented to prepare students for a particular UN peacekeeping mission, Pre-deployment Information Package (PIP) information may be available at the UN DPKO internet website, through 'current operations': <a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp">http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp</a>). Additional mission specific information is available at the UN DPKO Policy and Training internet website: <a href="http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx">http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx</a>

#### **Symbols Legend**

- Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration)
- Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words versus being read to participants)
- Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)
- e.g Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
- Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
- Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
- Film (A film that is recommended as a core part of the training or an option)
- Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
- Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit, section or part as indicated in the text)
- Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

Slide 4

| Session Notes   |         |
|---|---------|
| Legal Aspects of UN Peacekeeping  | Slide 1 |
| Aim  The aim of this module is to equip military staff officers with the basic legal foundation in United Nations peacekeeping in order to enhance their ability to appreciate and handle legal matters in a United Nations peacekeeping operations environment | Slide 2 |
| As UN Staff Officer Why should I know this?   | Slide 3 |

Allow participants to brainstorm this for a few minutes.

#### **Learning Outcome**

On completion of this session, participants will:

- Comprehend the application of legal principles in UN Peacekeeping missions.
- Be aware of the status, privileges and immunities, and responsibilities of the UN peacekeeper
- Be able to identify potential breach of international law in order to take the appropriate steps to prevent it.
- Be familiar with their rights and responsibilities as peacekeepers.

Introduce the session by letting participants know the intended learning outcomes of this section, as shown in the slide above. By the end of the session, the participants should be able to answer each of the above points.

This session outlines the fundamental aspect of the legal framework applicable in peacekeeping setting. It provides the requirements, guiding principles indicators of rule of law at the national level in all circumstances, including in crisis, post-crisis, conflict-prevention, conflict, post-conflict and development contexts.

#### PART 1

## Legal Aspects of UN Peacekeeping PART 1

Slide 5

#### **UN Peacekeeping and Rule of Law**

#### **UN Peacekeeping and Rule of Law**

#### Slide 6

#### What is Rule of Law?

"The **rule of law** is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards".

(Guidance Note Of The Secretary-General, "UN Approach To Rule Of Law Assistance"- Apr., 08)

#### **UN Peacekeeping and Rule of Law**

#### Slide 7

#### Requirements for Rule of Law

- Supremacy of the law
- Equality before the law
- Accountability to the law
- Fairness in the application of the law
- Legal certainty
- Avoidance of arbitrariness
- Participation in decision-making
- Procedural and legal transparency
- Separation of powers



The instructor is expected to explain these guiding principles with examples. Rule of law also requires presence of measures to ensure adherence to these principles. It should also be explained that, the full presence of all these principles is an ideal situation. They should therefore serve as guide toward achievement of good institutional rule of law.

|                                      | Slide 8 |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| UN Peacekeeping and Rule of Law      |         |
|                                      |         |
| Categories of Rule of Law Indicators |         |
| Activity/programme-based             |         |
| Institutional-based                  |         |
| Strategic/sector-based               |         |

#### Rule of Law Indicators

Generally, ROL indicators can be grouped into three categories as indicated on the slide above. Activity based indicators measure the progress of programme of activities towards programme-specific objectives. Institutional based indicators are largely focused on the change in capacity and integrity of state institutions over time. Strategic objectives / sector based indicators track overall progress made against goals set, for example; a reduction in armed violence incidents. For the purpose of obtaining input for operational analysis, military staff officers are encouraged to use the Strategic objectives / sector based indicators.

|                     | UN Peace                | ekeeping and Rule of Law  | Slide 9 |
|---------------------|-------------------------|---|---------|
|                     | Rul                     | le of Law Indicators  |         |
| Sam                 | ple Strategic C         | Objectives / Sector Based Indicators                                  |         |
| Purpose (To)        | Objective               | Indicators  |         |
| Increase safety and | Reduced<br>Incidents of | Decreased reporting rate of violent crime in 6 months period          |         |
| security            | armed violence          | Decrease in the percentage of people who feel unsafe                  |         |
|                     | Reduced burden of       | Reduced reporting rates of violence against women in 6 month period   |         |
|                     | armed violence          | Decrease in the percentage of women who feel unsafe.                  |         |
|                     | against women and       | Treatment of all forms of violence against women as serious offences. |         |
|                     | girls<br>(VAW/G)        |   |         |

|                                    | Rule of  | Law Indicators (Cont…)   | Slide 10 |
|------------------------------------|--|--|----------|
| Sam                                | ole Strategic O                                      | bjectives / Sector Based Indicators  |          |
| Purpose (To)                       | Objective  | Indicators   |          |
| Increase<br>safety and<br>security | Increased institutional integrity of the justice and | Decrease in percentage of respondents who believe that justice and security institutions discriminate in the prosecution of their duties   |          |
|                                    | security sector                                      | Increased confidence in law enforcement officials.  Reduction in the perception that prosecutors, judge, police are corrupt  Improvement in diversity of professional staff of justice and security sector |          |

| Rule of Law Indicators (Cont)  Sample Strategic Objectives / Sector Based Indicators |  |  | Slide 11 |
|--|--|--|----------|
| Purpose (To)   | Objective                              | Indicators   |          |
| Increase capacity of ROL institution   | Increased capacity to address VAW/G    | Increase in percentage of women that feel satisfied with policing mechanisms Improved rate of convictions of violent crime by prosecutors in 12 month period                               |          |
| s to<br>address<br>armed<br>violence   | Reduced<br>burden of<br>armed<br>VAW/G | Improved police-population ratio Reduction in the time of filing and first hearing court cases Increase in percentage of respondents who believe the courts contribute to community safety |          |

| Rule of Law Indicators (Cont)                         |                 |   | Slide 12 |
|---|-----------------|---|----------|
| Sample Strategic Objectives / Sector Based Indicators |                 |   |          |
| Purpose   | Objective       | Indicators                                      |          |
| (To)  |                 |   |          |
| Increase  | Increased       | Increase in rates of investigation, prosecution |          |
| capacity  | capacity of     | and conviction of all forms of violence against |          |
| of ROL  | justice and     | women and girls in 12 month period              |          |
| institution   | security        | Increase in percentage of women who believe     |          |
| s to  | institutions to | that justice system is able and willing to      |          |
| address   | address armed   | investigate, prosecute and convict all forms of |          |
| armed   | violence        | violence against women and girls                |          |
| violence  |                 | Increase in percentage of respondents that feel |          |
|   |                 | satisfied with policing mechanisms              |          |

#### **Legal Basis for UN Peacekeeping**

RoL indicators serve as important proxies to measure incidence rates of armed violence, associated risk factors and state capacity to respond to armed violence.


# Legal Basis for UN Peacekeeping UN Charter: Chapter I: Maintenance of international peace and security (Arts 1 & 2) Article 24 of the Charter Chapter VI: - Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Arts 33-38) Chapter VII: Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression (Arts 39-51) Chapter VIII: - The involvement of regional arrangements and agencies (Arts 52-54)

It is the prerogative of the United Nations Security Council, acting in its capacity as the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to determine when and where a United Nations peacekeeping operation should be deployed. The legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. While Chapter VI deals with the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", Chapter VII contains provisions related to "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression". Chapter VIII of the Charter also provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security with the proviso that, such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter.

# International Law applicable to UN peacekeeping Operations

#### What is International Law?

- Slide 14
- Set of laws that apply to nation/states and sometimes to individuals with an International scope:
  - o Rules governing the interaction between states
  - Rules governing the interaction between states and individuals



International law is the term commonly used for referring to laws that govern the conduct of independent nations in their relationships with one another although certain parts of international law (for example international humanitarian and human rights laws, international criminal law etc) also have legal consequences for individuals. Treaties and rules of customary international law are two of the most important sources of international law.

#### International Law applicable to UN peacekeeping Operations

Slide 15

- International Criminal Law (ICL)
  - o Genocide
  - Crimes Against Humanity
  - War Crimes
- International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
- International Human Rights Law (HR)
- International Refugee law
- UN peacekeepers are required to respect the International Human Rights Law (IHRL). The must also strictly abide by the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the Laws of Armed Conflict as stipulated in ST/SGB/1999/13. Furthermore, by the nature of their duties, it is also very important for peacekeepers to know their obligations to refugees and internally displaced persons as reflected in the UNSCR1674. The International Refugee Law is therefore another area that UN military Staff Officers should be familiar with.

Slide 16

Slide 17

Refer participants to CPTM modules on Effective Mandate Implementation – Unit3 Part 1d where International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law have been adequately dealt with.

#### **International Criminal Law**

- Legal rules prohibiting specific acts during wartime or peacetime
  - o Genocide
  - Crimes Against Humanity
  - War Crimes
- an individual can be held criminally responsible for violating these prohibited acts
- There are three main types of international crimes genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is an international crime to commit these acts during wartime or peacetime. Only individuals can be held criminally responsible for violations.

# International Criminal Law Genocide

- Killing members of a group
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group
- Forcibly transferring children of a group to another group
- International criminal law can overlap and intersect with IHL, IHRL as well as national laws.
  - The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) states that any of the above listed acts committed with the **intent** to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial or relgious group is genocide.
- Genocide is a universal crime for which individuals, no matter their status and authority, may be indicted, tried and punished by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

|                            | Slide 18 |
|----------------------------|----------|
| International Criminal Law |          |
| Genocide Process           |          |
| Categorisation             |          |
| Stereotyping               |          |
| Labelling                  |          |
| Polarisation               |          |
| Dehumanisation             |          |
| Organisation               |          |
| Preparation                |          |
| Genocide                   |          |
| Denial                     |          |

- It is recommended that the instructor explains this process and consequences with examples and also share experience with participants.
- Categorisation People are grouped, as whites, blacks, Asians; or into Muslims, Christians, Hindus and Jews.
- Stereotyping/ Labelling Perpetuation and popularisation of perceptions about specific social groups or types of individuals. Stereotypes are standardized and simplified conceptions of groups based on some prior assumptions. For example: some groups of people are domineering or are submissive, or are unfaithful, etc.
- **Polarisation:** A process by which the public opinion divides and goes to the extremes leading to a widening of political, social, religious, psychological or moral gap between a people ("us" and "them."). In this stage, moderate intellectuals and leaders are silenced either through intimidation, beatings, arrests, and outright assassination.
  - **Dehumanisation**: "Out-group" members are dehumanised, and called or compared to animals or other despicable objects to an extent that, they are considered sub-humans and nuisance to society
- **Organisation** Formation of groups for protection against or for attacking "out-groups"
- **Preparation** Imminence of a potential conflict propels groups to prepare themselves against opposing groups by gathering any weapon or defence materials with a view to using them at the appointed time.
- **Genocide** The deliberate and systematic destruction, in whole or in part, of a group
- **Denial** To deny or create scepticism about the occurrence or minimize the scale of genocide

Slide 19

# International Criminal Law Crimes Against Humanity

- Widespread or systematic attack against civilians including:
  - Murder
  - o Extermination
  - Enslavement
  - Deportation
  - Imprisonment
  - o Torture
  - Rape and other forms of sexual violence
  - o Persecution on political, racial or religious grounds
  - Other inhumane acts
- As set out in the Rome Statute, *crimes against humanity* include crimes such as the extermination of civilians, enslavement, torture, rape, forced pregnancy, persecution on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds, and enforced disappearances but only when they are part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
- The "widespread or systematic" qualification for crimes against humanity is very important, as it provides a higher threshold, requiring a particular magnitude and/or scope before a crime qualifies for the Court's jurisdiction. This differentiates random acts of violence such as rape, murder, or even torture that could be carried out, perhaps even by soldiers in uniform, but which may not actually qualify as crimes against humanity.
- For Example: On 22 February 2001, Dragoljub Kunarac, commander of a special unit for reconnaissance of the Bosnian Serb Army, was sentenced by the ICTY to 28 years imprisonment for torture, rape and enslavement because crimes against humanity, torture, and rape are violations of the laws or customs of war.

Slide 20

## International Criminal Law War Crimes

- Crimes committed <u>during an armed conflict</u> and in <u>connection</u> with the armed conflict.
- Crimes committed against protected persons:
  - Wounded or sick soldiers
  - Prisoners of war
  - o Civilians
  - Persons not taking active part in the hostilities
- Crimes include (but are not limited to):
  - Murder, torture, rape, taking hostages, use of child soldiers, forced labor, collective punishment.
- War crimes include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of the laws and customs that can be applied in international armed conflict, and in armed conflict "not of an international character", as listed in the Statute, when they are committed as part of a plan or policy or on a large scale.
- Question: Ask the group if they can identify the three categories of International Criminal Law (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes). Ask if anyone can give an explanation for each category. Try to solicit answers from six participants – one response for each participant.
  - Note to Instructor. If necessary complement the answers in showing the slides on these categories again.

#### **International Criminal Court**

Slide 21

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, permanent court that tries persons accused of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in order 'to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes'

(The ICC is an independent international organisation, and is not part of the United Nations system).

 Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are not usually associated with peacekeepers. The issue however is that, because peacekeepers are human and fallible, there must be safeguards against such unforeseen situations. Currently, there is no single criminal justice system for members of a peacekeeping force; hence, the need for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to possibly fill the gap by providing for a uniform international criminal law regime.

- The ICC was established upon the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC are those countries that have ratified or acceded to the statute.
- ICC Statute war crimes includes "Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict".

#### **International Criminal Court**

Slide 22

Principle of Complementarity

Complementarity' is a fundamental principle on which the functioning of the International Criminal Court is based. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC can only exercise its jurisdiction where the State Party of which the accused is a national, is unable or unwilling to prosecute. Hence the term 'complementarity', which makes the ICC a Court of last resort

The reason this principle came into existence was the fear on the part of many prospective States party that the ICC would become a supra-national criminal court and would result in countries losing domestic control of criminal prosecutions

Whereas the principle of complementary provided in the Rome Statute means that national courts have the priority to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes prohibited in the Statute, i.e. the ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction over the crimes unless the State concerned is unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute the crimes

One major characteristic of the court is its Principle of Complementarity. By this principle, it means that the ICC only acts as a complement to national courts and therefore comes into operation only when domestic prosecutors or courts are incapable or unable or fail to act. The principle of complementarity constitutes deference to national sovereignty. Therefore, if national authorities of a state adequately investigate or prosecute, or if they decide on solid grounds not to prosecute, the case will be inadmissible before the Court.

Slide 23

#### **International Criminal Court**

Scenarios in Which the ICC Cannot Admit a Case (Article 17(1))

- The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it;
- The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned
- The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint
- The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.

In the first two cases above, the ICC has to preclude the possibility that the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution before it can admit the case). However, if a State is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute a case, the ICC will invoke the principle of complementarity to admit any case concerned and exercise jurisdiction over it.

The ICC, however, does not derive its legal status from a Security Council resolution and it is not bolstered by the powerful language of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Court is established on the basis of a treaty, which is not a binding instrument for other states than those that ratify or accede to that treaty. Under these circumstances the drafters of the Statute did not consider it prudent to confer primacy on the permanent Court. Indeed, it is likely that the insertion of the notion of complementarity in the Statute was instrumental in securing support for the Court due to the fact that many countries raised various concerns about it jurisdiction.

# International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

- Also known as "the Law of War" or "the Law of Armed Conflict".
- Contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977
- Designed to protect persons who do not participate, or are no longer participating, in the hostilities
- Maintains a balance between military necessity and humanity

United Nations peacekeepers must have a clear understanding of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law\_and observe them in situations where they apply. The Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces

of International Humanitarian Law of 6 August 1999 (ST/SGB/1999/13) sets out the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law that may be applicable to United Nations peacekeepers and which are reflected in the applicable Rules of Engagement (ROE). Based on the ROE, the use of force must comply with international humanitarian law. Force must be used as a last resort and as a graduated response only to the extent necessary and proportionate to achieve the authorised objective against a legitimate target while at the same time avoiding, and in any event, minimizing loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property (collateral damage).

#### **International Human Rights Law (IHRL)**

- Slide 25
- International Human Rights Law is an integral part of the normative framework for United Nations peacekeeping operations
- United Nations peacekeepers should act in accordance with International Human Rights Law
- Human rights abusers will be held accountable

International human rights law is an integral part of the normative framework for United Nations peacekeeping operations. United Nations peacekeeping personnel -- whether military, police or civilian -- should act in accordance with international human rights law and should strive to ensure that they do not become perpetrators of human rights abuses. Where they commit abuses, they should be held accountable. The UN maintains a zero tolerance policy for human rights violations, including sexual exploitation and abuse.


Refer to the CPTM Unit 3 Part 1 - International Law Relevant to Peacekeeping Operations for detailed explanation on International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law where they have been adequately treated.

# International Refugee Law and Guiding Principles on IDPs Main Instruments

- The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees;
- The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees;
- The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa..
- Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Normally, peacekeepers have mainly been dealing with issues related to Internally Displace Persons (IDPs). A situation like that of Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia where peacekeepers have to with both cases at the same time requires them to understand the Refugee law and Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons.

- According to Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his origin and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.'
- Even though no international tribunal exists to conduct enquiries or to adjudicate claims that refugees' rights under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol have been violated, Peacekeepers are to coordinate with the UNHCR which has been given supervision and compliance oversight and responsibility to provide protection and seek permanent solutions for their problems under Article 35 of the 1951 Convention.



- In 1988, the Representative of the UN Secretary General on IDPs formulated 30 the "Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement' in order to strengthen protection and draw attention to the plight of IDPs. Even though the Principles in themselves do not have legal binding effect, they draw on the legally binding provisions of the domestic law, the IHL and IHRL, and to the basic principles of the refugee law.
- Although all the 30 principles are significant, numbers 2, 5.26, and 27 worth highlighting for peacekeepers. While 2<sup>nd</sup> principle call on all domestic and international actors, irrespective of their legal status to observe the these Guiding

Principles, the 5<sup>th</sup> principle call on all authorities and international actors to respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including IHL and IHRL, in all circumstances so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons. Furthermore, the 26<sup>th</sup> and the 27th principles request for the respect and protection of persons engaged in humanitarian assistance with their transport and supplies against violence, and the provision of protection needs and human rights of internally displaced persons in line with international standards and code of conduct.

Note to Instructor: Issues regarding International human rights law, International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and the Refugee Law and could be technical and in some cases complicated. There are always legal experts in the mission (i.e. human rights and judicial affairs officers, military and police legal advisors), as well as staff in UN agencies, like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that can be relied upon for legal guidance.



#### **Learning Activity 1 (Legal Aspects of Peacekeeping – Part 1)** Instructor's Guidelines

In this learning activity, participants are required to be exercised on recognition of potential international crimes in mission area.

#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|             | 5 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions      |
|-------------|------------|---|
|             | 10 minutes | Syndicate discussions                       |
|             | 10 minutes | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |
| Total time: | 25 minutes | *total time dependent number of groups      |

Note to instructor: Refer participants to Module 4 Information Gathering where information cycle has further explanation on Information Collection Plan.

| Learni      | ing Activity 1 (Le | egal Aspects of Peacekeeping – Part 1)      | Slide 28 |
|-------------|--------------------|---|----------|
| Learni      | ing Activity Time  | Required:                                   |          |
|             | 5 minutes          | Activity introduction and instructions      |          |
|             | 10 minutes         | Syndicate discussions                       |          |
|             | 10 minutes         | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |          |
| Total time: | 25 minutes         | *total time dependent number of groups      |          |

#### PART 2

|   | Slide 29 |
|---|----------|
| Legal Aspects of UN peacekeeping PART 2 |          |

#### **Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping**

# Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Key requirements Self Defence Defence of the Mandate

The concept of 'Use of Force' in peacekeeping is primarily based on the principle of 'Non Use of Force Except in Self Defence or Defence of the Mandate'. This includes resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. Although United Nations peacekeeping operation is not an enforcement tool, it is widely understood that it may use force at the tactical level. Self defence is an inherent right and does not require authorization from the Security Council. The Council has increasingly authorized peacekeeping mission and operations to use force beyond self-defence including for the protection of civilians. Self defence can therefore be pre-emptive.

# Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Robust Peacekeeping Vrs Peace Enforcement Aim Consent Level of Command and Control Authority Level of intensity

The decision to undertake any peacekeeping mission requires the **consent** of the host State. United Nations peacekeepers are sometimes deployed in environments that have militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such situations, the **aim** Security Council will be to provide the United Nations peacekeeping operations "robust" mandates authorizing them to "use all necessary means" to deter forceful attempts at disrupting the political process, protect civilians

under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assisting the national authorities in maintaining law and order.

The level of command and control for robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement also differ to some extent. While Robust peacekeeping is concentrated at tactical level of the mission, peace enforcement is generated from strategic level. Force is used at the strategic level, i.e. where consent is lacking, and robust peacekeeping, where there is consent at the strategic level, but where force may have to be used at the tactical level to manage spoilers. In Peace enforcement operations, the Council authorizes States or groups of States, under Chpater VII, to use force. Enforcement operations are usually beyond the United Nations' ability to plan command, and control. They may be carried out by a coalition of countries or by a regional organization such as NATO, ECOMOG etc.

The two concepts also have different levels of intensity of application of military power. For robust peacekeeping, there is insistence on calibrated use of force in precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. Unlike robust peacekeeping, peace enforcement will require a full range of military capabilities that meets or exceeds that of the conflict parties. Although the preferred objective is commitment of superior military force to dissuade conflict parties from further conflict, forces deployed for these operations assume for planning purposes that, use of force will be necessary to restore peace. However, Peace enforcement operations are also constrained and restricted by the principles of international humanitarian law.

In summary, the main distinction between peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping is not about the quantum of force being applied, but the context within which the force is being used. Robust peacekeeping like any peacekeeping mission requires the consent of the host State (Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan). Peace enforcement does not (Iraq, Libya).

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# Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Factors

- Mission capability
- Public perceptions
- Humanitarian impact
- Force protection
- Safety and security of personnel
- Effect on consent (national and local)

The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances. Judgments concerning its use will need to be made at the appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission capability; public perceptions;

humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the mission.

**Note to instructor**. These factors could also be used as a criterion for comparing courses of action during Military Component Planning Process.

|  | Slide 33 |
|--|----------|
| Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping                            |          |
| Principles   |          |
| Precise (Authorised objective against a legitimate target) |          |
| Necessary  |          |
| Proportional   |          |
| Appropriate  |          |
| Avoid, and in any event minimize, collateral damage        |          |
|  |          |



- The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be a last resort, calibrated in a graduated and precise manner, proportional and appropriate within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the authorized objective while avoiding or minimizing collateral damage. The deterrent capacity of the mission has to be upheld in order to adequately protect civilians. The use of force also comes with the accountability and responsibility to do so. The SOP defines what is meant by force and the principles governing its use.
- The mission-wide ROE for the military and DUF for the police components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation clarifies the different levels of force that can be used in various circumstances, how each level of force should be used, and any authorizations that must be obtained by commanders.
- They are meant to explain in detail the circumstances in which force may be used and establish the level of responsibility for taking the decision to use it. Simplified versions of ROE may be issued to individual soldiers for everyday reference, usually in the form of a readily accessible laminated card known as Aide Memoire. Instructions relating to the use of force in specific operational activities or for specific occasions may also be issued by the force commander down through the chain of command as the need arises.

# Status, privileges and immunities, and Responsibilities of UN peacekeepers

#### **Sources**

# Status, Privileges and Immunities, and Responsibilities of UN Peacekeepers Sources

- Charter of the United Nations
- United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
- Model SOFA
- Mission-specific SOFA/SOMA

#### Slide 34

#### Charter of the United Nations

- (i) Article 104: This provision ensures that the United Nations has such legal capacity as is necessary to carry out its responsibilities and to protect its interests. Among other things, this provision enables the United Nations to contract for goods and services (see also General Convention, below).
- (ii) Article 105(1): This provision ensures that Member States cannot, by judicial or administrative means, compromise the Organization's ability to carry out its essential purposes.
- (iii) These two provisions are binding on all Member States, whether or not they are parties to the General Convention.

#### **United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities**

This Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946. It was intended to give effect and to further delineate the requirements of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations

#### SOFA/SOMA

The SOFA and SOMA embodies the host States consent and regulated the status of the peacekeeping mission, its premises and personnel in the territory of the host country. It provides the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities enjoyed by the mission, the various categories of personnel including military personnel, the premises, property and equipment of the mission and the facilities provided to its contractors. It also sets out the rights and obligations of the mission and the host State to each other.

#### **Status**

# Status, privileges and Immunities, of UN peacekeepers Status

- An embodiment of the highest aspirations of the peoples of the world
- Epitome of competence, integrity, impartiality, independence and discretion
- Bears a responsibility for demonstrating good attitudes and examples
- Serve the ideals of peace, of respect for diversity and fundamental human rights

The United Nations peacekeeper is an embodiment of the highest aspirations of the peoples of the world. He or she therefore bears a responsibility for demonstrating good attitudes and examples based on the great traditions of public administration that have developed in member states: competence, integrity, impartiality, independence and discretion. Above all, the peacekeeper has a special calling: to serve the ideals of peace, of respect for diversity and fundamental human rights, of economic and social progress, and of international cooperation.

Military members of national contingents assigned to the military component of a United Nations peacekeeping or other field operation shall be subject to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal offences that may be committed by them in the mission area. They shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. They are, however, subject to the jurisdiction of the host country/territory in respect of any disputes/claims of a civil nature not related to the performance of their official functions.

#### **Immunities and Privileges**

#### Status, privileges and immunities of UN peacekeepers

- Immunity from arrest or detention
- Immunity from suit and from other legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done in performance of duty
- Exemption from taxation on salaries and emoluments received from the Organisation

#### Slide 35

Slide 36

#### Slide 37

#### Status, privileges and immunities, of UN peacekeepers

#### Immunities and Privileges (Cont...)

- Inviolability of papers and documents.
- The right, for the purpose of communicating with the organisation, to use codes and to send and receive correspondence and other papers and documents by couriers or in sealed bags.
- Exemption from currency or exchange restrictions to such extent as is accorded to a representative of a foreign government on a temporary mission on behalf of that government.
- The like privileges and immunities in respect of personal baggage as are accorded to a diplomatic agent

The privileges and immunities enjoyed by the United Nations by virtue of Article 105 of the Charter, the Convention and the SOFA/SOMA are conferred in the interests of the Organization. These privileges and immunities belong to the Organization and furnish no excuse to the staff members who are covered by them to fail to observe laws and police regulations of the State in which they are located nor do they furnish an excuse for non-performance of their private obligations.

**Note to instructor**. It is important to caution that all questions regarding maintaining or waiving the privileges, immunities and exemptions of the United Nations must be referred to the Office of Legal Affairs, which has been delegated exclusive responsibility for such questions.

#### Responsibilities

# Responsibilities of UN peacekeepers

- Uphold and respect the principles set out in the Charter
- Uphold the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity
- Neither seek nor accept instructions from any government or from any other source external to the organization
- Discharge functions and regulate conduct with only interests of the organisation in view
- Respect local laws and regulations
- While personal views and convictions, like political and religious convictions remain inviolable, they shall not adversely affect official duties or interests of the United Nations

#### Responsibilities of UN peacekeepers Responsibilities (Cont...)

- Not use office or knowledge gained from official functions for private gains or prejudice the positions of those they do not favour
- Not accept any honour, decoration, favour, gift or remuneration from any government
- The property and assets of the Organization shall only be used for official purposes and with reasonable care
- Respond fully to requests for information from staff members and other officials of the Organization authorized to investigate the possible misuse of funds, waste or abuse
- Must comply with local laws and honour private legal obligations, including, but not limited to, the obligation to honour orders of competent courts

It is advisable for instructors to do a general discussion on this and allow participants to clarify doubts and also share experience.

#### **Specific Instances of Prohibited Conduct**

# Responsibilities of UN peacekeepers Specific Instances of Prohibited Conduct

- Sexual exploitation or abuse (Zero Tolerance Policy)
- Any form of discrimination or harassment, including sexual or gender harassment, as well as physical or verbal abuse at the workplace or in connection with work
- Disruption or otherwise interference with any meeting or other official activity of the organization
- Intentionally misrepresenting functions, official title or nature of duties to any entities or persons external to the United Nations
- Intentionally altering, destroying, misplacing or rendering useless, any official document, record or file
- Offering or promising any personal benefit to another staff member or to any third party with a view to influencing the performance of any official act and vice versa

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#### **Learning Activity 2 (Legal Aspects of Peacekeeping – Part 2) Instructor's Guidelines**

In this learning activity, participants are required to be exercised on recognition of potential international crimes in mission area.

#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|  | 5 minutes                        | Activity introduction and instructions      |
|--|----------------------------------|---|
|  | 10 minutes Syndicate discussions |   |
|  | 10 minutes                       | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |
| <b>Total time:</b> 25 minutes *total time dependent number of groups |                                  | *total time dependent number of groups      |

Note to instructor: Refer participants to Module 4 Information Gathering where information cycle has further explanation on Information Collection Plan.

| Learning A | ctivity 2 (Legal | Aspects of Peacekeeping – Part 2)      | Slide 41 |
|------------|------------------|--|----------|
| Learning A | activity Time Re | quired                                 |          |
|            | 5 minutes        | Activity introduction and instructions |          |
|            | 10 minutes       | Syndicate discussions                  |          |
|            | 10 minutes       | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per       |          |
|            |                  | syndicate)                             |          |
| Total      | 25 minutes       | *total time dependent number of        |          |
| time:      |                  | groups                                 |          |

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#### **Preparatory Notes to Instructor**

#### **Background**

Today, the typical field environment is remote, austere and, increasingly, dangerous, sometimes openly hostile to a United Nations presence. In such settings, lines of communications (for support and sustainment) are often long and subject to frequent and extended natural and man-made disruptions. Local markets for goods and services are limited or non-existent, and the rule of law can be tenuous or wholly absent. Moreover, potable water is scarce and in high demand, fresh food can be difficult to procure in quantity, housing stock is frequently in short supply, and reliable communications infrastructure is lacking.

The required logistics functions are generated from various sources including the UN owned, military/police contingents or contractors. The exact composition of the logistics component is decided by DFS at UN Headquarters during the mission planning process in consultation with relevant offices of DPKO or DPA. The combination of logistics support resources selected for a particular mission will depend on various factors including the mission's tasks, its operating environment, economics, available budget, urgency of deployment and security situation.

Staff officers' understanding of logistic support structures and services in place at mission area will help them in performing their duties efficiently in above depicted environment.

#### Aim

The aim of the United Nations Logistic at work module is to provide staff officers with an overview of the United Nations logistics system and the system and its operations in support of field missions.

#### **Learning Outcomes**

On completion of the module: UN Logistic at work, participants should be able to:

- 1. Describe the concept of the Global Field Support Strategy, Integrated Support Services and the Joint Logistic Operations Centre.
- 2. Define the Contingent Owned Equipment System (COE) and United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE).
- 3. Explain the medical support in the field.

#### **Training Sequence**

The material contained in this module could be delivered over one to two training units, depending on the number of learning activities upon which the instructor decides. The instructor can modify the duration to suit national training requirements and reflect the subject matter comprehension level of the participants.

#### **Duration**

| Minimum<br>Session Time | Lecture/Presentation | Questions/Assessment | Session Activities |  |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--|
| 145 minutes 90 min      |                      | 10 min.              | 45                 |  |
| Additional<br>Options   | Mission Specific     | Optional Film        | Optional Activity  |  |
| TBD                     | TBD by PKTI          |                      |                    |  |

#### **Methodology**

This module contains suggested learning activities to keep adult learners engaged. The facilitation team should use as many of the learning activities as time allows and keep them tailored to the target audience. Participants should be fully involved in the learning process through practical exercises, brainstorming sessions, discussion of case studies, working in small groups on specific tasks, etc.

The instructor should inform participants of the content, format and timing. Knowing what to expect, participants can improve their ability to focus on the subject and benefit better from the session.

Structure of the presentation

- Overview of the Global Field Support Strategy
- The Integrated Support Services Policy and Procedures
- Joint Logistic Operations Centre
- Contingent Owned Equipment System and Memorandum of Understanding
- Contingent Owned Equipment management in the field
- United Nations Owned Equipment management in the field
- Logistic planning considerations
- The logistic estimate
- Medical support in the field

Instructors are encouraged to add examples and mission-specific information related to the specific deployment of participants, if known.

\*Please Note: It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written guiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers are provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages.

#### **Instructor Profile**

This module is best presented by an instructor who has experience in working at a logistic branch or JLOC in PK missions, who could share his/her, experience with the group. If there is more than one instructor, at least one should have practical experience. The instructor should also encourage questions from the participants

and aim for an interactive discussion. All participants should be encouraged to contribute to the group discussions, case study discussions and in any other activities.

#### **Instructor Preparations**

#### **Required Readings**

- Global Field Support Strategy. Report of the Secretary-General January 2010 (ref A/64/633)
- Progress on the Implementation of the global field support strategy. Report of the Secretary General December 2010 (ref A/65/643)
- Policy on Integrated Support Services (ISS) in United Nations Peace Support Operations. June 2008
- Policy on Joint Logistics Operations Centre in Peacekeeping Operations June 2008
- Manual on Policies and Procedures concerning the reimbursement and control of Contingent – Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors participating in peacekeeping missions (COE Manual) january 2009
- Medical Support Manual for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition 1999
- Medical Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, Revision 0, 2003

#### **General Preparations**

#### Equipment:

- 1. Computer and PowerPoint slides
- 2. Projector and Screen
- 3. Flip Chart
- Materials:
- 5. Copies of handouts...etc.

#### **Mission Specific**

If Module 3 is being presented to prepare participants for a particular UN peacekeeping mission, then gather mission specific information from the mission website (available at the UN DPKO internet website, through 'current operations': <a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp">http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp</a>). Additional mission specific information is available at the UN DPKO Policy and Training internet website: <a href="http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx">http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx</a>

#### Symbols Legend

- Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration)
- Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words versus being read to participants)

- Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)
- Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
- Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
- Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
- Film (A film that is recommended as a core part of the training or an option)
- Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
- Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit, section or part – as indicated in the text)
- Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

#### **Session Notes**

## Module 3 UN Logistics at work Slide 1



**Note to Instructor:** Give the participants a brief explanation why they should pay special attention to this module. Refer to: Background in the Preparatory Notes to the Instructor

| Aim   | Slide 2 |
|---|---------|
| To provide staff officers with an overview of the United Nations logistics system and its operations in support of field missions |         |
|   | T       |
| As UN Staff Oficer<br>Why should I know this?   | Slide 3 |

#### **Learning Outcome**

Slide 4

On completion of the module: UN Logistic at work, participants should be able to:

- Describe the concept of the Global Field Support Strategy, Integrated Support Services and the Joint Logistic Operations Centre.
- Define the Contingent Owned Equipment System(COE) and United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE).
- Explain the medical support in the field

#### Slide 5

#### **Structure of the Presentation**

- Overview of the Global Field Support Strategy
- The Integrated Support Services Policy and Procedures
- Joint Logistic Operations Centre
- Contingent Owned Equipment System and Memorandum of Understanding
- Contingent Owned Equipment management in the field
- United Nations Owned Equipment management in the field
- Medical support in the field

#### Overview of the Global Field Support Strategy

| The future trend in field support  | Slide 6 |
|--|---------|
| Improving the full spectrum of service delivery, on the one hand providing fast, complete and flexible support to the civilian, police and military components deployed in the field, and, on the other, ensuring cost efficiencies and transparency |         |

#### The future trend in field support

- The strategy considers key proposed changes aimed at improving the full spectrum of service delivery, on the one hand providing fast, complete and flexible support to the civilian, police and military components deployed in the field, and, on the other, ensuring cost efficiencies and transparency.
- A new global service-delivery model foresees a fundamental shift in the existing division of labour and a relocation of functions to improve responsiveness and better address the needs of the field missions. The intention is that:
- The Secretariat would continue to set strategic direction, exercise oversight and take policy decisions, but get out of the business of operational and transactional service delivery
- Global and regional service centres would take over the majority of operational and transactional functions
- The mission support component of field operations would thereby be reduced, with only location-dependent activities performed in specific mission locations

#### Core Objectives of the Global Field Support Strategy

| Core Objectives of the Global Field Support Strategy   | Slide 7 |
|--|---------|
| Expedite and improve support for peacekeeping, including critical early peace building;  |         |
| <ul> <li>Expedite and improve support for peacemaking, electoral<br/>assistance, mediation support and conflict prevention;</li> </ul> |         |
| Strengthen resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale;                        |         |
| Improve the safety and living conditions of staff.   |         |
|  |         |

#### Core Objectives of the Global Field Support Strategy


- The overall intention of this proposed global field support strategy is to transform service delivery to field missions. It is designed as an integrated comprehensive programme that draws on the lessons learned from several decades of operational experience. The strategy is designed to achieve four core, operationally focused objectives and two objectives that consider the impact of field missions' deployment footprints:
- The core objectives are to:
  - Expedite and improve support for peacekeeping, including critical early peace building;
  - Expedite and improve support for peacemaking, electoral assistance, mediation support and conflict prevention;
  - Strengthen resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale;
  - Improve the safety and living conditions of staff.

#### The four pillars of the Global Field Support Strategy

| The four pillars of the Global Field Support Strategy                  | Slide 8 |  |
|--|---------|--|
| The creation of global and regional service centres                    |         |  |
| <ul> <li>The establishment of deployment modules</li> </ul>            |         |  |
| <ul> <li>The modification of mission financing arrangements</li> </ul> |         |  |
| The reinforcement of response capacities                               |         |  |

- On the basis of these overarching principles, the strategy would have four distinct but integrated components:
  - The creation of global and regional service centres, including, in the first instance, reprofiling the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, and the existing Support Base in Entebbe, Uganda, as a shared service centre for missions in the region;
  - The establishment of deployment modules in order to improve the speed and predictability of the deployment of the military, police and civilian components of field missions, particularly in start-up or surge operations;
  - The modification of mission financing arrangements so as to expedite the timely deployment of material and human resources to missions;
  - The reinforcement of response capacities, a deliberate approach to securing external and building internal civilian capacities, including stand-by arrangements with contractors, military support capacities, short-term consultants and individual contractors, rapidly deployable standing and stand-by capacities, including senior-level positions and highly specialized functions, and rosters of capable and rapidly deployable capacities.

#### Service Centres



- **Service centres** The strategy proposes that two different types of service centres be established: a global service centre and regional service centres.
- Service centres will serve two main goals: to deliver predefined modules for goods and services, which are critical enablers for rapid deployment; and to host the operational support teams responsible for delivering day-to-day support services.
- The global service centre will consolidate service packages for global delivery. The global service centre will deliver predefined modules for goods and services at the global level. Proposed services include Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Asset Management; Financial Systems technical support' Global Education grants processing; Field Contract management; and Airfield air terminal standards.
- The regional service centres will deliver services at the regional level through operational support teams responsible for providing day-to-day support services that do not require the presence of the recipient of the service at the moment the transaction is performed. The Regional Service Centres will be owned, managed and staffed by the Regional Missions they serve. The Entebbe Centre for example, is governed by a Steering Committee comprising the directors and chiefs of mission support of the regional missions (the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, MINURCAT, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMIS and UNSOA).

#### Modularization Concept

#### **Modularization Concept**

The Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) introduced **modularity** as one of the four support pillars of GFSS which aims at successful deployment of mission infrastructure as deliberate and predefined packages delivered by UN provided or contracted as well as member states provided enabling capacities

Slide 10

<u>Modularization</u> The Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) introduced **modularity** as one of the four support pillars of GFSS which aims at successful deployment of mission infrastructure as deliberate and predefined packages delivered by UN provided or contracted as well as member states provided enabling capacities.

- Example: The December 2010 progress report on the implementation of the GFSS highlights that "the Service centre approach has already proved beneficial......the <u>Tranportation and Movement Integrated Control Centre</u>, part of the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe, was able to position two aircraft for the relocation of staff from Cote d'Ivoire in December 2010." This Centre was established to optimize the use of air assets in Central and Eastern African missions and is responsible for planning and movement of personnel and cargo within and between those missions. Additionally, the establishment of the <u>Regional Training and Conference Centre</u> has significantly increased access to training, conferences and retreats in a
  - Predefined modules for goods and services are service-delivery packages that meet field deployment requirements on missions' terms. The need to provide safe, appropriate living and working facilities, for example, will be addressed as a "service package", as opposed to a series of discrete services (project budget allocation, procurement, engineering design, labour, etc.), which require integration at the mission level and by mission staff.

conducive learning environment within the missions' areas of operations.<sup>1</sup>

**Example**: "The first of these modules is the design of a 200-person camp and its configuration from existing deployment stocks. It will consist of a pre-formatted site layout (scaled to size) for a 200-person camp; accommodations; a medical facility; information and communications technology; a rapidly deployable security perimeter system; a camp waste management system; energy systems; and on-call technical support in various disciplines to assist in the rapid in-mission deployment of the service package." The first prototype was demonstrated and reviewed in April 2011, in Brindisi. Subsequent modules for development in 2012 will

e.g

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Progress on the Implementation of the global field support strategy. Report of the Secretary General December 2010 (ref A/65/643)

include Catering; Port Operations and Movement Control; Transportation; Support to deep field; and Strategic Communications.

- Special attention is being paid to supporting the deployment of military and police contingents through the inclusion of military/police pattern equipment (i.e., inclusion in the strategic deployment stocks self-sustainment category), to be developed in consultation with the Department of Field Support and troopand police-contributing countries experts.
- The global service packages are configured and managed from the global service centre. Regional service centres could, in turn, develop region-specific service packages and/or focus on the regional delivery of global service packages.

#### The Integrated Support Services Policy and Procedures

|   | Slide 11 |
|---|----------|
| The Integrated Support Services Policy and Procedures |          |
|   |          |
|   |          |

#### Slide 12 Benefits of integration of support services Unity of purpose Synergy of effort. Economy of effort. Professionalism, accountability, transparency and continuity of staff. Responsiveness Balance

- Benefits of integration of support services. The benefits of the integration of support services can be seen through the application of the principles for the integration of logistic staff and resources as follows:
  - Achieve unity of purpose through teamwork.
  - Synergy of effort through unified planning and decentralized execution.
  - Economy of effort through efficiency, optimisation, appropriateness of the solution and reduced redundancy.
  - Professionalism, accountability, transparency and continuity of staff.
  - Responsiveness through flexibility, client-oriented service delivery and adoption of common standards.
  - Balance between operational responsiveness and financial accountability.

|   | How integration is achieved                      | Slide 13 |
|---|--|----------|
| • | The CISS   |          |
| • | Staffing Strategy for the ISS Sections and Units |          |
|   |  | 1        |


- How integration is achieved. To ensure effective, efficient, economic and timely use of limited logistics resources, it is important that these resources are consolidated, centrally controlled and used in an integrated manner according to the laid down priorities. The consolidation and integration of support is achieved through establishment of the ISS under a Chief Integrated Support Services (CISS). The ISS is the backbone of support in a peacekeeping mission. The ISS employs the largest number of international and local national staff and controls almost 60 percent of the mission's budget.
  - The CISS is responsible for providing logistics support to all mission components including regions/sectors according to the priorities laid down by the senior mission management. He/she controls all logistics resources in the mission to include the UN owned, commercially contracted and military enabling assets and services like military logistics, construction and maintenance engineering, medical, movements control, communications and information technology, geographical information services (GIS), supply, and air and surface transport units/ resources in the mission. While the CISS controls all second, third and fourth line resources present in the mission area, the first line and self –sustainment resources are controlled by the respective contingent commanders.
  - Staffing Strategy for the ISS Sections and Units. To achieve better integration of limited logistics resources, it is imperative that the sections and units in the ISS also structured to facilitate coordination and planning. In this regard all sections and units of the ISS are staffed with civilian and military/police officers at all levels of the management structure. The Deputy CISS is a seconded military or police officer, recruited on a UN contract by DPKO, answerable directly to the CISS (not the military chain of command). The individual is placed on contract in order to meet UN financial accountability requirements, and by doing so means the DCISS can fully deputise in the absence of the CISS.

|   | Slide 14           |
|---|--------------------|
| The role of military and sta                      | ff officers in ISS |
| <ul> <li>Military logistics capability</li> </ul> |                    |
| <ul> <li>Working relations</li> </ul>             |                    |
| <ul> <li>Staffing</li> </ul>                      |                    |

- The role of military and staff officers in ISS.
  - Military logistics capability comes fully-staffed and equipped, can operate in the most hostile environments and (depending upon the TCC) be mobilized relatively quickly. Military capability is very effective at locations that are not sufficiently secure for civilian operations. In addition certain operational support requirements can only be met by military enabling units.
  - Working relations. While the CISS reports to the DMS/CMS, but he/she maintains a working relationship of trust and cooperation with the military and police components. While being the biggest clients of the ISS, the military and police components are also among the critical resource providers for the ISS. In addition to an ISS representation at daily military and police briefings, the CISS makes an endeavour to personally attend such briefings as frequently as possible. For routine issues, the CISS invites HOMC's/HOPC's Logistics advisor for all ISS meetings.
  - **Staffing**. Due to the requirement of experience at the management level, need for continuity, financial accountability, the Section Chiefs normally are civilian staff members. It is normal for the second-in-command in each section to be a military/police officer. (See note above re DCISS)

#### Joint Logistic Operations Centre (JLOC)

- **The JLOC**. The JLOC is the nerve centre for logistics functions in a mission involving information gathering, analysis, planning, coordination, execution, monitoring and feedback. It is to provide all mission components, other UN and non-UN entities with a single point of coordination for all aspects of logistics support in the mission area.
- The Chief of the JLOC is the principal advisor to the CISS/DCISS on all logistics planning and operational matters.



- Logistics Plans Unit
- Current Logistics Operations Unit
- Regional Support Unit
- Information and Reporting Cell
- Liaison Cells between United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and JLOC
- Mine Action / Explosive Ordinance Disposal Coordination (MA/EOD) Cell
- Contractor Coordination Cell
- Joint Movements Control Centre (JMCC)
- Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC)
- Mission Maritime Operations Centre (MMOC)

#### The concept of logistic support in the field

Slide 16

To receive requests for logistics support, analyse the requirement, prioritise according to overall guidance provided by senior mission management, plan and coordinate implementation of tasks related to the request, task technical/other sections and then monitor implementation

The concept of logistic support in the field. Due to complex nature of peacekeeping operations and its support requirements, there is necessity for an entity which can receive requests for logistics support, analyse the requirement, prioritise according to overall guidance provided by senior mission management, plan and coordinate implementation of tasks related to the request, task technical/other sections and then monitor implementation. In addition there is a requirement to coordinate logistics support with other UN and non-UN entities operating in the mission area. It is the JLOC that has been organised and staffed to effectively carry out above-mentioned functions.

#### **Relationship of JLOC and Joint Operations Centre (JOC)**

Slide 17

- Routine: The JLOC keeps JOC informed of the day to day operations supported by ISS
- Crisis: The JLOC deploys a logistics staff officer in JOC
- Relationship of JLOC and Joint Operations Centre (JOC). The JOC is a jointly staffed establishment at Mission Headquarters which deals with day to day substantive operations in the mission. Besides planning and monitoring of the substantive operations, the JOC provides the HOM and the senior mission management with the situational awareness through timely and accurate reporting. It is manned on 24/7 basis. During an emergency, the JOC operates

as the primary centre for crisis management. The JLOC interfaces with the JOC as follows:

- Routine Situations: The JLOC keeps JOC informed of the day to day operations supported by ISS. In routine operations or if JLOC is collocated with the JOC, there is no requirement for a permanent JLOC presence in the JOC. However, if JLOC is not collocated with the JOC, a JLOC representative may be deputed to the JOC on permanent basis. In either case a JLOC representative attends all routine JOC meetings/briefings.
- Crisis Situations: In a crisis situation, the JLOC deploys a logistics staff officer in JOC who is authorized to take decisions on behalf of administration in case of an emergency or when the senior administrative managers can not be reached.

#### The role of military and staff officers in JLOC

Slide 18

JLOC is jointly staffed by military, police and civilian staff. Integration ensures that an in-house capacity is available to analyse, plan and implement logistics operations in support of any entity.

The role of military and staff officers in JLOC. JLOC is jointly staffed by military, police and civilian staff. Integration ensures that an in-house capacity is available to analyse, plan and implement logistics operations in support of any entity. This synergy of effort is important for efficiency and smooth provision of logistics support especially during the mission start-up period and during special events like elections, referendums etc. In addition logistics staff from the advance and/or rear parties of the military contingents may be deployed to the JLOC to coordinate deployment and repatriation respectively.

#### **Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) System and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)**

#### Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) System and **Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)**

Slide 19

#### The Contingent Owned Equipment Manual

The **Manual** on Policies and Procedures concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (the COE Manual) describes the procedures authorized by the General Assembly. The COE Manual contains the policies, procedures and actions to be followed by the United Nations Headquarters and peacekeeping missions. The COE Manual is intended to

provide assistance to troop/police contributors and to ensure that the decision of the General Assembly is fully and consistently implemented and their contributions appropriately reimbursed.

#### Principles of the system

|   | Principles of the system         | SI | ide 20 |
|---|----------------------------------|----|--------|
| • | Simplicity                       | 0. | uo 20  |
| • | Accountability                   |    |        |
| • | Financial and management control |    |        |

The basic principles of this system are simplicity, accountability, financial and management control. This is accomplished by reducing the administrative burden on troop/police contributors, the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions; standardization of reimbursement rates on an equitable basis and common standards to be applied to equipment and services to be provided. Furthermore, accountability and control are ensured by the system relying on a pre-existing agreement between the United Nations and the troop contributor for the leasing of equipment and the provision of services to personnel – the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The COE Manual contains the policies, procedures and actions to be followed by the United Nations Headquarters and peacekeeping missions, including the revised Model MOU.

#### The lease of major equipment

# The lease of major equipment Dry lease troop/police contributor provides equipment to the mission and the United Nations assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment. Wet lease troop/police contributor provides and assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting deployed major items of equipment, together with the associated minor equipment.

- The troop/police contributors are reimbursed under wet or dry lease arrangements, at the rates adopted by the General Assembly. Reimbursement is limited to those items of serviceable major equipment (including associated minor equipment and consumables) specifically agreed in the MOU negotiation phase.
- Dry lease means a contingent-owned equipment reimbursement system where the troop/police contributor provides equipment to the mission and the United

- Nations assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment. The troop/police contributor is reimbursed for the non-availability of its military resources for its national interest of deployed major and associated minor equipment.
- Wet lease means a contingent-owned reimbursement system where the troop/police contributor provides and assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting deployed major items of equipment, together with the associated minor equipment. The troop/police contributor is entitled to reimbursement for providing this support.

#### The Memorandum of Understanding

#### **Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)**

The purpose of the memorandum of understanding is to establish the administrative, logistics and financial terms and conditions to govern the contribution of personnel, equipment, and services provided by the member states' government in support of a United Nations peacekeeping mission

Slide 22

- The purpose of the memorandum of understanding is to establish the administrative, logistics and financial terms and conditions to govern the contribution of personnel, equipment, and services provided by the member states' government in support of a United Nations peacekeeping mission and to specify United Nations standards of conduct for personnel provided by the member state's government
- Self-sustainability for the first 30 to 90 days. In an established mission, logistics support is in place and contractors deliver rations according to religious, dietary or national preferences (e.g., western-style, beef-free or porkfree). Reserves of rations are stored according to menu types requested by contingents. Commercial contracts for the supply of water and for diesel to run generators and vehicles are likewise in place. In a mission's start-up phase, however the situation is usually quite different. Contingents and peacekeepers that arrive in a newly established mission must expect hardships. The United Nations may not yet have had the time to establish the required logistics, so, according to the mission MOU, contingents must be self-sufficient for the first 3 months in some or all categories.

Units are expected to deploy to the mission area with a 30-90 days' supply of

- Rations and drinking water
- Canteen supplies (cigarettes, toilet articles and the like)
- Repair parts
- Diesel fuel.

#### **Annex A Personnel**

|   | Annex A Personnel  | Slide 23 |
|---|--|----------|
| • | <b>Requirements</b> : The categories and number of personnel         |          |
| • | <b>Reimbursement</b> The reimbursement a Government will receive and |          |
| • | General conditions for personnel                                     |          |

- Annex A Personnel In the annex "A" of the MOU are specified the following aspects:
  - Requirements: The categories and number of personnel the government agrees to contribute to the peacekeeping mission and the period's starting date. Note: This will include Headquarters Staff Officers, who are deemed contingent members, but not UN Military Observers who are 'Experts on Mission'.
  - Reimbursement The reimbursement a Government will receive
    - Troop/police costs at the rate of \$1,028 per month per contingent member;
    - Personal clothing, gear, and equipment allowance at the rate of \$68
      per month per contingent member. The recommended troops/police kit
      requirement is listed in the appendix;
    - Personal weaponry and training ammunition at the rate of \$5 per month per contingent member;
    - An allowance for specialists at the rate of \$303 per month for 25 per cent of troop strength of [logistics units to be listed] and 10 per cent of troop strength of infantry unit, formed police unit, force headquarters, sector headquarters and other units
    - Note: The United Nations is not involved in directing contributing countries on the disbursement of these reimbursements to individuals deployed. Contingent personnel will receive, direct from the mission a daily allowance of \$1.28 plus a recreational leave allowance of \$10.50 per day for up to seven days of leave taken during each six-month period.
  - General conditions for personnel. The Government's commitment to provide personnel that meets the standards established by the United Nations for service with the United Nations peacekeeping mission, with respect to rank, experience, physical fitness, specialization, and knowledge of languages. Also the assurance that personnel are trained on the equipment with which the contingent is provided and comply with whatever policies and procedures may be laid down by the United Nations regarding medical or other clearances, vaccinations, travel, shipping, leave or other entitlements.

|   | Annex B Major Equipment                            | Slide 24 |
|---|--|----------|
| • | Requirement Method of reimbursement: wet/dry lease |          |
| • | General conditions for major equipment             |          |
| • | Verification and control procedures                |          |
|   |  |          |

- Annex B Major Equipment. In the annex "B" of the MOU are specified the following aspects:
  - Requirement Major equipment required by a contingent will be agreed during the MOU negotiations after consultation with mission planners and review of overall force requirements. The method of reimbursement - wet or dry lease will also be agreed.
  - **General conditions for major equipment** which are the following:
    - The major equipment provided under the MOU shall remain the property of the Government.
    - Major equipment deployed for short periods for specific tasks shall not form part of this MOU, or it shall be negotiated and agreed upon separately in supplementary arrangements to this MOU.
    - Reimbursement for major equipment will be in effect at full rates until the date of cessation of operations by the troop/police contributor or termination of the mission and thereafter be reduced to 50 per cent of the rates agreed in this MOU until the major equipment items have departed the mission area.
  - **Verification and control procedures** The main purpose of verification and control procedures is to verify that the terms and conditions of the bilateral MOU have been met, such as the equipment being serviceable and operators trained in using it, and to take corrective action when required. The United Nations is responsible, in coordination with the contingent or other delegated authority designated by the troop/police contributor, to ensure that the equipment provided by the Government meets the requirements of the United Nations peacekeeping operation and is provided in accordance with annex D (Principles of verification and performance standards for major equipment provided under the wet/dry lease arrangements) to the MOU.

|   | In the annex "C"  | Slide 25 |
|---|---|----------|
| • | <b>Requirements</b> The montly rate of reimbursement for the different categories of Self-sustainment |          |
| • | General conditions for self-sustainment   |          |
| • | Verification and control procedures   |          |

- In the annex "C" Self-sustainment of the MOU are specified the following aspects:
  - Requirements The montly rate of reimbursement for the different categories of Self-sustainment in United States dollars including mission factors (environment, intensified operational, hostility/forced abandonment).
  - General conditions for self-sustainment
    - The minor equipment and consumables provided under the MOU shall remain the property of the Government.
    - Reimbursement for self-sustainment will be in effect at full rates until the date of cessation of operations by a troop/police contributor or termination of the mission and thereafter be reduced to 50 per cent of the rates agreed in this MOU calculated upon the remaining actual deployed troop/police strength until all contingent personnel have departed the mission area.
  - Verification and control procedures The United Nations is responsible, in coordination with the contingent or other delegated authority designated by the troop/police contributor, to ensure that the equipment provided by the Government meets the requirements of the United Nations peacekeeping operation and is provided in accordance with annex C to the MOU. Also the United Nations is authorized to verify the status, condition and quantity of the equipment and services provided.

#### Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) management in the field

# Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) management in the field The mission has a COE Unit that is responsible for the inspection of all COE and self sustainment capability to ensure that they are in conformity with the COE manual and the respective MOU

Role and functions of COE Units in the field The mission has a COE Unit that is responsible for the inspection of all COE and self sustainment capability to ensure that they are in conformity with the COE manual and the respective MOU. The COE Unit carries out three main types of inspections, namely arrival inspections, periodic/operational readiness inspections and repatriation inspections. Upon completion of each inspection, the COE Unit sends the inspection report to the Force Commander and the CISS for certification. The report is then forwarded to the Finance Management and Support Service (FMSS), DFS. FMSS reviews the inspection report and seeks any relevant clarifications, before certification for payment.

Slide 27

#### Types of COE inspections

- **Arrival inspection** The inspection of major equipment takes place immediately upon arrival in the mission area and must be completed within one month
- Operational readiness inspections is implemented according to operational requirements during the stay of the units in the mission area
- **Repatriation inspection** The United Nations shall carry out an inspection at the time of repatriation of the contingent or component thereof from the mission area
- **Types of COE inspections**. The verification process provides for inspections at three separate stages. It is mandatory that such inspections be conducted on arrival and on repatriation. Arrival inspections must cover the scope of equipment and services for which reimbursement is sought in the MOU. It is the responsibility of the United Nations to ensure that operational readiness of equipment and/or services specified in the MOU are verified. Operational readiness inspections may be conducted with little notice when conditions exist that give rise to concern that the terms of the MOU are not being met.
  - **Arrival inspection** The inspection of major equipment takes place immediately upon arrival in the mission area and must be completed within one month. The United Nations, in consultation with the troop/police contributor, decides the time and place. Where equipment and personnel are already in the mission area when the MOU is concluded, the first inspection is carried out on a date to be jointly determined by the mission and contingent authorities and is to be completed within one month of that date.
    - Major equipment is counted/inspected in order to ensure categories and groups and the number delivered corresponds with the MOU and that they are in operationally serviceable condition, including painting in United Nations colours, upon arriving in theatre for use in its primary role;
    - In the case of dry lease, the equipment is inspected to determine whether the equipment condition is acceptable in accordance with established standards. This is compared with the consumption of spares and repair costs, ensuring that spares, etc., are provided and used according to the MOU;
    - Areas where the unit has a "self-sustainment" responsibility will be inspected within six months with a view to an assessment of the operational capabilities of the equipment and services:

- Operational readiness inspections Operational inspections is implemented according to operational requirements during the stay of the units in the mission area. These inspections include:
  - Major equipment is counted/inspected in order to classify the equipment into categories and groups and to ensure that the agreed number is present and used appropriately;
  - Major equipment is inspected to ensure that it is operational to the extent agreed to in the MOU. The United Nations considers that unsafe vehicles endangers the life of personnel and jeopardize the effectiveness of a mission and should not be considered operationally serviceable. The Chief Transportation Officer reviews vehicle safety and make recommendation to the Director/Chief, Mission Support and Force Commander/Police Commissioner on this issue;
  - In the case of a dry lease, a determination is made as to whether the condition of the equipment, i.e., its maintenance status, is acceptable. This is compared with the consumption of spares and repair costs, ensuring that spares, etc., are provided and used according to the MOU;
  - Areas where the unit has a "self-sustainment" responsibility is inspected with a view to an assessment of whether the sustainment capability is sufficient and satisfactory.
- Repatriation inspection The United Nations shall carry out an inspection at the time of repatriation of the contingent or component thereof from the mission area. The inspection shall:
  - Account for all major equipment of the troop/police contributor to be repatriated;
  - Verify the condition of major equipment provided under the dry lease arrangement to ensure that only equipment of the troop/police contributor is being repatriated.
  - When circumstances prevent the United Nations from conducting a repatriation inspection, consideration should be given to using the last validated inspection.

| Field verification reports  | Slide 28 |
|---|----------|
| <ul><li>Standard operational reporting.</li><li>Inspection reporting.</li><li>Claim status reporting.</li></ul> |          |

▼ Field verification reports. Verifications, inspection and control files are to be maintained at United Nations Headquarters, the force headquarters, the troop/police contributor and the unit. This reports are implemented as follows:

- **Standard operational reporting.** Standard operational reports are performed at the unit/contingent level by the unit/contingent on a monthly basis using a standardized form. These reports are maintained by the unit/contingent for presentation to the United Nations Inspection Team upon request. The report must describe the actual state of equipment and services provided by the unit and the United Nations;
- **Inspection reporting.** The United Nations Inspection Team will conduct periodic inspections. The reporting period will be decided between United Nations Headquarters and the mission. An inspection report i.e., verification report, is prepared by the United Nations Inspection Team after each inspection of a unit/contingent. The report describes the result of the inspection. The report is examined together with the unit and signed by the contingent representative;
- Claim status reporting. Claim status reporting is provided by the United Nations to the troop/police contributor upon request. The report shows monthly payments and/or debt as well as balance at the time of reporting.

| Self sustainment  | Slide 29 |
|---|----------|
| Logistics support for contingents in a peacekeeping mission area whereby the troop/police contributor provides some or all categories of logistics support to the contingent on a reimbursable basis: |          |
| <ul> <li>Catering</li> </ul>  |          |
| Communications.   |          |
| <ul> <li>Office</li> </ul>  |          |
| Electrical.   |          |
| <ul> <li>Minor engineering</li> </ul>   |          |
| <ul> <li>Explosive ordnance disposal</li> </ul>   |          |
| <ul> <li>Laundry and cleaning</li> </ul>  |          |
| <ul> <li>Tentage/accommodation</li> </ul>   |          |
| <ul> <li>Basic firefighting</li> </ul>  |          |
| <ul> <li>Fire detection and alarm capability</li> </ul>   |          |

**Self sustainment.** Self-sustainment is defined as logistics support for contingents in a peacekeeping mission area whereby the troop/police contributor provides some or all categories of logistics support to the contingent on a reimbursable basis. A contingent may be self-sufficient for various categories, depending on the ability of the United Nations to provide the necessary support and the contingent's own capabilities. The modular concept of self-sustainment is based on the principle that troop/police contributors cannot be partially self-sustaining in any given category.

- Standards The inspection team is responsible to verify the categories or subcategories of self-sustainment agreed to in the MOU to assess if the standard of operational requirement approved by the General Assembly is being fulfilled. In the same way, the United Nations must give an account of the services provided by the United Nations as stipulated in the MOU.
  - Catering the contingent must be able to feed its troops with cold and hot meals in a clean and healthy environment.
  - Communications. The telephone is the preferred means of communications for the contingent; it will be utilized as much as possible for internal communications within the headquarters, and with non-mobile subelements and sub-units of the contingent located in the main base camp. The requirement for VHF/UHF-FM and HF communications within the area of operations will be determined during the site survey and is subject to negotiation with the troop/police contributor.
  - Office the contingent must provide:
    - Office furniture, equipment and supplies for all unit headquarters staff;
    - Office supplies and services to personnel within the contingent;
    - Electronic data processing and reproduction capability, including necessary software, to run all internal headquarters correspondence and administration, including necessary databases.
  - **Electrical**. The contingent must provide decentralized electrical power from generators.
  - Minor engineering The contingent must be able, within its accommodation areas, to:
    - Undertake non-field defensive minor construction;
    - Handle minor electrical repairs and replacement;
    - Undertake repairs to plumbing and water systems;
    - Conduct minor maintenance and other light repair work;
    - Provide all related workshop equipment, construction tools and supplies.
  - Explosive ordnance disposal The contingent must have the capability for EOD to secure the unit's accommodation area. The contingent must have the ability to:
    - Locate and evaluate unexploded ordnance;
    - Dismantle or destroy isolated ordnance that is considered a threat to the contingent's safety;
    - Provide all related minor equipment, personal protective clothing, and consumables.
  - Laundry and cleaning The contingent must:

- Provide laundry for all military/police and personal clothing, including dry-cleaning of operationally required specialist clothing and cleaning facilities for all contingent personnel.
- Ensure all laundry and cleaning facilities have hygienic equipment that enables a clean and healthy environment to be maintained, i.e., cleaning of accommodation and office areas.
- Provide all related equipment, maintenance and supplies.
- **Tentage** In order to receive this reimbursement, the contingent must have the ability to (read in conjunction with the Guidelines to Troop- Contributing Countries):
  - House personnel in tented accommodations. Tentage includes flooring and the ability to heat and cool, as appropriate;
  - Provide ablutions capability under tentage, in which case the ablution facilities will be reimbursed under major equipment;
  - Provide temporary offices/workspace in tentage.



Note to the Instructor: The requirement or otherwise for tentage will be advised during the force generation process. Contingents will initially receive tentage reimbursement for up to six months if not accommodated by the UN. If hard wall accommodation is provided a lesser quantity of tentage may be reimbursable to retain mobility requirements of the contingent.

- **Accommodation** In order to receive this reimbursement, the troop/police contributor must:
  - Purchase or construct a permanent rigid structure to accommodate the contingent's personnel. This structure is fixed with heating, lighting, flooring, sanitation and running water. The rate is based on a standard of nine square metres per person;
  - Provide heaters and/or air conditioners for the accommodation as required by the local climatic conditions:
  - Provide furniture for eating facilities where necessary;
  - Provide offices/workspaces in permanent rigid structures.
- Basic firefighting capability The contingent must:
  - Provide sufficient basic fire fighting equipment, i.e., buckets, beaters and fire extinguishers, in accordance with the International Fire Code, as amended
  - Provide all necessary minor equipment and consumables.
- Fire detection and alarm capability The contingent must:
  - Provide sufficient fire detection and alarm capability equipment, i.e., smoke detectors and fire alarm systems, in accordance with the International Fire Code, as amended:
  - Provide all necessary minor equipment and consumables.

#### United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE) management in the field

| United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE) management in the field |
|---|
|---|

#### **Definitions of Property**

| Definitions of Property.   | Slide 31 |
|--|----------|
| Property in United Nations terminology consists of supplies, equipment, buildings and land belonging to or under the charge of the United Nations, whether acquired by purchase, rental, loan, donation, trust or other means. |          |

Definitions of Property. Property in United Nations terminology consists of supplies, equipment, buildings and land belonging to or under the charge of the United Nations, whether acquired by purchase, rental, loan, donation, trust or other means. United Nations-owned equipment (UNOE) is the only mission property that must be entered into the Field Asset Control System and/or Galileo Inventory Management System (FACS/Galileo) and reported to United Nations Headquarters.

#### **Categories of UNOE**

| Categories of UNOE Non-expendable property USD 1,500 or more per unit. Serviceable life of 5 years or more. (photocopiers, major equipment, vehicles, etc)                               | Slide 32 |
|--|----------|
| Attractive or special items Attractive nature between 500 and 1,500 USD and have a useful life expectancy of 5 years or more. (computers, cameras, televisions, facsimile machines, etc) |          |
| <b>Expendable property</b> less than USD 1,500, or more than USD 1,500 but with a serviceable life of less than 5 years. (toner cartridges, consumables, etc)                            |          |

- Categories of UNOE The United Nations defines property in the following categories in accordance with Administrative Instruction ST/Al/374: nonexpendable, attractive/special items, and expendable property.
  - Non-expendable property consists of items of property or equipment valued at USD 1,500 or more per unit at the time of purchase and with a serviceable life of5 years or more.
  - Attractive or special items are items of an attractive nature that are normally worth between USD 500 and USD 1,500 and have a useful life expectancy of 5 years or more.
  - **Expendable property** consists of property and equipment that originally cost less than USD 1,500, as well as items with an original cost of more than USD 1,500 but with a serviceable life of less than 5 years. Attractive or special items, as defined above, are excluded from this category.

#### **Personal Property Control**

#### **Personal Property Control**

Selected items of United Nations property that are issued to individual staff members for use in the performance of their official duties are subject to personal property controls.

The categories of military personnel to whom UNOE can be issued are as follows:

- Military Contingent staff
- Military UN Military Observer
- Military FHQ staff officers
- **Personal Property Control** Selected items of United Nations property that are issued to individual staff members for use in the performance of their official duties are subject to personal property controls. The issuance of any nonexpendable, attractive or special item, to an individual staff member, is recorded on a sequentially numbered issue voucher that, when signed, serves as a personal property receipt. The issuing section retains a copy of the voucher and the staff member must also retain a copy. The transaction details will be entered in FACS/Galileo. The categories of military personnel to whom UNOE can be issued are as follows:
  - Military Contingent staff
  - Military UN Military Observer
  - Military FHQ staff officers

#### **Final Clearance**

#### Slide 33

|  | Slide 34 |
|--|----------|
| Final Clearance  |          |
| When a staff is separated from service, reassigned or transferred to |          |
| another location or mission, the staff member must complete the      |          |
| property clearance process to ensure that there are no outstanding   |          |
| property items on loan to the staff member.                          |          |
|  |          |

Final Clearance When a staff is separated from service, reassigned or transferred to another location or mission, the staff member must complete the property clearance process to ensure that there are no outstanding property items on loan to the staff member.

#### **Logistics Planning Considerations**

| Logistics Planning Considerations  | Slide 35 |
|--|----------|
| Mission analysis   |          |
| <ul> <li>Logistic Planning Factors.</li> </ul>                           |          |
| <ul> <li>Determination of Logistic Requirements.</li> </ul>              |          |
| <ul> <li>Sources of Logistic Support.</li> </ul>                         |          |
| <ul> <li>Soliciting Member States for Logistic Contributions.</li> </ul> |          |
| Determination of Logistic Shortfalls                                     |          |

#### **Logistics Planning Considerations**

- Mission analysis defines the operational tasks to be performed and the resulting logistic requirements. Some tasks are specified by the mandate, while others are implied. For example, a specified task might be to disarm opposing factions. This is a c1ear task. The implied tasks, however, may include storage of and accountability for the weapons, destruction procedures, and re-issue procedures. If the mission analysis only notes the specified task, then the resources necessary to perform the implied tasks will be understated. Once the specified and implied tasks are identified, the logistic planner considers the tasks estimated in relation to the environment in which they are to be executed.
- Logistic Planning Factors. They are a listing of relationships between two or more variables, e.g., kgs/man/day, which can be used to plan resource needs

- in detail. If they are not readily available, they should be developed and applied when planning a specific mission
- **Determination of Logistic Requirements**. This is accomplished by applying the logistic planning factors against the tasks outlined in the mission analysis. The gross logistic requirements can then be used by the planner to determine the most efficient and cost effective method of supply and distribution.
- Sources of Logistic Support. The UN will normally obtain logistic support for field operations from four main sources: Member states; UN engaged contractor support (either local or international); UN owned assets; and/or host nations
- Soliciting Member States for Logistic Contributions. Once logistic requirements are known, the UN will solicit member states that possess the required logistic capability to provide all or part of the logistic force necessary. The member states will then indicate what support forces can. be made available.
- **Determination of Logistic Shortfalls.** Once member state contributions are determined, the planner can assess whether any capability shortfalls exist If identified shortfalls cannot be resolved through additional member solicitations or increased host nation or contractor support, the planner should recommend that the operational plan be changed to reflect these differences. Otherwise, the accomplishment of the mission may be in jeopardy.

#### **The Logistic Estimate**

| LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NO  | Slide 36 |
|---|----------|
| <ul> <li>2. FACTORS <ul> <li>a. Geography:</li> <li>b. Non-UN activity</li> <li>c. Tactical Situation.</li> <li>d. Logistics Situation.</li> <li>• Maintenance</li> <li>• Supply.</li> <li>• Services.</li> <li>• Transportation</li> <li>• Facilities and construction.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |          |

| LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NO(Cont)  |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| <ul><li>d. Personnel Situation.</li><li>e. Miscellaneous</li></ul>  |   |  |
| 3. <u>COURSES OF ACTION</u>   |   |  |
| <ul><li>a. Own courses of action (normally given by COO)</li><li>b. Analysis and discussion</li><li>c. Conclusions.</li></ul> |   |  |
| 4. <u>RECOMMENDATION</u>  |   |  |
| CMLO Annexes: Distribution:   |   |  |
| <u>CLASSIFICATION</u>   |   |  |
|   | , |  |

### (A TYPE FORMAT FOR UN LOGISTIC ESTIMATE) <u>CLASSIFICATION</u>

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NO.....

Ref: Maps, relevant documents, etc.

1. BASIS

(Mission, situation, Cdr's planning guidance, etc.)

#### 2. FACTORS

(Data/facts and deductions from these which may affect courses of action)

a. Geography: (Characteristics of the area of operations. Describe the general characteristics of the area of operations emphasizing specific aspects that may affect the logistics effort)

- b. Non-UN activity (Affecting logistics activities. Information should be detailed and oriented toward possible impact on logistics operations, to include what is known about conflicting parties)
- Tactical Situation. Affecting logistic situation. From the commander's C. planning guidance and from the operations office or annex. Subparagraph should be general in nature with concise statement of tactical intentions
- Logistics Situation. Summaries included, overlays, reference to annex, automation systems status, current and proposed locations of CSS activities, expected/available host nation support, and command/support relationships.
  - Maintenance (current capability, critical maintenance systems impact, equipment maintenance priorities.
  - Supply. Provide current overall status of controlled items and POL. comments on resupply availability and use terms such as days of supply, total line items, or total equipment shortages by unit. (Class I. water, ice, sundry packs, Class II, Class III, Industrial gases, Class IV, Class V, Class VI, Class VII, Class VIII, Class IX, Class X, Maps (unclassified).
  - Services. Provide current status, both capabilities and problems, Mortuary affairs.
  - Transportation (present status, current capabilities, problems, unusual transport distances, highway and trafficability conditions, terrestrial, aerial and maritime operations)
  - Facilities and construction. (provide present situation, status, restrictions, priority of effort, standards)
- Personnel Situation. (From the personnel officer. Include information on d. total strength, strength of units, factors for casualties, replacements, hospital returnees, etc.)
- Miscellaneous (diplomatic relations, religious and ethnological matters affecting the use, deployment and supply of units, etc)

#### 3. **COURSES OF ACTION**

- a. Own courses of action (normally given by COO)
- Analysis and discussion (advantages and disadvantages of each course of action from a logistic stand-point indicating problems and deficiencies. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each course of action)

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c. Conclusions.(Indicate whether the mission stated above can be logistically supported, indicate which course(s) of action can best be logistically supported, list the major logistics deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations concerning the methods of elimination or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

#### 4. <u>RECOMMENDATION</u>

(The logistic feasibility of the operation, and preferred course of action from a logistic stand-point).

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|               | CMLO           |
|---------------|----------------|
| Annexes:      |                |
| Distribution: |                |
|               | CLASSIFICATION |



#### **Learning Activity: United Nations Logistics at work Exercise: logistic estimate**

In this an exercise with a military scenario, participants are required to be exercised in the preparation of the logistic estimates and prepare the briefing on its conclusions/recommendations to put into practice the related material presented in SO STM Module 3



Participants should be provided with the Carana Scenario background, current situation, special idea and maps at reasonable time ahead of the lesson to enable them prepare adequately for it.




#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|             | 05 minutes | Activity introduction and instructions |
|-------------|------------|--|
|             | 20 minutes | Syndicate discussion                   |
|             | 05 minutes | Debrief in syndicates                  |
|             | 15 minutes | Debrief in the plenary group           |
| Total time: | 45 minutes |  |

| Learning Activity: United Nations Logistics at work Exercise: logistic estimate |            |  | Slide 38 |
|---|------------|--|----------|
| Learning Activity Time Required:  |            |  |          |
|   |            |  |          |
|   | 05 minutes | Activity introduction and instructions |          |
|   | 20 minutes | Syndicate discussion                   |          |
|   | 05 minutes | Debrief in syndicates                  |          |
|   | 15 minutes | Debrief in the plenary group           |          |
| Total time:   | 45 minutes |  |          |

#### Medical support in the field

- The Medical Support System In most peacekeeping missions two different medical systems work together with different degrees of integration from mission to mission. Medical personnel can be uniformed, international civilian, United Nations Volunteers or locally employed specialists or staff.
- There is a clear command structure within a peacekeeping force, with the most senior military medical officer in the Mission, the Force Medical Officer (FMedO), subordinated directly to the Force Commander (FC) or the designated Head of Mission. The FMedO acts on behalf of the Force Commander on all medical matters and controls all UN field medical units providing Force-wide coverage. He also exercises professional supervision over organic medical units attached to their national contingents, which remain under the command of their respective Unit Commanders. Similarly, he seeks professional supervision from the Medical Services Division (MSD) and Medical Support Unit (MSU) at UN HQ on policy and operational matters respectively. These agencies work closely to ensure effective medical support for the Mission.
- Where a Chief Civilian Medical Officer (CCMO) is available, he/she answers to the Director or Chief of Mission Support and has ultimate responsibility for all clinical services in the mission – except for the COE Level 1 facilities discussed below. The CCMO has no authority in the military chain of command but offers support to the FMedO where relevant to facilitate optimal functioning of the TCC based part of the mission medical system.



#### Levels of Medical care in the field

| Levels of Medical care in the field                                      | Slide 40 |
|--|----------|
| Basic Level  |          |
| <ul> <li>Primary Care (Level One)</li> </ul>                             |          |
| <ul> <li>Hospital care (Level two)</li> </ul>                            |          |
| <ul> <li>Hospital care (Level three)</li> </ul>                          |          |
| <ul> <li>Tertiary/Out of Mission Medical Support (Level four)</li> </ul> |          |
|  |          |

- Levels of medical support for UN peacekeeping missions have been standardized. This is necessary to ensure that the highest standards of medical care is provided to peacekeepers, particularly as medical units and personnel can come from different countries with varying standards of medical care. These levels are as follows:
- Basic Level. This effectively refers to basic First Aid and preventive medicine practised at the smallest sub-unit level. As there is no doctor present, care is provided by the peacekeeper, or by a trained paramedic or nurse, using basic medical equipment and supplies.

| Primary Care (Level One)   |  | Slide<br>41 |
|--|--|-------------|
| TREATMENT CAPABILITY   | TREATMENT CAPACITY                                 |             |
| Treatment of common illnesses  | - Treatment of 20 ambulatory patients per day      |             |
| <ul><li>2. Advanced life support</li><li>- airway maintenance</li><li>- ventilation</li><li>- haemorrhage control</li><li>- treatment of shock and dehydration</li></ul> | - Holding capacity of 5 patients for up to 2 days  |             |
| 3. Trauma management - fracture immobilisation - wound & burns management - infection control- analgesia   | - Medical supplies & consumables for up to 60 days |             |
| Minor surgery     Casualty evacuation  |  |             |
| 6. Preventive medicine   |  |             |

**Primary Care (Level One).** This is the first level where a doctor is available and may be either a COE or UNOE facility. It provides first line primary health care, emergency resuscitation, stabilization and evacuation of casualties to the next level of medical care within a peacekeeping mission. A schematic representation of a Level

Module 3: UN Logistics at work Pg. 36

| TREATMENT CAPABILITY   | TREATMENT CAPACITY                                 |
|--|--|
| Treatment of common illnesses  | - Treatment of 20 ambulatory patients per day      |
| <ul><li>2. Advanced life support</li><li>- airway maintenance</li><li>- ventilation</li><li>- haemorrhage control</li><li>- treatment of shock and dehydration</li></ul> | - Holding capacity of 5 patients for up to 2 days  |
| 3. Trauma management - fracture immobilisation - wound & burns management - infection control- analgesia   | - Medical supplies & consumables for up to 60 days |
| 4. Minor surgery   |  |
| 5. Casualty evacuation   |  |
| 6. Preventive medicine   |  |

Hospital Care (Level Two). Again, this services may be provided by COE or UNOE (contingent staffed facilities) and have mission-wide responsibilities. It is the next level of medical care and the first level where surgical expertise and facilities are available. The mission of a Level Two medical facility is to provide second line health care, emergency resuscitation and stabilization, limb and life-saving surgical interventions, basic dental care and casualty evacuation to the next echelon.

| Hospital Care (Level Two)  |  |   |  |
|--|--|---|--|
| TREATMENT CAPABILITY TREATMENT CAPACITY  |  |   |  |
| Treatment of common medical conditions   | - Up to 40 outpatient visits per day           |   |  |
| 2. Triage  | - 3 to 4 major surgeries per day               |   |  |
| 3. Advanced life-support and intensive care  | - 10 to 20 in- patients for up to 7 days each  |   |  |
| 4. Life and limb-saving surgery under anaesthesia  | - 5 to 10 dental treatments per day            |   |  |
| 5. Pharmacy  | - 10 x-rays and 20 laboratory tests per day    |   |  |
| 6. Basic dental care   | - Medical supplies and consumables for 60 days |   |  |
| 7. Basic laboratory facility - Blood group & cross matching - Hematology - Gram staining |  |   |  |
| - Blood film<br>- Urin analysis  |  |   |  |
| 8. Basic diagnostic radiography  |  |   |  |
| Hygiene control and preventive medicine  |  |   |  |
| 10. Casualty evacuation to Level 3 or 4  |  | ] |  |

|   | ·  |
|---|--|
| TREATMENT CAPABILITY                    | TREATMENT CAPACITY                       |
| Treatment of common medical             | - Up to 40 outpatient visits per day     |
| conditions                              |  |
| 2. Triage                               | - 3 to 4 major surgeries per day         |
| 3. Advanced life-support and intensive  | - 10 to 20 in- patients for up to 7 days |
| care                                    | each                                     |
| 4. Life and limb-saving surgery under   | - 5 to 10 dental treatments per day      |
| anaesthesia                             |  |
| 5. Pharmacy                             | - 10 x-rays and 20 laboratory tests per  |
|   | day                                      |
| 6. Basic dental care                    | - Medical supplies and consumables for   |
|   | 60 days                                  |
| 7. Basic laboratory facility            |  |
| - Blood group & cross matching          |  |
| - Hemotology                            |  |
| - Gram staining                         |  |
| - Blood film                            |  |
| - Urinanalysis                          |  |
| 8. Basic diagnostic radiography         |  |
| 9. Hygiene control and preventive       |  |
| medicine                                |  |
| 10. Casualty evacuation to Level 3 or 4 |  |

Hospital Care (Level Three). This is the highest level of medical care provided by a deployed UN medical unit. It combines the capabilities of Level One and Two units, with the additional capability of providing specialized in-patient treatment and surgery, as well as extensive diagnostic services. It is important to note that a Level Three unit is rarely deployed, and that this level of support is generally obtained from existing civilian or military hospitals within the Mission area or in a neighboring country.

| Hospital Care (Level Three)   |  | Slide<br>43 |
|---|--|-------------|
| TREATMENT CAPABILITY  | TREATMENT CAPACITY                             | 13          |
| All capabilities of Level Two facility. In addition:                      | - Up to 60 outpatient visits per day           |             |
| Specialist consultation services  |  |             |
| Multi-discipline surgical services     - Up to 10 major surgeries per day |  |             |
| 3. Post-operative & intensive care  | - Up to 50 inpatients for up to 30 days each   |             |
| 4. Full laboratory services   | - 10-20 dental treatments per day              |             |
| 5. Diagnostic radiology, ideally with                                     | - 20 x-rays and 40 laboratory tests per        |             |
| ultrasound & CT-scan  | day  |             |
| 6. Pharmacy   | - Medical supplies and consumables for 60 days |             |
| 7. Dental surgery and x-ray   |  |             |

| TREATMENT CAPABILITY                       | TREATMENT CAPACITY                      |
|--|---|
| All capabilities of Level Two facility. In | - Up to 60 outpatient visits per day    |
| addition:                                  |   |
| Specialist consultation services           |   |
| Multi-discipline surgical services         | - Up to 10 major surgeries per day      |
| 3. Post-operative & intensive care         | - Up to 50 inpatients for up to 30 days |
|  | each                                    |
| 4. Full laboratory services                | - 10-20 dental treatments per day       |
| 5. Diagnostic radiology, ideally with      | - 20 x-rays and 40 laboratory tests per |
| ultrasound & CT-scan                       | day                                     |
| 6. Pharmacy                                | - Medical supplies and consumables for  |
|  | 60 days                                 |
| 7. Dental surgery and x-ray                |   |

Tertiary/Out of Mission. A tertiary medical facility provides definitive medical care and specialist medical treatment unavailable or impractical to provide for within a Mission area. This includes specialist surgical and medical procedures, reconstruction, rehabilitation and convalescence. Such treatment is highly specialized and costly, and may be required for a long duration. It is neither practical nor cost-effective for the UN to deploy such a unit within the Mission area. Such services are generally sought in the host country, a neighbouring country, or in the troop contributing country itself. The UN can arrange transfer of a patient or casualty to such a facility, and for reasons of cost, compensation and pension, continues to monitor the patients' progress.

| Tertiary/Out of Mission   | Slide 44 |
|---|----------|
| A tertiary medical facility provides definitive medical care and specialist medical treatment unavailable or impractical to provide for within a Mission area |          |

Casualty treatment and evacuation

Slide 45

#### Casualty treatment and evacuation

**Medical triage** is the categorization of a patient or casualty based on clinical evaluation, for the purpose of establishing priorities for treatment and evacuation.

**Priority 1 (RED: Immediate) Priority 2 (YELLOW: Urgent)** Priority 3 (GREEN: Delayed or Hold) **Priority 4 (BLACK: Expectant or Deceased)** 

- **Medical triage** is the categorization of a patient or casualty based on clinical evaluation, for the purpose of establishing priorities for treatment and evacuation. This facilitates the effective use of limited medical resources and ensures the survival of the greatest possible number in a multiple casualty scenario. The UN recommends adopting a 4-category triage nomenclature based on the severity of the medical condition and urgency for treatment.
  - **Priority 1 (RED: Immediate)**. This category has the highest priority for treatment or evacuation, as urgent resuscitative interventions are required to ensure survival of the casualty or patient. Examples include airway obstruction, respiratory emergencies, shock and severe trauma. It is likely that such cases will die within 2 hours or earlier, in the absence of appropriate medical treatment.
  - Priority 2 (YELLOW: Urgent). This comprises cases that require early treatment, particularly surgery, and it is recommended that evacuation to a surgical facility take place within 6 hours of injury. Examples include visceral injury, closed thoracic injury without threatening asphyxia, major limb injuries and fractures, closed head injury, open eye injury and moderate burns.
  - Priority 3 (GREEN: Delayed or Hold). Treatment is less urgent in this category and can be deferred if there are other casualties requiring limited treatment or evacuation assets. Examples include simple closed fractures, soft tissue injury, closed chest injury and maxillaryfacial injury.
  - Priority 4 (BLACK: Expectant or Deceased). This category refers to casualties whose injuries or illnesses are so serious that they have minimal chances of survival or who are dead on arrival. Should there be competition for limited medical resources, such cases will have

lower priority for evacuation or treatment, despite the severity of their condition. Examples include brain-stem death and terminal illness.

| Medical Evacuation and Repatriation  | Slide 46 |
|--|----------|
| <ul><li>Casualty Evacuation (Casevac).</li><li>Medical Evacuation (Medevac).</li><li>Medical Repatriation.</li></ul> |          |

- Medical Evacuation and Repatriation Medical evacuation is a mission responsibility shared between the FMedO and the CCMO. The doctor responsible for treating the patient initiates the evacuation. The responsibility for planning and establishing an effective medical evacuation system lies with the planning staff in DPKO and the administration and medical staff in the Mission area. The CCMO liaises with UNHQ Medical Services Division for all matters relating to external AeroMedical Evacuations (AME). The FMedO coordinates in-theatre evacuation activities, with the support of the Mission administration and the guidance of the Medical Services Division. Details of the evacuation plan are to be included within every Mission's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The FMedO is responsible for SOP, planning and keeping a roster of uniformed medical personnel to use as escorts for evacuations. Except in actual evacuations, which are the responsibility of the CCMO, the FMedO has technical and operational control over the AME Team.
- There are three categories of patient or casualty transfer, these being:
  - Casualty Evacuation (Casevac). Evacuation of a casualty from the site of injury to the closest medical facility, which should ideally be conducted within 1 hour of injury.
  - Medical Evacuation (Medevac). Evacuation of a casualty between two medical facilities, either within the Mission area (in-theatre) or out of it (out-of-theatre). The casualty may either return to duty (RTD) within the time-frame stipulated in the holding policy, or be repatriated.
  - Medical Repatriation. Return of a patient or casualty to his homecountry because of medical reasons, following which he would be unlikely to return to duty.
- Frequently Asked Questions

Slide 47

| Frequently | asked | questions |
|------------|-------|-----------|
|------------|-------|-----------|

- Will the United Nations provide me with uniforms?
- What about my welfare?
- How do I send letters home to my family?
- How much equipment and/or luggage may I take on deployment or rotation flights?
- What about medical services in the mission area?

#### Will the United Nations provide me with uniforms?

- No, because the United Nations pays your country US\$ 73 monthly to provide you with clothing and equipment. The Organization does, however, provide you with a few items of clothing that identify you as a United Nations peacekeeper. They are
  - 1 blue beret
  - 1 blue field cap
  - 1 metal hat badge
  - 6 cloth shoulder patches
  - 2 olive drab armlets
  - 2 United Nations blue scarves.

#### What about my welfare?

- Welfare normally is a national responsibility and a full-time staff officer for welfare is included in each contingent. Canteen stores are also a national responsibility. Nonetheless, such provisions depend on the MOU between your country and the United Nations.
- How do I send letters home to my family?
- The United Nations normally provides you with the means to send up to five letters per week at no cost to yourself.
- How much equipment and/or luggage may I take on deployment or rotation flights?
- The maximum total weight including your personal military gear is normally 45 kilograms.
- What about medical services in the mission area?
- United Nations medical support aims to provide you with a standard of medical care in peace operations that approaches the level available in times of peace.

# **Learning Outcome Assessment**

It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written quiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers are provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages.

At the end of the entire unit and/or the conclusion of the STMs instructors may want to choose some of the following questions for review.

#### **Questions**

1. TBD



TBD

# Module 4 Introduction to Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)

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# **Preparatory Notes to Instructors**

#### Introduction

### The evolution of the 'integration' approach

Since the end of the Cold War, PKO were increasingly deployed during or after civil wars. The need therefore arose for the implementation of more complicated mandates in the context of other UN actors' programmes, and the activities of non-UN actors (NGOs, IFIs, etc.). In his report of 14 July 1997 entitled "Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform", the Secretary-General then, indicated that, while the very breadth of the substantive programmes of the United Nations was a great source of its potential institutional strength, the organization was not always able to take advantage of those strengths. This led to further studies into how the organisation can take full advantage these strengths to maximise success.

Findings of a number of peacekeeping, humanitarian and peacebuilding evaluation reports and related research have indicated the need for the United Nations to focus efforts at improving ability to undertake meaningful, coherent, coordinated and sustainable peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi report for example indicated that, a "contemporary peace operations, that combine a wide range of interrelated civilian and military activities (interposition; disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); rule of law; institutional building; humanitarian aid; economic reconstruction; etc.), makes an integrated and coordinated approach a condition of coherence and success". Also, a Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding analysis of 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over a decade identified lack of coherence at the strategic level in what it terms as 'strategic deficit', as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding.

#### The Development of IMPP

The United Nations therefore commissioned a series of high-level panels and working groups to consider the problem by experimenting with a number of strategic and operational coordination models. This culminated into an operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family is integrated into a single country-level UN System referred to as "The Integrated Mission Planning Process" (IMPP) which is to be implemented when the UN undertakes complex peacebuilding missions. The IMPP therefore became the authoritative basis for the planning of all new UN integrated missions.

Thus, the IMPP is a concept where the processes, mechanisms and structures in a mission are generated and sustained with a common strategic objective, and a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, humanitarian, and UN actors at country level.

The IMPP concept is particularly important for planning new multidimensional peace operations and current operations under-going transition, revision, or down-sizing. Although the IMPP tools are used most intensively at mission start-up and during

transition, the planning and tools identified in the IMPP (e.g. HQ-based Task Forces, integrated field coordination structures in the field, integrated strategic frameworks) should be used throughout the life of the mission to "maximize the individual and collective impact of the United Nations' response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace.

#### Aim

The aim of this module is to introduce military staff officers to the basics of the Integrated Mission Planning Process in order to facilitate their participation in its implementation in an integrated United Nations presence.

# **Learning Outcomes**

On completion of this section, participants will:

- Be familiar with the entire progression of the Integrated Mission Planning Process
- Understand the role of the field in process
- Be aware of the role of the headquarters in the process

#### **Training Sequence**

The material contained in this module could be delivered over one or two training units, depending on the number of learning activities the instructor decides to incorporate. The instructor can modify the duration to suit national training requirements and reflect the subject matter comprehension level of the participants/learners.

This module should be delivered in conjunction with or with due attention to the CPTM modules on Mandate Implementation and the Staff Officers STM on Military Component Planning Process.

#### Duration

The times shown below are the minimum recommended time periods. Additional activities and discussions can be added as time permits.

| Minimum Session Time | Lecture/Presentation                       | Questions/Discussion | Session Activities |
|----------------------|--|----------------------|--------------------|
| 125 minutes          | 90 min.                                    | 10 min.              | 25 min             |
| Additional Options   | Mission Specific                           | Optional Film        | Optional Activity  |
| TBD                  | Time to be determined by necessary content |                      |                    |

# **Methodology**

This module contains learning activities to keep adult learners engaged. The facilitation team should use as many of the learning activities as time allows and keep them tailored to the target audience. Participants should be fully involved in the learning process through practical exercises, brainstorming sessions, discussion of case studies, working in small groups on specific tasks, etc.

The instructor should inform participants of content, format and timing. Knowing what to expect, participants can improve their ability to focus on the subject and benefit to a greater extent from the session.

Instructors are highly recommended to distribute the hand-out to participants not later than the day before the session in order to give them the necessary time to prepare for the lesson.

#### **Structure of the presentation:**

- Background
- Key Players and Terminologies
- Planning Phases in an Integrated Presence
- Planning Cycle
- Strategic Assessement
- Integrated Strategic Framework
- Mission Concept
- IMPP in a Mission Start-Up
- Role of the Headquaters
- Role of the Field
- Integration Challenges
- Terms and Definitions

\*Please Note: It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written quiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers be provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages. Instructors are also encouraged to add examples and mission-specific information related to the specific deployment of participants, if available.

#### References

Joint Utstein Study of Peace-building, National Report from Germany Commissioned by the Evaluation Division of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) Eschborn 2003

The Brahimi Report: Four Years On, Proceedings Of A Workshop Held At The Geneva Centre For Security Policy20-21 June 2004

Overview: Integrated Missions Planning Process, UNDPKO/OO General IMPP Briefing Paper January 2010

IMPP: Role of the Field, Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences, January 2010

United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, 13 June 2006

IMPP GUIDELINES: Role of the Field Integrated Strategy and Planning

Guidelines - UN Strategic Assessment, May, 2009

Draft DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Mission Concept, 15 February, 2011

DPKO/ITS Module for Senior Mission Leaders Course

#### **Instructor Profile**

#### **Instructor Preparations**

This module is best presented by a military officer with the requisite UNHQ and field missions experience to share with the group. The instructor should also encourage questions from the participants and aim for an interactive discussion. All participants should be encouraged to contribute to the group discussions, case study discussions and in any other activity.

#### **Required Readings**

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (The Capstone Doctrine)

IMPP: Role of the Field, Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences, January 2010

IMPP GUIDELINES: Role of the Field Integrated Strategy and Planning

United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines 13 June 2006.

Draft DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Mission Concept, 15 February, 2011

Guidelines - UN Strategic Assessment, May 2009

#### **General Preparations**

#### Equipment:

- 1. Computer
- 2. Projector and Screen
- 3. Flip Chart

#### Materials:

- 1. Copies of handouts...etc.
- 2. Power Point presentations

#### **Mission Specific**


If this module is being presented to prepare students for a particular UN peacekeeping mission, Pre-deployment Information Package (PIP) information may be available at the UN DPKO internet website, through 'current operations':

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp). Additional mission specific information is available at the UN DPKO Policy and Training internet website:

http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

# **Symbols Legend**





- Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)
- e.g Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
- Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
- Hand-out (Indicates a hand-out is provided to participants at this point)
- Film (A film that is recommended as a core part of the training or an option)
- Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)



Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit, section or part – as indicated in the text)

Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

# **Session Notes**

# **Introduction to Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)**

Slide 1

Slide 2

"There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment."

(The 2000 Brahimi Report)

Introduce the session with the quotation above or any fitting one of your choice, state the 'Aim" and specify the intended learning outcomes of this lesson, as shown in the slide below. By the end of the session, the participants should be able to answer each of the above points

#### Aim

Slide 3

To introduce military staff officers to the basics of the Integrated Mission Planning Process in order to facilitate their participation in its implementation in an integrated United Nations presence.

Slide 4

# As UN Staff Officer... Why should I know this?

Slide 5

# **Learning Outcomes**

- Be familiar with the entire progression of the Integrated Mission Planning Process
- Comprehend the role of the field in process
- Be aware of the role of the headquarters in the process

# **Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)**

Slide 6

The authoritative basis for planning new multidimensional missions and United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) applying the principles of integration, as well for the revision of existing mission and UNCT plans

# **Some Key Players and Terminologies**

A successful IMPP presumes a functioning Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) at HQ level, and an integrated and dynamic structure at country level that brings together senior management (PKO Section Chiefs, UNCT Heads of Agency, etc.) and technical and operational staff on a regular basis to promote synergies, monitoring of progress, and adjustments to optimize impact. It also presumes the establishment of an Integrated Mission Planning Team to facilitate these processes at country level. Some key players and terminologies used are worth noting. This module also has a glossary of terms and abbreviations used in IMPP.

These terms have been grouped as follows: UN HQ teams and coordination mechanism on the first slide, followed by the field appointment, field coordination mechanisms and field plans and strategies.

# **Integrated Mission Task Force/Integrated Task Force (IMTF/ITF)**

Slide 7

IMTFs are the principal Headquarters-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to 'ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance' (SG's 2008 decision on Integration) to UN presences applying the principles of integration and undertaking the IMPP both before and throughout the deployment of a field mission.

# **Technical Assessment Mission (TAM)**

Slide 8

A type of UN assessment to provide options and recommendations for the (re-)formulation of a Security Council mandate and on the size, scope, tasks and structure of a UN Field Mission.

# **Technical Assessment Mission (TAM)**

Slide9

A type of UN assessment to provide options and recommendations for the (re-)formulation of a Security Council mandate and on the size, scope, tasks and structure of a UN Field Mission.

# **Strategic Assessment**

Slide 10

An internal UN interagency assessment tool to formulate or reformulate UN engagement in a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation.87

# **Integration Steering Group (ISG)**

Slide 11

Group established by 2008 SG decision on Integration to 'help ensure implementation and progress on integration related issues. The ISG consists of the key UN entities and meet at the ASG level on a quarterly basis. It is chaired by USG DPKO

# **Technical Assessment Mission (TAM)**

Slide 12

A technical Assessment Mission is deployed (usually from Headquarters) to make an assessment of the conditions in the country from a technical, as distinct from 'strategic' point of view. Usually the product of a TAM is a TAM report. TAM report usually informs the report of the Secretary General to the UN Security Council for proposals on alterations to the Mission Mandate.

#### Slide 11

#### Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC)

In many but not all integrated and non-integrated presences, the jobs of Resident Coordinator of UN Agencies Funds and Programmes (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) are held by a single individual. In many integrated presences, this individual is also the Deputy SRSG, with this third responsibility earns the title 'triple-hat'.

# **Strategic Policy Group (SPG)**

Field level coordination mechanism composed of SRSG and deputies at the Principals level, responsible for providing strategic direction for integrated planning.

# Slide 12

# **Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT)**

Title given in 2006 guidelines to the coordination body now referred to as ISPT, following 2009 guidelines

#### Slide 13

# **Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT)**

Field level coordination mechanism that translates the strategic direction given by the SPG into concrete deliverables and coordinates implementation. Composed by staff at the senior officer level. It may be advisable to use the term "Joint Strategy Team" for UN presences that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC

# Slide 14

# **Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP)**

The CHAP is a strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region (OCHA website).

# Slide 15

# **Consolidated Appeals Process** (CAP)

The CAP is much more than an appeal for money. It is a tool used by aid organisations to plan, implement and monitor their activities together. Working together in the world's crisis regions, they produce appeals, which they present to the international community and donors (OCHA website).

# **UN Development Assistance Framework** (UNDAF)

The UNDAF is the strategic programme framework for the UN Country Team. It describes the collective response of the UNCT to the priorities in the national development framework - priorities that may have been influenced by the UNCT's analytical contribution. Its high level expected results are called UNDAF outcomes. These show where the UNCT can bring its unique comparative advantages to bear in advocacy, capacity development, policy advice and programming for the achievement of MD/MDG related national priorities (UNDG website).

Slide 17

Instructors are encouraged to explain the roles of these key players and the significance of the terminologies in the IMPP.

# **Background**

#### Background

- 1997 'Renewing the United Nations a Programme for Reform'
- **2000** 
  - Brahimi report: IMTFs (for planning, crisis support)
  - SG Guidance: structural integration (SRSG & DSRSG/RCHC)
- **2006**
- Revised note of guidance on Integration
- Planning Guidelines (IMPP)
- 2008 SG Decision on Integration

■ The 1997 Secretary General (SG) report 'Renewing the United Nations – a Programme for Reform suggested ways for the UN to act 'as one' and 'consolidate the UN presence under one flag' at the country level.

In 2000, there were two significant developments. One was the Brahimi report that provided a number of recommendations on Integration, based on thinking from the late 1990s on improving coherence including the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) that was introduced as a temporary mechanism for planning and crisis management support, and was first applied fully for Afghanistan. Second was the SG note of guidance that launched the 'Structural Integration' model, saying where possible the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian coordinator (RC/HC) will serve as the D/SRSG, and giving the SRSG 'authority and responsibility to establish the political framework for, and provide overarching leadership to, the UN team in country,

within the parameters of the mandate established by the relevant resolution of the Security Council or the General Assembly' and 'providing the impetus for a coordinated and coherent approach by all UN components in the country'. It also points to the central role to be played by OHCHR as "lead agency" on human rights issues, through the provision of expertise, guidance and support to human rights components.

**In 2006**, the SG guidance on integration was updated following a Policy Committee (PC) decision in 2005 that re-affirmed the principle of structural integration. This is reflected in the closer involvement in planning processes to produce 'a clear and shared understanding of priorities and a willingness by all actors to contribute toward the achievement of common objectives.' The note clarified that integration is also about the implementation of a peacebuilding strategy, based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of priorities by means of which the UN system will 'maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict in a 'coherent and mutually supportive manner' The revised guidelines therefore established the IMPP as "the authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of the existing integrated mission plans for all UN departments, offices, agencies, funds, and programmes. The Decision also asked each of the 18 integrated UN presences (the Mission and the UNCT) to have a "shared analytical and planning capacity as well an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) to articulate a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives and an associated set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for tasks critical for peace consolidation.

The 2008 PC decision expanded the scope, established minimum standards, introduced oversight mechanism, and triggered a new set of guidance building on the 2006 IMPP guidance - 2009/10 guidance covering the Strategic Assessment, Responsibility of the Field, and Responsibility of HQ

The 2008 SG decision was followed by the joint endorsement in 2011 by DPKO, OHCHR, DPA and DFS of a Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions, a comprehensive and binding document which provides operational guidance on how human rights are to be integrated into the work of peace missions including in the context of planning processes and with regard to the military component.

# 2008 Policy Committee Decision Slide 19

Reaffirmed integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether those presences are structurally integrated or not.

# **2008 Policy Committee Decision**

# 2008 Policy Committee Decision

Slide 20

Scope

Applied to all missions with UNCT and either multidimensional PKO or Special Political Mission (SPM) in same country

**Purpose** 

To maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace and security based on Strategic Partnership between Mission and UNCT under the lead of SRSG"

#### Slide 21

# 2008 Policy Committee Decision (Cont...)

- **Characteristics**
- Minimum standards: Country level arrangements should include in all cases:
  - A shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives,
  - Closely aligned or integrated planning,
  - A set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and
  - Agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.
  - 'Country level arrangements should respect the specific requirements and circumstances and can take different structural forms', or 'form follows function'
- ISG:

Tracks and supports compliance

I(M)TF:

From planning and crisis support to standing body providing policy quidance and support

The 2008 decision is the latest move in the development of UN Integration policy. It has the following implications;

**Scope** - IMPP applied to all missions with UNCT and either multidimensional PKO or SPM in same country (this brings in DPA led missions).

Purpose - SG and PC stated clearly that the purpose of Integration was no longer simple 'coherence', but is 'maximising collective and individual impact, concentrating on activities required to consolidate peace'. This had been mentioned in 2006, but its implications were not fully explored. It also counters the 'mission centric' tone of earlier IMPP by describing the relationship between the lead department and others as a 'strategic partnership'

#### **Characteristics**

It set minimum standards even though it also conceded that, 'country level arrangements should respect the specific requirements and circumstances and can take different structural forms. It created the Integrated Steering Group (ISG) as the high-level (ASG) body responsible for supporting implementation of Integration decision of 2008. ISG meets quarterly, reporting to the Policy Committee. It develops the Task Force concept from one designed for planning to one designed to provide ongoing guidance and support

# **The Planning Process**

# **The Planning Process**

Slide 22

May be triggered by:

- Deliberations in the UN Security Council (UNSC)
- Recommendation of Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)
- Development of PBC or PBSO of overarching strategy
- Negotiation or signing of peace agreement with international community and UN implications

There are different factors that may trigger the IMPP process, depending on the international, regional and national response to a crisis, including:

- Deliberations in the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the possibility of UNSCmandated peacekeeping operation;
- A recommendation of Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), or a request by a Member State or regional organization to consider possible options including a peacekeeping operation
- The development of PBC or PBSO of overarching strategy for UN peacebuilding keeping
- The negotiation or signing of peace agreement with implications for the international community and the UN

# Stages and Levels of the Planning Process

| Stages and Levels of              | the Planning Process            |   |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| STAGE                             | LEVEL                           | 7 |
| 1. Advance Planning               | 1.1 Advance Planning            |   |
| _                                 | 1.2 Foundation Planning         |   |
| 2. Operational Planning           | 2.1 Operational Planning        | 1 |
|                                   | 2.2 Implementation planning     |   |
| 3. Review and transition planning | 3.1 Continuation planning       |   |
|                                   | 3.2 Transition to exit planning |   |

The integration process is planned in three stages with each stage having two levels as indicated on the table above. During the Advance Stage, the IMTF develops the Strategic Assessment, the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), the initial Results Based Budgeting, and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or the Mission Concept. The Operational Planning Stage entails the development of the operational plan and further development of the Results Based Budgeting, and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or the Mission Concept. The Review and Transition Planning Stage deals with the continuous monitoring, update, and revision of mission plan as well as planning the exit strategy.

#### THE PLANNING PROCESS

#### THE ADVANCE STAGE

| LEVEL                         | Objective   | Responsibili<br>ty  | Key Outputs   | Phase   | Time frame                                      |
|-------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1<br>Advance<br>Planning    | Develop a<br>strategic<br>assessment of<br>UN peace<br>support<br>objectives. | IMTF with<br>designated<br>focal points<br>from UNCT<br>and RC/HC | <ul> <li>Strategic Assessment</li> <li>SG Strategic Planning<br/>Directive</li> <li>IOT compile draft<br/>mission concept (MC)</li> </ul> | Commences with<br>SG's decision to<br>initiate IMPP and<br>ends with SG<br>Planning Directive | Strategic<br>Assessment<br>within four<br>weeks |
| 1.2<br>Foundation<br>Planning | Develop a comprehensive concept of  | IMTF in consultation with RC/HC                                   | <ul><li>USG planning directive</li><li>Elaboration of ISF</li><li>Joint transition plan</li></ul>   | Commences with USG's planning directive and ends  | 3-6 weeks                                       |

| operations and initiate a results and resource planning | <ul> <li>MC is basis for detailed planning</li> <li>Draft mission budget</li> <li>Report of the SG</li> </ul> | with SG report to UN Security Council |
|---|---|---------------------------------------|
|---|---|---------------------------------------|


### **OPERATIONAL PLANNING STAGE**

| 2.1<br>Operational<br>Planning        | Develop fully-<br>costed draft<br>mission plan,<br>transfer planning<br>responsibilities to<br>mission. | IMTF and<br>mission<br>planning<br>teams/leader<br>ship | <ul> <li>IOT continue<br/>development of<br/>MC</li> <li>Mission budget<br/>report</li> <li>Directive to the<br/>SRSG</li> </ul> | Commences with UN Security Council authorization for PKO and ends with the Directive to the SRSG    | 3-6 weeks |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|--|---|-----------|
| 2.2<br>Implement<br>ation<br>planning | Ensure transfer of operational planning responsibilities from IMTF to PKO                               | Joint PKO<br>and UNCT<br>planning<br>team               | <ul> <li>Establishment<br/>of IMP team</li> <li>MC is<br/>transferred from<br/>IOT to SRSG</li> </ul>                            | Commences with<br>an exercise at<br>country level and<br>ends with the<br>finalized mission<br>plan | 2-3 weeks |

### **REVIEW AND TRANSITION PLANNING STAGE**

| 3.1<br>Continuation<br>planning       | Ensure<br>flexibility of<br>mission plan                    | IMP team with IMTF | <ul><li>Periodic reviews</li><li>Monitoring and update</li></ul>   | Commences with adoption of mission plan and lasts until reconfigure the mission or exit strategy               | Length of the mission           |
|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------|--|--|---------------------------------|
| 3.2 Transition<br>to exit<br>planning | Provide<br>framework for<br>transition and<br>exit planning | IMPT with<br>IMTF  | <ul> <li>Revised USG's planning directive</li> <li>Report of SG</li> <li>Revised mission plan</li> <li>Revised SRSG Directive</li> </ul> | Commences following<br>SG decision to<br>transition and end with<br>revised SRSG directive<br>and mission plan | No time<br>frame<br>established |

**Planning Cycle - Integrated Presence** 



- An integrated UN presence is a mission to which the principle of integration applies. This includes both structurally integrated field missions (e.g., UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/head of Mission) such as MONUSCO or UNMIL as well as missions that are not structurally integrated but to which the principles of integration still applies (e.g., UNPOS).
- Once a mission is up and running, an ITF or IMTF could call for a Strategic Assessment, especially if there are drastic changes in the situation and/or if there is a joint recognition that the UN"s strategic vision in a given country needs to be reformulated. However, more generic assessment tools, such as TAMs, are generally used after a mission is established.

# **Strategic Assessment**


#### **Strategic Assessment**

- HQ-led UN system-wide assessment to formulate or reformulate UN strategic engagement in countries where conflict is present, imminent or could recur
- Contains
  - Analysis
  - UN priorities
  - Strategic options
- Can be requested by
  - HQ: SG, member of Policy Committee or ECPS
  - Field: Task Force, HoM, Mission planning team, UNCT
- Led by Integrated Task Force

Desk review, field visit, report to PC

A Strategic Assessment conducted by the Secretariat to devise concrete recommendations to the Secretary-General on how the UN system could formulate or re-formulate its response to a crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situation. It is mostly applied to situations where there is no current UN peacekeeping operation or political mission/office. It may also be applied to situations where the existing UN architecture needs adaptation to conform to changed circumstances. It entails analysis and field visit to conflict areas with a view to identifying key conflict factors, priority objectives for the country and the strategic options open to the United Nations.

#### A Typical Sequence for a Strategic Assessment



A Strategic Assessment is managed by the lead Department through the Integrated Task Force (ITF)/Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF). The ITF/IMTF is responsible for the following:

- a. Writing the Terms of Reference
- b. Composing and Fielding the Technical Assessment Team
- c. Managing follow-ups to the mission.

A Strategic Assessment may not necessarily lead to the fielding of a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation and thus, may or may not trigger an IMPP. Where the SC adopts a mandate upon submission of the report, the next phase is directive from USG/DPKO to SRSG and RBB for the mission. Finally the field produces an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).


# **Integrated Strategic Framework**

# ISF Purpose To Establish a Common Set of Agreed Peace Consolidation Priorities

- To Facilitate Shifts in Priorities and/Or Resources as Required
- Allow for Regular Stocktaking by Senior Managers

The primary purpose of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is to reflect the collaborative objectives of the UN system for peace consolidation at the strategic level by bringing together the Mission and the UNCT around a common set of agreed peace consolidation priorities. An ISF is meant to focus the attention of senior managers around a shared set of high-level strategic priorities. An ISF translates into concrete resources and actions, by updating (or developing from scratch where they do not exist) the relevant programmatic elements and/or projects in the RBB, UNDAF, and CAP frameworks to ensure that its objectives are adequately resourced. Thus, an ISF forms the basis for the revision of peace consolidation aims within existing UN system planning tools (e.g. UNDAF, CHAP/CAP, RBB etc).

# **Planning Cycle - Integrated Presence**



- Since most ISFs are drafted and reviewed in existing missions, rather than startups, this slide was created to show the planning cycle for the ISF in an ongoing mission
- When a mandate is adopted, the ISF is drafted on this basis.
- Then the situation may change, either because of a change on the ground or at the Security Council level
- Depending on the magnitude of this change, it may be appropriate to launch a
  Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) or a Strategic Assessment (SA). In the case
  of a SA, this would normally lead to a new SG report and a new mandate. Less
  drastic mandate changes may also stem from the conclusions of a TAM.
- This would then serve as the basis for review of the ISF, which, once complete
  would close the cycle of planning for the ISF.

#### **ISF Minimum Standards**

Slide 29

#### **ISF Minimum Standards**

- Shared Vision and Analysis of the Conflict
  - causes
  - triggers
- Strategic Priorities, Results, Responsibilities, Timelines
  - Overall Approach
  - Identify strategic priority areas
    - Narrative Strategy for Each Strategic Objective
    - Link the ISF and national strategies (as appropriate)
  - Results
  - Timelines
  - Summary results framework

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# **ISF Minimum Standards (Cont...)**

- Strategic Priorities, Results, Responsibilities, Timelines
  - Responsibilities (who does what)
  - Results (at the strategic level)
  - Timelines
- Coordination and Implementation arrangements
- Monitoring and evaluation framework
  - Evaluation Framework
  - Leverage existing data collection and monitoring capacity
  - Provide Scope for Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis
- The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration requires UN field presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT) to have an ISF. The ISF has the following objectives:
- a. Shared Vision and Analysis of the Conflict
  - (1) Situation analysis: This draws on the conflict analysis and current conflict causes and triggers identified in the preparatory phase (or previous Strategic Assessment), may consider divergent trends within the country and reflect risks and assumptions.
  - (2) Description of the *UN's combined mandate and partnerships* in country and expectations regarding its future strategy

- (3) Peace consolidation end state that the UN seeks to achieve over the ISF timeframe (generally longer than the Mission mandate and shorter than a typical multi-year development programming cycle)
- (4) Reference to the ISF development and endorsement process.

#### b. Agreed Results, Timelines, and Responsibilities

- (1) Overall Approach: Scope of the ISF priorities, reasons for the prioritization, role of non-UN actors, link between the ISF and national strategies (as relevant), assumptions/risks/scenarios
- (2) Narrative Strategy for Each Strategic Objective: Each thematic area has a unique narrative explaining what is to be achieved, why it is a priority, how it will be done, and who is/are the responsible leads/co-leads, and risks to achievement.
- (3) Results: Set of results pitched at the strategic level (e.g. using a similar methodology as an UNDAF "outcome" or RBB "expected accomplishment"). Special or joint implementation arrangements may also be presented.
- (4) **Timelines**: explanation of how the strategic objectives and related results will be phased to take into consideration the synergies in the plan (may split results into phases, use critical path methodology, etc)
- (5) **Summary results framework**: A summary of the ISF results framework may also be presented graphically as part of the ISF document.

# c. Coordination and Implementation arrangements


A brief description of coordination, prioritisation, facilitation and implementation arrangements(e.g. visual graphic) and any integrated approaches that bring together the Mission and UNCT mandates and resources to be employed in implementation of the ISF.

### d. Monitoring and evaluation framework

Establishing a mechanism that spells out the frequency of reporting, role of integrated field coordination structures (SPG, ISPT, etc) in reviewing/acting upon monitoring reports, actual reporting format, and Roles and responsibilities in data collection Each ISF must contain a monitoring and evaluation framework when it is presented for endorsement. This monitoring framework should leverage existing data collection and monitoring capacity and experience within the Mission and UNCT (e.g. UNCT Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group, Mission JMAC, RBB performance monitoring reports). Unlike purely quantitative monitoring tools, the ISF's tracking tool should provide scope for quantitative and qualitative analysis. The target audience of the monitoring tool is the senior leadership team and the Strategic Policy Group (or similar), who should review the monitoring reports regularly. As the monitoring tool is designed to be discussed by groups such as the SPG, it is an important tool for promoting teamwork and ensuring mutual accountability for results under the ISF.


The IMPP Working Group track compliance and provide regular status reviews to the Integration Steering Group. This includes quality assurance on the development and implementation of integrated field coordination structures and integrated strategic frameworks. The Integration Steering Group (ISG) will also monitor compliance with these Guidelines and report to the Secretary-General's Policy Committee.


# Scope of ISF




The cross-cutting issues carried out by the peace and security, humanitarian, and development actors are at the heart of the ISF. ISF will primarily be concerned with activities contributing to peace consolidation at the initial stages of the UN presence. This will mean that ISF covers all or a large share of mission activity and so the scope seems weighted towards the peace and security side of the triangle.

|             | Slide 32 |
|-------------|----------|
| ISF : SCOPE |          |







The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. In that regard, a review of current ISFs reveals the following thematic priorities: Security Sector Reform, DDR, Rule of Law, restoration of state authority, Protection of Civilians, recovery (including at the early stage), and basic social services. These issues involve potentially political and necessarily sequenced inputs from number of UN actors and, thus, could benefit from inclusion in an ISF to promote a coherent approach and a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities.

# **Mission Concept**

In peacekeeping missions, operational parameters, statutory basis, managerial practices and budgetary arrangements create the need for an instrument that elaborates the operational implications of their mandates, giving full and authoritative expression to the strategy by which the mission will achieve its objectives. These requirements used to be met by a Mission Plan or Mandate Implementation Plan (MIP). However, with the introduction of Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) as mandatory model for all integrated missions, the MIP is being substituted with Mission Concept to bridge gap between the political level, including SCR and other mandates or UN system-wide level strategic planning such as ISF and the level of mission specific planning processes (ie RBB and military and civilian component plans).

As part of all DPKO-led multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, a Mission Concept is elaborated after the Security Council delivers the mission mandate. The main purpose of the Mission Concept is to provide political and operational direction, timelines and lead/supporting roles for priority activities to achieve the mission's mandate as provided by the Security Council. It should include the mission's priority tasks and related organizational and deployment structure. For any mission start up, the Mission Concept will be developed by the lead department (In case of DPKO, the IOT) in consultation with the IMTF.

# **Mission Concept**

#### **Purpose**

- The requirement to meet the needs of planning process in Missions in which the principle of integration does not apply
- The need to focus planning on mission specific issues in Missions with ISF
- The requirement for a conceptual vision of mission purpose, shape and size needed to support processes at a final stage of the planning cycle

The need to develop the political intent of the new mandate alongside existing mandates and guidance into a coherent Mission strategy to guide component activity

- According to the 2009 IMPP guidelines for Integrated Planning for UN Field presence, when the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) was made mandatory for integrated missions, the requirement for a MIP was eliminated in an effort to streamline planning requirements. However the existence of the ISF would have no effect on the needs of the planning process to which the principle of integration does not apply.
- Since 2009, it has also become clear that missions with ISF still need an instrument to focus planning on mission specific issues from the beginning of the planning cycle (even prior to the initiation of the IMPP). At a latter stage of the planning cycle, a conceptual vision of mission purpose shape and size are also required to support various processes such as Pre-mandate Commitment Authority (PMCA), Technical Assessment Mission (TAM), the inaugural SG report, and the development of military and police CONOPS and operational plans as well as support plans and other mission component plans.
- Following the expression of a mission mandate in a UN SC Resolution, the obligation of RBB and further elaboration of military and civil component require the political intent of the new mandate to be developed alongside existing mandates and guidance into a coherent Mission strategy to guide component activity.

#### **Mission Concept**

#### Scope

- A **vision** to capture and communicate the purpose of the mission
- A **concept** that promotes strategic coherence by ordering mission tasks by sequence and priority
- Timely and detailed direction to guide and enable the planning and operational processes of each component of the mission as well as supporting the implementation of crosscutting issues

The Mission Concept is not a plan but a document with the scope in the slide above. It covers this scope by translating the political intent of mandates and other directives into a form that supports follow-on planning processes (i.e. military or police components planning processes/ CONOPS, Operational plans, component work plans, RBB, etc) and informs directives governing mission structure, reporting and

relations. MC therefore infers, explores, and articulates the operational implications and consequences that other statements of intent will not or cannot mention, but which are needed to plan and implement mandated activities and manage risks.

# **Mission Concept**

#### Slide 37

#### Features

- Articulates the SRSG's Strategic Vision
- Assesses Enabling or Constraining Conditions and their Consequences for Sequencing and Implementation of Tasks
- Sequentially Arrange Priorities for Mandate Implementation within Phases
- Articulates the Mission's CONOPS
- Articulates the Directives to Component Heads

# **Mission Concept (Cont...)**

#### Slide 38


#### Features

- Outlines Instructions and Indicates the Coordination Mechanisms with other Components and Entities in their Planning Process
- Lays out Procedures on Internal and External Relations
- Identifies Strategic Consequences and Assumptions with Regard to Resources
- Identifies the Monitoring and Evaluation Tools for Mission Progress

These features are considered as the basis for the distinctive and complimentary functions of MC in relation to other planning-related processes.

The Relationship between Mission Concept and other Planning Processes

Mission Concept
The Relationship Between Mission Concept and other Planning
Processes




Although the UN is yet to articulate an overall framework that systematically orders the functions and relations of its various planning instruments and processes, the imperatives of avoiding gaps and unproductive duplications in planning puts the MC as one element of the system. It must also be noted that, the concept is under development and is therefore currently (2011) being piloted in two missions (MONUSCO and UNMIT).

# **IMPP** in a Mission Start-Up

- The Integrated Mission Planning Process is among the critical management systems to be established as a priority planning within the mission. It is coordinated by the senior planning officer, under the direction of COS (on behalf of the SRSG/HOM) and with the involvement of the entire SMG and UNCT. The senior planning officer heads a (SPC) that may involve one or more officers. In large integrated missions for example, the SPC generally consists of a senior planning officer (P-5), a planning officer (P-3/P-4) and a coordination officer (P-3/P-4). Mission planners should be dedicated staff who arrive early to the mission and should, ideally, be insulated from day-to-day operations.
- The Mission's SPC works in close cooperation with the Strategic Planner(s) in the UNCT on integration-related strategy and planning. While some missions may decide to establish a structurally-integrated planning unit for this purpose, this is not a requirement. At a minimum, however, both mission and UNCT should identify focal points within their respective planning cells that form part of a shared analytical and planning capacity of the United Nations and have a joint Terms of Reference.

- The shared analytical and planning capacity should benefit from oversight by the senior leadership of both the mission and the UNCT, including the SRSG/HOM. Its core functions should include, among others, to:
  - a. Serve as a secretariat to mission-UNCT integrated planning and coordination bodies.
  - b. Provide support to the development of a UN system-wide integrated strategic framework.
  - c. Work closely with the UNHQ-based Integrated (Mission) Task Force (ITF/IMTF). For example, mission and UNCT planners should participate in ITF/IMTF meetings via teleconferencing facilities and the mission; UNHQ groups should exchange meeting summaries/action points.



Missions start-up, normally follow the sequence of the simple model above with some variations to fit the each context. The areas shaded blue indicate IMPP coordination mechanisms and products. The Integrated Task Force (ITF), a UNHQ based coordination mechanism carries out Strategic Assessment (SA).

#### **Role of the Headquarters**

The main responsibility of the lead Department in implementing the IMPP at the Headquarters level is the management of the Integrated (Mission) Task Force (IMTF/ITF).

#### **Integrated Mission Task Force (I/MTF)**

#### **Integrated (Mission) Task Forces**

#### Purpose

- To serve as an HQ planning body responsible for implementing
- To ensure consistent and coherent support and policy guidance to
- To consider all issues that significance or programmatic impact for the UN presence
- To serve as a decision making body have strategic not just for information sharing

The IMTF/ITF is "established as the formal headquarters-based planning body responsible for implementing the IMPP. IMTFs are therefore, the principal Headquarters-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to "ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to UN presences applying the principles of integration and undertaking the IMPP both before and throughout the deployment of a field mission.

#### **Integrated (Mission) Task Forces**

#### Composition


- Level of senior desk officer, team leader or functional specialist
- key Secretariat and Agency representatives (2+4 formula)
- specialized actors (e.g. WB, Non-UN, NGOs) on an ad hoc basis
- Mission and UNCT field reps. should be included regularly (VTC).

Composition: The IMTF is chaired by a senior representative from the lead UN Department and will consist of representatives from all relevant UN entities, including DPKO.DFS, DPA, PBSO, OHCHR, and DSS, as well as UNDG and ECHA members based on the '2+4' formula. Under this formula, the humanitarian and development actors are represented by OCHA and DOCO, respectively. In addition to these two, four representatives from the UN Funds, Programmes, and Agencies may participate based on their involvement in the country in question.

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An IMTF has an active terms of reference (ToR) outlining its primary responsibilities. It tailors its activities to the situation on the ground and seeks to define its own key deliverables, while taking into consideration that the ToR evolves over time.

#### **HQ-based Task Force Membership**



Field representatives from both the Mission and the UN Country Team are also regularly included in the IMTF/ITF through teleconferencing or video teleconferencing, and the Integration Steering Group have taken decision for the field should co-chair the task force or alternating chairmanship (between HQ and the Field) arrangements should be instituted. IMTF members should participate at the senior officer level and meetings should be held at the Director level, as required.

#### **Role of the IMTF at Mission Start up:**

The IMTF's main role at mission start-up is to undertake the necessary analysis of field missions to produce the key planning products identified in the flow chart below:

|                                       | Slide 44 |
|---------------------------------------|----------|
| Role of the IMTF at Mission Start up: |          |
|                                       |          |



These products include: Planning Directive(s), Commitment Authority (the funding mechanism), Technical Assessment Missions (TAM), The Secretary-General's Report, Mission Concept, Mission Results-Based Budget, and the Directive to the SRSG. The IMTF is consulted on the mission budget (Results Based Budget, RBB), and structure and staffing to ensure complementary programmatic funding and human resources are available in the UN Country Team to achieve UN system objectives as well as avoiding duplication of tasks/capacities, and identifying potential synergies.

#### **Role of IMTF beyond Mission Start-up**

The IMTF remains active once a mission is deployed, but generally meets less frequently and has a more supportive role. At this stage, the IMTF considers relevant policy documents (e.g. Policy Committee papers, Reports of the Secretary-General) that have strategic significance or programmatic impact for the UN presence in the relevant country. The IMTF becomes more active again in mission planning during periods of mandate adjustment, transition planning, and drawdown phases. During these adjustment periods, planning is closely coordinated between the Field and the Headquarters through the IMTF. The IMTF devotes particular attention to programmatic areas of overlap among the peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights, and development components of an integrated mission (e.g. DDR, human rights, rule of law, and early recovery) since experience shows that coordinated operational and resource planning is required for successful outcomes.


#### Role of the Field

- Once a mission becomes fully operational, the primacy of the Integrated Planning effort shifts to the field. In this regard, the main responsibilities of the field missions and UNCTs in the IMPP are to develop and implement:
- a. Integrated field coordination structures (e.g. Strategic Policy Group, Integrated Strategy and Planning Team) and a related
- b. Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) that defines the strategic partnership between the Mission and the UNCT towards joint peace consolidation priorities.

#### **Integrated Field Coordination**

- Each UN field presence should have a standing coordination body or bodies that bring together the Mission and the UNCT to provide strategic direction and planning oversight to the joint peace consolidation efforts of the UN field presence. These coordination bodies assist with the requirement in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) for the development and implementation of an effective strategic partnership between the UN mission and UNCT to "ensure that all components of the UN mission/office and the Country Team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner." The field-based integrated field coordination structures also serve as partners to headquarters-based IMPP structures, in particular the Integrated (Mission) Task Forces (IMTF/ITFs)
- As far as human rights integration at field level is concerned, human rights components and military peacekeepers are required to work closely together and develop dedicated mechanisms and procedures to facilitate cooperation. Areas of cooperation include for instance information sharing, early warning on signs of impending violence and planning on immediate and long-term strategies to prevent and respond to upsurges of human rights violations. In addition, staff officers are required to ensure that instructions and procedures are in place from the onset of a peace operation to guide peacekeepers' action when confronted with human rights violations (In line with DPKO/OHCHR/DPA and DFS Policy on Human Rights).

#### Field based coordination mechanism



- +Y A role play using mission specific examples among the participants is recommended.
  - The joint analysis and planning capacity provides a commonly agreed set of data, assessments and assumptions that serve as a basis for integrated planning.

- The field level coordination called SPG is led by a senior management group headed by the SRSG. It is a forum to bring together the mission senior management team with the UNCT (on a roughly equal footing). They discuss and agree on strategic guidance for the Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT), including overall vision for the UN purpose and priority areas contributing to peace consolidation.
- In multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations a Principals-level Strategic Policy Group and a senior working level ISPT may be considered. In smaller integrated peacebuilding environments, a Strategic Policy Group (SPG) may be sufficient. In many cases, existing coordination bodies of either the Mission or UNCT may be leveraged to create integrated field coordination structures. Moreover, the thematic working groups will often be utilized to coordinate development and implementation of joint strategies.
- Integrated field coordination structures should be supported by a "shared analytical and planning capacity" to facilitate and support joint strategic planning exercises. Dedicated strategic planning resources are provided to Resident Coordinators through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO). On the Mission side, planning capacity is budgeted through the Results Based Budgeting process. Although some UN field presences may decide to create a structurally-integrated planning unit, this is not a requirement. The Mission and UNCT strategic planners must have a shared understanding of their purpose, core tasks, the composition of the team, and the organization of work. This joint understanding should be captured in a Terms of Reference that is developed under the direction of the senior leadership team and/or integrated field coordination structures.
- The configuration and composition of integrated field coordination mechanisms will vary from country to country based on the scale of the UN's operations and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required in keeping with the principle of "form follows function". Regardless of their configuration, the coordination architecture should fulfil key functions at the strategic, coordination, and planning levels. Furthermore, regardless of their configuration, there is a requirement that heads of human rights components always be part of senior decision, policy and strategy making bodies so as to duly integrate human rights in the senior management of peace operations and political missions
- At this stage, the instructor should emphasise the fact that although IMPP has been rolled out, it is still evolving and therefore has some teething challenges which are being systematically handled at appropriate levels.

#### **Some Integration Challenges**

|                        | Slide 46 |
|------------------------|----------|
| Integration Challenges |          |

- Differences in Institutional Culture and Incentives
- Recent Trends Towards Greater Fragmentation
- Challenges Posed by Active Conflict Situations(Particularly Humanitarian Space)
- A Continuing Lack of Understanding and Knowledge and Uneven Implementation of Integration Policies
- Diverging Expectations, Perceptions and Institutional Differences Among Secretariat Departments, Missions, UN Agencies and Member States
- Support Related Issues, Different Administrative, Personnel, and Finance Rules and Systems for Missions and UNCT Members
- Inherent Structural Limitations.
- Differences in institutional culture and organisational incentives especially in a complex structure like the United Nations presence are difficult to handle especially at this teething stage of the IMPP concept. Also recent trends within the UN and among its many partners have been towards greater fragmentation, coupled with the increasing rate of the already large number of actors active in the conflict and post-conflict space than ten or more years ago pose enormous challenge.
- Furthermore, Integration in active conflict situations especially where there is lack of understanding and knowledge, and uneven implementation of integration policies, both at HQ and in the field is very challenging. This breeds divergent expectations, perceptions and compounds institutional differences among Secretariat departments, missions, UN agencies and Member States.
- Additionally, inherent structural limitations beyond the remit of the ISG (and the Policy Committee) and support related issues, including different administrative, personnel, and finance rules and systems for missions and UNCT remain major obstacles to effective integration.



# Learning Activity (Integrated Mission Planning Process) Instructor's Guidelines

In this learning activity, participants are required to be exercised on the usefulness of some key IMPP documents in their staff work at the Force and Sector Hqs.

#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|             | 5 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions      |
|-------------|------------|---|
|             | 10 minutes | Syndicate discussions                       |
|             | 10 minutes | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |
| Total time: | 25 minutes | *total time dependent number of groups      |

| Learning Activity (Integrated Mission Planning Process) |                 |  | Slide 47 |
|---|-----------------|--|----------|
| Learning A  | ctivity Time Re | quired:                                |          |
|   | E minutos       | Activity introduction and instructions |          |
|   | 5 minutes       | Activity introduction and instructions |          |
|   | 10 minutes      | Syndicate discussions                  |          |
|   | 10 minutes      | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per       |          |
|   |                 | syndicate)                             |          |
| Total   | 25 minutes      | *total time dependent number of        |          |
| time:   |                 | groups                                 |          |

### **Handout Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations**

IMPP (Integrated Mission Planning Process) the authoritative basis for planning new multidimensional missions and UNCTs applying the principles of integration, as well for the revision of existing mission and UNCT plans

Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): "...the authoritative basis for planning new multidimensional missions and UNCTs applying the principles of integration, as well for the revision of existing mission and UNCT plans". Established in 2006 and updated in the 2009-2010 guidance, this is the process guiding UN system-wide planning in countries where the principle of integration applies, i.e. where there is both a UN Country Team and either a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or a special political mission/office.

Integrated Mission Generally refers to structurally integrated field missions, e.g. UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/Head of Mission. However, structural integration is no longer the key trigger for applying an "integrated approach" as required by the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008). Rather, the collaborative principles of integration are to be applied in UN field presences with a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office working alongside a UN Country Team.

Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF): This mandatory planning instrument in all integrated presences is a short (15-20 page) document embodying the main elements of the Secretary General's Policy Committee decision of 2008 on integration

**SA** (Strategic Assessment) - An activity conducted by the Secretariat to devise concrete recommendations to the Secretary-General on how the UN system could formulate or re-formulate its response to a crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situation.

Strategic Assessment: An internal UN interagency assessment tool to formulate or reformulate UN engagement in a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation.

**SMG** (Senior Management Group)

**UNCT** (United Nations Country Team)

**SRSG** (Senior representative of the Secretary General)

**HOM** (Head of Mission)

**OHCHR** (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). OHCHR relations with DPKO, DPA and DFS in the context of peace operations and political missions are governed by the 2005 SG Decision on human rights in integrated missions and the DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions (September 2011), which among others provides guidance on how the military and other mission components are required to promote and protect human rights through their work

**SPC** (Strategic Planning Cell)

**SPM** (Special Political Mission)

**SPG** (Strategic Policy Group)

**ITF** (Integrated Task force)

**IMTF** (Integrated Mission Task Force) Integrated Task Force/Integrated Mission Task Force (ITF/IMTF): "A Headquarter-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to UN presences applying the principles of integration".50 The task forces for DPA-led missions are called ITF, whereas those for DPKO-led missions are called IMTFs. While they are Headquarters-based, their membership extends to field counterparts in the mission and the UNCT.

**Integrated UN presence**: An integrated UN presence is a mission to which the principle of integration applies51. This includes both structurally integrated field missions (e.g., UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/head of Mission)52 such as MONUSCO or UNMIL as well as missions that are not structurally integrated but to which the principles of integration still applies (e.g., UNPOS).

Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF): This is a mandatory planning instrument in all integrated presences. It is a15-20 page document embodying the collaborative objectives of the UN system for peace consolidation at the strategic level by bringing together the Mission and the UNCT around a common set of agreed peace consolidation priorities. An ISF is meant to focus the attention of senior managers around a shared set of high-level strategic priorities. It also defines the strategic partnership between the Mission and the UNCT towards joint peace consolidation priorities.

**ISPT** (Integrated Strategy and Planning Team)

**ISG** (Integration Steering Group)

**DPA** (Department of Political Affairs)

**RC** (Resident Coordinator)

**HC** (Humanitarian Coordinator)

**TAM** (Technical Assessment Mission) A type of UN assessment to provide options and recommendations for the (re-)formulation of a Security Council mandate and on the size, scope, tasks and structure of a UN Field Mission.

**CHAP** (Common Humanitarian Action Plan)

**CAP** (Consolidated Appeals Process)

**UNDAF** (UN Development Assistance Framework)

**PRSP** (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper)

Mission Concept (MC): In peacekeeping missions, operational parameters, statutory basis, managerial practices and budgetary arrangements create the need for an instrument that elaborates the operational implications of their mandates, giving full and authoritative expression to the strategy by which the mission will achieve its objectives. These requirements used to be met by a Mission Plan or Mandate Implementation Plan (MIP). However, with the introduction of Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) as mandatory model for all integrated missions, the MIP is being substituted with Mission Concept to bridge gap between the political level, including SCR and other mandates or UN system-wide level strategic planning such as ISF and the level of mission specific planning processes (ie RBB and military and civilian component plans). As part of all DPKO-led multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions. a Mission Concept is elaborated after the Security Council delivers the mission mandate. The main purpose of the Mission Concept is therefore to provide political and operational direction, timelines and lead/supporting roles for priority activities to achieve the mission's mandate as provided by the Security Council. It should include the mission's priority tasks and related organizational and deployment structure. Thus the MC grows out of a strategic process that translates the political intent of mandates and other higher directives into a form that supports follow-on planning processes like the Operational planning Process (OPP) at DPKO/OMA and the MCPP in the mission.

**Pre-mandate Commitment Authority (PCMA):** The sources of budgetary support available to the Secretary-General of the UN to establish or expand a peacekeeping operation or Special Political Mission. Certain conditions govern the use of the PMCA, which may include (depending on circumstances) approval from the **ACABQ** or notification of the President of the Security Council.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ): A 16 member subsidiary organ of the General Assembly (appointed by the Assembly in their individual capacity) that examines and reports on the budget submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. The committee also advises the General Assembly on administrative and budgetary matters referred to it. Additionally, it examines the administrative budgets of the specialised agencies as well as report on the Auditors' Reports on the accounts of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies to the General Assembly.

**Results-based budgeting (RBB)**: A budgeting process in which a set of predefined objectives and expected results would justify resource requirements. The actual performance in achieving the expected results is measured by some objective performance indicators.

#### **Handout IMPP Overview**

Since the end of the Cold War, PKO were increasingly deployed during or after civil wars. The need therefore arose for the implementation of more complicated mandates in the context of other UN actors' programmes, and the activities of non-UN actors (NGOs, IFIs, etc.). In his report of 14 July 1997 entitled "Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform", the Secretary-General indicated that, while the very breadth of the substantive programmes of the United Nations was a great source of its potential institutional strength, the organization was not always able to take advantage of those strengths. This led to further studies into how the organisation can take full advantage these strengths to maximise success.

Findings of a number of peacekeeping, humanitarian and peacebuilding evaluation reports and related research indicated the need for the United Nations to focus efforts at improving ability to undertake meaningful, coherent, coordinated and sustainable peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi report for example indicated that, a "contemporary peace operations, that combine a wide range of interrelated civilian and military activities (interposition; disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); rule of law; institution building; humanitarian aid; economic reconstruction; etc.), makes an integrated and coordinated approach a condition of coherence and success".

The United Nations therefore commissioned a series of high-level panels and working groups to consider the problem by experimenting with a number of strategic and operational coordination models. This culminated into an operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family is integrated into a single country-level UN System referred to as "The Integrated Mission Planning Process" (IMPP) which is to be implemented when the UN undertakes complex peacebuilding missions. The IMPP is therefore the authoritative basis for the planning of all new UN integrated missions.

Thus, the IMPP is a concept where the processes, mechanisms and structures in a mission are generated and sustained with a common strategic objective, and a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, humanitarian, and UN actors at country level.

The IMPP concept is particularly important for planning new multidimensional peace operations and current operations under-going transition, revision, or down-sizing. Although the IMPP tools are used most intensively at mission start-up and during transition, the planning and tools identified in the IMPP (e.g. HQ-based Task Forces, integrated field coordination structures in the field, integrated strategic frameworks) should be used throughout the life of the mission to "maximize the individual and collective impact of the United Nations' response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace.

#### **Handout Stages and Levels of the Planning Process**

| STAGE                                      | LEVEL                                    | Objective  | Responsib ility   | Key Outputs  | Phase  | Time<br>frame                                       |
|--|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| 1.<br>Advance<br>Planning                  | 1.1<br>Advance<br>Planning               | Develop a<br>strategic<br>assessment of<br>UN peace<br>support<br>objectives.                                | IMTF with<br>designated<br>focal points<br>from UNCT<br>and RC/HC | <ul> <li>Strategic         Assessment</li> <li>SG Strategic         Planning         Directive</li> <li>IOT compile draft         mission concept         (MC)</li> </ul>                                | Commences with<br>SG's decision to<br>initiate IMPP and<br>ends with SG<br>Planning<br>Directive                     | Strategic<br>Assessm<br>ent within<br>four<br>weeks |
|  | 1.2<br>Foundation<br>Planning            | Develop a<br>comprehensive<br>concept of<br>operations and<br>initiate a results<br>and resource<br>planning | IMTF in<br>consultatio<br>n with<br>RC/HC                         | <ul> <li>USG planning directive</li> <li>Elaboration of ISF</li> <li>Joint transition plan</li> <li>MC is basis for detailed planning</li> <li>Draft mission budget</li> <li>Report of the SG</li> </ul> | Commences with<br>USG's planning<br>directive and<br>ends with SG<br>report to UN<br>Security Council                | 3-6<br>weeks  |
| 2.<br>Operation<br>al<br>Planning          | 2.1<br>Operational<br>Planning           | Develop fully-<br>costed draft<br>mission plan,<br>transfer<br>planning<br>responsibilities<br>to mission.   | IMTF and<br>mission<br>planning<br>teams/lead<br>ership           | <ul> <li>IOT continue<br/>development of<br/>MC</li> <li>Mission budget<br/>report</li> <li>Directive to the<br/>SRSG</li> </ul>   | Commences with UN Security Council authorization for PKO and ends with the Directive to the SRSG                     | 3-6<br>weeks  |
|  | 2.2<br>Implementa<br>tion<br>planning    | Ensure transfer<br>of operational<br>planning<br>responsibilities<br>from IMTF to<br>PKO                     | Joint PKO<br>and UNCT<br>planning<br>team                         | <ul> <li>Establishment of<br/>IMP team</li> <li>MC is transferred<br/>from IOT to<br/>SRSG</li> </ul>  | Commences with<br>an exercise at<br>country level and<br>ends with the<br>finalized mission<br>plan                  | 2-3<br>weeks  |
| 3. Review<br>and<br>transition<br>planning | 3.1<br>Continuatio<br>n planning         | Ensure<br>flexibility of<br>mission plan   | IMP team<br>with IMTF   | <ul> <li>Periodic reviews</li> <li>Monitoring and update</li> </ul>  | Commences with adoption of mission plan and lasts until reconfigure the mission or exit strategy                     | Length of<br>the<br>mission                         |
|  | 3.2<br>Transition<br>to exit<br>planning | Provide<br>framework for<br>transition and<br>exit planning  | IMPT with<br>IMTF   | <ul> <li>Revised USG's planning directive</li> <li>Report of SG</li> <li>Revised mission plan</li> <li>Revised SRSG Directive</li> </ul>   | Commences<br>following SG<br>decision to<br>transition and<br>end with revised<br>SRSG directive<br>and mission plan | No time<br>frame<br>establish<br>ed                 |

#### **Handout Main IMPP Concepts**

#### STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

A Strategic Assessment may be conducted by the Secretariat to devise concrete recommendations to the Secretary-General for how the UN system could formulate or re-formulate its response to a crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situation. It is most likely applied to situations where there is currently no UN peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, but may also be applied to situations where the existing UN architecture may need to be adapted in response to changed circumstances. The Strategic Assessment should be managed by the lead Department through the Integrated Task Force (ITF)/Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF). The ITF/IMTF is responsible for writing the terms of reference, fielding the team, and managing the follow-up to the mission. A Strategic Assessment may or may not lead to the fielding of a multi-dimensional peace operation and thus, may or may not also trigger an IMPP.

#### INTEGRATED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration requires UN field presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT) to have an integrated strategic framework (ISF) that reflects:

- A shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives" and,
- A set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace"

#### **Purpose**

- Bring together the Mission and the UNCT around a common set of agreed peace consolidation priorities Prioritize and sequence agreed elements
- Facilitate a shift in priorities and/or resources, as required
- Allow for regular stocktaking by senior managers

An ISF is meant to focus the attention of senior managers around a shared set of high-level strategic priorities. It therefore, should not reach the level of programmatic interventions. That said, an ISF will need to be translated into concrete resources and actions, by updating (or developing from scratch where they do not exist) the relevant programmatic elements and/or projects in the RBB, UNDAF, and CAP frameworks to ensure that the ISF's objectives are adequately resourced. Thus, an ISF should form the basis for the revision of peace consolidation aims within existing UN system planning tools (e.g. UNDAF, CHAP/CAP, and RBB).

The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. In that regard, a review of current ISFs7 reveals the following thematic priorities: security sector reform, DDR, rule of law, restoration of state authority, protection of civilians, return and reintegration and durable solutions, recovery (including at the early stage), and basic social services. These issues involve potentially political and necessarily sequenced inputs from number of UN actors and, thus, could benefit from inclusion in

an ISF to promote a coherent approach and a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities.

#### **MISSION CONCEPT**

In peacekeeping missions, operational parameters, statutory basis, managerial practices and budgetary arrangements create the need for an instrument that elaborates the operational implications of their mandates, giving full and authoritative expression to the strategy by which the mission will achieve its objectives. These requirements used to be met by a Mission Plan or Mandate Implementation Plan (MIP).

However, with the introduction of Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) as mandatory model for all integrated missions, the MIP was substituted with Mission Concept to bridge gap between the political level, including SCR and other mandates or UN system-wide level strategic planning such as ISF and the level of mission specific planning processes (ie RBB and military and civilian component plans).

#### **Purpose**

- The requirement to meet the needs of planning process in Missions in which the principle of integration does not apply
- The need to focus planning on mission specific issues in Missions with ISF
- The requirement for a conceptual vision of mission purpose, shape and size needed to support processes at a final stage of the planning cycle
- The need to develop the political intent of the new mandate alongside existing mandates and guidance into a coherent Mission strategy to guide component activity

The Mission Concept is not a plan but a document with the scope in the slide above. It covers this scope by translating the political intent of mandates and other directives into a form that supports follow-on planning processes l(ie military or police components planning processes/ CONOPS, Operational plans, component work plans, RBB, etc) and informs directives governing mission structure, reporting and relations. MC therefore infers, explores, and articulates the operational implications and consequences that other statements of intent will not or cannot mention, but which are needed to plan and implement mandated activities and manage risks.

#### **ROLE OF THE HEADQUARTERS**

The main responsibility of the lead Department in implementing the IMPP at the Headquarters level is the management of the Integrated (Mission) Task Force (IMTF/ITF). The IMTF/ITF is "established as the formal headquarters-based planning body responsible for implementing the IMPP for a specific country" and "ensures coherent and consistent support and policy guidance" 3 to the relevant integrated

mission and, in particular, its senior leadership, integrated mission planning and coordination and planning staff.

#### **Composition:**

The IMTF should be chaired by a senior representative from the lead UN Department and will consist of representatives from all relevant UN entities, including DPKO,DFS, DPA, PBSO, OHCHR, and DSS, as well as UNDG and ECHA members based on the '2+4' formula.4 Field representatives from both the Mission and the UN Country Team should also be regularly included in the IMTF/ITF through teleconferencing or video teleconferencing, and as per the July decision of the Integration Steering Group, the field should co-chair the task force or alternating chairmanship (between HQ and the Field) arrangements should be instituted. IMTF members should participate at the senior officer level and meetings should be held at the Director level, as required.

#### Role of the IMTF at Mission Start up:

IMTFs are most active at the mission start-up phase. The IMTF's main role at mission start-up is to undertake the necessary analysis and field missions to produce the key planning products. These include: Planning Directive(s), Commitment Authority (the funding mechanism), Technical Assessment Missions (TAM), and the Report of the Secretary-General, Mission Concept, Mission Results-Based Budget, and the Directive to the SRSG. The IMTF is consulted on the mission budget (Results Based Budget, RBB), structure and staffing to ensure complementary programmatic funding and human resources are available in the UN Country Team to achieve UN system objectives, to avoid duplication of tasks/capacities, and to identify potential synergies.

#### Role of the IMTF Beyond Mission Start-up:

The IMTF remains active once a mission is deployed, but generally meets less frequently and has a more supportive role. At this stage, the IMTF considers relevant policy documents (e.g. Policy Committee papers, Reports of the Secretary-General) that has strategic significance or programmatic impact for the UN presence in the relevant country."5 The IMTF becomes more active again in mission planning during periods of mandate adjustment, transition planning, and drawdown phases. During these adjustment periods, planning should be closely coordinated between the Field and the Headquarters through the IMTF.

The IMTF handles programmatic areas of overlap among the peacekeeping, humanitarian and development components of an integrated mission (e.g. DDR, protection, rule of law, and early recovery) since experience shows that coordinated operational and resource planning is required for successful outcomes.

#### ROLE OF THE FIELD

Once a mission becomes fully operational, the primacy of the Integrated Planning effort shifts to the field. In this regard, the main responsibilities of the field missions and UNCTs in the IMPP are to develop and implement (1) integrated field coordination structures (e.g. Strategic Policy Group, Integrated Strategy and Planning Team) and a

related (2) Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) that defines the strategic partnership between the Mission and the UNCT towards joint peace consolidation priorities.

#### Integrated Field Coordination:

Each UN field presence should have a standing coordination body or bodies that bring together the Mission and the UNCT to provide **strategic direction**, **coordination**, **and planning oversight to the joint peace consolidation efforts of the UN field presence**. The configuration and composition of integrated field coordination mechanisms will vary from country to country based on the scale of the UN's operations and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required in keeping with the principle of "form follows function". Regardless of their configuration, the coordination architecture should fulfil key functions at the strategic, coordination, and planning levels. In multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations a Principals-level Strategic Policy Group and a senior working level Integrated Strategy and Planning Team may be considered. In smaller integrated peacebuilding environments, a Strategic Policy Group may be sufficient.

In many cases, existing coordination bodies of either the Mission or UNCT may be leveraged to create integrated field coordination structures. Moreover, thematic working groups will often be utilized to coordinate development and implementation of joint strategies. Integrated field coordination structures should be supported by a "shared analytical and planning capacity" to facilitate and support joint strategic planning exercises. Dedicated strategic planning resources are provided to Resident Coordinators through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO).

On the Mission side, planning capacity is budgeted through the Results Based Budgeting process. Although some UN field presences may decide to create a structurally-integrated planning unit, this is not a requirement. The Mission and UNCT strategic planners must have a shared understanding of their purpose, core tasks, the composition of the team, and the organization of work. This joint understanding should be captured in a Terms of Reference that is developed under the direction of the senior leadership team and/or integrated field coordination structures.

## **Module 5 Information Gathering Table of Contents**

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#### **Preparatory Notes to Instructor**

#### **Background**

In the report of the panel on UN peace operations chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi in 2000, is mentioned: "A strategic approach by the United Nations to conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding will require that the Secretariat's key implementing departments in peace and security work more closely together. To do so, they will need sharper tools to gather and analyze relevant information".

In peacekeeping missions the eyes and ears are frequently the military members of the mission - military observers and staff officers who need to be able to accurately observe, critically analyse and succinctly report their observations to allow Mission and Higher Headquarters to make decisions.

Approaches to information gathering will vary dramatically based on the person being addressed. The approach for a local informant, a UN counterpart, or humanitarian partners will all be different. Common to all however will be the basic concepts of information gathering, particularly the need to establish a relationship and build confidence.

Vast mission areas and limited mission resources often do not allow having a comprehensive view and understanding of the situation and require that human assets be complemented by technological tools. Monitoring and Surveillance Technology can significantly improve capabilities of peacekeeping missions to generate a comprehensive picture of the operating environment, and ultimately enhance the quality of decision-making for a variety of mandated tasks, including the protection of UN staff.

This module seeks to inform military staff officers in missions on the concepts and practices of information gathering as they apply to peacekeeping missions.

The material contained in this module draws on doctrine/concepts/best practices from Member States and their Peacekeeping Training Centres, UN Missions and UN Headquarters and is equally applicable to members of other components of any mission.

#### Aim

The aim of this Unit is to inform military staff officers in missions on the concepts and practices of information gathering in a complex United Nations peace operation.

#### **Learning Outcomes**

On completion of this Module, participants will be able to:

- Understand the direction and planning of Information Gathering.
- Identify the different methods of Information Gathering.
- Understand how gathered information is processed.
- Identify the various products of processed information.
- Recognise and Protect sensitive information

#### **Training Sequence**

The material contained in this module could be delivered over one to two training units, depending on the number of learning activities upon which the instructor decides. The instructor can modify the duration to suit national training requirements and reflect the subject matter comprehension level of the participants/learners.

#### **Duration**

| Minimum<br>Session Time | Lecture/Presentation | Questions/Assessment | Session Activities  |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 90 minutes              | 35 min               | 10 min.              | 45 min              |
| Additional<br>Options   | Mission Specific     | Optional Film        | Optional Activity   |
| TBD                     | TBD by PKTC          |                      | Training Activity?? |

#### **Methodology**

This module contains suggested learning activities to keep adult learners engaged. The facilitation team should use as many of the learning activities as time allows and keep them tailored to the target audience. Participants should be fully involved in the learning process through practical exercises, brainstorming sessions, discussion of case studies, working in small groups on specific tasks, etc.

It is advisable to distribute all handouts prior to the session, so participants can take advantage from the information and ask instructors for clarifications.

The instructor should inform participants of the content, format and timing. Knowing what to expect, participants can improve their ability to focus on the subject and benefit better from the session.

#### Structure of the presentation

- Principles applicable to Information Gathering
- Requirements for Information Gathering
- Information Cycle
- Analysis of Operation Environment (AOE)
- The Military Information Estimate
- Information Security
- Administrative Support, Database and Templates
- Structure and Personnel
- Exercise (case-study)
- Learning Outcome Assessment

\*Please Note: It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written quiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers are provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages.

Instructors are encouraged to add examples and mission-specific information related to the specific deployment of participants, if known.

#### **Instructor Profile**

This module is best presented by an instructor who has experience in their national military intelligence process, ideally in a peacekeeping environment, who could share his/her experience with the group. If there is more than one instructor, at least one should have practical experience. The instructor should also encourage questions from the participants and aim for an interactive discussion. All trainees should be encouraged to contribute to the group discussions, case study discussions and in any other activity.

#### **Instructor Preparations**

#### **General Sources**

- OCHCR Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, 2001 (Chapter 7, Information Gathering), available at 
   http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training7Introen.pdf>
- ICRC Professional Standards for Protection Work (Chapter 5, Managing Sensitive Protection Information), available at < http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0999.htm>
- Walter Dorn, 'Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006-07, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.24. No. 6, 805-835, December 2009, available at < http://walterdorn.org/pub/53>

#### Required Readings

- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone)
- UN SG's Bulletin: Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling, 2007 (ref ST/SGB/2007/6)
- UN-DPKO-DFS Policy: Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), 2010 (ref 2120.3)
- UN-DPKO-DFS Guidelines: Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), 2010 (ref 2010.7)
- UN-DPKO Policy: Monitoring and Surveillance Technology in Field Missions, 2010 (ref 2010.34)
- UN-DPKO SOP: Monitoring and Surveillance Technology in Field Missions, 2010 (ref 2010.35)
- UN-DPKO-DFS SOP: Access to Information, 2011 (ref 2010.36)

#### **General Preparations**

#### Equipment:

- Computer and PowerPoint slides
- 2. Projector and Screen
- 3. Flip Chart
- 4. Materials: Copies of handouts...etc.

#### **Mission Specific**

If this module is being presented to prepare participants for a particular UN peacekeeping mission, then gather mission specific information from the mission website (available at the UN DPKO internet website, through 'current operations': <a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp">http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp</a>). Additional mission specific information is available at the UN DPKO Policy and Training internet website: <a href="http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx">http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx</a>

#### **Symbols Legend**



- Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words versus being read to participants)
- Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)
- Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
- Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
- Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
- Film (A film that is recommended as a core part of the training or an option)
- Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
- Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit, section or part as indicated in the text)
  - Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

#### **Session Notes**

# Information Gathering in Peacekeeping Missions Slide 01

Note to instructor: Before showing the slide below; highlight to the participants the link to the preceding module on the Integrated Mission Planning Process.

|     | Aim  | Slide 02 |
|-----|--|----------|
| - 1 | The aim of this Unit is to inform military staff officers in missions on the concepts and practices of information gathering in a complex United Nations peace operation |          |

| As UN Staff Officer Why should I know this? | Slide 03 |
|---|----------|
|   |          |

| Learning Outcomes  | Slide 04 |
|--|----------|
| On completion of this module participants will be able to:           |          |
| <ul> <li>Describe the principles of Information Gathering</li> </ul> |          |
| <ul> <li>Define the Information Cycle</li> </ul>                     |          |
| <ul> <li>Identify sources of Information in peacekeeping</li> </ul>  |          |
| <ul> <li>Understand management of Sensitive</li> </ul>               |          |
| Information  |          |

| Structure of Presentation   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Principles of Information Gathering                                 |  |  |
| Requirements for Information Gathering                              |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Information Cycle</li> </ul>                               |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Military Information Preparation of the Area of</li> </ul> |  |  |
| Operation (MIPAO)   |  |  |
| <ul> <li>The Military Information Estimate</li> </ul>               |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Information Security</li> </ul>                            |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Administrative Support, Database and Templates</li> </ul>  |  |  |

#### **Principles applicable to Information Gathering**

Structure and Personnel Exercise (case-study)



#### Note to instructor: Before showing the slide below; ask the participants

| Principles applicable to Information Gathering            | Slide 06 |  |
|---|----------|--|
| <ul> <li>Accuracy and timeliness</li> </ul>               |          |  |
| <ul> <li>Utilization of multiple sources</li> </ul>       |          |  |
| <ul> <li>Prioritization</li> </ul>                        |          |  |
| <ul> <li>Forward looking</li> </ul>                       |          |  |
| Human relations   |          |  |
| <ul> <li>Coordination</li> </ul>                          |          |  |
| <ul> <li>Assessing the perspective of contacts</li> </ul> |          |  |
| Following up  |          |  |
| <b>.</b>  |          |  |
|   |          |  |

In the Guidelines of Joint Information Analysis Centres (JMAC) there are described a set of principles applicable to information gathering, and they are:

- Accuracy and timeliness: The analysis produced in a timely fashion and based upon accurate information is of paramount importance
- Utilization of multiple sources: It should make every effort to incorporate information from multiple sources and checking its consistency.
- Prioritization: it is important to identify the information priorities seeking direction from HoM/MLT.
- Forward looking: the ability to provide advance warning and contextual information enabling HoM and MLT to take timely decisions.
- Human relations: At three levels: relationships with other mission components, with the UNCT external actors or organizations (host nation, embassies, NGOs etc.)
- Coordination: with DSS, UNPOL, JMAC and JOC and the human rights and other civilian components.
- Assessing the perspective of contacts<sup>1</sup>
- Following up, ..... and reporting.<sup>2</sup>



**Example MINUSTAH's operations against the gangs of Cite Soleil in 2006 and 2007** provide excellent examples of the benefits of information gathering. Dorns' article<sup>3</sup> states: "MINUSTAH's precision operations required the gathering and processing of a great deal of sensitive information to minimize fatalities and maximize operational effectiveness. It was necessary to 'know the enemy', though strictly the United Nations has no human enemy. Still, the gangs were armed and dangerous opponents who needed to be understood and tracked." Dorn also went on to say that one of the gang

OCHCR Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, 2001 (Chapter 7, Information Gathering), available at <</p> http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training7Introen.pdf>

OCHCR Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, 2001 (Chapter 7, Information Gathering), available at <</p> http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training7Introen.pdf>

Walter Dorn, 'Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006-07, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.24. No. 6, 805-835, December 2009, available at < http://walterdorn.org/pub/53>

#### Module 5: Information Gathering Pg. 8

leader 'posed the greatest threat to peace in Port-au-Prince' further highlighting the need for accurate, timely information.



Include a Mission Specific case.

#### **Requirements for Information Gathering**

| Requirements for Information Gathering  | Slide 07 |
|---|----------|
| <ul> <li>Eyes and ears of the mission, and the UNHQ</li> <li>Essential input to the Operational Assessment of the Mission Environment – critical to subsequent planning</li> <li>What sources are to be employed in UN peacekeeping information gathering and what is the limit?</li> </ul> |          |

- Timely, accurate and relevant information is necessary in all phases of the mission, by all components.
- It needs to be understood that UN military personnel:
  - Should always operate within the bounds of international laws and common senses.
  - Should not carry out any intelligence work that involves disguising or misrepresenting its activity.
  - Should be pro-active instead of reactive, seeking to define courses of action that prevent conflicts from occurring.
  - Should employ legitimate methods.

|              | Information Requirements                      | Slide 08 |
|--------------|---|----------|
| Information  | on the natural environment                    |          |
| •            | Country/countries of deployment;              |          |
| •            | Terrain;                                      |          |
| Information  | on the parties in conflict                    |          |
| •            | Conflict;                                     |          |
| •            | Population;                                   |          |
| •            | Armed actors;                                 |          |
| •            | Infrastructure;                               |          |
| •            | Support for reforms                           |          |
| General infe | ormation                                      |          |
| •            | Political and governmental leadership;        |          |
| •            | Religion;                                     |          |
| •            | Economy;                                      |          |
| •            | Mutual support capabilities of the parties in |          |
| pres         | ence;   |          |
| •            | Role of the media.                            |          |
|              |   |          |
|              |   |          |

Information on the natural environment

- Country/countries of deployment;
- Terrain:


Information on the parties in conflict

- Conflict;
- Population:
- Armed forces:
- Infrastructure:
- Support for reforms

#### General information


- Political and governmental leadership;
- Religion:
- Economy;
- Mutual support capabilities of the parties in presence;
- Role of the media.

#### The Information Cycle





Note to instructor. Before showing the slide below; ask the participants what are the components of the Information Cycle.



#### Module 5: Information Gathering Pg. 10

accurate portrayal of the AO. Both processes, conducted simultaneously and at all levels, incorporate MI battle procedure and MI cycle functions.

#### Phase 1 – Tasking

- What information is required?
- How do we collect it?
- What is the priority?
- How do we synchronise/coordinate the gathering in the mission to ensure we get the right answers in time!!

#### Phase 2 – Collection

- Sources of Information: Signal Information (SIGINF), including Communications Information (COMINF), Electronic Information (ELINF), Imagery Information (IMINF), Human Information (HUMINF), media, reports, other agencies, NGOs, IOs, other sources
- Methods of Collection

#### Phase 3 – Analysis

- Is it timely? Is it relevant? Is it Accurate?
- What seems irrelevant to you may not be to the rest of the team collaborate in analysis.
- Record, Collate, Evaluate/Validate, Analyse, Review

#### Phase 4 – Dissemination

- Timeliness, volume, sensitivity
- Packaging, delivery for the end user
- Security Need-to-know-Principle

#### Phase 1 Tasking

# Phase 1 Tasking Priority Information Requirement (PIR) Request for Information (RFI) Use of collection assets is planned and coordinated to respond to various simultaneous requirements.

- In the UN PK mission the HoM together with the MLT are responsible for the Priority Information Requirement (PIR) which is the tasking order that prioritize the mission information requirement.
- When a member other than HoM/MLT requires the analysis of information other than already in the PIR the Request for Information (RFI) is issued. All this activities are concentrated and directed to the JMAC.
- Information requirements are established and prioritized to support decision-making. Staff and technical resources to fulfil these requirements are defined as well as timelines. Use of collection assets is planned and coordinated to respond to various

simultaneous requirements. In the field this will be coordinated – pending the set-up of a mission between FHQ J2 - Military Information Branch, JOC and JMAC - coordinated by JMAC.



Pre-reading/Handouts: JOC/JMAC – policy and guidelines documents

#### Phase 2. Collection

#### Phase 2. Collection

Slide 11

- Collection is a guided process led by PIR
- Collection plan is an agenda for collection
- Sources
  - SIGINF, (including COMINF, ELINF),
  - IMINF,
  - HUMINF.
  - Media.
  - Reports,
  - OSINF (open sources of information),
  - other sources Monitoring and Surveillance Technology
- Methods
  - Deliberate
  - Incidental

Note to instructor. Before showing the slide above; ask the participants what sources of collection they would expect in a peacekeeping mission; further break it down to the various components - military, policy, development, etc. After showing the slide distribute

#### **Collection - Sources**

- Collection in the PK mission is in the interest of efficiency a guided process led by mission PIR.
- Information and data are collected using various collection sources.
  - SIGINF is also very important source of information gathering, but SIGINF is an asset for UN to be sceptical as a means of information gathering. It could violate privacy and national laws. To overcome fear of broad phone surveillance in the national and international community, the UN could limit such monitoring to 'tactical' level, meaning that surveillance would be confined to current operations and for specifically-approved targets. Signals Information; broad category covering:

- Communications Information (phone taps, interception of faxes, monitoring radio exchanges etc), i.e. words
- Electronic Information (electromagnetic, non-communications transmissions like radar and aircraft IFF (automated aircraft identification signals) – i.e. non-verbal electronic signals
- **Example** The Maritime Component in UNIFIL used ship-borne radars to detect un-identified vessels approaching ports.

IMINF - will be critical to support decision making process and also during operation. However, it should be thought in a way of best cost-and-effect viewpoint since all the equipment is highly expensive and contingent would not contribute those assets easily. Imagery Information (any imagery ranging from satellites, to mission helicopters, to snapshots taken by an observer or tourist). As an example see: http://www.satsentinel.org/maps for open source satellite information.

- **Examples** MINUSTAH successfully used photos of gang men and their leaders in screening individuals entering or leaving cordoned off areas. Aerial imagery was also used to provide near-real time information and all up-to-date maps to be produced. Another example is the use of Satellite Imagery for Haiti, where it contributed to situational awareness in planning in the aftermath of the earthquake. Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have also been trialled in missions.
  - Proved to be key sources, while HUMINF – Human Information. technologies helped considerably (MINUSTAH 2006-07). Usually UN peacekeeping missions are deployed in underdeveloped countries, where most of infrastructure was destroyed and high tech industry was not even begun. Most of PKO missions are believed HUMINF-rich environment (UNPOL, UNMO, DSS, civil affairs, political affairs, human rights components, and force elements) as well as outside (representatives from UN agencies UNICEF, UNDP and NGOs) Most common in peacekeeping operations as it can be conducted openly to maintain impartiality, and has little cost associated unlike the more high-tech methods that require skilled operators, maintainers and analysts.
    - Advantages can be real-time; Provides a 'feeling on the ground'; Can reveal direct and indirect relationships (political, financial, military, criminal, romantic); Cost-effective
    - Limitations time lag between collection and reporting/verifying can render the information useless; no certainty of collection success; may be politically sensitive; often difficult to determine reliability of sources or verify the information.

- OSINF (Open source information) are the common language in creating and sustaining effective partnership between UN agencies, NGOs as well as Actually the vast majority of the relevant useful indigenous organization. information is not secret and may be collected by the different components of the mission such as military, police, human rights, civil affairs, political affairs, child protection etc. However, information collected by the different mission actors it is to be analyzed in a correct manner and purpose oriented. There are many sources to join this open source gathering; National, military, law enforcement, business, academic, NGO or media, and civilian groups. These groups can contribute to the collective intelligence of all people. Open source information collation and analysis efforts should be enhanced in other agencies that that have been present in the mission area for some time will likely have wellestablished collection methods and networks. This includes humanitarian actors though interaction with them must take due consideration to the need to preserve their 'humanitarian space'.
- Policing sources teach that "Information sharing is a reciprocal concept based on mutual advantage, and, unless information flows in both directions, the stream of information will soon dry up." This concept applies particularly to information gathered from partner agencies.
- (Handling of sensitive information will be covered later in the presentation)

#### **Collection Plan**

#### **Collection Plan**

The guidance for collection is expressed in the form of **Collection Plan (CP)** which contains complete information of collection network and list of analytical processes and projects. The CP could be used as an agenda for collection

Slide 12

Note to instructor: Before showing the slide above; distribute participants with the template of the collection plan handout.

The guidance for collection is expressed in the form of **Collection Plan (CP)** which contains complete information of collection network and list of analytical processes and projects. The CP could be used as an agenda for collection. (see attached Collection Plan)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit on Police Information and Intelligence Systems, 2006; Chapter Five – Criminal Intelligence as a Process

#### Module 5: Information Gathering Pg. 14

- The collection plan reflects the strategy to collect information in support of the military component of the mission. It reflects all outstanding collection requirements, their relative priorities, and the desired overlap between different sensors and disciplines.
- A collection worksheet is prepared as an internal working document for the G2 staff. Once all available sources and agencies have been entered on the worksheet, PMIRs are listed in order of priority following which specific questions based on associated indicators are developed. Finally, those sources and agencies which are best suited and/or have the technical capability to answer these specific questions are identified. More than one source or agency can be tasked to provide greater assurance that the information desired will be collected.

#### **Collection – Methods**

# Collection – Methods Deliberate (Planned) Patrolling (vehicle, aerial, foot, boat) Routine Liaison Visits Vigilant Operations – static or mobile check points Observation of habits and routines of local populace Non-deliberate (Incidental) Eyes and Ears open at all times.

- Collection can be conducted in a deliberate (planned) or non-deliberate (incidental) manner. Incidental information is that which comes to your attention through unexpectedly such as an unsolicited approach from a stranger, or something revealed unintentionally in a conversation.
- Deliberate Collection. All of the types of deliberate operations require careful planning and coordination.
  - Patrolling (vehicle, aerial, foot, boat)
  - Routine Liaison Visits
  - Vigilant Operations static or mobile check points
  - Observation of habits and routines of local populace
- **Example** Refer to Dorn's paper on the MINUSTAH operations against the gangs, and the success of their 'Human Resource Network' a rewards-based system where names and activities of informants had to be carefully safeguarded, and the reliability of the sources was determined over time.

Phase 3. Analysis

| Phase 3. Analysis   | Slide 14 |
|---|----------|
| Degrees of relevance? Accuracy? Reliability? Trustworthiness? |          |

Collected information is processed and analysed to address the needs and concerns of the Senior Mission Management and/or to identify issues that may become a matter of concern in the future. The volume of information collected makes it necessary for Information Management techniques to be employed such as databases and commercially available software programs to analyse trends and linkages.

- Degrees of:
  - Relevance?
  - Accuracy?
  - Reliability?
  - Trustworthiness?
- **Example** "The telephone hotline established in MINUSTAH proved valuable. Although the hotline received a majority of crank calls (e.g. Disruptive, misleading or vendetta calls), its information helped locate and liberate hostages and capture gang members. To distinguish between crank and legitimate calls, operators needed analytical skills and associated mission personnel needed means to corroborate or discredit information."<sup>5</sup>
  - In the MINUSTAH case, close liaison between the military, UNPOL and the local police was necessary to resolve this dilemma.
  - MINUSTAH also established a Strategic Analysis Cell which brought together officials from each of the main divisions - civil affairs, political affairs, justice, human rights, public information, other agencies such as UNDP and UNICEF - on a weekly basis to share information and insights.

#### Phase 4. Dissemination/Reporting

|   | Phase 4 - Dissemination/Reporting | Slide 15 |
|---|-----------------------------------|----------|
| • | Timeliness                        |          |
| • | Volume                            |          |
| • | Sensitivity                       |          |
|   |                                   |          |

Results of the analytical process are disseminated to the Senior Mission Management and to other addressees through reports, presentations, briefings or database access. Three factors measured together will determine the method you will use to report:

- Timeliness how soon is the information required?
- Volume How much information is there to convey? And

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Dorn, ibid

#### Module 5: Information Gathering Pg. 16

- Sensitivity Is the material from a protected source, how highly classified is it? Are there limits with whom it can be shared with? Whatever the assessment on sensitivity is, it is important not to include any name of victim or source of information on human rights violations in the SITREPs and other military reports.
- Example The MINUSTAH JMAC produced 'target packages' for anti-gang operations including personal information on the leaders, locations of where they lived, 'worked', and with whom they met or lived. Additionally they produced weekly information brief for the SRSG, a weekly information summary, threat assessments for VIP visits and major mission activities such as the electoral process. To support the host government, the SRSG occasionally briefed the Haitian President using JMAC products, particularly for analysis of 'political drivers of civil unrest'.

#### **Analysis of Operational Environment (AOE)**

| Analysis of Operational Environment (AOE)   | Slide 16 |
|---|----------|
| AOE provides the military component with a relatively accurate assessment of how the conflict parties (CP), weather and terrain will act or react within the Area of Operations (AO). |          |

- AOE is the foundation for the Military Component Planning Process. It provides the military component with a relatively accurate assessment of how the conflict parties (CP), weather and terrain will act or react within the Area of Operations (AO). AOE products will form the basis for the MI Estimate or MI Annex as well as to support the development of the collection plan.
  - AOE is a systematic and continuous process by which can be determined a belligerent's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action in a specific geographic area.
- **Note to instructor**: This process will be further and thorough explained in the Module 6 Military Component Planning Process.

#### **The Military Information Estimate**

#### Slide 17 **Military Information Estimate** INFORMATION ESTIMATE NO..... Ref: Maps, relevant documents, etc. **BASIS** 2. **FACTORS** a. Weather/climate b. Terrain c. Other characteristics d. Non-UN activity e. Minefields3. 3. COURSE OF ACTION a. Non-UN capabilities b. Analysis and discussion c. Conclusions 4. RECOMMENDATION

#### **CLASSIFICATION**

Copy No..... Issuing HQ Place of Issue DTG Ref No.....

| ) |
|---|
|   |

Ref: Maps, relevant documents, etc.

#### 1. **BASIS**

(Mission, situation, Cdr's planning guidance, etc.)

#### 2. **FACTORS**

(Data/facts and deductions from these which may affect the accomplishment of the mission)

- a. Weather/climate: Analysis includes weather/climate explaining how it affects mobility and observation;
- b. Terrain: By examining the trafficability afforded by the terrain, the best approaches available to the belligerent are revealed. By analyzing the

#### Module 5: Information Gathering Pg. 18

- obvious approaches and dominating ground, the belligerent's axes and objectives become evident.
- c. Other characteristics (economics, sociology, politics, psychology, etc.)
- f. Non-UN activity (composition, dispositions and strength of Non-UN forces, personnel, logistics, vulnerabilities security hazards, etc.)
- e. Minefields

#### 3. COURSE OF ACTION

- a. Non-UN capabilities
- b. Analysis and discussion
- c. Conclusions

#### 4. **RECOMMENDATION**

Recommended actions by UN-forces based upon the most dangerous course of action by the Non-UN forces.

Mil Info Officer

Annexes: Distribution:

**CLASSIFICATION** 



# **Learning Activity: Information Gathering Exercise: Military Information Estimate**

In this an exercise with a military scenario, participants are required to be exercised in the preparation of the military information estimate and prepare the briefing on its conclusions/recommendations to put into practice the related material presented in SO STM Module 5



Participants should be provided with the Carana Scenario background, current situation, special idea and maps at reasonable time ahead of the lesson to enable them prepare adequately for it.



# **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|             | 05 minutes | Activity introduction and instructions |
|-------------|------------|--|
|             | 20 minutes | Syndicate discussion                   |
|             | 05 minutes | Debrief in syndicates                  |
|             | 15 minutes | Debrief in the plenary group           |
| Total time: | 45 minutes |  |

## **Learning Activity: Information Gathering Exercise: Military** Information Estimate

Slide 18



# **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|             | 05 minutes | Activity introduction and instructions |
|-------------|------------|--|
|             | 20 minutes | Syndicate discussion                   |
|             | 05 minutes | Debrief in syndicates                  |
|             | 15 minutes | Debrief in the plenary group           |
| Total time: | 45 minutes |  |

# **Information Security**

# Information Security Principles Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability Accountability UN Classifications Sensitive (Confidential or Strictly Confidential) Unclassified

- Note to instructor: Before showing the slide above; highlight to the participants the UN SG's Bulletin: Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling, 2007 (ref ST/SGB/2007/6)
- Principles: Traditionally, the core principles of information security have been Confidentiality (prevent the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals or systems), Integrity (means that data cannot be modified undetectably) and Availability (the information must be available when it is needed). More recently the addition of Accountability has gained some prevalence.
- Definitions:
  - <u>Information Security</u> Protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction.
  - <u>UN Confidential</u> applies to information or material whose unauthorised disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the work of the United Nations.
  - <u>UN Strictly Confidential</u> applies to information or material whose unauthorised disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage or impede the conduct of the work of the United Nations.
  - <u>Unclassified</u> applies to information or material whose unauthorised disclosure could reasonably be expected not to cause damage to the work of the United Nations.
- The work of the United Nations should be open and transparent, except insofar as the nature of information concerned is deemed confidential in accordance with the promulgated guidelines.
- For the peacekeeper in the field, information gathered must be protected for a number of reasons:
  - Protecting the source, whether it is a local informant, government contact, other agency, foreign national, foreign official so as not to jeopardise

future information or reveal the identity and potentially place the individual at risk, and

 Operational security – where early or inappropriate release may jeopardise planned, or ongoing, operations

# **Administrative Support, Databases and Templates**

This chapter could refer to the info gathering cycle – the key the Collection Plan – in an integrated mission the Integrated Collection Plan (ICP).

That would trigger the admin and support and would allow for templates. Tables and matrixes to be used.

# **Administrative Support, Databases and Templates**

Slide 20

- Integrated missions brings Integrated Collection Plan
- Mission specific forms and documentations
- SOP's
- Information collectors guidance on what information is sought and where whom to focus on to get it
- REMEMBER the UN Principles

**Note to instructor**: Before showing the slide below; ask the participants what systems they are familiar with – databases, spreadsheets, matrix, software etc

Different missions will have their own way of managing the information gathered. Templates are useful to ensure the right information is collected that meets all users' needs, and minimises repeat visits to individual areas seeking variations on the same information. Participants are reminded of the earlier discussion on information collection.



**Example** The UN Mission in Central Africa and Chad (MINURCAT) required specific information in relation to the villages being visited around the mission area. To give the information collectors clear guidance on what information is sought and where and whom to focus on to get it, an Information Gathering Template was developed.

Note to instructor. Before showing the slide below; it may be easier to pass out copies of the template for better viewing by the participants.

| MINUF   | Small Extract from RCAT Information Gathering Template   | Slide 2 |
|---|--|---------|
| UNITED NATIONS<br>Subset Nations scholes to the<br>Control African Republic and<br>Charl                | NATIONS UMED  Melatine des Serbent Base  on République Controlleules et au  Tokad  MINURCAT  |         |
| Wilage Name 3   | Others Coordinates   Date:   D |         |
| Village Charf Name and Phone (had set is now do vote shift de village?  3) Approximate Population:      | B) Primary School: Yes No.   |         |
| Restrict conducts to proceed a port of all?  Number of Households:  Restrict conducts to make part day? | T a "I d uan école sui!"  Neuron: Quelle set l'école in plue proche:   |         |
| 4) lithnic Orrospe<br>(Juli and le groupes wheeper représents to<br>et qu'elle au l'arbite supertaine)  | 9) Art Grow any refugion/III Pr. Yes No. Fig If the refugion on procurement diplicate as if  |         |
| Are there any othero/interconstraintly<br>conflicts   | If yes, how many refugeed/IDPn1 A ray, numbers you at all!   |         |

#### **UNITED NATIONS**

United Nations mission in the Central African Republic and Chad



#### **NATIONS UNIES**

Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad

| Village Name   | Village Coordinates:  | Distance<br>from T/S | Date:     |
|--|---|----------------------|-----------|
| 1a) AXIS   | N<br>W  |                      | Time Out: |
| 2) Village Chief Name and Phone<br>Quel est le nom de votre chef du village?                                 |   |                      |           |
| 3) Approximate Population:<br>Environ combien de personnes y-a-t'il ici?                                     | 8) Primary School:<br>Y'a-t'il une école ici?                   | Yes                  | No        |
| 4) Ethnic Groups:<br>Quels sont les groupes ethniques représentés ic<br>et qu'elle est l'ethnie majoritaire? | 9) Are there any refugee i Y'a -t'il des réfugiés ou pers  pers |                      |           |
| Are there any ethnic/intercommunity conflicts: Y'a t-il des conflits interethnique ou intercommunautaire?    | If yes, how many refuge<br>Si oui, combien y'en a t-il?         | ees/IDPs?            |           |
| 5) Villagers Living Conditions:<br>Quelles sont les conditions de vie des<br>villageois?                     | 10) Religion:<br>Quelle est la religion pratiqu                 | iée ici?             |           |
| 6) Law & Order, Security Situation Y'a t'il un problème de sécurité?   | 11) Medical Facilities:<br>Y'a -t'il un centre de santé?        | Yes                  | No        |

After Action Review Information Gathering Methods, MINURCAT

This report reflects the personal views of its author(s) and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.

| 7) Water Supply: Yes No<br>Avez-vous une pompe?<br>Où est-ce que les gens trouvent l'eau à boire? | Nearest: Où est-ce que vous allez pour vous soigner? |
|---|--|
| 12) Population Attitude Towards MINUI<br>Qu'est-ce que les gens pensent de la MINURCAT            |  |
| 13) Population Attitude Towards/Experie Qu'est-ce que les gens pensent du/ou quells sont          |  |
| 14) State of the Roads and Bridges: L'état general des ponts et des routes:                       |  |
| 15) Any rebels activities?  Y'a-t'il des mouvements rebels dans la region?                        |  |
| 16) Breaches to Human Rights:<br>Cas de violations de Droits de l'Homme                           |  |
| 17) Confidence Building Etablir le contact et gagner la confiance                                 |  |
| 18) Miscellaneous: Divers:  | Primary School coordinates                           |
| Divers:   | N  |
|   | W  |
|   |  |
|   |  |

**Example** The JMAC Guidance document gives samples of both products and tools. The products provided include samples, models and formats of Mission Threat Analysis, Warning Note, Incident Analysis, Trend Analysis, Scenarios, Profiling and Risk Mapping. The specific tools that are provided include samples, models and formats of Priority Information Requirements (PIR), Request for Information (RFI), and Collection Plans.



Mission Specific: UNAMID JMAC has produced, in their JMAC SOP, mission specific templates the tools and products referred to above.

# **Joint Mission Analysis Centre Structure and Personnel**

# Joint Mission Analysis Centre Structure and Personnel

Slide 22

- Varies from mission to mission
- Personnel
  - composed of military, police and civilian
  - members share a same physical office space and report to a common civilian chief
- Structure




**Note to instructor**: Before showing the slide below; refer the participants to the JMAC Guidelines<sup>6</sup> document for detailed discussion of the structure of JMACs.

- Since most mission information gathering is either coordinated through, or processed by the JMAC, it is important to understand the structure and staffing of a generic JMAC. "The actual structure of the JMAC will vary from mission to mission depending on mandate, size, composition, operational requirements and available partner organisations. Ideally all will have separated analysis from collection and data management; will have specified liaison personnel to mange liaison with major contributors; and will have arranged their analysts into thematic, operational or geographic categories.
- UN member states have begun to support a limited UN intelligence capability in peacekeeping missions. As a result, the UN created a new multidisciplinary structure in 2005, the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), whose mandate is to produce mission-wide integrated analyses for the senior management of peacekeeping missions. The uniqueness of the JMAC model lies in the fact that JMAC teams are composed of military, police and civilian team members who share a same physical office space and report to a common civilian chief.
- Missions without an established JMAC will still have a requirement to conduct integrated analysis. This could be done through regular strategic meetings of mission components where multi-source information is discussed and individual components are tasked with drafting risk assessments or other integrated papers as required."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> UN-DPKO-DFS Guidelines: Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), 2010 (ref 2010.7)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>ibid



The Chief of the JMAC will normally be a civilian, assisted by a specified number of information analysts and collection officers, both civilian (including from mission security) and uniformed. In addition, liaison officers from other offices (such as the UN Country Team) may also be invited to participate



**Example** At this point is highly recommended to add the JMAC Mission Specific Structure

# **Summary**

# Slide 24 Summary Describe the principles of Information Gathering Define the Information Cycle Identify sources of Information in peacekeeping Understand management of Sensitive Information

# **Learning Outcome Assessment**

It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written quiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers are provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages.

At the end of the entire unit and/or the conclusion of the STMs instructors may want to choose some of the following questions for review.

| Que | St | tions   |
|-----|----|---|
| 1.  |    | Define  |
| 2.  |    | Define  |
| 3.  |    | Identify the  |
| 4.  |    | Identify the phases of the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx                  |
|     |    | Expected outcome  |
| 1.  |    | Define  |
|     |    | Definition  |
|     |    |   |
|     |    | Characteristics   |
|     | •  |   |
|     | •  |   |
|     |    |   |
| 2.  |    | Define  |
|     |    | Definition  |
|     |    |   |
|     |    | Characteristics   |
|     | •  |   |
|     | •  |   |
| 3.  |    | Identify the phases of the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx |
|     |    | • 1   |
|     |    | • 2   |
|     |    | • 3   |
|     |    | • 4   |
|     |    | • 5   |

Handout: COLLECTION PLAN

UNM..... PERIOD:

INFORMATION PROBLEM (OUTLINE):

Do the conflict parties intend to hamper the deployment of UN Forces into the area of operation (Sectors).

| PIR's  | RFI´s   | INDICATORS  |   | COLLECTION SOURCES |   |   | TASKS | REPORTING |     |     |   |  |
|--|---|---|---|--------------------|---|---|-------|-----------|-----|-----|---|--|
|  |   |   | Α | В                  | С | D | E     | F         | G   | Н   |   | INSTRUCTIONS   |
| Do the xxx forces intend to hamper the deployment of infantry battalion B into the temporary | Do the xxx forces<br>have any OP's<br>along the axis<br>from A to B?            | Comms traffic from OP's along the axis.                             |   | (X)                |   |   |       |           |     | Х   | Monitor xxx forces VHF band in the area between A and B. Report on Comms activity.                        | INFREP. Tactical<br>Tip-off to Unit B.   |
| security zone?  If YES; How and with what force?   | Are there any xxx forces deployed between A and B?                              | Military activity along the axis.  Xxx preparations for combat Ops. |   | X                  |   | Х |       |           |     | (X) | Determine location of xxx forces between A and B down to platoon level.                                   | INFREP with<br>Tactical Tip-off to<br>Unit B.  |
|  | Do the xxx forces<br>have artillery<br>covering the axis<br>between A and<br>B? | Artillery/Mortar test firing in the vicinity of the axis.           |   | X                  |   | X |       |           |     | (X) | Determine location of xxx artillery covering the area between A and B. Report on any calibration firings. | INFREP. Tactical<br>Tip-off to Unit B.<br>Report on Comms<br>traffic on C2/Arty<br>nets. |
|  | Do xxx forces have any mine laying capacity along the axis from A to B?         | Minefields/<br>obstacles.   |   | ×                  |   | X |       |           | (X) |     | Determine location of<br>any obstacles /mine-<br>fields/ along the road<br>between A and B.               | INFREP. Tactical Tip-off to Unit B.  |

<sup>(</sup>X): Source has the capacity to provide information

**A**: Sector 1, **B**: Sector 2, **C**: Sector 3, **D**: South Africa Maritime Reaction Squadron, **E**: Nigeria HQ & Signal Squadron, **F**: Zambia Aviation Squadron, **G**: Egyptian MP Battalion, **H**: Algerian Intelligence Company

X: Source is tasked to provide information

# Module 6 Introduction to Military Component Planning Process

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# **Preparatory Notes to Instructor**

#### Introduction

The Introduction to Military Component Planning Process is designed to facilitate timely planning and complex decision making required by force and sector headquarters elements of peacekeeping operations. It is a comprehensive process that guides military staff officers in their decision making within a UN peacekeeping environment. It is however based on the presumption that, qualified military staff officers would have undergone national staff courses as part of their career progression.

This module is intended to provide guidance to staff officers in the performance of their planning duties at UN field mission force and sector HQs. It is not meant to substitute national training doctrines of Troop Contributing Countries but to complement their peacekeeping training effort.

Staff officers are therefore advised to combine their knowledge and experience, the FC's style and the peculiarities of the operational area in their planning process.

#### Aim

The aim of this module is to provide Military Staff Officers with the necessary information to understand the requirements and procedures of Military Component Planning Process in a United Nations Peacekeeping operation.

# **Learning Outcomes**

On completion of this Module, participants will:

- Be familiar with the UN military component authority, command and control structure and relations.
- Be familiar with the basic tenets of Mission Command.
- Understand the how the Operational Area is generally organised for effective mandate implementation.
- Identify the steps of the Military Component Planning Process
- Understand how, as staff officers, they can contribute to the MCPP process.

# **Training Sequence**

This module could be delivered over three or more training sessions, depending on the learning activities used and the level of participants' comprehension of the process.

Note to Instructor: It is highly recommended for this module to be delivered <u>after</u> the modules on Integrated Mission Planning Process and Information Gathering.

Also, give the participants a brief explanation on why they should pay special attention to this module. Refer to: Background in the Preparatory Notes to the Instructor

#### Duration

| Minimum<br>Session Time                       | Lecture/Presentation            | Questions/Assessment            | Session Activities              |
|---|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 350 Minutes                                   | 175 min                         | 35 min.                         | 140 min                         |
| Additional<br>Options                         | Mission Specific                | Optional Film                   | Optional Activity               |
| 90 Min for a scenario based learning activity | <b>TBD by Trainer</b><br>20 min | <b>TBD by Trainer</b><br>40 min | <b>TBD by Trainer</b><br>60 min |

# Methodology

The delivery of this module should be based on participatory learning principles in order to keep participants engaged. The facilitation team should use as many of the learning activities as time allows and keep them tailored to the target audience. Participants should be fully involved in the learning process through practical exercises, brainstorming sessions, scenario-based case studies, working in small groups on specific tasks, etc.

It is advisable to distribute all handouts prior to the session, to give participants enough time to prepare for an interactive lesson.

## Structure of the presentation

- Conceptual Background
  - Principles of Planning
  - UN Authority, Command, and Control
  - UN Operational Area Organisation
  - Analysis of the Operational Environment
- The planning process
  - Step 1. Guidance
  - Step 2. Mission Analysis
  - Step 3. Courses of Action Development
  - Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection
  - Step 5. Develop Concept of Operations and Plan

**Note to Instructor:** Instructors are encouraged to use examples and mission-specific information related to the specific deployment of participants during training delivery.

#### **Instructor Profile**

This module is best presented by a military Senior Staff Course qualified instructor with peacekeeping experience and good understanding of the United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).

## **Instructor Preparations**

#### **General Sources**

The material contained in this module draws on training manuals, doctrine, concepts, and best practices provided by Member States and their Peacekeeping Training Centres, UN Missions and UN Headquarters.

#### **Required Readings**

The material listed below form the basis of the guidance material on which this module is based. Instructors should familiarise themselves with these documents prior to preparing their presentations:

- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone)
- UN-DPKO-DFS Guidelines: Mission Start-up Field Guide, August 2010 (ref 2010.1)
- DPKO-OMA: Military Planning Process for Peacekeeping Operations, 2009
- CPTM Module 2: The Establishment and Functioning of UN Peacekeeping Operations
- UN IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Field Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences, January 2010
- UN IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Headquarters Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences, May 2009
- UN Strategic Assessment Guidelines, May 2009

#### **General Preparations**

#### Equipment:

- 1. Computers
- 2. Projector and Screen
- 3. Flip Chart

Materials:

Copies of handouts

Templates for matrices

#### **Mission Specific**

If this module is being presented to prepare participants for a particular UN peacekeeping mission, then gather mission specific information from ITS Community of Practice platform (cop.dfs.un.org), specific mission's website or the http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp). Additional mission specific information available the UN DPKO Policy and Training internet website: http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

# **Symbols Legend**

- Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration)
- Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words versus being read to participants)
- Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)
- e.g Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
- Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
- Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
- Film (A film that is recommended as a core part of the training or an option)
- Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
- Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit, section or part as indicated in the text)
- Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session.)

# Session Notes

# **Military Component Planning Process**

Slide 01



**Note to Instructor:** Give the participants a brief explanation on why they should pay special attention to this module. Highlight the importance of Introduction to the IMPP and the Information Gathering Modules as this module will build on that knowledge. Refer to: Background in the Preparatory Notes to the Instructor

| Aim  | Slide 02 |
|--|----------|
| The aim of this module is to provide Military Staff Officers with the fundamental skill of the UN Military Component Planning Process, its requirements and procedures in a United Nations Peacekeeping operation. |          |

# As UN Staff Officer... Why should I know this?

Slide 03

# **Learning Outcome**

Slide 04

On completion of the module, participants will be able to:

- Identify the phases of the Military Component Planning Process
- Be aware of the basic tenets of Mission Command
- Understand the Staff officers' contribution to UNPKO Military Component Planning Process
- Understand the human rights component's contribution to military planning
- Understand the UN military component authority, command and control structure and relations
- Understand the how Operational Area is generally organised for effective mandate implementation



In a traditional military operation, the planning process will determine resource requirements – troops and equipment required to achieve the task. In the context of a UN PK Mission many of these factors would have been determined as part of the strategic planning in UNHQ, and provided as guidance through relevent documents like

the Security Council Resolution outlining the mandate of the mission, the CONOPS, Intgrated Strategic framework (ISF), Mission Concept etc.

# Structure of the presentation

#### Slide 05

- Conceptual Background
  - Principles of Planning
  - UN Authority, Command, and Control
  - UN Operational Area Organisation
  - Analysis of the Operational Environment
- The planning process
  - Guidance
  - Mission Analysis
  - Courses of Action Development
  - Course of Action Analysis and Selection
  - Develop Concept of Operations and Plan

# **Conceptual Background**

## **Conceptual Background**

Slide 06

- Principles of Planning
- UN Authority, Command, and Control
- UN Operational Area Organisation
- Analysis of the Operational Environment

The conceptual background provides a basic operational framework to guide the conduct of the MCPP. A good grasp of the conceptual background facilitates the understanding of the planning process by putting it in its appropriate context.

# **Principles of Planning**

- Note to instructor. It is important for all to understand these basic principles of planning and be able to apply them as they are common themes across all aspects of military operations.
- A basic principle of good planning is that individual short-term decisions should support strategic long-term goals. This requires comprehensive situational analysis by staff officers and guidance and direction from leadership to manage the process effectively.

|  | Slide 07               |
|--|------------------------|
| Princ  | ples of Planning       |
| <ul> <li>Should be:         <ul> <li>Compreh</li> <li>Efficient</li> <li>Inclusive</li> <li>Information</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | (with long term goals) |

Planning Principles. Good planning requires a methodical process that clearly defines the steps that lead to optimal solutions. This process should reflect the following principles:

| morning printerprees          |   |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Comprehensive                 | <ul> <li>All significant options and impacts on work of other<br/>components are considered.</li> </ul>   |
| <ul> <li>Efficient</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Efficient use available resources.</li> </ul>  |
| • Inclusive                   | <ul> <li>All components affected by the plan have opportunities to<br/>be involved.</li> </ul>  |
| <ul><li>Informative</li></ul> | <ul> <li>Results are understood by stakeholders (people affected<br/>by a decision).</li> </ul>   |
| <ul><li>Integrated</li></ul>  | <ul> <li>Individual, short-term decisions should support strategic,<br/>long-term goals.</li> </ul>   |
| <ul><li>Logical</li></ul>     | <ul> <li>Each step should lead logically to the next.</li> </ul>  |
| Transparent                   | <ul> <li>Everybody involved should not only be aware of the<br/>desired end-state but also understand their roles in each<br/>step of the process.</li> </ul> |

### **Themes of Planning**

| Principles of Planning   | Slide 08 |
|--|----------|
| Themes of Planning   |          |
| <ul> <li>Determine the nature of the problem and what is to be achieved</li> <li>Gather information</li> </ul>               |          |
| <ul> <li>Generate options to achieve those goals</li> <li>Decide on the way ahead and then execute it. Who, What,</li> </ul> |          |

Where, When, How, Why?

- Determine the nature of the problem and what is to be achieved
- Gather information
- Generate options to achieve those goals
- Decide on the way ahead and then execute it. Who, What, Where, When, How, Why?

Even though planning skills are used in everyday military life, participants should be aware that, in a peacekeeping operation they will be engaging with civilian mission components and many agencies and organizations that may not be familiar with the military planning process, but will possibly have a process of their own. The military staff officer must be flexible enough to combine these processes especially in an integrated mission.

#### **Mission Command**

The usual non-linear nature of Peacekeeping Operations imposes many command and control challenges for Peacekeepers. Unit and sub-unit commanders who are remotely deployed or facing rapidly changing situation should be able to take decisions in line with the mission's overall objective. They would therefore need a clear understanding of their higher commander's intent and total comprehension of their assigned task/role and its purpose in higher commander's plan to enable them to make timely and appropriate decision.

| Principles of Planning  Tenets of Mission Command | Slide 09 |
|---|----------|
| Decentralised Command                             |          |
| Commander's Intent                                |          |
| <ul> <li>Initiative</li> </ul>                    |          |
| <ul> <li>Responsibility</li> </ul>                |          |
| Trust and Mutual Understanding                    |          |

The mission command concept is based on decentralised command that focuses on subordinates' understanding of higher commander's intent, their role in his plan, and a clear responsibility to exercise initiative in line with that intent in order to take timely decision toward achievement of the mission's mandate. It also calls for trust and mutual understanding between commanders and their subordinates. Missions assigned to subordinates; apart from the "who, what, where and when" aspects, should

also include the reason "why" that task should be carried out in order to guide use of initiative by subordinates.

# **UN Authority, Command, and Control**

- Let participants recollect their lesson on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping covered in CPTM Unit 2 Part 2: How United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Function. This session makes it more comprehensive to suit the demands of military staff officers.
- Before showing the slide below; discuss hierarchy of operations with the participants. Also refer participants to the DPKO-DFS Policy: Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 2008.
- Handout: DPKO-DFS Policy: Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 2008.

## Levels of Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations



UN policy directive defines and describes UN peacekeeping Authority, Command and Control as three separate but overlapping levels of Strategic, Operational and Tactical. These levels clarify the seamless links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Within a mission area, the framework includes a clear chain of command and appropriate succession arrangements.

#### **Strategic Level:**

This is the management of a peacekeeping operation at United Nations Headquarters level in New York. The Security Council provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction, and political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations, and vests the operational authority for directing these operations in the Secretary-General who also delegates responsibility for the administration and provision of executive direction for, all UN peacekeeping operations to the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG DPKO).

#### **Operational Level:**

- The field-based management of a peacekeeping operation at the Mission Headquarters is considered to be the operational level. The following senior officials hold operational level authority, and command and control responsibilities at the Mission Headquarters level:
  - Head of Mission (HOM);
  - Head of Military Component (HOMC);
  - Head of Police Component (HOPC);
  - Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary-General (DSRSG);
     and
  - Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMSICMS)
- In addition, there are several joint, integration and coordination structures that support mission-wide coherence at the operational level. These are not command and control structures but they support the integration effort across the peacekeeping operation under the authority of the Head of Mission.

#### **Tactical Level:**

- This entails the management of military, police and civilian operations below the level of Mission Headquarters as well as the supervision of individual personnel. It is exercised at various levels by subordinate commanders of respective components and designated civilian heads at levels below the Mission Headquarters. Tactical level includes all subordinate command levels established within the military command frameworks i.e. Brigade, Regional, and Sector Commanders etc.
- Tactical level commanders report directly to their respective operational commanders. This level of command and control generally involves the physical conduct of tasks in order to implement or safeguard the mission's mandate. Where a Division Headquarters is established in the operational chain of command, this headquarters shall be considered to be at the operational level of command and control although reporting to the HOMC at Mission Headquarters.

#### **Status of UNDPKO Authority, Command and Control Relations**

The authority, command and control arrangements within military components of United Nations peacekeeping operations as well as their relationship with other uniformed and civilian components is an important tool for effective integration of the mission effort in multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Clear command and control arrangements also support greater cohesiveness amongst all mission elements, leading to efficient and effective implementation of mandates and strengthening the

mission's preparedness to handle crisis situations. This allows the higher and lower level commanders and staff at all levels to have a common understanding of the status of the command and control they have issued or received.

Authority, command and control arrangements also clarify the inherent responsibilities, degree of separate employment or tasking, and caveats associated with the employment or deployment of resources assigned to them.

| Status of UNDPKO Command and Control   | Slide 11 |
|--|----------|
| <ul> <li>United Nations Operational Authority (OPA)</li> <li>Tasking Authority (TA)</li> <li>Command (COMD)</li> <li>United Nations Operational Control (OPCON)</li> <li>United Nations Tactical Command (TACOM)</li> <li>United Nations Tactical Control (TACON)</li> <li>Administrative Control (ADCON)</li> </ul> |          |



Note that Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) retain Full Command of forces assigned to a mission.

#### **United Nations Operational Authority**

The authority transferred by the member states to the U N to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, Formed Police Units and/or military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. Operational authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General. In the field mission Operational Authority is vested in the SRSG.

#### **Tasking Authority**

The authority vested in specified senior appointments (Head of Military Component (HOMC), Head of Police Component (HOPC) or Director of Mission Support /Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) to assign tasks to enabling units. This includes the authority to deploy, redeploy and employ all or part of an enabling unit to achieve the mission's mandate. Enabling units comprise aviation, engineering, logistics, medical, signals, transport and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units. Tasking authority over military or police personnel/units, when exercised by civilians is applicable for their routine, day to day employment.

#### Command

The authority vested in a Military Commander for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. Command denotes functional and knowledgeable exercise of military authority to attain military objectives.

#### **United Nations Operational Control**

The authority granted to a Military Commander in a United Nations
Peacekeeping Operation to direct forces assigned so that the Commander may
accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or
location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to
retain or assign Tactical Command or Control of those units/personnel. This includes
the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units, as the operational necessities
require, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent
Commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters.

#### **United Nations Tactical Command**

The authority delegated to a commander in a United Nations Peacekeeping operation to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

#### **United Nations Tactical Control**

The detailed and local direction and control of movement, or manoeuvre, necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate the Tactical Control of assigned military forces/police personnel to the subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.

#### **Administrative Control**

The authority over subordinate or other organizations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in peacekeeping operations.

Status of UNDPKO Command and Control Matrix

| Status of UNDPKO Command and Control Matrix |     |                                   |      |       |       |       | Slide 12 |  |
|---|-----|-----------------------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|----------|--|
| Details                                     | OPA | TA<br>(Enabling<br>Units<br>Only) | COMD | OPCON | TACOM | TACON | ADCON    |  |
| Assign Mission                              | Х   | X                                 | Х    |       |       |       |          |  |
| Delegate Equal<br>Command and<br>Control    | Х   | Х                                 | Х    |       |       | Х     |          |  |
| Separate Employment of Components           | Х   | Х                                 | Х    | Х     |       |       |          |  |
| Assign Task                                 | Х   | Х                                 | Х    | Х     | Х     |       |          |  |
| Delegate Lower<br>Command and<br>Control    | Х   | Х                                 | Х    | Х     | Х     | Х     |          |  |
| Coordinate Local movement                   | Х   | Х                                 | Х    | Х     | Х     | Х     |          |  |
| Service Support<br>Responsibility           |     |                                   |      |       |       |       | Х        |  |

This matrix should only serve as a guide. Situations in the mission may necessitate adoption of some other local arrangements to complement these ones.

# **UN Operational Area Organisation**

This is a complete visualisation of the operational area for the challenges, possibilities, and limitations it offers in deploying military forces. It entails the use of operational concepts to guide both command and staff in seizing and maintaining initiative. Operational Area Organisation helps commanders to control regulate the tempo operation and also ensures that the operation is planned and conducted with a higher degree of certainty.

| Operational Area Organisation |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Decisive Operations           |  |  |  |  |
| Shaping Operations            |  |  |  |  |
| Sustainment Operations        |  |  |  |  |
|                               |  |  |  |  |

The operational area organisation involves the allocation of resources in the area of operation (AO) by purpose. The purpose could be the conduct of one or a combination of the concepts of shaping, sustainment or decisive operations. The application of these concepts in MCPP is a useful approach to providing a simple but comprehensive guide to the development of creative operational area organisation. These concepts form the basis for the development of the Concept of Operations

(describing how shaping operations will facilitate decisive operations), assignment of tasks and allocation of resources to all units in the AO. They entail a functional categorisation of military activities in an operational area in a way that helps in phasing, synchronising, and focusing those activities toward mission success.

#### **Decisive Operation**

Decisive operations are carried out to directly accomplish the task/mission assigned by the higher headquarters. A Decisive Operation has a direct bearing and conclusively determines the outcome of the Mission's success. Depending on complexities of the situation, there may be multiple activities conducted concurrently or sequentially as part of one decisive operation.

#### **Shaping Operations**

Shaping Operations entail all activities conducted to create and preserve conditions for the success of Decisive Operations. These include those activities that limit the operational capabilities and freedom of movement of armed elements, such as cordon and search and check points, long range/air inserted patrols etc. Shaping Operations may also involve hearts and minds operations like Quick Impact Projects (QIP) and other humanitarian activities to gain the confidence, acceptability and support of the local or civil population. Shaping Operations therefore begin before and continue after Decisive Operations and may be conducted throughout the operation

#### **Sustainment Operations**

Sustainment Operations generate, maintain and synergise the enabling environment for the conduct of shaping and decisive operations. This includes the timely and adequate provision of appropriate administrative and logistic support, base and rear area security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development to the mission elements. Sustainment Operations are hence influenced by the operational tempo of the AO. It is therefore important for the rhythm of the operation and anticipates the operational requirements to support it. Also, effective Sustainment Operations serves as a force multiplier for the mission.

In UNMIL for example; the success of the Mission hinged on one Decisive


Operation - a successful conduct of the Liberian Presidential Elections. This ranged
from the ensuring a secure environment for pre-voting activities, provision of security to
all polling stations during voting, crowd control after announcement of the result and
provision of security for the inauguration of the president elect. Some Shaping

Operations that heralded the Decisive Operations included Long Range Patrols,
supporting the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes,
extensive cordon and search operations and domination of the AO with a progressive
system of checkpoints, observation posts, and day night foot and mobile patrols.

Group Participants into three syndicates and either give them a separate mission mandate or a single mission mandate for them to ascertain and present the decisive, shaping and sustainment operation that may be applicable to that or those mission(s).

The Military Component Planning Process (MCPP) is designed to give effect to the DPKO Military Planning Process (MPP) at the Force and Sector HQs in the field. It is designed to increase the awareness of the staff officers about the process. It also provides good grounds for incorprorating the IMPP in the Mission's decision making process.

# **The Planning Process**



The Military Component Planning Process has six steps as shown on the slide above. It is here depicted cyclically because of its continuous nature in DPKO led Peacekeeping Operations. Also the Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) is centrally located due to the fact that it provides inputs for the development of each step.

# **Step 1 Guidance**

| Step 1. Guidance   | Slide 15 |
|--|----------|
| <ul> <li>Collect DPKO Guidance Materials</li> <li>Study Initial Assessment of Operational Environment</li> <li>Prepare/Update Staff Estimates</li> <li>Conduct Quick Time Estimate</li> <li>Issue Initial Warning Order</li> </ul> |          |

It is recommended that the instructor includes a mission specific example that illustrates some of the guidance contained for that mission

|   | Step 1. Guidance                      | Slide 16 |
|---|---------------------------------------|----------|
|   | Collection of DPKO Guidance Materials |          |
|   |                                       |          |
| • | UNHQ Strategic/Operational Estimates  |          |
| • | Technical Assessment Report           |          |
| • | Secretary General's Report            |          |
| • | Rules of Engagement                   |          |

- Integrated Strategic Framework
- Mission Concept
- CONOPS
- HOMC Directive
- Troop Contributing Country (TCC) Guidelines
- Input from other Programmes and Agencies



Provide participants with samples ahead of time for them to study. Establish linkages to IMPP.




The instructor could pose questions to participants to get their understanding of the importance of these materials and the AOE and why the need to prepare/update all Staff Estimates at this stage.

The first step of Guidance is the collection and study of DPKO guidance materials to understand the status of the operartion. Other materials like maps, field manuals and UN codes of conduct are also important at this stage.

#### **Initial Staff Estimates**

The conduct of Initial Staff Estimate involves the processing of significant facts, assumptions, events, and conclusions based on analyzed data in order to make recommendations on the best use of available resources. Normally overlooked resources include UN country elements whose input need to be sought especially in the implementation of protection mandate. A comprehensive Staff estimates consider both the tangible and intangible aspects of the entire AO and translate them into operational imperatives like combat capabilities, critical capabilities, critical vulnerabilities, and critical requirements of both friendly and forces and conflict parties. A good and timely staff estimates form the basis for analysing the operational Centres of Gravity (CoG) and a viable COA development.

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- The diagram above outlines how staff estimate is applied in the MCPP. The diagram seeks to clear some confusion over the relationship between Staff Estimates and MCPP. Upon receipt of the assigned mission, both command and staff elements will start conduct of staff estimates usually under the guidance of the Chief of Staff. The arrows indicate where Staff Estimates feeds the planning process. The various stages of the MCPP are connected by dotted lines.
- Conducting staff estimates for MCPP is a continuous process. Due to the fluidity and complexity of UN operations, staff estimates need to be prepared and constantly updated to enable the military component to seize and maintain initiative of military operational activities. Apart from the initial estimates at the commencement of the operation, staff estimates are also updated or prepared when new facts are recognized or there are changes to the mandate. Also, due to insufficient information at the beginning of the operation, there are many assumptions made to fill in the 'information gap'. Staff estimates are therefore updated when assumptions are replaced with facts or when those assumptions become invalid or irrelevant.

# Step 1. Guidance

#### Sample Format for Staff Estimates

- Mission (Given by higher HQ)
- Higher Commander's Intent
- Situation
  - Characteristics of area of operation
  - Conflict Parties
  - UN Mission Component (Military, Police, and Civillians)
  - UN Country Team
  - Other NGOs and GOs
  - Assumptions
- Analysis
  - Each COA
  - Troops to Task
- Comparison
- Conclusions
- Recommendations
- The assigned mission should be placed in the context of the higher commander's intent to set the stage for the conduct of the estimate. The Situation paragraph considers the characteristics of the AO in terms of how the weather, terrain, economic, socio-political, infrastructure etc will impact on the operation. The conflict parties' dispositions, composition, strength, capabilities, and COAs as they affect particular staff areas of concern are considered. The mission military component's resources and capabilities to coordinate with or contain those factors and key assumptions are also assessed.
- Due to the cyclical nature of the MCPP, after making input to the COAs there is always the need to re-analyze those COAs and also do comparison (when necessary) in order to come up with conclusions and make recommendations for the next stage. It is also essential to conduct quick time to task estimate in order to come up with planning timeline for the conduct of the MCPP.

| Step 1. Guidance SampleTime Estimate |          |                     |                                  |                                     |                                      |             |  |
|--------------------------------------|----------|---------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|--|
| Time<br>Now:                         | Time     |                     | ZMAY11 (DTG)<br>completed by 062 | Time availal<br>2100ZMAY11          | ole – 50Hrs                          | Remarks     |  |
| Activity:                            | Guidance | Mission<br>Analysis | COA<br>Development               | COA<br>Analysis<br>and<br>Selection | Development<br>of CONOPS /<br>Orders | Contingency |  |
| % of<br>Time<br>Allotted:            | 5%       | 10%                 | 20%                              | 35%                                 | 20%                                  | 10%         |  |
| Time<br>in<br>Minutes:               | 150mins  | 300mins             | 600mins                          | 1,050mins                           | 600mims                              | 300mins     |  |
| Real<br>Time:                        | 030930Z  | 031430Z             | 041230Z                          | 051800Z                             | 061600Z                              | 062100Z     |  |

This is a simple and basic sample timeline to serve as a guide. Staff Officers are to consider the exigencies of the situation and the higher commander or supervisors requirements and priorities. It is also necessary to make room for "buffer" or "cushion" time in order to take care of unexpected situations. Also note that this Time Estimate is based on one-third of the total time available.

#### One-third/Two-thirds Rule

It is important to note that, sub units will need adequate time for their planning and preparations. As a general rule, a minimum of two-thirds of the time available is allocated to sub-units. The application of one-third/two-third rule allows subunits to do detailed planning and preparation. Consideration should however be given to the use of information technology for parallel and collaborative planning if available and secure.

#### **Issue Initial Warning Order**


A warning order is an executive order that initiates preparation among all concerned units and personnel for an impending operation. Warning orders are subject to continuous update during the planning process. They are therefore normally numbered progressively (Warning Order No.1 etc). Formats for warning order normally depend on the amount of details needed to be included, time available, and the available means of communication. For MCPP, warning orders would normally be detailed and would therefore take the form of an operation order in order to cover all the essential details and provide all the necessary information available to subunits and staff elements to proceed with their planning and preparations. The second and the third warning orders are issued after FC's Approval and Guidance for the Re-stated Mission, and Selection of Course of Action (Steps2 and 4 respectively).

# Slide 20 Step 1. Guidance **Sample Warning Order Format** WARNING ORDER No. 1 Copy No. 4 of 48 References: 1. SITUATION a. Conflict Parties b. Friendly forces c. Attachments and detachments 2. MISSION 3. EXECUTION Intent (when available) a. Concept of operation (when available) b. Tasks c. Coordinating instructions (1) Earliest movement time and degree of notice (2) Orders group (attendees, location, and time) (when applicable) 4. SERVICE SUPPORT a. Ration b. Special equipment c. Transportation etc. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The MCPP has five phases with the Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE), playing an interconnecting role in the entire process.

# **Analysis of the Operational Environment**

For the military planning staff of the mission FHQ to have a better understanding of the operational area and the options available to mission elements and conflict parties, the process of AOE needs to be carried out. The AOE is a systematic and continuous process of analyzing the threats and the operational environment in order to produce an appropriate description of how they affect mandate implementation. Hence, this process informs the Force Commander in selecting the appropriate Course of Action (COA) for an effective and efficient implementation of the mandate.



The slide above shows the five cyclical steps for MCPP and highlights (with red ring) the interconnecting role of the AOE. Before showing the slide below; ascertain the participants' level of comprehension of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) which forms the basis for the AOE. Participants should also be referred to related the lesson in Module 5 – Information Gathering

# Analysis of the Operational Environment (Steps)

- Description of the Operational Environment
  - Describe the environment
  - Analyse the Terrain
  - Describe the effects on operations
- Threat Evaluation
  - Conflict Parties
  - Internal Dynamics
  - External Interest
- Determination of Threat's Courses of Action
  - Visualise Potential Problems Using Effects
  - Determine Conflict Parties' Most Dangerous and Most Likely COAs
- Develop Information Collection Plan
- Risk Management

The conduct of AOE at the operational level is a J2 staff responsibility. This will usually involve further gathering of information on the ground and fine-tuning of inputs received from the AOE carried out at the Strategic level (DPKO) to feed the MCPP throughout the lifetime of the mission.

Slide 22

| Analysis of the Operational Environment              |                          |              |  |  |  |  |
|--|--------------------------|--------------|--|--|--|--|
| Description of the Operational Environment (Factors) |                          |              |  |  |  |  |
| Climatic   | Climatic Cultural Social |              |  |  |  |  |
| Terrain  | Religious                | Political    |  |  |  |  |
| Infrastructural                                      | Historical               | Economic etc |  |  |  |  |

- This step involves putting together all the features of the operational environment that have the potential to influence the course of the conflict and/or affect the successful implementation of the mandate.
- In describing the effects on operations, both elements of UN Presence and conflict parties need to be considered. The J2 staff must identify the opportunities, possibilities, and limitations the environment presents to the potential operations of both UN mission elements and the conflict parties. The effects need to be analysed on a case by case basis and put in context to avoid the tendency for overgeneralization.



For example, in assessing the effect on own and adversary forces, fine weather may appear to be positive for the PKO. However, a more detailed and balanced analysis may reveal that, because the PKO has more alternate, faster and reliable means of movement, that situation might even be more valuable to a conflict party who relies solely on unpaved road network for movement

| Analysis of the Operational Environment |   |  |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|--|
| TI                                      | hreat Evaluation  |  |  |  |
| Conflict Parties                        |   |  |  |  |
| •                                       | Composition and organization (to include size, leadership and chain of command) Tactical doctrine Weapons and equipment Sustainment systems Sources of motivation External and internal support Military and political objective, etc |  |  |  |

Threat evaluation is a detailed study of the conflict parties, their composition and organization (to include size, leadership and chain of command), tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, sustainment systems, source of motivation, external and internal support, military and political objective, etc.

#### **Analysis of the Operational Environment**

#### Slide 25

#### Threat Evaluation (Cont...)

- External Interest
  - Regional organisations
  - Neighbouring countries
  - Position of powerful countries on the conflict
  - Governmental and non-governmental organisations, etc
- Internal Dynamics (See factors under description of operational environment).
- Due to the usual complex nature of current conflicts, there may also be the need to study the external interest and internal dynamics players such as regional organisations, countries, governmental and non-governmental organisations, etc. Threat evaluation determines the threat's intent, capabilities and limitations and how the threat's reaction under a given circumstance could in anyway affect mandate implementation.

#### **Determination of Threat's Courses of Action**

Slide 26

- Prepare a List of Potential Problems Using Effects
- Develop Conflict Parties Most Dangerous and Most Likely COAs
- Prepare Information Collection Plan
- Based on the Threat Evaluation, the data gathered need to be analysed and the potential problems visualised and clearly stated or expressed in the form of effect schematics. For example, DEMONSTRATIONS, RIOTING, SEIZE, etc. Then the conflict parties' most dangerous and most likely COAs would be developed by describing the options available to them.
- e.g For example, Conflict Party A might want to DISRUPT the electoral process in der to maintain the on-going political stalemate.
  - The most dangerous COAs are those that when taken by conflict parties would have serious consequences on the achievement of their objectives and the most likely COAs are those that are feasible and therefore likely for them to take. After coming up with the most likely COAs, a comprehensive Information Collection Plan needs to be developed through the tasking of all available resources to gather and provide pertinent information within a required time limit as part of the information cycle.

### **Analysis of the Operational Environment**

Slide 25

#### Threat Evaluation (Cont...)

- Risk Management
  - Identify Risk.
  - Asses Risk
  - **Develop Control Measures**
  - Disseminate Controls Measures
  - Monitor
  - Evaluate

It is advisable to first introduce participants to terms below in order to facilitate understanding of risk management.

### Risk Management

The identification and assessment of potential risks in a given Course of Action with the view to minimizing, monitoring, and controlling its probability and possibly exploiting its inherent opportunities.

Slide 27

Risk Management is a six-step process, which identifies operational hazards and takes reasonable measures to reduce risk to personnel, equipment and the mandate. The Mission Concept and the ISF are good sources for inputs into this exercise. The FC and his staff identify some potential hazards based on those documents, and the staff analysis in order to make initial assessment of risk levels in the operational area.

#### Hazards

A condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesirable situation

Slide 28

Hazards are sources of danger or risks due to enemy or adversary presence and other conditions not due to enemy or adversary capabilities.

#### Risk

Risk is the chance of hazard or bad consequences occurring.

Slide 29

Risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from hazards due to the presence of an enemy, an adversary, or some other hazardous condition, stance

# **Risk Management Principles**

Transference (to another party)

Slide 30

- AvoidanceReductionAcceptanceExploitation
- The FC decides on the level of acceptable risk that he is willing to take. The objective of risk management is to protect the force and civilians and increase the chance of mandate accomplishment.
- The key principle to consider in conducting risk management include transferring the risk to another party(if that will be advantageous to the UN), avoiding the risk, reducing the negative effect or probability of the risk, accepting some or all of its consequences or even where possible, exploiting any potential opportunity the risk may offer to us.

|                               | Slide 31 |
|-------------------------------|----------|
| Risk Management Process       |          |
| Identify Hazards              |          |
| Assess Hazards                |          |
| Develop Control Measures      |          |
| Disseminate Controls Measures |          |
| Monitor                       |          |
| Evaluate                      |          |
|                               |          |

- Risk management is both command and staff responsibility. It behoves on both elements to work together to ensure an effective risk management system is in place in the mission.
- First, all hazards to the force's current and future operations need to be identified. A hazard is any existing or potential condition that can cause injury, harm, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or degrade operational security.
- Each hazard is then assessed to determine the risk of potential loss based on probability and severity of the hazard. The probability and severity levels of a hazard are estimated based on the available knowledge on its probability of occurrence and the severity of its consequences. The risk level is determined by the intersection of the probability column and the severity row. The matrix below

|          | Individual Hazard - Risk Assessment Matrix |          |        |            |        |          |         |  |
|----------|--|----------|--------|------------|--------|----------|---------|--|
| F        | PROBABILITY                                | Frequent | Likely | Occasional | Seldom | Unlikely | Remarks |  |
| s        | Catastrophic                               | E        | E      | Н          | Н      | M        |         |  |
| E        | Critical                                   | E        | Н      | Н          | M      | L        |         |  |
| V<br>  E | Marginal                                   | Н        | M      | M          | L      | L        |         |  |
| R        |  |          |        |            |        |          |         |  |
| <br>  T  | Negligible                                 | Н        | L      | L          | L      | L        |         |  |
| Υ        |  |          |        |            |        |          |         |  |

Individual hazard-risk assessments are conducted throughout the MCPP and must consider both mission and non-mission related aspects that may have an impact. The end result of this assessment is an initial estimate of risk for each identified hazard expressed in terms of **EXTREMELY HIGH**, **HIGH**, **MODERATE**, or **LOW** as determined from the standardized application of the risk assessment matrix.

| Hazard Probability                                | Slide 33 |
|---|----------|
| (The likelihood that an event will occur)         |          |
| Frequent- Occurs often, continuously experienced. |          |
| Likely - Occurs several times.                    |          |
| Occasional - Occurs sporadically.                 |          |
| Seldom - Unlikely, but could occur at some time.  |          |
| Unlikely - Can assume it will not occur.          |          |
|   |          |

**SEVERITY** (The degree of injury, property damage, or other mission-impairing factors)

**Catastrophic** - Death or permanent total disability, system loss, major property damage.

**Critical** - Permanent partial disability, temporary total disability in excess of three months, major system damage, significant property damage.

**Marginal** - Minor injury, lost workday accident, minor system damage, minor property damage.

**Negligible -** First aid or minor medical treatment, minor system impairment RISK LEVELS

**E (Extremely High)** - Loss of ability to accomplish mission.

**H (High)** - Significantly degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standard.

M (Moderate) - Degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.

L (Low) - Little or no impact on accomplishment of mission

- Risk management here is distinct from the one done by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). In MCPP, risk management is directed at reducing operational uncertainties while taking advantage of opportunities. This leads to the development of control and risk reduction measures to ensure acceptable levels of risks are not exceeded.
- Risk management is a crosscutting exercise in the entire Military Component Planning Process and even more crucial during the execution process.
- The presence of many ex-combatants in an AO may be a threat to the peace process but their capacity to mobilise and their ability to access weapons is a risk that has to be constantly managed mostly in collaboration with all stake holders in the conflict.



# Learning Activity 1 (Assessment of the Operational Environment) Instructor's Guidelines

In this scenario based exercise, participants are required to be exercised the preparation of staff estimates and conduct of AOE.


Participants should be provided with this learning activity at reasonable time ahead of the lesson to enable them prepare adequately for it.

# **Learning Activity Time Required:**

| 5 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions      |  |  |
|------------|---|--|--|
| 15 minutes | Syndicate discussions                       |  |  |
| 10 minutes | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |  |  |
| 30 minutes | *total time dependent number of groups      |  |  |

Total time:

| Learning    | Learning Activity 1 (Assessment of the Operational Environment) Instructor's Guidelines |  |  |  |  |
|-------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| Lea         | Learning Activity Time Required:  |  |  |  |  |
|             | 5 minutes   |  |  |  |  |
|             | 15 minutes Syndicate discussions  |  |  |  |  |
|             | 10 minutes Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate)                                  |  |  |  |  |
| Total time: | 30 minutes  | *total time dependent number of groups |  |  |  |



Highlight the importance of Mission Analysis and the pivotal role it plays in the entire planning process.

| Step 2. Mission Analysis  | Slide 36 |
|---|----------|
| Mission Analysis is an important planning tool that guides the MCPP. It helps the command and staff elements to refine their situational awareness and understanding in order to have better visualization of the operational environment |          |

While the staff may have a role in the mission analysis, its completion is a command responsibility.

| Step 2. Mission Analysis          |                                |                                 |         | Slide<br>37 |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|-------------|
| Inputs                            | Process                        | Output                          | Remarks |             |
| 1. CPs COAs                       | 1. Review AOE                  | 1. Re-stated                    |         |             |
| 2. Staff                          | 2. Analyse Higher HQ           | Mission                         |         |             |
| Estimates                         | Msn/Intent                     | 2. Commander's                  |         |             |
| 3. Restated                       | 3. Identify Specified Implied, | Intent                          |         |             |
| Mission                           | and Essential Tasks            | 3. Commander's                  |         |             |
| 4. Cdr's 4. Determine Constraints |                                | Guidance                        |         |             |
| Guidance /                        | and Restrictions               | 4. Warning Order                |         |             |
| Intent                            | 5. Conduct Operational Risk    | No.2                            |         |             |
|                                   | Assessment                     | 5. Risk Assessment              |         |             |
|                                   | 6. Troops to Task              | Chart                           |         |             |
|                                   | Assessment                     | <ol><li>Updated Staff</li></ol> |         |             |
|                                   | 6. Identify and Analyse        | Estimate                        |         |             |
|                                   | Critical Facts and             | 7. Mission Analysis             |         |             |
|                                   | Assumptions                    | Brief                           |         |             |
|                                   |                                |                                 |         |             |

#### **Review of AOE**

The AOE is a continuous and cyclical process and therefore needs to be reviewed at every phase of MCPP. New information or strategic direction will affect the direction of MCPP, so before developing the Mission, AOE must be reviewed to keep the mission development in context.

#### **Analyse Higher HQ Mission/Intent**

The commander's intent provides specific military direction and intentions from the USG to achieve effective mandate implementation. Commander's Intent is not meant to be too specific; it links the mission to the concept of operations by stating the key task(s). Higher commander's intent forms the basis for subordinates' exercise of initiative. Commanders may also use the commander's intent to explain a broader purpose beyond that of the mission statement. The mission and the commander's intent must be understood two echelons down

#### Step 2. Mission Analysis

#### Slide 38

# Sample Higher Comd' Intent

Purpose: To Neutralise Conflict Parties' ability to conduct offensive operations by conducting operational activities to seize all arms ammunition and war-like materials in the AO.

Description: To dominate the AO with a system of Checkpoints Observation Posts, Patrols, then conduct Cordon & Search operations whiles providing intimate support to thel disarmament processes in the AO.

Endstate: A state where Conflict Parties do not have the capacity to threaten the peace process through the use of arms

- The purpose provides the reason for the force conducting the operation.
- Gives a general description of how the purpose is to be achieved.
- Endstate provides the success criteria.

#### **Identification and Analysis of Tasks**

This involves the categorisation of tasks into specified, implied and essential by the staff officers as part of the operational area organisation.

#### **Review of AOE**

Refer participants to the connection this categorisation has with the concept Operational Area Organisation with specific reference to Decisive, Shaping and Sustainment Operations.

#### Step 2. Mission Analysis

# **Categorisation of Tasks**

- Specified Tasks Stated tasks in DPKO CONOPS
- Implied Tasks Those task that need to be performed to accomplish a specified task, but which are not specifically ordered.
- Essential Tasks Those specified and/or implied task(s) that must be carried out in order to accomplish the assigned mission.
- Specified tasks must be completed because they have been ordered specifically from higher HQ. Detailed analysis of the specified tasks (including any procedural requirements) and other relevant factors in the Area of Operation will result in the identification of implied tasks. Only those implied tasks that require the allocation of resources should be retained. A list of essential tasks could also be prepared to focus the commander during the mission analysis.

# Step 2. Mission Analysis

# **Operational Limitations**

- Constraints Requirements imposed by superior authority that affect the manner in which the subordinate's operation can be conducted
- Restraints Prohibitions imposed by superior authority that affect the manner in which the subordinate's operation can be conducted
- Caveats Restrictions attached to the deployment of troops or employment of resources
- Operational Limitations are action required or prohibited by higher authority; such as constraints or restraints and caveats that limit the commander's freedom of action. Constraints take the form of a requirement to do something. For example, maintain a reserve of three squadrons of a Quick Reaction Unit. Restraints are prohibitions that are imposed by a superior authority. Caveats are limits associated with the use of resources as a result of agreements reached between TCCs and the UN. Operational limitations are considered only if they affect the manner in which the commander can conduct the operation.

#### Slide 39

The difference between constraints and restraints could spark an argument during discussion. Participants should be encouraged to view them from operational context as explained below:

Constraints - 'Must do' actions (i.e. must include local police in long range patrols or that, the battalion must conduct four or more long range patrols per month).

Restraints - 'Must not do' actions (i.e. operations must not obstruct legal economic activities or must not conduct operational activities between 0100 and 0500 hrs).

- It is important that staff officers consider these operational limitations with the following questions in mind:
  - What does it mean to me?
  - What does it mean to potential spoilers?
  - What do I need to do?

# Step 2. Mission Analysis

# Commander's Critical Information Requirements

- Priority Information Requirements (PIR) A list of information requirements which the commander has an anticipated and stated priority. It is the highest priority information requirements and must be approved by the commander. PIRs are normally in the form of questions and with time limits.
- Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) —
   Prohibitions imposed by superior authority that affect the manner in which the subordinate's operation can be conduct
- Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) Restrictions attached to the deployment of troops or employment of resources

CCIR usually result in the generation of three types of information requirements: Priority Information Requirements (PIR), Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR).

#### Step 2. Mission Analysis

#### Slide 42

#### **Critical Facts**

Facts are statements of known data or actual or existing circumstances of the operational environment including the Conflict Parties' and the mission components' strengths, dispositions, resources etc. Critical facts are therefore those facts that need to be analysed because of their crucial importance in determining the state of affairs in the mission.



Conflict Party A is on record to have used a Multiple Rocket Launchers during the conflict but has not turned them in for disarmament.

# Step 2. Mission Analysis

#### Slide 43

# **Assumptions**

- Assumptions state essential conditions, which must exist if a specific plan is to succeed; take the place of facts; must be valid and necessary; and regularly validated.
- Example:

The population generally support the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the presence of peacekeeping troops in the area of responsibility (AOR)

- Assumptions are appropriate if they meet the tests of validity and necessity. The validity of an assumption has to do with its likelihood to be true. Necessity is whether the assumption is essential for planning or not. Where planning could go on without the assumption, it becomes unnecessary and should be discarded. Assumptions are to be replaced with facts as soon as possible
- Upon analysing critical facts and assumptions, the staff officer will identify some information gaps that need to be answered if the mission should progress successfully. These are known as Information Requirements (IR). The most important IRs are termed Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). CCIRs identify information needed by the commander to make critical decisions, especially to determine or validate courses of action. They help the commander filter information available to him by defining what is important to mission accomplishment.

#### **Development of Mission Statement**

The final output of mission analysis is the development of a mission statement for the FCs approval during the mission analysis brief. This is a clear and concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted (The order of the elements may vary)

# Step 2. Mission Analysis Five Elements of a Mission Statement • Who - (The Unit) to execute the action? • What - type of action (i.e. Protect Civilians) is contemplated? • When - will the action begin? • Where — will the action occur? • Why — (for what purpose) will each Unit conduct its part?

Note to instructor: Invite some participants to give sample missions statements. Also anticipate questions on the "Why" aspect of the mission statement which may be new to some participants. The "Why" gives the unifying purpose that forms the basis for the exercise of initiative by subordinate commanders. It is normally stated as "In order to....." followed by the reason why the tasked commander should carry out the assigned mission.

#### **Commanders Intent**

# Slide 45 Commanders Intent Must be understood two levels down and contain: Clear and concise statement of the success criteria and desired end-state Key tasks that become the basis for planning

The FC's intent is stated in a clear, concise statement of the success criteria with respect to the current situation, the terrain and the desired end-state. It will also contain key tasks that are the basis for initiative of subordinates.

For new peacekeeping missions, due to the absence of the HQ staff and in most cases the Head of Military Component, the Intent and the initial CONOPS are in fact

Slide 47

developed by the Military Planning Service (MPS), DPKO. However, once the staff officers arrive and the Force HQ starts functioning, the FC may review the plan developed by the DPKO including the Commander's Intent in line with ground realities.

#### **Mission Analysis Brief**

| Step 2. Mission Analysis |  | Slide 46 |
|--------------------------|--|----------|
|                          | Mission Analysis Brief - Purpose                 |          |
| •                        | To integrate the mission analysis                |          |
| •                        | Seek approval of the re-stated Mission Statement |          |
| •                        | Obtain additional guidance from the FC           |          |

This is a summary of the directives, decisions, initial concerns, and a description of the mission as perceived by the commander. Its purpose is to integrate the mission analysis, seek the FC's approval of the Re-stated Mission Statement and obtain his additional guidance. After the FC's guidance, Warning order No2 will be issued.

|                | Step 2. Mission Analysis            | Ondo 4        |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|
| Sa             | ample Mission Analysis Brief Format |               |
| Briefer        | Subject                             | $\neg$ $\mid$ |
| Chief of Staff | Purpose and Agenda                  |               |
| J2             | Initial J2 Estimate                 |               |
| J3             | Operations                          |               |
| J1             | Personnel service support           |               |
| J4             | Sustainment systems                 |               |
| J5             | Initial CIMIC estimate.             |               |
| Chief of Staff | Proposed restated mission           |               |
| Commander      | Guidance                            |               |

This format should only serve as a guide. The commander's style and the situations on the ground should determine the schedule.



# **MISSION ANALYSIS WORK SHEET**



| MISSION (ASSIGNED)     |            | HIGHER (   | COMMANDERS' INTENT |  |
|------------------------|------------|------------|--------------------|--|
|                        |            | 1. TWO UP  |                    |  |
| MY ROLE (IN ONE UP COM | ID'S PLAN) | 2. ONE UP  |                    |  |
|                        |            |            |                    |  |
| SPECIFIED TASK         | <b>(S</b>  | I          | MPLIED TASKS       |  |
| 1.                     |            | 1.         | 3.                 |  |
| 2.                     |            | 2.         | 4.                 |  |
| RESOURCES AVAIL        | ABLE       |            | CAVEATS            |  |
| 1. 3.                  |            | 1.         |                    |  |
| 2. 4.                  |            | 2.         |                    |  |
| CONSTRAINTS            |            | RESTRAINTS |                    |  |
| 1.                     |            | 1.         |                    |  |
| 2.                     |            | 2.         |                    |  |
| CCIR                   | H\         | /Ts        | KEY EVENTS         |  |
| PIR                    | 1.         |            | 1.                 |  |
|                        | 2.         |            | 2.                 |  |
| EEFI                   | 3.         |            | 3.                 |  |
|                        | HF         | PTs        | 4.                 |  |
| FFIR                   | 1.         |            | 5.                 |  |
|                        | 2.         |            | 6.                 |  |
|                        | 3.         |            | 7.                 |  |
|                        | 4.         |            | 8.                 |  |
| MISSION (RESTATED)     |            |            |                    |  |
| ,                      |            |            |                    |  |
|                        |            |            |                    |  |
|                        |            |            |                    |  |
|                        |            |            | (Slide 48)         |  |

The Resources Available to the FC should be listed up to battalion (or lower) level including units with caveats in order to provide a snap shot of the resource situation. This helps in developing realistic SOMs for each COA and also facilitates the preparation of Task Organisation after the Plan has been developed.

There is the tendency for questions to arise as to the differences between constraints, restraints and caveats. One explanation is that, while constraints and restraints are imposed by higher command in the mission for operational exigencies, caveats are imposed by national authorities before units deploy to the mission.



For example: Irish armoured regiment could be deployed on UN OPCON in UNMIL FOR URBAN PATROLS ONLY. This means that, although the FC has Irish armoured regiment under UN OPCON, the unit came with a caveat that it will only be used for urban patrols only. Caveats must be known ahead of the planning process because the may invariably influence the COAs.



#### **Instructor's Guidelines**

This is a follow up to the earlier exercise on staff estimates and AOE. As much as possible, linkages should be made to that one and participants should be encouraged to refer to the complete Carana Country Study to get the necessary information for the exercise. Good use of ingenuity and initiative should also be welcomed.


# **Learning Activity Time Required:**

| 5 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions      |  |  |
|------------|---|--|--|
| 15 minutes | Syndicate discussions                       |  |  |
| 10 minutes | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |  |  |
| 30 minutes | *total time dependent number of groups      |  |  |

Total time:

| Learning Activity 2 (Mission Analysis)                 |                                  |  | Slide 4 |
|--|----------------------------------|--|---------|
| Learning Activity Time Required:                       |                                  |  |         |
|  | 5 minutes                        | Activity introduction and instructions |         |
|  | 15 minutes Syndicate discussions |  |         |
| 10 minutes Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |                                  |  |         |
| Total time:  | 30 minutes                       | *total time dependent number of groups |         |

# **Step3. Course of Action Development**



Having thoroughly analysed the requirements of the mission, and after receiving command guidance and approval of the proposed mission statement, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander must involve himself in their development. His guidance and intent focus the staff's creativity to produce a comprehensive but flexible plan within the time constraints. His direct participation

helps the staff get quick, accurate answers to questions that occur during the process. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable COAs (difficult for the enemy to deduce). They are possible options for accomplishing the mission that are opened to the FC.

| Step 3. Course of Action Development          |  |             |         | Slide 51 |
|---|--|-------------|---------|----------|
| Inputs  | Process                                  | Output      | Remarks |          |
| 1. CPs COAs                                   | 1. Review FC's                           | 1. Prepare  |         |          |
| 2. Staff Estimates                            | 2. Staff Estimates Planning Guidance COA |             |         |          |
| 3. Restated 2. Analyse Centre of Statements / |  |             |         |          |
| Mission                                       | Gravity                                  | Graphics    |         |          |
| 4. Cdr's 3. Generate Options 2. COA           |  |             |         |          |
| Guidance / Intent                             | 4. Develop the Scheme                    | Development |         |          |
|   | of Manoeuvre                             | Brief       |         |          |
|   |  |             |         |          |

The Centre of Gravity Analysis would have been done at DPKO.

COA development begins with a review of the FC's Planning Guidance, provided in the Mission Analysis Brief. This provides the necessary direction and guidance to the planning staff to continue the estimate process and shape the development of the initial COAs. The Centre of Gravity Analysis would let the exercise go beyond mere Troops to Task Assessment and comparison of individual Conflict Party's (CP) strength, weapons and equipment as the UN military component would normally have better capabilities. The focus here should be on how to exploit each Conflict Party's Critical vulnerabilities and how they are likely to use their Critical Capabilities. Also vital is how we can effectively employ our Critical Capabilities and safeguard our Critical vulnerabilities well as that of the UN Country Presence.

| Step 3. Course of Action Development  | Slide 52 |
|---|----------|
| Centre of Gravity   |          |
| A characteristic, capability or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to engage in the operation. |          |

| Step 3. Course of Action Development | Slide 53 |
|--------------------------------------|----------|
| Elements of Centre of Gravity        |          |
| Critical Capabilities                |          |

- Critical Vulnerabilities
- Critical Requirements
- A COG will consist of Critical Capabilities (a characteristic or key element of a force that if destroyed or neutralised will significantly undermine operational capability), Critical Requirements (Enablers, essential condition, resource or means that is needed for a critical capability to be fully functional) and Critical Vulnerabilities (an element of a critical requirement that is vulnerable or that can be made vulnerable). While a COG can have several elements, there can be only one COG for each force. Analysing Conflict Parties' individual Critical Vulnerabilities is what is however important in COA development.
- When analysing Critical Capabilities, it is important to remember that it is not only about force ratio. The analysis must also result in identifying critical capabilities of the Conflict Parties that are vulnerable for action while identifying and protecting our own critical capabilities that are vulnerable

# Slide 54 Criteria Suitability (Will it result in Mission accomplishment?) Feasibility (Achievable within allocated resources?) Acceptability (Accepted doctrine, risk, etc)

- Development of (our own) COAs then commences. Options are generated for the FC to consider. The COAs are guided by the Conflict Parties' COAs developed during the AOE, Staff Estimates, the Restated Mission, and the FC's Guidance / Intent. Each COA will then be validated by testing against a number of factors such as:
  - Suitability Based on the guidance given from higher authorities

Exclusivity (Different from other COAs?)

Completeness (Answers the 5W questions?)

- Feasibility Force capability in terms of equipment, resources, availability of troops in time, robust ROE, etc.
- Acceptability In terms of legality, cost, colateral damage, casualties to UN troops and other staff, and resource availability.
- Exclusivity Each COA is clearly distinct from other COA


 Complete – Each COA should have sufficient details to explain the mission, how the mission goals and objectives will be achieved, and a broad concept of how operations will progress, taking into account possible future tasks.

| Step 3. Course of Action Development  |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| Scheme of Manoeuvre   |  |  |  |  |
| Description of how the FC's intent is expressed in the deployment of military assets under his command to accomplish the mission. |  |  |  |  |

For each COA, the Scheme of Manoeuvre usually provide an understanding of the manner in which the mission would be accomplished by assigning roles to sub-units and other resources to be employed. Also, the Main Effort, End State, and Success Criteria have to be designated and well defined.

Slide 56





**Intent:** To restore peace and security in Carana through effective safeguarding of the United Nations demilitarised zone while dominating the Area of Operation to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolution.

**SOM:** To secure the demilitarised zones with a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and Observation Posts while decentralising enabling units to the Sectors with a battlegroup size Force Mobile Reserve at Xalksa

**ME**: Safeguarding the United Nations demilitarised zones and lies with Sects 2 and 3 **End State**: Complete cessation of hostilities in Carana with UNAC presence felt in the entire country

**Success Criteria:** Free movement of UNCT and locals throughout Carana without fear of attack or harassment by conflict parties or criminal gangs.


This COA seeks to decentralise the Force's enabling units to the various Sectors while maintaining a battlegroup size Force Mobile Reserve at Xalksa to be ready to reinforce any of the sectors. The demilitarised zones will be safeguarded with a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and OPs.

Slide

57



Sample Course of Action (COA2)



Intent: To restore peace and security in Carana through effective safeguarding of the United Nations demilitarised zone while dominating the Area of Operation to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolution.

SOM: To secure the demilitarised zones with a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and Observation Posts while centralising enabling units and a strong Force Mobile Reserve of brigadegroup size at Xalksa.

ME: Safeguarding the United Nations demilitarised zones and lies with Sects 2 and

End State: Complete cessation of hostilities in Carana with UNAC presence felt in the entire country

Success Criteria: Free movement of UNCT and locals throughout Carana without fear of attack or harassment by conflict parties or criminal gangs.

This COA seeks to centralise the Force's enabling units at Xalksa with a strong (brigade group size) Force Mobile Reserve ready to support any of the sectors while maintaining a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and OPs to safeguard the demilitarised zones.



# **Learning Activity 3 (COA Development)** Instructor's Guidelines


In this scenario based exercise, participants are required to be exercised the preparation and delivery of COA brief.

Participants should be provided with this learning activity at reasonable time ahead of the lesson to enable them prepare adequately for it. **Learning Activity Time Required:** 

|             | 5 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|             | 20 minutes Syndicate discussions                           |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|             | 10 minutes   | Syndicates' delivery                   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total time: | al time: 35 minutes *total time dependent number of groups |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

| Learning Activity 3 (COA Development) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Learning Activity Time Required:      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                                       | 5 minutes  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                                       | 20 minutes Syndicate discussions                       |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                                       | 10 minutes Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total time:                           | ,  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

# **Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection**



COA Analysis identifies the strengths and weaknesses of each COA developed against all the possible threats toward successful accomplishment of the mission. It includes rules and steps that help the FC and staff officers visualize the way each COA is likely to unfold.

| Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection |                           |                      |  |  |  |  |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Inputs  | Inputs Process Output Rem |                      |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Conflict Parties' COA                        | 1. Conduct COA            | 1. COA Testing       |  |  |  |  |
| 2. COA Stmts /                                  | Testing (War-             | Results              |  |  |  |  |
| Sketches  | gaming)                   | 2. Task Organization |  |  |  |  |
| 3. Staff Estimates                              | 2. Conduct                | 3. CCIR              |  |  |  |  |
| 4.List of Assumptions                           | COA Evaluation            | 4. Control Measures  |  |  |  |  |
| 5.List of Critical Events                       | and Comparison            | 5. Decision Brief    |  |  |  |  |
| 6. Risk Management                              |                           | 6. Synch Matrix      |  |  |  |  |
| Chart   |                           | 7. Warning Order     |  |  |  |  |
| 7. ROE  |                           | No.3                 |  |  |  |  |
|   |                           |                      |  |  |  |  |

COA Testing (War-gaming) is a term used to describe a military boardroom simulation exercise conducted to analyse COAs against realistic threats through an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. It focuses the staff's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence in order to assess their possibilities and limitations in the operational environment for modifications. COA Testing exposes lapses in the COAs for CCIR and appropriate Control Measures to be generated.

| Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection COA Testing Methods |                        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| •   | Box Method             |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| •   | Belt Method            |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| •   | Avenue-in-depth Method |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Note to instructor: It is advisable to make this a participant led discussion as it entails maximum use of ingenuity and practicality. Participants must also be made to be aware that, depending on the availability of equipment or tools, testing COAs may range from full scale practical exercise to conduct of academic or verbal exchanges.

#### **Box Method**

- The Box Method involves the selection of key events like, Disarmament, Preelection, Elections, Post-elections problems etc and testing the COAs against them. This method is particularly useful for non-linear and non-contiguous operational environments – normal with PKOs.
- Participants should be encouraged to provide mission specific examples for discussion.

#### **Belt Method**

- The Belt Method is based on possible scenarios that may unfold throughout the life time of the PKO. Such scenarios can be found in the mission's ISF. This method is also good for operations in which high fluidity of events are anticipated.
- The UNOCI ISF for example had these three scenarios:

  Scenario A Successful elections with outcome accepted by all
  - Scenario B Continued stalemate and violence.
  - Scenario C No elections and no violence.

#### **Avenue-in-Depth Method**

The Avenue-in Depth method is based on a situation where only one option is being considered. This is also good for situations where the Decisive Operation takes place at the very beginning of the operation. This is hardly the case when it comes to UNPKOs. The Avenue-in Depth method can however be used in tandem with, or to support any of the other methods especially in more complex situations.

| Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
|   | COA Testing Guidelines                                  |  |  |  |  |  |
| •   | Remaining objective and impartial                       |  |  |  |  |  |
| •   | Continuous verification each COA's crediblity           |  |  |  |  |  |
| •   | Avoiding premature conclusions                          |  |  |  |  |  |
| •   | Each COA to be tested against each Conflict Party's COA |  |  |  |  |  |

It is advisable to make this a participant led discussion as it entails maximum use of ingenuity and practical experience.

|  |  |   | Slide 63 |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|---|----------|--|--|--|--|
| Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection Comparison |  |   |          |  |  |  |  |
| COA  | Advantages   | Disadvantages   |          |  |  |  |  |
| 1  | Surprise Less employment of robust capabilities                                  | Potential loss of domestic and international support May compromise inter – agency cooperation                  |          |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | Affords flexibility Provides Initiative Strengthens moral authority of UN forces | Lacks Long-term sustainability Vulnerability of forward deployed forces Highly dependent on Host Nation Support |          |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | Strong moral authority and international acceptance Domestically popular         | Loses military initiative Potentially attritional   |          |  |  |  |  |

The analysis of the COAs leads to the comparison of their individual advantages and disadvantages. From here, the COAs are compared with each other using the same criteria to determine the most appropriate COA. This exercise is called Course of Action Comparison. Although Course of Action Comparison is combined with the Course of Action Analysis, it is classified as a separate step by some military doctrines.

#### **Course of Action Evaluation**

COA Comparison entails the juxtaposing the most feasible COAs against a criterion in order to select the most feasible COA for the operation.

| Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection Evaluation |                  |      |      |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|------------------|------|------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Srl  | CRITERIA         | COA1 | COA2 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1  | Consent          | 3    | 2    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | Impartiality     | 4    | 4    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | Non Use of Force | 3    | 2    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | Legitimacy       | 5    | 3    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | Credibility      | 4    | 3    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | ROI              | 4    | 3    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | Risk Management  | 3    | 2    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | Totals           | 26   | 19   |  |  |  |  |  |

The criterion for comparison is decided upon considering factors such as the aim of the operation, the assigned mission, commander's intent (up to two-levels-up), the ROE etc. Available criteria include Functions in Combat, SWOT Analysis, and Principles of

Peacekeeping etc. The chosen criterion is then weighted against the COAs. For DPKO led peacekeeping missions, the use of the Peacekeeping effort Guiding Principles and other factors like Risks for mission personnel and country elements as well as peculiar mission specific factors are recommended.

| COA1 (Statement /or Schematic) COA2 (Stateme          | ent /or Schematic)               |
|---|----------------------------------|
|   |                                  |
| Intent Intent   |                                  |
| SOM SOM   |                                  |
| ME ME   |                                  |
|   | DVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES          |
| 3 Consent 2   |                                  |
| 4 Impartiality 4                                      |                                  |
| 3 Non Use of Force                                    |                                  |
| 5 Legitimacy 3  |                                  |
| 4 Credibility 3                                       |                                  |
| 4 Return on 3 Investment                              |                                  |
| 3 Risk 2<br>Management                                |                                  |
| Summary (of advantages and disadvantages) Summary (of | of advantages and disadvantages) |
| Total Score 26 19 To                                  | otal Score                       |

Staff Officers would upon completing the COA analysis, prepare a COA Decision Brief for presentation to the FC. The purpose of a Decision Briefing is to obtain the commander's decision on a recommended COA. Staff Officers will present the COAs where possible using graphics and sketches to justify their recomendations including draft Task Organisations (Task Orgs), the assumptions used and make recommendations. The commander, by his judgement may accept, modify, or even decline the COAs.

#### **Task organization**

Task organization (Task org) is the process of allocating resources to sub units and defining their command and control relationship including caveats. For a new mission, this process is carried out during the Development of CONOPS at the DPKO. However, for an on-going mission the Task Org may have to be modified to suit the prevailing situation. The commander's ability to tailor and task organize gives him/her the agility to organize their units to make best use available resources and also the ability to shift rapidly between operations of different levels of intensity.

| Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection COA Decision Brief Template |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| Briefer   | Subject                                      |  |  |  |  |
| Chief of Staff  | Higher Commander's Intent, situation, HOMC   |  |  |  |  |
|   | Guidance, conclusion                         |  |  |  |  |
| JMAC - J2   | AOE (Relevant aspects)                       |  |  |  |  |
| Chief of Ops / J3   | Re-stated Mission and Status of own forces   |  |  |  |  |
| Staff branches -  | Own situation                                |  |  |  |  |
| J1, 4, 5, 6, 9  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chief of Plans /J5  | COA Comparison (Including risks and control  |  |  |  |  |
|   | measures)                                    |  |  |  |  |
| Commander   | Decision                                     |  |  |  |  |
| Chief of Staff  | Apportion tasks to staff areas; plan for the |  |  |  |  |
|   | further development of the selected COA      |  |  |  |  |

#### **COA Selection**

Upon completion of the Decision Brief, the FC makes his decision on one or two COAs and provides further guidance for the next step of the MCPP – Development of CONOPS and Orders. If the FC selects two, he may indicate which COA has priority over the other. The Chief of Staff will then apportion tasks to the staff for the further development of the selected COA – Synchronisation Matrix.

| SOM   ME   | Step 4. Course of Action Analysis and Selection Sample Synchronisation Matrix Format |                            |        |  |        |        |        |     | S        |        |  |        |        |               |  |
|--|--|----------------------------|--------|--|--------|--------|--------|-----|----------|--------|--|--------|--------|---------------|--|
| NTENT   SOM   STATE    | ORIGINATOR: (HQ)   |                            |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| N   N   SUB UNIT 2   SUB UNIT 2   SUB UNIT 3   SUB UNIT 4   SUB UNIT 5   SUB UNIT 5   SUB UNIT 5   SUB UNIT 6   SUB UNIT 6   SUB UNIT 7   SUB UNIT 7   SUB UNIT 7   SUB UNIT 8   SUB UNIT 9   SUB UNIT   |  |                            |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| SOM   ME   | 0 0  | 7                          | _      |  |        |        |        |     |          |        | REF:   |        |        |               |  |
| TIME   | 8N   | IN INTENT INTENT SCHEMATIC |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| TIME   |  |                            |        |  |        |        |        |     | ]        |        |  |        |        | - 1           |  |
| TIME H - 72 H - 48 H - 38 H - 24 H - 12 H H R H + 12 H + 24 H + 38 H + 48 H + 72 REMARKS  CONFLICT PARTY 1 (ACTIONS)  CONFLICT PARTY 2 (ACTIONS)  POTENTIAL DB  M SUB UNIT 1 A SUB UNIT 2 E R RES SUB UNIT 3  OR RES SUB UNIT 5  OR RES SUB UNIT 5  OR RES SUB UNIT 6  OR RES SUB UNIT 6  OR RES SUB UNIT 7  OR RES SUB UNIT 7  OR RES SUB UNIT 8  OR RES SUB UNIT 8  OR RES SUB UNIT 9  OR RES SUB UNIT  |  |                            |        | SOM  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| CONFLICT PARTY 1 (ACTIONS)  CONFLICT PARTY 2 (ACTIONS)  POTENTIAL DB  SUB UNIT 1  A  N  SUB UNIT 2  E  SUB UNIT 3  V  R  MOBILE RES  E  RES SUB UNIT  OS  PARM  ENGR  COMM ETC  LOG  YC SP  MED  E8  |  |                            |        | ME   |        |        |        |     | END STAT | TE.    |  |        |        |               |  |
| (ACTIONS) CONFLICT PARTY 2 (ACTIONS) POTENTIAL DB  SUB UNIT 1 A N SUB UNIT 2 E SUB UNIT 3 V R MOBILE RES E RES SUB UNIT OS PARM ENGR COMM ETC LOG YC SP MED ES   |  | TIME                       | H - 72 | H - 48   | H - 38 | H - 24 | H - 12 | HHR | H + 12   | H + 24 | H + 38   | H + 48 | H + 72 | REMARKS       |  |
| (ACTIONS)  POTENTIAL DB  M   | (A   | CTIONS)                    |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| POTENTIAL DB  M  |  |                            |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| M  |  |                            |        | -  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| A N O SUB UNIT 2 SUB UNIT 3 SUB UNIT 3 SUB UNIT 3 SUB UNIT 5 SUB U |  | ENTIAL DB                  |        | _  |        | _      |        |     |          |        |  | _      |        | $\overline{}$ |  |
| N 0 8UB UNIT 2 8UB UNIT 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9  |  | SUB UNIT 1                 |        | _  |        | _      |        |     |          |        |  | _      |        |               |  |
| O SUB UNIT 2  SUB UNIT 3  MOBILE RES  E RES SUB UNIT  OS  PARM ENGR COMMETC  LOG  YC SP  MED ES  ES  MED ES  ES  MED E |  |                            |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| SUB UNIT 3   |  | SUB UNIT 2                 |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| MOBILE RES   | E  |                            |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| RE MOBILE RES  RES SUB UNIT  OS  PARM ENGR COMMETC  LOG  YC SP  ES  ES  MED  ES  MED | _  | SUB UNIT 3                 |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| RES SUB UNIT   | -  | MOBILE RES                 |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| RES SUB UNIT  OS  PARM ENGR COMMETC  LOG  YC SP MED  E8  |  | TODICE NEG                 |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| P ARM  | -  |                            |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| COMMETC  LOG  YC SP  MED  E8   |  |                            |        |  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        |               |  |
| YC SP  | PARM   |                            |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |
| YC SP MED ES   |  |                            |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |
| E8   | VC SP  |                            |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |
|  | 10 01  |                            |        | -  |        |        |        |     |          | _      |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |
| JNCT CONTRACTOR CONTRA |  | Eĕ                         |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          | _      |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |
|  | UNCT   |                            |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          | _      |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |
|  | CAG  |                            |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          | _      |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |
|  |  |                            |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |
| THERS  | THERS  |                            |        | <del>                                     </del> |        |        |        |     |          | _      | <del>                                     </del> |        |        |               |  |
|  |  |                            |        | _  |        |        |        |     |          |        |  |        |        | $\vdash$      |  |

The Synchronisation Matrix provides a linked coordination of planned military components activities with the likely role of other mission components and anticipated Conflict Parties' actions. This provides the basis for the resourcing of Contingency Plans.



# Learning Activity 4 (COA Analysis and Selection) Instructor's Guidelines

In this scenario based exercise, participants are required to be exercised the preparation and conduct of Decision Brief.

Participants should be provided with this learning activity at reasonable time ahead of the lesson to enable them prepare adequately for it. Also note that due time constraint, instructors can select one or two requirements to be exercised

#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

| 5 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions |
|------------|--|
| 20 minutes | Syndicate discussions                  |
| 20 minutes | Syndicates' delivery                   |
| 45 minutes | *total time dependent number of groups |


Total time:

**Note to instructor**. This aspect demands closer guidance from facilitators. Participants should be guided by the Carana Country Study. Use of good initiative and ingenuity should be encouraged to allow realism in the exercise.

|             | arning Activity<br>rning Activity T | 4 (COA Analysis and Selection) ime Required: | Slide 69 |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|--|----------|
|             | 5 minutes                           | Activity introduction and instructions       |          |
|             | 20 minutes                          | Syndicate discussions                        |          |
|             | 20 minutes                          | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate)  |          |
| Total time: | 45 minutes                          | *total time dependent number of groups       |          |

# **Step 5 Development of Concept of Operations & Plan**

|                         | Slide 70 |
|-------------------------|----------|
| nce of a well-          |          |
| (Napoleon I, 1769-1821) |          |
|                         |          |



Note to instructor: Discuss the similarities and dissimilarities of CONOPS, Plan, and Order and their interrelationships.

| Step 5             | 5 Development of Cond  | cept of Operations &                         | Plan    | Slide 72 |
|--------------------|--|--|---------|----------|
| Inputs             | Process  | Output                                       | Remarks |          |
| 1. Selected COA(s) | <ol> <li>Develop CONOPS</li> <li>Produce Plan</li> <li>Develop Draft</li> <li>Contingency Plans</li> </ol> | 1. CONOPS 2. Plan 3. Draft Contingency Plans |         |          |

Once the FC has selected his COA, the CONOPS must be developed and a plan produced..

| S | tep 5 Development of Concept of Operations & Plan Elements of Concept of Operations | Slide 73 |
|---|---|----------|
| • | Intent  |          |
| • | Scheme of Manoeuvre   |          |
| • | Main Effort   |          |
| • | End State   |          |
|   |   |          |

- The selected COA's CONOPS will be adopted and further developed for the operation. The objective of the CONOPS is to link the mission mandate to the execution of key objectives such as, Operational Intent which provides specific military direction and intentions from the FC. This has vertical nesting with the CONOPS issued from DPKO.
- The Scheme of Manoeuvre gives a general description of how the intent is to achieved.
- The Main Effort establishes an activity, the successful accomplishment of which is decisive to the achievement of the mission. This is normally resourced to ensure the responsibility for its execution is assigned.
- The Endstate defines the success criteria for completion of the mission. The Endstate sets up conditions for benchmarking against which the Adjustment, Drawdown and Withdrawal process for the mission will be drawn.

#### The Plan

The plan development is the definitive aspect of the MCPP. This is where various outputs of the entire process are integrated to produce a comprehensive plan based on which the Operation Order will be crafted.

| Step 5 Development of Concept of Operations & Plan Characteristics of the Plan | Slide 74 |
|--|----------|
| <ul><li>Clear</li><li>Concise</li><li>Complete</li><li>Authoritative</li></ul> |          |

The Plan, when developed should be very clear for its recipient to understand. Technical or and winding sentences should be avoided. It should also be rid of superfluous and unnecessary wording to make it concise without losing the message. It must further contain the complete information and instructions in an authoritative manner to reflect the FC's determination to succeed.

Slide 75

#### Step5 Development of Concept of Operations & Plan **Headings of the Plan**

- **BACKGROUND**
- **CURRENT SITUATION** 
  - Conflict Parties
  - Own Forces
  - Assumptions
  - Limitations and Constraints
- MISSION
- **EXECUTION** 
  - Concept of Operations
  - Tasks
  - Coordinating Instructions
- **INTEGRATED SUPPORT SYSTEM (ISS)**



# **Learning Activity 5 (CONOPS Development and Plan) Instructor's Guidelines**

In this scenario based exercise, participants are required to be exercised the preparation and presentation of a Plan

Participants should be provided with this learning activity at reasonable time ahead of the lesson to enable them prepare adequately for it.

# **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|             | 5 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions |
|-------------|------------|--|
|             | 15 minutes | Syndicate discussions                  |
|             | 10 minutes | Syndicates' delivery (5mins each)      |
| Total time: | 30 minutes |  |

| Learning Activity 5 (CONOPS Development and Plan) |            |   |   |
|---|------------|---|---|
| Learning Activity Time Required:                  |            |   |   |
|   | 5 minutes  | Activity introduction and instructions      | 1 |
|   | 15 minutes | Syndicate discussions                       | - |
|   | 10 minutes | Syndicates' delivery (5 mins per syndicate) |   |
| Total time:                                       | 30 minutes | *total time dependent number of groups      |   |

| TACTICAL TASK         | MEANING | GRAPHICS |
|-----------------------|---------|----------|
| Conflict Party        |         |          |
| Block                 |         |          |
| Breach                |         |          |
| Unhinge               |         |          |
| Seize                 |         |          |
| Escort                |         |          |
| Bypass                |         |          |
| Search                |         |          |
| Fix                   |         |          |
| Occupy                |         |          |
| Patrol                |         |          |
| Disperse              |         |          |
| Halt                  |         |          |
| Support               |         |          |
| Envelop               |         |          |
| Cover                 |         |          |
| Suppress              |         |          |
| Strike                |         |          |
| Monitor               |         |          |
| Neutralise            |         |          |
| Destroy               |         |          |
| Terrain/Installations |         |          |
| Search                |         |          |
| Guard                 |         |          |
| Overwatch             |         |          |
| Reconnoitre           |         |          |
| Cordon                |         |          |
| Advance               |         |          |
| Defend                |         |          |
| Withdraw              |         |          |
| Cover                 |         |          |
| Penetrate             |         |          |
| Protect               |         |          |

| Deploy  |  |
|---|--|
| Dominate  |  |
| Secure  |  |
| Block   |  |
| Seize   |  |
| Demonstrate   |  |
| Patrol  |  |
| Local Population  |  |
| Escort  |  |
| Search  |  |
| Support   |  |
| Cover   |  |
| Reassure  |  |
| Protect   |  |
| Monitor   |  |
| <u>UN/Allied Presence</u>   |  |
| Escort  |  |
| Support   |  |
| Cover   |  |
| Reassure  |  |
| Protect   |  |
| <u>Unifying Purpose</u> (in order to)   |  |
| Verify Hinder Allow Rescue Canalise Surprise Influence Deter Deny Retain Interdict Divert Open Force Deceive Create Destroy |  |
|   |  |

| Pg.58 Module 6: Introduction to Military Component Planning Process |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|
|   |  |  |  |  |
|   |  |  |  |  |
|   |  |  |  |  |
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# **Module 7 Introduction to Crisis Management Table of Contents**

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# **Preparatory Notes to Instructor**

#### Introduction

Crises in the United Nations peacekeeping mission environment can take many forms including: military (armed conflicts between military factions or armed groups), terrorist attacks, political crises (lack of government, coup, election-related violence); large scale and widespread human rights violations (conflict related or triggered by political or electoral violence); economic crises (riots, violence related to economic gains or losses); natural disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, etc.); and even public health crises (diarrhea, measles). In this context UN mission will be challenged on its contingency planning and preparedness; and on its ability to respond quickly, effectively and in a fully integrated manner. The success on those challenges will be determined not only by the mission leadership team (MLT), but also by the knowledge of the different roles that mission components can play as well as the level and adequacy of the training received by peacekeepers to manage crisis situations.

#### Aim

The aim of the Introduction to Crisis Management module is to provide staff officers with an overview of the crisis response in the UN HQ and DPKO led field missions as well as the DSS role during a crisis situation.

# **Learning Outcomes**

On completion of the module participants will be able to:

- Understand the principles of UN HQ crisis response in support of DPKO led field missions.
- Define the DPKO-led field mission crisis response.
- 3. Comprehend the DSS role in a crisis situation.

# **Training Sequence**

The material contained in this module could be delivered over one to two training units, depending on the number of learning activities upon which the instructor decides. The instructor can modify the duration to suit national training requirements and reflect the subject matter comprehension level of the participants.

#### **Duration**

| Minimum Lecture/Presentation Session Time |             | Questions/Assessment | Session Activities |
|---|-------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 130<br>minutes                            | 45 min      | 10 min.              | 75 min             |
| Additional Mission Specific Options       |             | Optional Film        | Optional Activity  |
|   | TBD by PKTI |                      |                    |

# **Methodology**

This module contains suggested learning activities to keep adult learners engaged. The facilitation team should use as many of the learning activities as time allows and keep them tailored to the target audience. Participants should be fully involved in the learning process through practical exercises, brainstorming sessions, discussion of case studies, working in small groups on specific tasks, etc.

The instructor should inform participants of the content, format and timing. Knowing what to expect, participants can improve their ability to focus on the subject and benefit better from the session.

Structure of the presentation

- The United Nations Head quarters response in support of DPKO led field missions
- The DPKO led field missions crisis response
- The DSS role in a crisis situation
- Practical example on CM (2010 crisis in MINUSTAH)

Instructors are encouraged to add examples and mission-specific information related to the specific deployment of participants, if known.

\*Please Note: It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written guiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers are provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages.

#### **Instructor Profile**

This module is best presented by an instructor who has experience in working at JOC or JMAC in PKO missions, or as a Security Advisor in mission (UNDP or DSS),

who could share his/her, experience with the group. If there is more than one instructor, at least one should have practical experience. The instructor should also encourage questions from the participants and aim for an interactive discussion. All participants should be encouraged to contribute to the group discussions, case study discussions and in any other activities.

# **Instructor Preparations**

# **Required Readings**

- Mission Start-up Field Guide August 2010
- Headquarters Crisis Response in Support of DPKO-Led Field Missions December 2008
- Missions JOC and JMAC SOPs 2010
- Missions Crisis Management SOPs 2010
- Department of Safety and Security Framework for Accountability April 2007
- Field Security Handbook January 2006
- DPKO-DFS SOP: Emergency Preparedness,2009
- DPKO-DFS SOP: Short -Term Continuity of Ops, 2009

#### **General Preparations**

#### Equipment:

- Computer and PowerPoint slides
- 2. Projector and Screen
- 3. Flip Chart

#### Materials:

Copies of handouts.

#### **Mission Specific**

If Module 7 is being presented to prepare participants for a particular UN peacekeeping mission, then gather mission specific information from the mission website (available at the UN DPKO internet website, through 'current operations': <a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp">http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp</a>). Additional mission specific information is available at the UN DPKO Policy and Training internet website: <a href="http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx">http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx</a>

# Symbols Legend



- Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words versus being read to participants)
- Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)
- Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
- Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
- Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
- Film (A film that is recommended as a core part of the training or an option)
- Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
- Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit, section or part – as indicated in the text)
- Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

#### **Session Notes**

# Module 7: Introduction to Crisis Management Slide 1



**Note to Instructor:** Give the participants a brief explanation why they should pay special attention to this module. Refer to: Background in the Preparatory Notes to the Instructor

| Aim   | Slide 2 |
|---|---------|
| The aim of the Introduction to Crisis Management module is to provide staff officers with an overview of the crisis response in the UN HQ and DPKO-led field missions as well as the DSS role during a crisis situation |         |

| As UN Staff Officer, Why should I know this? | Slide 3 |
|--|---------|
|  |         |

# Dearning Outcome On completion of the module: Introduction to Crisis Management, participants will be able to: • Understand the principles of UN HQ crisis response in support of DPKO led field missions. • Define the DPKO-led field mission crisis response. • Comprehend the DSS role in a crisis situation.

| Structure of the Presentation   | Slide 5 |  |
|---|---------|--|
| <ul> <li>The United Nations Head quarters response in<br/>support of DPKO led field missions</li> </ul> |         |  |
| <ul> <li>The DPKO-led field missions crisis response</li> </ul>   |         |  |
| <ul> <li>The DSS role in a crisis situation</li> </ul>  |         |  |

Practical example on CM (2010 crisis in MINUSTAH)



#### **UN HQ crisis response in support of DPKO-led field missions Learning Activity: What is the definition of crisis?**

In this a simple questionnaire activity, Staff Officers are to read the suggested question and based on their own experience provide the answer taking in consideration the content of the UN crisis content.

#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|             | 02 minutes | activity introduction and instructions          |
|-------------|------------|---|
|             | 05 minutes | reading the questionnaire and write the answers |
|             | 08 minutes | debrief in the plenary group                    |
|             | 05 minutes | final conclusions                               |
| Total time: | 20 minutes |   |

#### **Activity Guidelines:**

- Before starting the session, mark only one question to be answered by participants.
- 2. Provide one questionnaire to every two participants and ask them to read the questionnaire and consult among them selves to answer the suggested question (only one: A, B, C or D).
- Use five minutes to allow the participants to read through the questionnaire and 3. write their answers
- Allow participants, using modules content provide answers to given questionnaire and report back in the plenary discussion.

| Learnin    | Slide 6  |  |
|------------|--|--|
| Mention ac |  |  |
| Α.         | safety and security of personnel in UN PKO and missions; |  |
| B.         | security of mission assets and premises;                 |  |
| C.         | effective functioning of the mission;                    |  |
| D.         | viability of the mission mandate                         |  |
|            | You have 5 minutes. Good Luck!                           |  |

#### Questionnaire to be distributed to participants

#### What is the definition of crisis?

Mention an action, incident or event that presents an exceptional and imminent threat to:

- A. safety and security of personnel in UN PKO and missions;
- B. security of mission assets and premises;
- C. effective functioning of the mission;
- D. viability of the mission mandate

- What is the definition of crisis? A crisis is understood to be an action. incident or event that presents an exceptional and imminent threat to any of the following:
  - safety and security of personnel in UN peacekeeping operations and missions:
  - security of mission assets and premises;
  - effective functioning of the mission;
  - Viability of the mission mandate.

#### **UN crisis management principles**

#### **UN crisis management principles** Crisis is managed by HOM (in some missions FC in

- personal union) and CMT Procedures for accelerated, unified information flow
- and decision-making are put in place DPKO/DFS support to missions fall in two
- categories:
  - Enhanced preparedness
  - Crisis response
- Every member of SMT can propose the activation of categories of DPKO/DFS support
- DPKO/DFS Chain of command and succession arrangements remain intact
- In a catastrophic event the USG/DPKO may serve as HOM
- Effectiveness of crisis response depends on unity of command and unity of information flow.
- A crisis in a DPKO-led mission is managed in the field by the Head of Mission and his/her Crisis Management Team, in line with standard delegation of operational responsibilities and decision-making authority.
- DPKO continues to perform all assigned functions. However, under crisis conditions procedures for accelerated, unified information flow and decision-making are put in place to respond to the special requirements of a mission managing a highly volatile and fluid situation.
- **DPKO and DFS** Headquarters support to missions facing deteriorating or crisis situations fall into two categories:
  - Enhanced preparedness when contingency planning is initiated in view of significant negative indicators; and,

- Crisis response mode when the threat has become significant and imminent, or when an event or incident of critical proportions has already occurred and requires the special measures.
- Every member of the DPKO and DFS Senior Management Team (SMT) can propose the activation of either the enhanced preparedness posture or crisis response mode to the USG/DPKO.
- DPKO and DFS chain of command and succession arrangements remain intact, except where noted otherwise.
- In the case of a catastrophic event that renders a mission incapable of exercising command, DPKO Headquarters may take over all necessary decision-making functions, including crisis management. In such circumstances, the USG/DPKO or his/her designated representative may serve as the *de facto* Head of Mission until senior managers in the field can resume their designated roles.
- (e.g)

We will examine a case study that shows a crisis response during the MINUSTAH earthquake and the continuity of operations.

The effectiveness of crisis response depends vitally on unity of command and unity of information flow. All DPKO and DFS personnel involved in crisis response must abide by these principles and support the key players in their responsibilities.

#### **Field Mission Crisis Procedures**

| Field Mission Crisis Procedures           | Slide 8 |
|---|---------|
| Day- to-day preparedness                  |         |
| <ul> <li>Enhanced preparedness</li> </ul> |         |
| Crisis response                           |         |

- Field Mission Crisis Procedures Field mission capabilities to react and assure the mission success during crisis situations lean on the preparedness of all the organs and personnel involved and the continuity of the information flow. Missions usually follow the same three modes of crisis procedures:
  - Day- to-day preparedness
  - Enhanced preparedness
  - Crisis response



#### **Learning Activity: UN and Mission HQs Crisis Procedures** WHO DOES THIS WHEN?

In this a PPT questionnaire activity, Staff Officers are to read the suggested question and based on handouts provided the day before, answer the questions.

#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

| 02 minutes | activity introduction and instructions           |
|------------|--|
| 10 minutes | reading the questionnaire and giving the answers |
| 03 minutes | final conclusions                                |
| 15 minutes |  |

Total time: | 15

#### **Activity Guidelines:**

- 1. At least the day before the session provide participants the handouts on UN HQ Crisis Procedures and Field Mission Crisis Procedures
- 2. Divide the participants in two to three groups and explain the dynamics of the activity
- 3. Groups have to identify in the handouts the right answer for the question that appeared in the slides. Facilitator should provide the chance to answer the question to that group who's participant rises the hand first, then check the correctness of the answer and grant the score accordingly (use a flip chart to check the answers provided by groups)
- 4. After answering all questions the facilitator should check the group that provided the highest number of right questions and announce it as the winner to the plenary (depending of the availability of resources think on giving a price to the winner group)

#### Do not include these slides in the handout for participants

| UN HQ AND MISSION HQ CRISIS<br>PROCEDURES | Slide 9 |
|---|---------|
| Training Activity                         |         |
| WHO? DOES THIS: WHEN?                     |         |

| t .      |
|----------|
|          |
| Slide 10 |
| Jilde 10 |
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| Slide 11 |
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6. members deals with counterparts in the field tracking, monitoring, clarifying and reporting to the SITCEN and parent offices of it's members

CRC - EP

7. Decides to activate CRC

**USG/DPKO - CRISIS** 

| UN HQ CRISIS PROCEDURES<br>WHO? DOES THIS: WHEN?                       | Slide 12 |
|--|----------|
| Ensure that all CRC procedures and systems are functioning effectively |          |
| SITCEN – CRISIS  |          |
| 9. Revision of leave plans of key personnel at HQ to                   |          |
| ensure coverage in case of crisis                                      |          |
| ASG/OO or ASG/DFS – EP   |          |
| 10. Decides on the frequency of meetings and VTC                       |          |
| meetings between IOT and affected mission                              |          |
| RD/OO - CRISIS   |          |

Slide 13

#### MISSION HQ CRISIS PROCEDURES WHO? DOES THIS: WHEN?

1. Chairs the meeting of CMT

#### **SRSG - CRISIS**

2. Together with Security Section undertake thorough security risk assessments and identify trends or indicators of deteriorating situations

#### JMAC - DtD

3. When required sends out an immediate notification to all CMT members

**JOC - CRISIS** 

#### MISSION HQ CRISIS PROCEDURES Slide 14 WHO? DOES THIS: WHEN?

4. Maintains an early warning capabilities to notify senior management and concerned personnel of actions, events that could develop in crisis

#### JOC - DtD

5. Maintains situational awareness during the crisis situation by the continuous monitoring of relevant sources of information and events in their respective areas

#### JMAC - CRISIS

6. assess the information and determines the distribution of it

**JOC - CRISIS** 

#### MISSION HQ CRISIS PROCEDURES WHO? DOES THIS: WHEN?

7. Guides all public information activities related to the crisis

#### CMT - CRISIS

8. If necessary invokes the relocation/ evacuation arrangements through the mission support component and ensures proper notification to Headquarters.

#### **JOC - CRISIS**

9. Assess impact of known events

#### JOC - DtD

10. Issues instructions and updates to all mission personnel including UN CT

SOC - CRISIS

#### Slide 15

| 1 |
|---|

#### Handout UN HQ Crisis Procedures

|                                     | DOES WHAT, WHEN   |   |  |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|--|
| WHO                                 | Day-to-day<br>Preparedness  | Enhanced<br>Preparedness  | Crisis response  |
| SITCEN                              | <ul> <li>Maintains an updated mission contact database and mission specific Crisis Folders</li> <li>Maintains 24/7 watch capability to collect/disseminate info</li> <li>Assess impact of known events</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Maintains an updated mission contact database and mission specific Crisis Folders</li> <li>Maintains 24/7 watch capability to collect/disseminate info</li> <li>Assess impact of known events</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Receive the initial notification of a crisis from the mission</li> <li>Passes information to all decision-makers/desk officers and disseminates it outside the admin chain of command</li> <li>Keeps close contact 24-hour with mission JOC or designate structure</li> <li>Ensure that all CRC procedures and systems are functioning effectively</li> </ul> |
| IOT                                 | Monitor events in their respective areas     Identify trends or indicators of deteriorating situations  | <ul> <li>Consults with the mission on contingency plan</li> <li>Conveys to the SITCEN silent hour contact points</li> <li>Prepares briefings to Security Council and TCCs/PCCs</li> <li>Notifies USG/DPKO and senior staff of DPKO/DFS or DSS on</li> </ul> | Convenes IOT meeting during silent hours Advises RD/OO of the proposed COA Prepares briefings to SG and Security Council, TCCs/PCCs IOT Team Leader chairs the CRC as the PKO/DFS Crisis Manager  Is advised by IOT Team leader of the proposed COA Decides on the frequency of meetings   |
| D. I. I.                            |   | assessment of the situation and enhanced preparedness status  • Develops public   | and VTC meetings between IOT and affected mission  Implements the public information   |
| Public<br>Affairs<br>Unit           |   | information strategy  | strategy   |
| ASG/OO<br>or<br>ASG/DFS             |   | <ul> <li>Revision of leave plans<br/>of key personnel at HQ<br/>to ensure coverage in<br/>case of crisis</li> </ul>   |  |
| DPKO/DF<br>S SMT                    |   |   | Identifies the need to establish a<br>Crisis Response Cell (CRC)   |
| USG/DPK<br>O                        |   |   | Decides to activate CRC  |
| Crisis<br>Response<br>Cell<br>(CRC) |   |   | <ul> <li>Co-location space provided by SITCEN</li> <li>CRC members deals with counterparts in the field tracking, monitoring, clarifying and reporting to the SITCEN and parent offices of CRCs members</li> <li>Take operational decisions and provide RD/OO and DPKO/DFS senior managers with operational</li> </ul>   |

updates

#### Handout Field Mission Crisis Procedures

|      | DOES WHAT, WHEN   |  |  |
|------|---|--|--|
| WHO  | Day-to-day Preparedness   | Enhanced Preparedness  | Crisis response  |
| JOC  | <ul> <li>Maintains an updated situation awareness in the Mission AOR</li> <li>Maintains an early warning capabilities to notify senior management and concerned personnel of actions, events that could develop in crisis</li> <li>Maintain CMT contact list and be able to reach CMT members at all the times</li> <li>Maintains 24/7 watch capability to collect/disseminate info</li> <li>Assess impact of known events</li> </ul> | The enhanced preparedness mode refers to a heightened alert status within UNHQ in response to a deteriorating situation supported by a security risk assessment provided by the mission. Thus enhanced | <ul> <li>Serves as entry point for all relevant information. SOC and all mission personnel, including managers, who receive indications on an imminent crisis or updates during an ongoing crisis, must ensure that the information is immediately passed to JOC</li> <li>JOC assess the information and determines the distribution of it</li> <li>JOC alerts the SRSG through COS and informs SITCEN the initial notification of a crisis.</li> <li>When required sends out an immediate notification to all CMT members</li> <li>Share reports with all units chiefs and heads or regional offices in the mission, SMT members, DPKO and DSS HQ through SITCEN</li> <li>If necessary invokes the relocation/evacuation arrangements through the mission support component and ensures proper notification to Headquarters.</li> </ul> |
| JMAC | <ul> <li>Maintains situational awareness<br/>by the continuous monitoring of<br/>relevant sources of information<br/>and events in their respective<br/>areas</li> <li>Together with Security Section<br/>undertake thorough security risk<br/>assessments and identify trends<br/>or indicators of deteriorating<br/>situations</li> </ul>   | preparedness<br>does not<br>involve any<br>departure<br>from<br>standard<br>decision-<br>making<br>procedures;<br>measures are   | <ul> <li>Maintains situational awareness during the crisis situation by the continuous monitoring of relevant sources of information and events in their respective areas</li> <li>Together with Security Section undertake thorough security risk assessments and identify trends or indicators of evolving crisis situations</li> </ul>  |
| soc  | Maintains the communications infrastructure and early warning capabilities that guarantee the immediate notification of all personnel concerned of actions, events or incidents that could develop into a crisis  | put in place<br>to increase<br>the<br>preparedness<br>of field<br>mission.   | Issues instructions and updates to all mission personnel including UN CT   |
| SRSG |   |  | <ul> <li>Or the OIC, COS, or Police Commissioner can invoke the CMT</li> <li>Chairs the meeting of CMT</li> </ul>  |
| СМТ  |   |  | <ul> <li>Ensures accelerated decision-making, issuance of instructions to all mission components and liaison with external partners</li> <li>Guides all public information activities related to the crisis.</li> <li>May decide to establish 24/7 Crisis Management Centre (CMC) to support the JOC in centralizing crisis related information.</li> </ul>  |

| <ul> <li>By its decision other units (MLG, PAO, Chief<br/>Medical Officer or other specialists may be</li> </ul> |
|--|
| required to maintain presence in the CMC.  |

#### The UNHQ Crisis Response Cell

# The UNHQ Crisis Response Cell The primary purpose of the CRC is to further strengthen the unity and speed of information flow and monitoring of follow-up action. Representation should include:

- Office of Operations (relevant IOT)
- SITCEN (Operations Room)
- OMA (Current Military Operations Service)
- OROLSI (Police Division Mission Management, Mine Action as required)
- OUSG (Peacekeeping Public Affairs Unit)
- DFS (Field Personnel Operations Service, Operational Support Service, Specialist Support Service such as Medical as required)
- DSS (Peacekeeping Operations Support Section)

Slide 16

- The Crisis Response Cell. The concerned IOT Team Leader will chair the CRC, as the DPKO/DFS Crisis Manager. However, the CRC may be chaired by the RD/OO, ASG/OO, ASG/DFS, USG/DPKO or USG/DFS, if so decided. The CRC may, as necessary, co-locate representatives from the components involved in the crisis response effort. 00 (relevant Integrated Operational Team)
  - Office of Operations (relevant Integrated Operational Team)
  - o SITCEN (Operations Room)
  - o OMA (Current Military Operations Service)
  - OROLSI (Police Division Mission Management, Mine Action as required)
  - o OUSG (Peacekeeping Public Affairs Unit)
  - DFS (Field Personnel Operations Service, Operational Support Service, Specialist Support Service such as Medical as required)
  - o DSS (Peacekeeping Operations Support Section)

#### The DSS role in a crisis situation

#### Introduction to the Security Management System

#### **Introduction to the Security Management System**

Slide 17

The goal of the United Nations Security Management System is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority

Introduction to the Security Management System The goal of the United Nations Security Management System is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and wellbeing of staff as a high priority

#### Scope of the United Nations security management system responsibility



Scope of the United Nations security management system responsibility The United Nations system has a security responsibility for about 150,000 personnel of the Organizations which are members of the United Nations Security Management System (UN Organs, funds and programs, specialized

agencies and related organizations) (shown in the slide) irrespective of their type and/or duration of contract, including personnel appointed for short-term periods and those persons who are employed under special contractual arrangements such as electoral observers in more than 170 countries.


#### **Applicability of UNSMS Policies and Procedures**

| Applicability of UNSMS Policies and Procedures   | Slide 19 |
|--|----------|
| Apply to:  |          |
| All UN civilian and eligible dependants  |          |
| <ul> <li>Case by case to Individually deployed military and police personnel</li> </ul>                |          |
| <ul> <li>Security Risk Management model as tool also for<br/>Military and Police Components</li> </ul> |          |

#### Apply to:

- All UN civilian and eligible dependants
- Case by case to Individually deployed military and police personnel
- Security Risk Management model as tool also for Military and Police Components

Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and the Security Level System (SLS)




- A credible SRA is an essential pre-requisite to the effective management of risk; the objective of an SRA is to identify and assess the nature of the risks to a UN operation or activity so that those risks can be effectively managed through the application of mitigating measures.
- The main risk management measures are prevention (lowering likelihood) and mitigation (lowering impact). Risk management strategies can also be categorized as follows:
  - Accept. The unmitigated risk is accepted without the need for any further mitigating measures.
  - Control. Implement prevention and/or mitigation measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
  - **Avoid.** Temporarily distance the potential target (e.g. UN staff, vehicles etc) from the risk.
  - Transfer. Insurance or sub-contracting implementation to other parties who can operate safely.

Security Risk Analysis Table (Apr 2009)

| ь           | ISK ANALYSIS         |            |          | IMPACT   |           |              |
|-------------|----------------------|------------|----------|----------|-----------|--------------|
| ĸ           | TABLE                | Negligible | Minor    | Moderate | Severe    | Critical     |
| L           | Very<br>Likely       | Low        | Medium   | High     | Very High | Unacceptable |
| K           | Likely               | Low        | Medium   | High     | High      | Very High    |
| L           | Moderately<br>Likely | Very Low   | Low      | Medium   | High      | High         |
| H<br>0<br>0 | Unlikely             | Very Low   | Low      | Low      | Medium    | Medium       |
| D           | Very<br>Unlikely     | Very Low   | Very Low | Very Low | Low       | Low          |

- With this adjustment/new table, we can now more clearly discuss acceptable risk. First, any residual risk or unmanaged risk that is assessed as in the black is always unacceptable for UN presence. The only risk management option in this situation is to avoid the risk (evacuate).
- Programmes may continue if the UN transfers the work to a partner (who may be exposed to a lower level or risk). In this environment, the UN must invest in risk management and lower the risk until the residual risk is at least Very High.
- Whether risk is acceptable at any level lower than "unacceptable" (black) is a question of programme priority. The table below suggests definitions of Programme Criticality, level of program decision making, and the highest level of risk at which this program is acceptable.

#### **Purpose of the Security Levels System**



To fulfill two main functions:

- Describe the general security environment in a certain geographical area
- Give an overall impression on how the security environment in one area compares with another

It is:

Descriptive – not predictive General – not specific

#### **De-linking Security Measures**

| De-linking Security Measures   | Slide 23 |
|--|----------|
| SLS de-links security measures, such as:                                 |          |
| Relocation   |          |
| <ul> <li>Evacuation</li> </ul>   |          |
| Hazard Pay   |          |
| There is a separate decision process for security measures, based on SRA |          |
| Security decisions are based on specific risk                            |          |

SLS de-links security measures, such as:

- Relocation
- Evacuation
- Hazard Pay

There is a separate decision process for security measures, based on SRA Security decisions are based on specific risk

#### The DSS role in crisis management

| The DSS role in crisis management   | Slide 24 |
|---|----------|
| Designated Official (DO)  |          |
| Country Representatives   |          |
| Security Management Team (SMT)  |          |
| Field Security Officers i) Full-time Professionals - Principal Security Advisor (PSA) and/or Chief Security Advisor (CSA) |          |
| Chief Security Officer for PK Missions  |          |

Field Security Officer
Single-agency Security Officers
Wardens
Personnel employed by the UN System

The DSS role in crisis management. The roles and responsibilities for all actors in the United Nations Security Management System are specified in the Framework for Accountability. Crisis management roles are included as part of the security activities described in the framework. Following are the crisis management roles of the main actors of the UN Security Management System present in the field missions.

#### Handout DSS Field Mission Crisis Responsibilities

| TITLE                                | RESPONSIBILITIES  |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Designated<br>Official (DO)          | <ul> <li>The Designated Official is the person responsible for the security management arrangements of the United Nations system.</li> <li>Keeping the SG informed through the USG for Safety and Security, of all developments in the country that have a bearing on the security and protection of the civilian personnel employed by the mission and their recognized dependants and property.</li> <li>Ensuring the regular functioning of the Security Management Team (SMT) and identifying staff members who will have special responsibilities in this regard</li> <li>In an emergency where it has not been possible to communicate with USG for SS, the DO uses his/her best judgment in carrying out relocations/evacuations and reporting to the SG through the USG for SS</li> </ul> |
| Country<br>Representatives           | <ul> <li>Serving as members of the SMT</li> <li>Ensuring full compliance by his/her personnel and their recognized dependants with all security-related instructions</li> </ul>   |
| Security<br>Management<br>Team (SMT) | <ul> <li>Ensuring that there are functioning and effective security and contingency plans<br/>that are maintained and implemented for all locations throughout the country<br/>where personnel employed by the UN System and their recognized dependants<br/>are present</li> </ul>   |

| Field Security Officers i) Full- time Professionals - Principal Security Advisor (PSA) and/or Chief Security Advisor (CSA) | <ul> <li>The Chief Security Advisor, who is the senior security official at the duty station, is directly accountable to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and is appointed as the primary advisor to the Designated Official and the Security Management Team on all matters related to security.</li> <li>Keeping the DO systematically informed regarding incidents or developments in their area of responsibility that have a bearing on the security and safety of personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants</li> </ul>  |
|--|---|
| Chief Security<br>Officer for PK<br>Missions   | <ul> <li>Serving as principal adviser to the DO and SMT on all aspects of security management, crisis readiness and preparedness at their respective duty stations and in the execution of responsibilities with regard to security of personnel employed by the organizations of the UN system and their eligible dependants and their property</li> <li>Preparing, maintaining and updating the country-specific security plan, contingency plans and security listings of personnel employed by the organizations of the UN System and their recognized dependants</li> <li>Ensuring that plans for relocation/evacuation to a safe area are current, feasible and implementable</li> <li>Ensuring that an effective and functioning security and emergency communications system is in place</li> </ul> |
| Field Security<br>Officer  | <ul> <li>Reviewing and monitoring activities related to the mission Security programme and mission security plans. Identifying air and land evacuation requirements to be used in emergencies</li> <li>Ensuring availability of emergency communications</li> <li>Establishing a 24/7 emergency response system</li> <li>Maintaining continuing awareness of prevailing local security conditions, identifying probable threats and advising mission and project personnel to follow appropriate preventative steps</li> </ul>  |
| Single-agency<br>Security Officers   | <ul> <li>Advising and assisting the agency country representative, situation or operations<br/>manager, on his/her security responsibilities, including participation in operational<br/>planning, and providing security inputs</li> </ul>   |
| Wardens  | <ul> <li>Wardens are appointed to ensure proper implementation of the Security Plan in a predetermined zone of a large city.</li> <li>Functioning as a channel of communication between the DO and the personnel employed by the UN System and their recognized dependants in his/her zone</li> <li>Ensuring that such personnel are regularly informed with regard to security arrangements and emergency phases in effect</li> </ul>  |
| Personnel<br>employed by<br>the UN System  | <ul> <li>Familiarizing themselves with information provided to them regarding the UN security management system at their location</li> <li>Reporting all security incidents in a timely manner</li> <li>Attending security training relevant to their level and role.</li> </ul>  |

#### **Security Management Team (SMT)**

| Security Management Team (SMT)                                    | Slide 25 |
|---|----------|
| Designated Official;  |          |
| <ul> <li>Deputy Designated Official(s), as applicable;</li> </ul> |          |
| <ul> <li>Heads of Agencies, Programmes and Funds;</li> </ul>      |          |

- Chief Security Advisor;
- Representatives of IGOs/NGOs who have signed the Memorandum of
- Understanding; and any mission dispatched to the area by DSS.
- **Security Management Team (SMT)** The Designated Official will constitute, after consultation with the representatives of the other organizations, a Security Management Team which will ensure that security is managed and coordinated in an integrated manner on an inter-agency basis. Such a team must include:
  - Designated Official;
  - Deputy Designated Official(s), as applicable;
  - Heads of Agencies, Programmes and Funds;
  - Chief Security Advisor;
  - Representatives of IGOs/NGOs who have signed the Memorandum of
  - Understanding; and
  - any mission dispatched to the area by DSS.

| End of first part | Slide 26 |
|-------------------|----------|
|                   | 1        |



#### **Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management:** Case Study, Haiti 2010

In this a case study with a real situation scenario, Staff Officers are to analyse the given situation and propose feasible actions in response to it, taking in consideration the content of the UN crisis response.

#### **Learning Activity Time Required:**

|             | 05 minutes | activity introduction and instructions                 |
|-------------|------------|--|
|             | 15 minutes | reading the scenario, syndicate discussion and debrief |
|             | 10 minutes | debrief in the plenary group                           |
|             | 05 minutes | Final conclusions                                      |
| Total time: | 40 minutes |  |

| Study, Haiti 2010  Learning Activity Time Required:    05 minutes  |  |                 |   | ,        |  |  |
|--|--|-----------------|---|----------|--|--|
| D5 minutes   activity introduction and instructions   15 minutes   reading the scenario, syndicate discussion and debrief   10 minutes   debrief in the plenary group   05 minutes   Final conclusions   | Lea  | Slide 27        |   |          |  |  |
| Total time:    15 minutes   reading the scenario, syndicate discussion and debrief     10 minutes   debrief in the plenary group     05 minutes   Final conclusions     10 minutes   Final conc | Learning Activity Time Required:   |                 |   |          |  |  |
| and debrief 10 minutes debrief in the plenary group 05 minutes Final conclusions  Total time:  Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010  Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010  Syndicates distribution  Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010  Comments  Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010  Comments  Slide 3  Slide 3  Slide 3  Slide 3  Within 36 hours of the earthquake, the Secretary-General dispatched two high ranking officials (ASGs Mulet and Banbury) and a team of officers to lead the mission to make up for the many senior officials that had perished.  This team immediately re-established crucial communication lines with  |  | 05 minutes      | activity introduction and instructions  |          |  |  |
| Total time:    Comments  |  | 15 minutes      | , ,                                     |          |  |  |
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| Study, Haiti 2010  Syndicates distribution  Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010  Comments  Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010  2010 – 05 – 26 MPAC Haiti briefing  Rapid deployment:  Within 36 hours of the earthquake, the Secretary-General dispatched two high ranking officials (ASGs Mulet and Banbury) and a team of officers to lead the mission to make up for the many senior officials that had perished.  This team immediately re-established crucial communication lines with   | Lea  | rning Activity: | Introduction to Crisis Management: Case | Slide 29 |  |  |
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| Study, Haiti 2010  Comments  Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010  2010 – 05 – 26 MPAC Haiti briefing  Rapid deployment:  Within 36 hours of the earthquake, the Secretary-General dispatched two high ranking officials (ASGs Mulet and Banbury) and a team of officers to lead the mission to make up for the many senior officials that had perished.  This team immediately re-established crucial communication lines with  | Loo  |                 |   |          |  |  |
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| Within 36 hours of the earthquake, the Secretary-General dispatched two high ranking officials (ASGs Mulet and Banbury) and a team of officers to lead the mission to make up for the many senior officials that had perished.  This team immediately re-established crucial communication lines with  | 2010 – 05 – 2  |                 |   |          |  |  |
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|  | two high rank officers to lea  |                 |   |          |  |  |
| Rey government omolals and international partners.   | This team immediately re-established crucial communication lines with key government officials and international partners. |                 |   |          |  |  |
| Within days of the earthquake assessments were made of the need for  | Within days o  |                 |   |          |  |  |

additional military and police capacities.

## Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010

Slide 32

2010 - 05 - 26 MPAC Haiti briefing

General coordination:

#### In-theatre coordination: strategic:

Of key importance to the overall coordination of relief and humanitarian aid was the creation of the High Level Coordination Committee (HLCC)

#### In-theatre coordination: operational

At the operational level, the HLCC was "supplemented" with a "working level" Coordination Support Committee co-chaired by the Minister of Tourism of the GoH and the Principal Deputy SRSG MINUSTAH.

#### In-theatre coordination: tactical

At the operational level, in order to ensure the best possible use of all available military capabilities in support of the humanitarian effort, both UN and bilateral, MINUSTAH created the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC).

## Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010

Slide 33

2010 - 05 - 26 MPAC Haiti briefing

General coordination:

Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC).

JOTC: representatives from Mission components (military, police, and relevant civilian sections), OCHA, WFP, liaison officers (US and Canadian JTFs), European Union Situation Centre cell, and the CARICOM military contingent.

JOTC provided a single clearing house for all humanitarian requests for military support, both logistical and security.

JOTC demonstrated the value of co-location, coordination and joint planning between Government, humanitarian organizations, MINUSTAH and international military partners in situations of large-scale humanitarian emergency and also served as a confidence building tool between the international community and the Government of Haiti.

#### Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, **Haiti 2010**

Slide 34

2010 - 05 - 26 MPAC Haiti briefing UN-US coordination

#### Coordination framework:

Statement of Principles between the US Government and the UN to delineate the responsibilities of the UN and the US (and Canada). The MoU set out:

- Primary responsibility of the Government of Haiti (GoH) for the response to the earthquake with the UN and the US acting in a supporting role.
- UN's coordinating role for international assistance (in consultation with the GoH);
- UN's responsibility for ensuring a secure and stable environment, for the protection of civilians under imminent threat of violence.
- the US-JTF's role in support of the humanitarian response
- that US military forces would operate under an autonomous chain of command.

Learning Activity: Introduction to Crisis Management: Case Study, Haiti 2010

Slide 35

2010 - 05 - 26 MPAC Haiti briefing

**Planning** 

DPKO had delegated strategic planning responsibility to MINUSTAH.

At HQ, with Integrated Mission Task Force (IMPP).

United States, Canadian and Brazil

Enabling capacities:

The rapid deployment by the US of key expertise to restore critical airport functions and the temporary transfer of air-traffic control functions to US military facilities was critical to allow for the rapid build-up of humanitarian aid.

- Key summary points. It is important to highlight that crisis management in the field reflects not only reactive actions to be taken once the crisis occurs but mainly relays in the preparedness and proactive actions all peacekeepers must perform. Participants should assure below learning outcomes achievement for their own benefit and the mission success.
  - Explain the UN HQ crisis response in support of DPKO led field missions.
  - Define the DPKO led field mission crisis response.
  - Indicate the DSS role in a crisis situation.

#### **Learning Outcome Assessment**

It is up to the learning institution to decide whether the learning assessment questions are used informally in a group question and answer session, or if they are provided to the participants as a written quiz. In either case, it is recommended that the correct answers are provided at the end of the assessment in order to ensure participants are clear on the key messages.

At the end of the entire unit and/or the conclusion of the STMs instructors may want to choose some of the following questions for review.

#### Questions


1. TBD

Expected outcome

TBD

#### Annex 1: UN HQ key players during a crisis situation, their roles and responsibilities. A trainers Handout

#### **UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING DPKO - DFS AND INTEGRATED STRUCTURES**



# UN HQ key players during a crisis situation, their roles and responsibilities. A Trainers Handout


Effective Headquarters support to a mission managing a crisis requires clarity on roles and responsibilities from the onset of a critical situation. Following are description of roles and responsibilities of the key actors in UN HQ during a crisis in field missions.


- Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG/DPKO)
  retains overall responsibility for and executive direction of DPKO-led missions,
  including in times of crisis, and decides on actions to be taken with respect to
  keeping the Secretary-General informed of the situation. The USG/DPKO, or
  the Officer-in-Charge, decides on. The activation of enhanced preparedness or
  crisis response mode in DPKO and determines the need to establish a Crisis
  Response Cell (CRC).
- 2. **Under-Secretary-General for Field Support (USGIDFS)** is responsible for advising the USG/DPKO on all logistical and administrative issues and for providing all crisis-specific logistical, personnel and administrative assistance to the affected mission.

- 3. Assistant Secretary-General of the Office of Operations (ASG/OO) oversees the provision of all political advice to the affected mission, as well as all interaction with the Security Council and Troop Contributing Countries/Police Contributing Countries (TCC/PCCs). In the absence of the ASG/OO, the 00 Regional Director of the affected Division will take on his/her crisis-related functions.
- 4. **Military Adviser** is responsible for advising ASG/OO on issues and requirements concerning the military component of the affected mission and for ensuring that all military information flows into the crisis response effort.
- 5. **Police Adviser** is responsible for advising *ASG/OO* on issues and requirements concerning the police component of the affected mission and for ensuring that all police information flows into the crisis response effort.
- Chief of Staff is responsible to ensure that DPKO and DFS work in an 6. integrated manner at all levels,
- Regional Director, Office of Operations (RD/OO) is responsible for directing 7. the DPKO crisis response, based on advice provided by the relevant Integrated Operational Team (IOT) Team Leader. S/he is authorized to activate the crisis response in urgent situations but shall consult USG/DPKO, USG/DFS and ASG/OO and brief other key staff as soon as feasible. S/he maintains situational awareness at all times and formulates the development of options and recommendations for ASG/OO and USG/DPKO.
- 8. Team Leader of Integrated Operational Team (IOT) will direct the CRC unless authority is retained by the hierarchy. Should the situation require, the Team Leader is responsible for recommending the establishment of a Crisis Response Cell (CRC) to the RD/OO.
- 9. Chief, Peacekeeping Public Affairs Unit is responsible for coordinating the DPKO and DFS response to the increased media activity often associated with a crisis including coordination with the Office of the Spokesman, the Department of Public Information, and the public information assets on the ground.
- 10. Chief, Peacekeeping Operations Support Section (POSS); Department of Safety and Security CDSS), will ensure close contact with DPKO and DFS in support of DKPO-led field missions, with respect to the security of all United Nations civilian personnel, in peacekeeping operations as they fall under the responsibility of the USG for Safety and Security.
- 11. Chief, Peacekeeping Situation Centre (SITCEN) is responsible for ensuring that the DPKO SITCEN discharges its designated functions around the clock in terms of day-today preparedness, enhanced readiness and crisis response. Is the information hub with a 24 hour Operations Room, and provides immediate notification of crisis situations to all senior managers and desk officers concerned:

#### Handout the DPKO-led field missions crisis response


DPKO led field mission key players, their roles and responsibilities





- DPKO led field mission key players, their roles and responsibilities missions operate in an environment where a rapid and significant deterioration of situation is a possibility. Effective crisis response and accelerated decision-making requires the clarity of roles and responsibilities from the onset of a critical situation. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG/DPKO) retains overall responsibility for and executive direction of DPKO-led missions, including in times of crisis, and decides on actions to be taken with respect to keeping the Secretary-General informed of the situation. The USG/DPKO, or the Officer-in-Charge, decides on. The activation of enhanced preparedness or crisis response mode in DPKO and determines the need to establish a Crisis Response Cell (CRC).
- Below are the roles and responsibilities of the mission key players during a crisis situation.
  - Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) may convene the Crisis Management Team (CMT). While the SRSG retains overall responsibility and decision making power, the CMT may be used as the coordination body for decision making purposes and efforts to mitigate or resolve the crisis
  - 2. Crisis Management Team (CMT) The SRSG/HOM or DO chairs the CMT. The CMT membership is predetermined. The membership must be widely known among mission managers, to allow for rapid response in case of a crisis. CMT should normally include at least the following: DSRSG(s), the heads of the military and police components and the Political Affairs Office and Public Information Office; the COS, DMS/CMS, CSO and CSA and, as applicable, RC/HC. Depending on the nature of the event, CMT may expand to include specialists such as the CISS, the Chief Medical Officer/Force Medical Officer, the Spokesperson and others. The CMT Chair is a senior manager which selection is based on her/his experience in crisis management, as CMT must be able to make decisions quickly. The CMT will liaise and coordinate with the host country strategic organs responsible for crisis and disaster management







As an example, the composition of the CMT in UNMIT is: SRGS, DSRSG (Security Sector Support and Rule of Law), DSRSG (Governance Support, Development and Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator), UNPOL Commissioner, Chief of Staff, Chief Mission Support, Chief Political Affairs, Chief Legal Affairs, Chief Communications and Public Information, Chief Military Liaison Officer, Security Adviser, Chief Joint Operations Centre, Chief Joint Mission Analysis Centre.

- 3. Crisis Management Centre (CMC) The CMT may decide in consultation with the Chief of JOC, to establish a Crisis Management Centre in support of the JOC in centralizing crisis related information and to enhance the coordination of the mission crisis response. In CMC, information is received and centralized, coordinated instructions are issued. From CMC the SRSG or the CMT affect the command and control. CMC is operated 24/7 basis
- 4. Joint Operations Centre The mission's JOC is an integral part of the crisis response process. JOC operates on a 24/7 basis. It ensures that all CMT procedures and systems are functioning effectively. JOC is the focal poit for all information flows within the mission and between the mission and the DPKO SITCEN during the crisis and keeps a log of events, reports and CMT decisions/actions. Also monitors the implementation of operational orders by the CMT
- 5. **Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)** in coordination with the Political Affairs Section supports the CMT with analysis and recommendations on possible actions to contain or resolve the crisis
- 6. Security Operations Centre (SOC) major roles are to provide on 24/7 basis incident logging and reporting, staff security incident management, the UN security management system emergency communications network (which covers both mission and country team personnel) security broadcast centre, aero-medical evacuations management and staff tracking. It maintains coordination with JOC, Staff Counselling Unit and DSS Communications Centre
- 7. **Chief Security Adviser** is responsible for the overall Mission Security Plan and coordinates it with all mission components